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ABSTRACT 
The 25th January uprising has drawn attention to young Egyptians who were able to 
spark off a revolution in the tightly repressed political environment. The time that led to 
the uprising was marked by vibrant political mobilisation. It witnessed several 
endeavours through which Egyptians have expressed their aspirations for social and 
political reform. Empowered by what new information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) afford, young Egyptians have arguably managed to mobilise sizable 
numbers of people to take to the streets and demand change. 
This thesis explores the perceptions of a sample of young Egyptian activists about the 
potential of social media (SM) for mobilising collective action. Themes of media usage, 
dispositions and actions (online and off-line) that appear to relate to these perceptions 
are investigated and analysed. 
This study aims to enhance original research in three main ways: one, to contribute to a 
growing body of empirical research about new media potential for mobilisation. 
Secondly, it deepens academic understanding of young activists’ uses of SM and 
practices in the realm of political activism and social movement construction, especially 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where the role of social media seems to be 
developing constantly. Most importantly, thirdly, this study comprises a scholarly and 
proactive approach that explores evolving political changes that have taken place in 
Egypt since 2008 from a media perspective and thus provides a qualitative research 
basis that is beneficial in comparing and contrasting new media roles prior to the 25th 
January 2011 uprising and in its aftermath. This study will be of value to activists, 
researchers and social movement organisations (SMOs) in Egypt and the MENA region, 
and elsewhere, who are considering the opportunities, challenges and complications of 
this rapidly growing study area.   
The thesis begins with a critical literature analysis in two parts: the first explores the 
socio-political context of the Egyptian polity in the last decade of Mubarak’s presidency, 
and the second discusses issues of social movements’ growth and development, 
predominantly in how new ICTs, particularly SM, may contribute to the organisation of 
social movements, creating opportunities through which to gain experience and  
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acquire participatory skills, and finally to practise collective action that forms the 
skeleton of the second part of the literature review. Empirical data were collected 
through a variety of research methods and sources. 
This thesis builds a moderate case for SM’s influence on the mobilisation of collective 
action. Although young activists purposively use the SM repertoire as instruments 
through which to mobilise collective action, they believe that the role these media may 
play varies significantly, depending on the media user, i.e., the contribution of SM to 
creating favourable dispositions towards the participation and mobilisation of 
individuals to move from behind their keyboards and to take to the streets differs 
between activists and non-politicised individuals. The findings suggest that SM are not 
perceived as a suitable arena for the building of an activist identity, which consequently 
raises concerns about the commitment to and sustainability of social movements 
organised on social media platforms. 
This thesis is organised to allow these arguments to be made clearly in relation to the 
data. Findings are discussed and analysed in Chapters Five (young activists’ uses of 
social media), Six (young activists’ contextual perceptions and political dispositions) 
and Seven (the perceived opportunities to link to off-line space). Each chapter considers 
several dimensions that are related to the theme being investigated. Throughout these 
chapters, the data are analysed and discussed horizontally in order to delineate the 
interconnection and interaction of the research themes. In each chapter, data from 
questionnaires and focus group discussions (FGDs) are presented. Quantitative and 
qualitative findings around key themes and issues are presented in an integrated 
fashion. In most cases, general findings begin by displaying participants’ questionnaire 
answers. These findings are subsequently considered within the context of what 
respondents said in FGDs. Chapter Eight coherently draws together these three 
dimensions based on findings illuminated in the preceding three chapters. It also 
presents recommendations for practice and future research.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
When people chanted on January 2011 ‘al sha’ab yoreed iskat al nitham’ (the people 
demand the fall of the regime), nobody would have expected that Egyptians, who had 
known almost nothing but authoritarian forms of rule throughout their modern history, 
would be capable of delivering such a civilised message to the whole world. The 
eruption of the massive demonstrations throughout the Arab region in late 2010 and 
early 2011, in what has become known as the Arab Spring, has indeed drawn the 
attention of journalists, professionals and commentators who have made several 
attempts to explain this public awakening and have tried to arrive at an understanding 
of its motivations and mechanisms. Abundant scholarly work has focused on the role 
that new media might have played in instigating the events of the Arab Spring (e.g., Lim, 
2012; Mansour, 2012; Rane & Salem, 2012; Youmans & York, 2012). Elsewhere, 
connections have been made between new media and political activism. For example, 
the Iranian post-election protests of 2009 have been termed ‘the Twitter revolution’ 
(Morozov, 2009). In Egypt, a preoccupation with the two online services, Facebook and 
Twitter, was by and large witnessed (Rinke & Roder, 2011).  
During the time leading up to the first Egyptian uprising in 25th January 2011, several 
endeavours introduced young Egyptians to the political arena. Resourced mainly by 
new communication technologies, groups of youths managed to organise many 
collective actions and to mobilise the public to support change. In particular, references 
have been made to the Egyptian general strike that erupted in the city of Mahalla in 
2008. Although this general strike was initiated by workers of El-Mahalla El-Kubra, it 
was picked up, promoted and expanded by activists, mainly through the use of the 
Internet and cellphones. The strike introduced the social networking site Facebook to 
the public arena of political engagement in Egypt. The April 6th Youth Movement Group 
was formed on Facebook and then attracted more than 64,000 members. Several 
initiatives followed. One of the most significant groups that emerged on Facebook was 
“We are all Khaled Said” which sparked the January uprising and was widely used as a 
rallying point during the protests.  
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In this context, the current research primarily seeks to answer questions that relate to 
its central inquiry into the perceived role of social media for the mobilisation of collective 
action in Egypt. As the connection between media as a means of protest and political 
change under authoritarian rule has been theoretically established (e.g., Habermas, 
1989; Tarrow, 1998) as well as being empirically established (e.g., Howard, 2010; 
Richter, 2010), and taking the aforementioned incidents into account, one could easily 
slip into seeing a connection, or even a causal relationship, between the use of social 
media (SM) and the organisation and materialisation of the public call for social and 
political change in Egypt and elsewhere. Indeed, the consecutive Arab uprisings, or what 
has been termed the domino-effect of the Arab Spring, have attracted a profusion of 
scholarly attention from different perspectives. Researchers and commentators have 
hastily made their efforts to describe, analyse and explain the Arab Spring and situate 
media within its incidents. Such “close-to-exclusive focus [has been argued to represent] 
an undue restriction in our thinking about the role of communication for such events” 
(Rinke & Roder, 2011, p. 1274).  
In terms of size of mobilisation and significance of SM use, it has been argued that the 
use of SM portals as tools for the dissemination of ideas, ideology, perspective, and calls 
to action reached a small, yet growing, minority of the technologically-savvy, engaged, 
and largely middle upper class segment of Egyptian society. It also converged with a 
disparaged transnational Egyptian diaspora which amplified the messaging beyond the 
territorial geography of the state's jurisdictional control (Iskandar, 2013). Most 
importantly, Iskandar asserts, the role that SM have been playing in what Egypt has 
been witnessing since 25th January 2011 up till now significantly differs from what has 
existed before, 
Few [of Egypt’s activists] do not use Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and other 
portals to disseminate their messages and document their experiences and efforts. This 
digitisation of Egypt's protest movement far exceeds that which existed ahead of the 
eighteen days of protest in January 2011 (emphasis added). 
Surprisingly enough, people of Egypt have been able to revolt again more vigorously 
after less than three years of toppling the Mubarak regime. ‘Tamarod’ (rebellion) 
managed to mobilise a successful petition campaign to oust, the now former, President 
Mohamed Morsi from office on the first anniversary of his, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s, inauguration.  These massive upheavals of 30th June 2013, arguably, 
18 
 
“confirm beyond a shadow of a doubt that the spiral of silence has definitely been 
broken forever” (Iskandar, 2013). 
Having been started in autumn 2009 and completed in autumn 2012, and building on 
the aforementioned assertions, the current research is well-situated to answer 
questions about Egypt’s protest movement prior to such significant political change.  
1.1. Statement of purpose 
This study aims to investigate a sample of young Egyptian activists’ perceptions of the 
potential of SM for mobilising collective action prior to the Egyptian massive uprising of 
25th January, 2011. It sheds light on activists’ stated uses of SM, and the perceived 
related consequences of their mobilising activism on both online and off-line political 
arenas that are mediated by young activists’ reported political dispositions. The study is 
mainly organised around three themes with which it is important for the study to 
engage: firstly, the reasons why young activists utilise SM platforms for political 
activism. Secondly, their attitudes, which may serve as intrinsic incentives for their 
political activism, both on and off-line, and may also help to introduce several aspects of 
the context within which young activists operate (i.e., fear of repression and political 
efficacy); and thirdly, the actual outcome of SM mobilisation as reported by young 
activists. These themes are linked to each other and together shape the current study’s 
argument.  
Broadly stated, the study aimed to: 
 Identify and explain the range of uses of SM for political activism, as reported by a 
sample of young Egyptian activists before the 25th January 2011 uprising. 
 Appraise the potential implication of what these media afford, as seen through 
young activists’ critique of them as the degree to which young activists feel 
satisfied (or not) with SM’s contribution to their political activism.  
 Reveal and analyse young Egyptian activists’ political dispositions that appear to 
relate to their purposive use of SM and that are expected to contribute to shaping 
their tendency to engage in different forms and levels of political activism. 
 Illuminate ways in which young Egyptian activists utilise SM tools to shape their 
movement and to mobilise sizable off-line collective action.  
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In so doing, the study aimed to improve original research in several ways:  
a. To contribute to a growing body of empirical research about new media’s 
potential for mobilisation and democratisation.  
b. To deepen academic understanding of young activists’ uses of SM and practices in 
such a critical phase of new media evolution in the realm of political 
communication. Although SM are not now a new phenomenon, its utilisation for 
political activism and social movement construction is still developing constantly, 
especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), thus beginning by 
understanding why an important cohort, such as young activists, use such 
communicative platforms as part of their collective action repertoire, would help 
to better understand new media’s contribution to movements’ growth and 
development.  
c. Most importantly, this study comprises a scholarly, proactive approach to the 
exploration of evolving political changes that have taken place in Egypt since 2008 
from a media perspective and, hence, provides a quality research basis that may 
be beneficial in comparing and contrasting new media’s role prior to the January 
2011 uprising and in its aftermath. This study would be of value to activists, 
researchers and social movement organisations (SMOs) in Egypt and the MENA 
region and elsewhere that are contemplating the opportunities, challenges and 
complications in this rapidly growing study area. 
Research questions 
The cornerstone of the main research study was the question: 
How do young Egyptian activists’ perceive social media’s potential for the mobilisation 
of collective action? 
Under this overarching inquiry, I sought to answer the following subsidiary questions 
and related sub-questions: 
RQ1. Why do young activists use social media?  
20 
 
RQ2. How do social media contribute to the creation of opportunities (favourable 
dispositions) for the practice of collective action off-line?  
RQ2.1. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
feelings of fear of repression? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ2.2. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
feelings of being politically efficacious? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ3. How do social media contribute to the mobilisation of collective action practice 
off-line? 
RQ3.1. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
tendency to practise politics online? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ3.2. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
tendency to practise politics off-line? And if so, in what ways? 
These questions were answered and the results discussed within a broader discussion 
of the political context of the Egyptian society during Hosni Mubarak’s presidency 
(October, 1981-February, 2011). The thesis’ central argument is presented in the order 
shown in Figure 1.1.   
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Chapter (8) 
Conclusion: SM uses and collective action 
gratifications 
Chapter (7) 
Uses of SM and perceived contribution to link 
to the off-line space 
 
Chapter (6) 
Uses of SM and young activists’ contextual 
perceptions and political dispositions 
 
Chapter (5) 
Mapping the online space of participation: 
young activists’ uses of SM 
 Self-administered questionnaires 
 Focus group discussions 
 Self-administered questionnaires. 
 Focus group discussions 
 
 Self-administered questionnaires. 
 Focus group discussions 
 
A study of activists’ perceptions of the 
potential of social media for mobilisation 
Chapter (1) 
Chapter (2) 
Young Egyptians and the mobilisation movement: 
between reality exclusion and virtual inclusion 
 
Chapter (3) 
Uses of SM and collective action mobilisation: a 
review of literature  
Chapter (4) 
Theoretical framework and 
methodological considerations 
 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis 
22 
 
1.2. The study’s proposed general structure 
The study is organised into two main parts; the first begins with an introduction, and 
the second ends with a conclusion. Part one provides a theoretical foundation for the 
research and starts with the contextualisation of the research through a discussion of 
the elements of Egyptian society’s political structure. This structure is expected to have 
implications for media uses as well as for activists’ tendency to practise and mobilise 
off-line political activism. In situating the research in the field and narrowing down the 
focus, I then moved on to review the relevant literature and to define the possible gaps 
and areas of tension. The methodology chapter follows, introducing the research design 
and discussing the research’s main theoretical framework.  
The theoretical basis presented in part one overarches and readily feeds into the second 
half of the study, which is comprised of three empirical chapters and a concluding 
chapter. Each of the empirical chapters aims to address one of the research themes 
(media uses, dispositions, and actions) and to answer one of the subsidiary research 
questions on that theme. These themes were analysed horizontally in order to delineate 
their interconnectedness in order to build up the research’s argument. I finally sum up 
with a concluding chapter that presents and briefly discusses the main research findings 
and draws together and articulates the study’s main argument (see Figures 5.1, 6.1 & 
7.3). The limitations of the current research and comments about further research are 
also discussed in this chapter.  
1.2.1. Part one: The study’s theoretical foundation 
In the first part, the study begins with a review of pertinent literature that continues in 
Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two: ‘Young Egyptians and the mobilisation 
movement: between reality exclusion and virtual inclusion,’ a brief historical snapshot is 
presented in order to contextualise the study domestically in the sociopolitical 
specificities of Egyptian society. This was achieved by adopting a broad, flexible 
definition of Tarrow’s concept of political opportunity.  
Some scholars argue that “the presumption of consistent rational behaviour on the part 
of political actors based on a logical assessment of the contextual constraints is 
unjustified” (Zaki, 1994). This suggests that solely following structural elements and 
rational calculations would not help delineate why and how people act. However, it is 
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argued that mobilisation strategies from which activists may choose are highly 
dependent on environmental structural restrictions (Zaki, 1994). To avoid contributing 
to the illusionary expansion of the political opportunity concept, this chapter introduced 
elements of the Egyptian political environment, with a special focus on certain factors 
clarified by Tarrow (1998). Two main sets of Tarrow’s factors were highlighted in 
regard to the Egyptian polity: 1) The state’s modes of repression and social control, and 
2) The opening of access to participation for new actors (Tarrow, 1998).  
These factors were expected to help explain the emergence of a new cohort of activists 
and the various strategies they may have been employing in response to - or maybe to 
enforce - openness in the political environment under which they operate. Such an 
environment was expected to promote, or inhibit, prospects for the mobilisation of 
collective action to achieve social and political change in Egypt. 
The political opportunity is introduced as an umbrella concept which helped in 
discussing the context within which the cohort of politically active young Egyptians has 
emerged and which they have been encountering during the past three decades. In 
order to understand the role that SM may play in mobilising change in Egypt, as 
perceived by young Egyptian activists, different strategies from which political actors 
could choose were also discussed in line with what their sociopolitical environmental 
structure affords. Amongst these variables is the rise of an educated middle class cohort 
in Egypt, and the effects of demonstration. These political variables, amongst others, 
were expected to serve as forces that could challenge and destabilise the authoritarian 
regime’s power. 
In Chapter Three ‘Uses of SM and collective action mobilisation,’ I review academic 
literature that is relevant to this study. The chapter aims to shed light on the main 
themes and concepts, and introduces the current research’s design. I first reviewed 
literature on media uses with a special focus on instrumental versus habitual uses of 
media and users’ active role in both constructs. The skeleton of the remainder of the 
chapter was built around media uses in relation to social movement organisation, 
shaping dispositions and mobilising collective action. 
The chapter then concludes by situating the study in the spectrum of the relevant 
research to show my own position in the field. I demonstrated that although there is a 
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constant increase in the amount of scholarly work on SM and political engagement, very 
little has focused on the Arab region, especially prior to the massive protests and revolts 
that have lately occurred in Egypt and several other Arab countries. I also show how the 
current research’s focus is different from that of existing studies. On the basis of this 
review, I identified the study’s overarching question: how do young Egyptian activists 
perceive SM’s potential for mobilisation? These perceptions were demonstrated by 
seeking answers to questions about activists’ uses of social networking sites (SNSs) for 
political purposes, their political dispositions, and their online and off-line political 
practices. These specific themes were also reflected in the literature reviewed in order 
to form a bridge between the current research and previous scholarly work, as well as 
with the current study’s special environment, which, together, comprise the umbrella 
for analysis throughout the study.  
Chapter Four ‘Theoretical framework and methodological considerations’, discusses the 
methodology used to obtain and analyse data for this research. The chapter discusses 
the theoretical framework and the research design’s rationale and the ways in which 
the research variables were expected to relate to each other. The key concepts relating 
to the aforementioned questions about media uses, political dispositions and political 
participation, on- and off-line, were operationally defined. The theoretical and practical 
foundation for the application of the mixed methods approach for data collection is also 
discussed. Data for the current study came from the combination of a quantitative 
dataset from survey questionnaires with a set of qualitative comments resulting from 
follow up focus group discussions (FGDs). The pros and cons of applying a mixed 
methods approach for data collection are also discussed.  
The chapter then continues by introducing the research population that represents the 
pool from which prospective participants were sampled. The sampling procedures for 
each selected method are delineated. Users’ profiles are presented in this chapter to 
build up a picture of participants in the current research. This also helped set up a 
ground from which to better understand any of the differences among activists that 
could be expected, based on gender, age, income, and/or education. 
The data collection instrument and the measures used for each method are thoroughly 
discussed in this chapter, as well as the statistical tests used to analyse the quantitative 
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data. The flexible approach used to analyse the qualitative data and identify themes is 
also explained. The chapter pictures the field work experience by delineating the ethical 
considerations that guide the research’s application and the difficulties I faced in the 
field with respect to the sensitivity of the topic, given the very special circumstances and 
incidents that took place prior to, during and even after the research’s application.  
1.2.2. Part two: The empirical findings and discussion 
In the thesis’s second part, I introduce and discuss the research’s empirical findings. 
Through Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I seek to answer the research questions that 
revolve around the main research concepts; media uses, political dispositions, and 
actions. Data were analysed horizontally so as to provide a homogeneous 
representation of SM’s contribution to the mobilisation of collective action as perceived 
by the research participants. Each chapter starts by setting the ground by presenting 
the frequencies of the study’s variables. More detailed discussion of young activists’ 
perceptions then follows, based on qualitative data from FGDs. 
Based on the assumption that the Internet has a considerable impact on the way in 
which contemporary movements and individual activists organise, create opportunities 
and mobilise for collective action (Ayres, 1999; Bennett, 2003a), reasons for using the 
Internet and SM for participation were expected to influence the reasons that cause 
people to participate in collective action. Accordingly, the analysis starts by 
investigating what drives young Egyptian activists to use SNSs for political 
communication in Chapter Five ‘Mapping the online space of participation: young 
activists’ uses of SM.’ The chapter starts by delineating young activists’ most frequent 
uses of SM. It then begins with a broader discussion of their critique of SM affordances 
for political activism and the degree to which they are satisfied with SM’s contribution 
in this regard. Participants made a clear distinction between themselves, as politicised 
citizens, and the non-politicised others in terms of the needs they seek to gratify from 
their purposive media use and the functions that they believe SM performs for each 
camp. Differences in SM use that were expected to stem from participants’ demographic 
characteristics are finally discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Six ‘Uses of SM and young activists’ contextual perceptions and political 
dispositions,’ empirically situates reported uses of SM in the context of the study. In 
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authoritarian regimes, it is argued that young people need to be mobilised as a citizenry 
as well as a democracy (Machacek, 2001). Individuals’ legal, political and social 
relationship to the society to which they belong need to be defined to enable an active 
practice of citizenry (Wallace, 2001). People tend to make their decisions about the 
actions they are about to take based on their evaluations of the consequences and 
outcomes of their deeds. Under repressive systems of governance, where taking part in 
politics, especially unconventional forms of activism, might bring about unwanted 
results, and as citizenry might be vulnerable to changing circumstances (Helve & 
Wallace, 2001), young activists were expected to make certain evaluations of their 
participatory environment before they decided in what forms of actions they would 
take part, when and how. Previous research has distinguished a welcoming, safe 
environment and meaningful participation and engagement among several dimensions 
of critical youth empowerment (Jennings, Parra-Medina, Hilfinger-Messias, & 
McLoughlin, 2006).  On comparison of their political stances and decisions, the 
perceived patterns and trends of public opinion were also found to affect individuals’ 
political decisions and actions (Dalton, 2002). Individuals’ confidence in their ability to 
participate significantly in politics was also found to relate to a reliance on the Internet, 
as well as to their perceptions on the utility and comprehensiveness of the medium 
(Ognyanova & Ball-Rokeach, 2012; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). In the current research, two 
variables were selected to represent the young activists’ perceptions of their 
participatory environment: the reported fear of repression and the perceived sense of 
political efficacy.  
The chapter starts with the frequencies of participants’ reported feelings of fear of 
repression and political efficacy. The chapter then explores the relationship between 
the gratifications young activists sought from social networking site use and their 
perceptions of their broader political context. Those dispositions could be considered to 
be antecedents which may interfere in the shaping of activists’ selections of media 
platforms as part of the repertoire that they use when practising politics. Conversely, 
media use could be associated with the way young activists practise politics in reality 
via their influencing of dispositions. Earlier studies have provided insight into the way 
different antecedents relate to media incentives. Researchers suggest that 
communication motives result from the interactions between demographics, 
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communication needs and social and psychological factors (Rosengren, 1974, in, 
Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000 and Sheldon, 2008). Researchers have also investigated 
how political attitudes influence the gratifications sought from media use, reflecting on 
the gratification obtained and audience behaviour (Kaye & Johnson, 2004). 
In addition to delineating young activists’ distribution according to their perceived 
dispositions, hypothesised correlations in research sub-questions were statistically 
tested to explore the way in which such dispositions may relate to media uses and 
hence to online/off-line political participation. To build up a picture of activists’ 
personal experiences, and to go beyond quantitative percentages and rigid numbers to 
discuss and explain how activists perceive their political arena, young activists’ 
repertoires and evaluations of their own experiences with the authorities, were gauged 
through analysis of data from the FGDs.  
For the discussion, I drew on issues that are identified and the concepts discussed in 
Chapters Two (Young Egyptians and the mobilisation movement) and Three (The 
literature review) in order to investigate and analyse how those contextual factors may 
have affected the reasons behind activists’ purposive utilisation of SM platforms. 
Discussion in this chapter paves the way for an exploration of how those dispositions 
might have bridged young activists’ use of SM to more costly and riskier levels of 
political activism. The chapter also attempts to unpack the reasons for differences 
amongst activists in regard to their dispositions, e.g., those based on gender, education, 
income and age.  
Chapter Seven ‘Uses of SM and the perceived contribution to link to the off-line space’ 
investigates the question of stated behavioral outcomes and the SM’s contribution to the 
mobilisation of collective off-line action. The chapter starts by testing correlations 
between different forms of SM use and online political activism.  It was contended that 
instrumental rather than habitual uses of SM correlated with practising politics online. 
Qualitative data from the FGDs revealed that young Egyptian activists have been using 
SM to construct social meanings and to frame their movement and to recruit potential 
supporters for their cause. To explore SM’s potential for linking online interaction to off-
line action, correlation between on- and off-line political practices was tested before 
and after the introduction of young activists’ reported political dispositions to the 
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equation.  It was found that reported feelings of fear of repression and political efficacy 
did not deter young Egyptian activists from upgrading their online activism to street 
politics. However, FGD data revealed that participants were not satisfied with the 
amount of collective action that SM mobilisation could spur, which suggests that other 
factors, in addition to SM’s contribution, have contributed to encouraging the Egyptian 
people to take to the streets en masse on the 25th of January 2011. 
Chapter Eight brings together the study’s main themes and the correlations that 
emerge throughout the findings chapters and their implications for related political 
debates and for political communication theory. Each research question answered in 
one of the analytical chapters is represented in the concluding chapter through one of 
what I have called ‘cycles of mobilisation.’ Each cycle summarised activists’ perceptions 
with regard to one of the research’s main themes. Together, these cycles of mobilisation 
integrate data discussed in the preceding three chapters, under three theme headings: 
Cycle (1) young Egyptian activists and the instrumentality of social media. 
Cycle (2) same media, different opportunities for different actors. 
Cycle (3) social media uses and gratifying off-line collective outcomes. 
These cycles represent the interrelations and interaction between media uses, 
dispositions and actions (on- and off-line). As figures 8.1 & 8.2 show, using SM as 
instruments of mobilisation helps young activists to create favourable dispositions 
among non-politicised individuals towards the practice of more demanding political 
activities off-line. Young activists’ uses of SM relate positively to their online activism 
which, in turn, feeds into their off-line political practices. However, they believe that 
practising politics on SM may impede social movements’ development if individuals, 
especially the non-politicised, become entrapped in the virtual sphere and refrain from 
linking their online, convenient practices to the off-line, more risky, reality. 
Chapter Eight also discusses recommendations and offers scope for future research in 
the realm of political communication and new media studies. More investigation of the 
uses of SM for political communication is still needed, especially in the authoritative 
contexts of governance, in order to better understand the opportunities these media 
may create for younger generations in a rapidly changing environment. It may also be 
useful to look at what they afford through a ‘civic cultural’ lens which, although mainly 
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applied in democratic contexts, may shed light on novel modalities of political and civic 
traditions in societies under political and social transformation. 
The chapter also introduces several implications for practices relating to social 
movements. It is suggested that more inclusive frames of social movements could help 
to develop feelings of belonging among sympathisers and potential supporters and, 
hence, to ameliorate issues of commitment to, and the sustainability of, social 
movements. As the role of SM evolves, it also emphasises that conventional institutional 
organisations still play a crucial role in the promotion and wide diffusion of social 
movements’ frames. They may also create personal incentives for prospective 
supporters to practise collective action which SM may not be able to provide.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
YOUNG EGYPTIANS AND THE MOBILISATION MOVEMENT: BETWEEN 
REALITY EXCLUSION AND VIRTUAL INCLUSION 
Under U.S pressure to put the freedom agenda into effect (Tisdall, 2011), along with other 
internal and external stimuli, some Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia have 
seen the emergence of many new change movements at the beginning of the current 
decade. A number of these movements, including, for example, the Egyptian Movement for 
Change (EMC), known as ‘Kefaya,’ has managed to impose themselves strongly on the 
political arena, through non-traditional theses and effectiveness among broad and 
important sectors of the community, which makes these movements an important variable 
in the political reality in these countries, and a phenomenon worthy of research and study. 
This study addresses the perceptions of young Egyptian activists about one of the aspects 
of the Egyptian environment (new media) that may have contributed to the emergence and 
development of these movements which led to the eruption of two waves of massive 
protests. The first wave broke out in 25th January 2011 and led to the toppling of former 
President Mubarak, and the second erupted on 30th June 2013, leading to the ousting of the 
elected President, Mohamed Morsi, after only a year in office. This chapter aims to situate 
this inquiry within the socio-political and media environments that have contributed to 
shaping young Egyptian activists’ perceptions of the opportunities allowed for their 
participation in Egyptian polity during the last decade of Mubarak’s presidency (1982–
2011).  
Three arguments are put forward in this chapter. First is that certain political conditions, as 
well as social and economic difficulties in Egyptian polity have given room for the 
emergence of a new political movement and have pushed towards more vibrant 
mobilisation for reform. As one of the participants in the current study put it, the Egyptian 
polity has reached a deadlock that requires collective action and holistic changes as:  
Demands and efforts for accomplishing any kind of reform under the current political 
structure have reached the saturation point. We lost trust in the current regime, and no one 
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can claim that reform and change could be feasible through this structure and its 
mechanisms; political parties, elections, and so on. In the meantime, Egypt is suffering 
serious social problems that have almost caused the fall of other regimes, and ours are even 
worse; people have nothing to lose (A.Y., 2010). 
Second, it is argued that young Egyptians are key players in the contemporary political 
mobilisation that Egypt has been witnessing since 2000. However, Egyptian youth have 
endured nearly a decade of political demobilisation, coupled with a political culture that is 
not necessarily favourable to active engagement with public life, whether as a result of 
authoritarianism and oppression, or due to issues related to social and economic hurdles 
that influence the geographic availability of a large segment of the population and give 
priority to everyday life issues at the expense of the practice of political activism. This leads 
readily to the third argument about the new communication technology and the potential it 
offers for young people to circumvent tight control over state-run media and to create 
alternative mechanisms of inclusion and political expression. Fourth, it is argued that 
Egyptian youth have been able to challenge their tightly oppressed political environment 
and use the new repertoires of social media (SM) to voice their aspirations for change.   
This chapter is organised into five sections: 
2.1. The resurgence of political movements in Egypt. 
2.1.1. The reasons for the political mobilisation phenomenon in Egypt. 
2.1.2. Key indicators of political mobilisation in Egypt. 
2.1.2.1. Reviving the political society. 
2.1.2.2. Developments within the opposition camp. 
2.1.2.3. The growth of pro-reform demonstrations. 
2.1.2.4. The blogger movement. 
2.2. Young Egyptians: A flawed political culture and exclusion mechanisms. 
2.2.1. Egyptian youth: Alternative mechanisms for inclusion. 
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2.3. Egypt’s dual media environment: Freer communication and limited participation. 
2.3.1. The Egyptian press. 
2.3.2. Television broadcasting in Egypt. 
2.3.3. The Internet in Egypt. 
2.3.4. Internet censorship in Egypt. 
2.3.5. Creating opportunities via the Internet. 
2.4. New media, new publics: Revolting in a repressed environment. 
2.4.1. Youth mobilisation since 2000. 
2.4.2. April 6th Youth Movement. 
2.4.3. The personification of societal problems: ‘We are all Khaled Said.’ 
2.5. Conclusion. 
2.1. The resurgence of political movements in Egypt 
Although Egypt was among the many developing countries that witnessed waves of 
reforms towards democracy, Mubarak’s first years in power signified a cautious hesitant 
tolerance rather than a fundamental change towards democracy (Brownlee, 2002, p. 8). 
Additionally, with this centralisation of authority, the country has managed to escape those 
changes and to hold to what has been termed the “flexible authoritarian” regime (El-Mahdi, 
2009, p. 1011, 1029). Egypt suffered many serious problems under Mubarak’s presidency. 
Since 1967, Egypt lived under a declared “state of emergency”, by which the regime 
legalised the outlawing of demonstrations, the use of indefinite imprisonment without trial, 
and the donation of presidential decrees by law. The law was terminated by President 
Sadat in Spring, 1981. Nevertheless, his successor – Mubarak ــ quickly reactivated the 
emergency law in the shadow of Sadat’s assassination (Brownlee, 2002, pp. 6, 7).  
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However, at the beginning of the current decade, especially following the incidents of 
September 11, 2001, in the U.S.A., Egypt, among a number of other Arab countries, 
witnessed waves of significant political mobilisation. This resulted in the foundation of 
movements for change that had new political thoughts and their own agendas and action 
mechanisms that distinguish them from the traditional opposition. While this political 
mobilisation is the direct cause of the formation of these movements, these movements had 
an influential role in the activation of this mobilisation process (Mneisy, 2011). In the 
following pages, I discuss the various dimensions of this phenomenon. 
The study of new movements for change in Egypt raises several questions; the most 
prominent of which focuses on the nature of the environment that produced such 
movements, their very nature, and finally their influence on the political reality which has 
witnessed complex interactions during the current phase. 
2.1.1. The reasons for the political mobilisation phenomenon in Egypt 
Political mobilisation that Egypt has witnessed over the last decade could be ascribed to a 
binary set of factors; the first set includes internal reasons and the second, external ones 
which are basically centred on pressures and incentives stemming from the international 
environment. For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the internal incentives for 
political mobilisation, i.e., the reasons that stem from the context within which individuals 
are operating in Egypt. 
The political reasons include the deterioration in Egypt’s political situation, and the inability 
to manage the emerging pressing issues, both global and local. During the last decade, the 
political system seemed incapable of confronting the challenges that beset the region, 
especially with the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, and the escalation of Israeli aggression 
against Palestine, in the phase that followed the failure of the Camp David negotiations-2 in 
summer, 2000, and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2001. As well as the rigidity of 
traditional institutions like the ruling party (the National Democratic Party NDP), and the 
despair of the masses at the government’s credibility and reliability when it promised to 
bring about the required democratic change. Moreover, the slow rate of the reform that had 
been promised by the government, and the sense of many sectors of the elite community 
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that the dominant, governing forces had a tendency to circumvent the promised change, to 
avoid public pressure without actually seeking to respond to the mass’s legitimate 
demands (Sha'ban, 2005). 
In addition, the worsening situation of the political parties and the opposition forces makes 
it difficult to rely on them as tools to pressurise the regime to achieve democratic 
transformation. This crisis, according to Ahmed and Mus’ad (2006) is due to a combination 
of factors that relate, in part, to the restricting mechanisms of political parties’ practice. 
These mechanisms represent the regime’s authoritarian nature. Another set of factors is 
linked to the parties’ distorted conceptualisation of party work, and their inability to 
develop organisational structures and intellectual frameworks, which make them 
reproduce the same deficits as the ruling elites, such as rejecting the devolution of power, 
denying the right to dissent and excluding the masses (Ahmed & Mus'ad, 2006). 
Economic reasons: have contributed to the creation of a phenomenon of political 
mobilisation. These reasons include the growing economic pressures that burden the 
citizen, and the growing realization among broad sectors of the political and economic 
elites that the absence of democratic traditions from political reality has led to the 
deterioration of the economic growth index. Unemployment is one of the leading indicators 
of such a decline, and this has pushed in the direction of political mobilisation. According to 
the World Bank, unemployment rates (the percentage of the total labour force aged 15-24 
who are unemployed at a specific time) have increased from 9.0 percent in 2000 to 11.2 
percent in 2005 (The World Bank, 2011). As for poverty rates, data from the same source 
indicate that the percentage of the Egyptian population who have been living beneath the 
poverty line (estimates of the percentage of the population falling below the poverty line 
are based on certain standards of poverty and these vary between poor and rich nations) 
have also increased from 16.7 in 2000 to 21.6 percent in 2009. 
Social reasons: Egypt has witnessed significant developments in the social sphere that have 
had direct repercussions for political mobilisation. For example, the major development in 
the field of education and the eradication of illiteracy in the past two decades; the 
increasing rate of urbanisation; the growing role of women in society; prominent 
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improvements in the health field, and the media boom. Among the main social factors is the 
contradiction between Egypt’s socio-economic structure and developments arising from 
the growing sector of the younger generations who have studied abroad. These generations 
have accumulated a sense of alienation from their society, and desperation at the political 
elite’s inability to achieve the goals of reform. Additionally, corruption in many sectors of 
the state has reflected on citizens’ lives and has pushed them to despair of the possibility of 
solving their problems at the hands of the ruling regime. (Sha'ban, 2005). 
Here, special attention is paid to the two aspects of the social underpinnings of the political 
mobilisation that are most relevant to the current study. These are: youth’s political culture 
(Section 2.2) and new media environment (Section 2.3). The aim is to better understand 
how these two factors might have contributed to creating opportunities for, or putting 
obstacles before, the development and growth of political mobilisation in Egypt over the 
past decade. 
2.1.2. Key indicators of political mobilisation in Egypt 
In the last decade, Egypt has witnessed remarkable political mobility. Determinants and 
indicators of the recent growth of political movement in Egypt are discussed beneath. 
2.1.2.1. Reviving the political society 
The revival of the Egyptian political community and the establishment of the political 
movement that produced the new change movements could be attributed to four key 
developments (Said, 2007). These developments are: 
 The growth of the Human Rights Movement: Since the end of the ’80s, the Human 
Rights Movement has challenged the repressive legislative structure around the foundation 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), not only through raising public opinion 
awareness about partial laws, but also because they considered these laws to be a violation 
of international conventions, thus the movement  gained legitimacy based on the concept of 
‘right’ rather than ‘licensing’ that underpins the legislation and that pertains to the 
formation of such organisations. Such a concept was not only responsible for granting the 
state the jurisdiction to withdraw NGOs’ licenses, but also to the ability to de jure and de 
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facto fully control all aspects of the space of such association, in addition to the terms of 
their continuing survival. This development has clearly reflected on the genesis of the new 
movements for change, the presence of which is based on the principle of ‘right’, and not on 
a request for legal legitimacy. 
 The mobilisation of the Trade Union Movement in the ’80s and ’90s. On this 
development, polarisation between civil intellectual and political trends on the one hand, 
and the Islamic leanings on the other, has crystallised sharply, when the latter started to 
gain control on the boards of a number of major trade unions via elections, especially 
doctors’, engineers’ and lawyers’ unions. However, the most important achievement is the 
capability of moderate trends in both parties to manage a series of dialogues that began 
between unions and then moved to the partisan level. That experience has established 
channels of communication and dialogue that enriched the political environment during 
the years that followed. Based on this achievement in the trade union field, a general 
consensus on mutual acceptance and co-existence between all political currents has grown- 
at that time. 
 The development of civil and political struggle in solidarity with national and Arab 
issues; mainly the issues of Palestine and Iraq. For example, the establishment of the 
"Egyptian Committee for the Support of the Intifada" has been very significant, firstly, as an 
opportunity to build a coalition of various political currents, although individually. 
Secondly, as a basis for widespread collective work, which has already reached deep into 
Egyptian society, including the very poor rural areas. 
 The results of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, when the great 
frustration caused by this occupation raised “new” awareness that has restored the 
correlation between national and democratic issues. 
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This invasion nullified any argument that sought to "prove" the need for an authoritarian 
state to protect national independence, where it is no longer justified to say that "no voice 
should be louder than the voice of the battle",1 not because there is no longer a battle, but 
because the battle’s nature has changed. Hence, there is a growing need for democracy to 
restore the national struggle for a "second independence." 
2.1.2.2. Developments within the opposition camp 
The opposition camp has witnessed a number of important developments since 2000 that 
have had a strong impact in supporting political movements in the Egyptian polity. One of 
the most significant developments in this regard is the foundation of new opposition 
parties, such as al-Ghad Party, and its founder, Dr. Ayman Nour, who was the first runner-
up in the 2005 presidential election (Mneisy, 2011). In addition to the new role of the 
opposition parties, other developments in the opposition camp that have had positive 
repercussions on the political movement on several levels include: 
 The formation of coalitions against the governing regime following parliamentary 
elections in 2000: several attempts have been launched by the opposition forces and 
parties to form alliances against the ruling regime in order to intensify the pressure on it 
and to enforce democratic transformation. For example, a number of parties have formed 
the "parties of national consensus" bloc, which included eight parties; these are al-
Tagammu’ (The National Progressive Unionist Party, NPUP), the Wafd, the Nasserist, the 
Labour Party, al-Umma (the Nation) Party, al-Geel al-Dimocrati (Democratic Generation 
Party), the Egypt 2000 Party and al-Wefak al-Kawmy (the National Conciliation) Party. 
These parties held a conference on 21st September 2004, during which the bloc announced 
a programme of political reform (Elaph, 2006). Other parties and opposition forces formed 
the "20th March Movement for Change," which includes civil society organisations such as 
the "Hesham Mubarak Law Centre," banned groups, such as the "Muslim Brotherhood" and 
the "Communist Party", and independent intellectuals. This coalition’s name refers to the 
                                                        
1 The slogan “no voice should be louder than the voice of the battle" was invented in Nasser’s era, when 
Egyptians were urged to prioritise fighting against foreign invasion. The slogan is usually revived on 
occasions when collective action is mobilised and it was echoed during the latest uprisings in Egypt and in 
other Arab countries. 
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day Cairo witnessed massive demonstrations to condemn the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003. This coalition mobilised against President Mubarak’s nomination for a fifth term in 
office in 2005, and declared its absolute rejection of ‘heredity’ and Gamal Mubarak’s 
succession to the presidency (Shehata, 2004).   
 The ‘Kefaya’ Movement: the most prominent amongst these blocs is that enrolled under 
the umbrella of the "National Front for Change" ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elections, 
which included al-Wafd Party, al-Tagammu’ Party (NPUP), the Labour Party and the 
Nasserist Party, in addition to a number of new movements for change, e.g., the Egyptian 
Movement for Change (EMC) (Kefaya), and both al-Wasat (the Centre) Party and the 
Karama party (the Dignity Party) (both of which were then under construction). 
This loose coalition of political groups has used the Internet heavily to meet its overarching 
goal of opposition to President Hosni Mubarak and the prospective succession of his son, 
Gamal Mubarak. It is argued (Isherwood, 2008) that most of the currently influential 
bloggers started their political blogging at this time. The vigorous new opposition that has 
emerged or evolved around the Kefaya opposition group has formed a coalition that also 
includes the active role of the Muslim Brothers, intellectuals, and civil society activists who 
have also operated as incentives for reform (Brown, Dunne & Hamzawy, 2007). The group 
took to the streets for the first time without prior governmental permission. In 2005, 
constitutional amendments were enacted to allow the choice of the president through 
multi-candidate elections rather than by the plebiscitary system of presidential elections in 
a step that aimed to ameliorate one of the major deficits in Egypt’s democracy. These 
deficits also include the state-of-emergency laws that have been enacted since 1981, and 
human rights violations that are attached to the fight against the Muslim Brothers’ swelling 
force (Harik, 1994).  
The 2005 presidential elections and the political activism the elections provoked have 
forcefully driven Egyptian bloggers “from obscurity to the heart of the new Arab public 
sphere of transnational media” (Haugbolle, 2007, p. 1). The movement failed to spread 
beyond intellectuals and the political elite and engage with millions of young Egyptians 
(Osman, 2010). In February 2005, many Egyptian bloggers who were members of Kefaya 
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decided to form a more organised group; al-Shabab min Agl al-Taghyeer, or Youth for 
Change. Beside their online activities, they particularly participated in the Spring 2003 anti-
Iraq war movement. In the shadow of the governmental roundup of protestors in the week 
following the anti-war demonstrations the movement faded, but it paved the way to 
criticism of domestic policy on the war (Fahmi, 2009, p. 96). 
During 2006 and 2007, the political arena saw continuing attempts at coordination 
between the different parties and political forces, in order to form common alliances. The 
most prominent of these attempts was the one launched by al-Wafd Party, al-Tagammu’ 
Party (NPUP), the Nasserist Party, and the Democratic Front in 2007. The four parties 
agreed to form a committee to develop and document national action to be discussed with 
political parties and other political groups, to form a new united front of all opposition 
forces (al-Gomhouria Newspaper, 26th September, 2007, in, Mneisy, 2011).  
 The initiatives for political reform: In 2004, several political forces and key opposition 
parties launched significant initiatives for political reform in Egypt. However, introducing 
these initiatives individually confirms the failure of communication between the, at the 
time, ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and other political forces. Nevertheless, these 
initiatives invigorated political life and provoked public debate on ways out of the stagnant 
status quo. Among the key initiatives are: 
Initiative (1) was introduced by al-Tagammu’ Party (NPUP) in May 2004.  This initiative 
stipulated the call for the election of the president from a choice of more than one 
candidate and that the president should abandon his partisan affiliation throughout his 
time in office and identify and reduce the powers granted to him by the Constitution. The 
initiative also called for the abolition of the state of emergency, the release of political 
prisoners, the guarantee of free and fair elections, the freedom to form political parties, the 
assurance of the independence of the trade unions, NGOs and civil society institutions, the 
freedom to publish newspapers and of media ownership, and the liberalisation of the 
media and the national press from the control of the ruling party (Al-Tagammu' Initiative 
for Political Reform in Egypt, 2005) . 
40 
 
Initiative (2) was provided by the Muslim Brotherhood in March 2004, and called for the 
full recognition that the people are the source of all authorities. The initiative similarly 
stipulated that the powers granted to the state president should be determined, and not 
include executive responsibilities. A Presidency should not exceed two consecutive terms, 
and laws with a "bad reputation" should be abolished, especially the Emergency Law and 
the Trade Unions Act, which led to the political deadlock that ails Egyptian political life 
(Akef, 2004). 
Initiative (3) was posed by the Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC) (Kefaya) through a 
statement it called "a statement to the nation", released in September 2004. This statement 
made the link between international pressures and plans that aimed to reshape the Middle 
East and North Africa region (MENA) on the one hand, and the prevalence of domestic 
tyrany on the other, which requires comprehensive reform stemming from the people, 
rather than being imposed on them. The initiative identified the required reform as being a 
comprehensive political and constitutional reform that guarantees putting an end to the 
monopoly of power and the opening of a door for devolution, and the upholding of the rule 
of law and the judiciary’s independence, also putting an end to the monopoly of wealth and 
the restoration of Egypt’s role and position, which has been seriously shaken since the 
signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979 (Mneisy, 2011).  
These initiatives have arguably created a “laboratory of ideas” (Mneisy, 2011, p. 98) that is 
much needed for political reform. They have defined the minimum and maximum limits of 
reform and have embodied the identity of the political change for which they aspire. 
Additionally, these initiatives have re-affirmed the political programmes for each individual 
political trend. 
2.1.2.3. The growth of pro-reform demonstrations 
In the aftermath of the May 2005 amendment of Article 76 regarding the election of the 
president from a selection of more than one candidate, Egypt has witnessed a significant 
uptake in the number of pro-reform demonstrations. Interestingly, for the first time in 
decades, the Muslim Brotherhood have taken to the streets to demonstrate and demand 
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reform. Despite repression, these demonstrations represented outspoken rebellion in the 
face of the regime and its large numbers of Central Security Forces. The key feature of these 
demonstrations is their national character, which has transcended political parties, both in 
symbols and in the slogans that were chanted to demand reform (Mneisy, 2011). 
After the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, the protests continued to gain 
momentum with a shift in the dominant socio-economic incentive rather than demands 
that were politically based. It is worth mentioning, on this line, that the Egyptian regime, 
like other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, tends “not to coordinate and 
particularly to keep socio-economic and political demands separate” (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 
2011, p. 1). Such tactics, according to Ottaway and Hamzawy have helped the Egyptian 
regime to remain in power despite the high levels of dissatisfaction. 
These demonstrations represented a public awakening and a collective challenge to the 
regime which refused to allow such forms of opinion expression. As such, collective actions 
were able to grab the constitutional right to demonstrate, and they contributed to the 
spread of a culture of objection amongst the ordinary citizens. These demonstrations were 
also an opportunity to express different theses of political reform. In addition they were an 
opportunity to expose the regime’s and its various institutions’ excesses, particularly those 
of the security agencies. Additionally, the demonstrations revealed the shortcomings in the 
regime's policies and its failure to deal with many issues and problems, including 
unemployment, high prices and corruption. Such problems were the headlines for many of 
the demonstrations. Finally, these demonstrations, which actually embodied a direct 
opposition action to the ruling regime, represented a mechanism for coordination and 
communication between the opposition forces and parties, and extended the bridges of 
cooperation between these powers who were seeking for the same purpose, i.e., political 
reform and an ending to political tyranny. 
2.1.2.4. The blogger movement 
Political blogging grew significantly in Egypt during 2005 and 2006, and contributed to the 
development and growth of the political movement. Considering the evolution of blogging 
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in Egypt reveals a number of important facts; firstly, blogging, which began with writing 
diaries, soon became a widespread form of citizen journalism. Secondly, it moved to an 
even more important stage when bloggers began to lead campaigns to condemn corruption 
and tyranny and to expose torture. Bloggers became the new opinion leaders in the 
community, as blogging has become a powerful force for pressure on the regime. 
By the time blogging arrived in Egypt in 2003-2004 it “accelerated the pace of changes 
triggered a decade ago by the growth of satellite television and independent press” 
(Isherwood, 2008, p.2). Blogging, despite its limitations, has heralded a new era of youth 
participation in political life in Egypt. “Like all Internet-based media, blogs reverse 
hierarchies of age and empower the language and worldview of the young generation” 
(Haugbolle, 2007, p. 22). 
Blogs have gained wide popularity as one of the pillars of political movements that support 
democracy in the Arab world. Egyptian bloggers are one of the most prominent exemplars 
of this connection. Unlike most formal websites, blogs were originally designed as personal 
diaries, which make them more appealing to youth and easier to use. The first generation of 
Egyptian bloggers was a handful of the national elite, innovators who were dedicated to 
freedom of expression. They mainly publish in English, addressing personal audiences of 
friends internally, and a Western, English speaking audience externally. It was not until 
bloggers started to post in the Arabic language that blogs started to reach wider circles of 
the Egyptian audiences (Radsch, 2008).  It is argued that one of the reasons behind blogs’ 
popularity all over the Arab world is their use of Arabic colloquial language, which is closer 
to the everyday spoken language that people use to communicate with each other, as 
opposed to the more formal Arabic normally used in the media (Rinnawy, 2011). 
Nevertheless, in most Arab countries, it is argued that blogs are still the territory of the 
middle and upper classes.  Blogs may also be less common due to the moderate numbers of 
Internet users in Egypt and the language barriers. Nevertheless, the blogging impact could 
actually reach wider circles than the blogosphere’s actual size. Early Egyptian bloggers 
have multiplied the effects of their activism through building networks of bloggers, 
activists, ‘techies’ and journalists. For example, techies help to overcome the Language 
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barriers and to develop Arabic writing. Other bloggers worked as journalists and had links 
with international news organisations. Through ‘cross-fertilisation’, blogs helped the new 
technology to gain momentum (Radsch, 2008).  Isherwood (2008) adds that the actual size 
of the blogosphere, although difficult to assess, belies the impact the blogs may have. He 
argues that blogs have a “multiplier effect” because they influence the mainstream media 
which reach larger audiences (p. 4). Blogging in English also allows bloggers to transcend 
national borders and to reach international human rights groups, media, researchers and, 
most importantly, a community of other bloggers worldwide (Haugbolle, 2007). 
Change and democracy need “freedom fighters” (Amin, 2002, p. 133). Reality today reflects 
a sincere aspiration –especially in young people- for more freedom to practise a positive 
role in their society’s reform. Although facing problems of access and experience which can 
affect the efficacy needed to make the best use of the Internet, Egyptian bloggers have 
managed to build up their capabilities and to represent a very good example in combining 
cyberpolitical activism with street actions for democratic reforms. They are practising a 
kind of “citizen journalism” that combines text with pictures of police abuse and assaults in 
order to build a “contemporary archive of Egypt’s battle for democracy” (Fahmi, 2009, p. 
91-92). 
Empirical evidence shows how Internet activists, especially bloggers and SM users, have 
managed to draw international attention to security practices against Egyptian citizens. 
Over the past few years, young activists have succeeded in ‘mainstreaming’ politicised SM 
content and so they voice their message to the wider public. Their weblogs and posts on SM 
platforms on police violations and brutality against citizens have embarrassed the Egyptian 
media to provide coverage of many stories, which-in some cases-led to the trials of 
policemen and security agents who were involved in the violations. They also use these 
platforms for meeting, organising and for gaining solidarity to support their cause.  
Through practising political blogging, Egyptian bloggers have succeeded in bringing many 
sensitive issues and authoritative violations to public attention. For example: 
44 
 
 Blogs exposed violations that took place on 25th May 2005 during the referendum on 
the amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution. This day witnessed a number of violations 
by the security forces; notably of the sexual harassment and assault of a group of girls in 
the demonstration that was organised in front of the Press Syndicate in downtown Cairo. 
Documenting the events on the weblogs led to the acceptance of the case filed by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR). Egyptian investigative 
entities considered the evidence insufficient to convict anyone. The Commission found that 
the Egyptian state had failed to protect four women journalists from violence and in doing 
so it had violated their human rights, including their rights to equality and non-
discrimination, their right to dignity and to protection from cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and their right to express and disseminate opinions within the law (EIPR, 2013). 
 Bloggers have also played a significant role in demonstrating and archiving events in 
solidarity with the Egyptian judges protesting against the fraud that plagued the 2005 
elections. In 2006, a number of senior judges have called for an open sit-in to demand the 
judiciary’s independence. A group of activists organised a sit-in next to the Judges’ Club in 
Cairo, which was attended by a number of activists and bloggers, who succeeded in 
monitoring the details of the crackdown on the sit-in and the detention of protesters by 
security forces (Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2006). 
 A cellphone video of two policemen torturing and humiliating a minibus driver in 
January 2006 was widely circulated on Egyptian blogs. Posting the cellphone video and 
tracking the events on the blogs has spread the word widely and has revealed practices 
that otherwise would have been kept in the dark. Wael Abbas, one of the most prominent 
and influential Egyptian bloggers, posted the video on his blog Misr digit@l (Egyptian 
Awareness), which created wide dissemination before the story was picked up by the 
independent newspapers al-Fagr and al-Masry al-Youm. The minibus driver was then 
identified and persuaded to pursue the case. The cellphone video was used as evidence 
against the police officers during the trial, which eventually found the two police officers 
guilty (Isherwood, 2008; Pintak, 2008). 
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 A number of blogs have emerged in the Egyptian political arena and have had a clear 
impact on political movements in Egypt. Including the aforementioned 
“misrdigital.blogspirit.com” by Wael Abbas, “egyworkers.blogspot.com” by Karem El-
Behirey, a worker in the Mahalla factory, which provided a vivid picture of the workers’ sit- 
in at the factory in 2007, and the "Alaa and Manal" blog, which has been remarkably active 
in uploading news of protests and demonstrations in Egypt during 2005 and2006. 
2.2. Young Egyptians: A flawed political culture and exclusion mechanisms 
In a country whose public has always feared government retaliation against dissent and 
where the national press is rarely critical of the state, few citizens demonstrate active 
opposition to the regime. They are generally loyal to it, apathetic toward it, or, at most, 
suspicious of it (Iskandar, 2006, p. 18). 
Despite the reforms that have been made, and the liveliness that the Egyptian media 
environment has witnessed with the Internet’s arrival and the privatisation waves that 
echoed in Egypt as part of the wider globalisation trend, it has been argued that these 
reforms did not go beyond being cosmetic changes in a stagnant sociopolitical 
environment. Amongst all political and economic liberalisation, the dominant fact remains 
the prevalence of Presidency –even in economic matters. The ‘control’ function is the first 
role played by the government when compared to the developmental and welfare function, 
or, as Ayubi (1982b) puts it: “there is too much government where it is least needed, and 
too little government when it is needed most”. As a presidential state, “the President is the 
dominant political and governmental authority” (Tripp & Owen, 1989, p. 2). The Egyptian 
constituency could not find their way in the political arena upon which the government 
kept its hegemony. Their withdrawal from the political and civic life did not derive from a 
religious, ethnic, or cultural context (Meital, 2006, p. 258), but, rather, was due to the 
unsupportive environment, practically buttressed by governmental censorship of the 
media.  
However, ‘Egypt is at a stage in its demographic transition with a marked “youth bulge”, a 
period in which the proportion of youth in the population increases significantly compared 
to other age groups’ (Assaad & Barsoum, 2007, p. 5). As shown in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 
below, more than a quarter of the Egyptian population is youth aged 20 – 34 years-old all 
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born in Mubarak’s era and raised up in the age of the Internet and open spaces, albeit not 
all of them have the capacity to enjoy it, as will be discussed in Section 2.3.3.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: The population pyramid, Egypt 2011 
Source: CAPMAS, 2012 
Table 2.1: Population distribution by age and gender in Egypt in 2011 
Source: CAPMAS, 2012 
 
Young Egyptians seem to be alienated from their sociopolitical milieu. They are excluded 
from public life by hard life conditions that render them hardly free to make their own 
choices, or are raised within a political culture that does not normally favour civic 
engagement and political participation. Egypt Human Development Report (EHDR) of 2010 
shows that only 7 percent of Egyptian male youth perceive participation as their first 
priority compared to 42 percent who are preoccupied with sex and its psychological 
aspects and related physical needs. As for females, only 4 percent prioritised political 
participation over other concerns (UNDP & INP, 2010). It could be said, then, that Egyptian 
Age Million % % Female % Male 
65+ 3.01 3.7 47.9 52.1 
20 – 64 42.44 52.8 49.2 50.8 
<20 34.96 43.5 48.5 51.5 
Total  80.4 100 48.9 51.1 
20 – 24 yrs old 
Born 1991 
Total: 8 692 m 
 
25 – 29 yrs old 
Born 1986 
Total: 7 057 m 
 
30 – 34 yrs old 
Born 1981 
Total: 5 225 m 
 
20 – 34 yrs old 
Total: 20 974 m 
Youth ratio: 26.08% 
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youth are geographically unavailable; as they suffer “personal constraints that may 
increase the costs and risks of movement participation” (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). Expectedly, 
the youth participation rate in political life is very weak. Only 28 percent participated in the 
2005 parliamentary election and 23 percent voted in the 2005 presidential election (UNDP 
& RBAS, 2009)  
Under an authoritarian form of governance, political participation has not been 
authenticated by tradition in Egyptian society. People have been excluded from public life 
and marginalised in terms of taking part in the decision making process. They have been 
disaffected due to being overburdened with daily life problems. Within such a political and 
social environment, new generations are not expected to be properly “introduced to 
institutions, mores and practices of democratic governance” (Loader, 2007, p. 1). It is 
argued that “the blame for modest participation and little civic engagement from youth 
should be placed on the present cultural and political environment in Egypt rather than on 
the youth themselves” (UNDP & INP, 2010). About 82 percent of the sample of the World 
Values Survey (WVS) (2005-2008) stressed the importance of preserving customs and 
traditions that are embedded in religion and family as characteristics that completely apply 
to them. Citizens have been brought up to have submissive perceptions and passive notions 
of political participation, either as being dangerous or inefficient at bringing about any 
feasible change. Notions like ‘walk beside the wall’ (a phrase usually used in Egypt as 
advice to avoid getting one’s self into trouble), and ‘mind your own business’, are popular 
clichés in Egyptian public discourse and are sincere advice from caring parents who do not 
want their ‘children’ to get into trouble by getting involved in politics. Such negative 
stereotypes and disaffecting norms, either cultivated by socialising institutions (family and 
school) or implied and imposed by the regime, may have induced a bitter feeling of 
alienation among younger generations.  
This feeling of alienation and exclusion is fed by the absence of a national project around 
which Egyptian youth can congregate. In diagnosing and analysing Egypt’s political 
illnesses, Bishry (2006), Amin (2009) and Abdel Meguid (2005), prominent Egyptian 
intellectuals and activists, all agree, although from different approaches, that the lack of 
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such a national project is among the main causes and symptoms of these illnesses. 
Comparing the eras of Nasser and Sadat with Mubarak’s, Bishry and Amin, for example, 
argue that this very absence of a national project in the latter’s time has resulted in the 
absence of politics along with the national interest; as Mubarak’s appointees lacked 
political competences and skills. Amin discusses how this absence of a national project has 
resulted in a major shift in the regime’s focus, from meeting the expectations of Egyptians 
to satisfying the Western allies. The result is, of course, higher degrees of corruption in a 
‘self-centered’ state that grew softer while possessing the absolute power of suppression. 
In fact, Egypt was exhausted by two consecutive national projects: Nasser’s socialism and 
then Sadat’s capitalism, which made a pause in the period of recovery necessary (Shorbagy, 
2009). However, it seems that Mubarak’s regime “turned a needed pause into a process of 
putting the whole society in the freezer until it has been hard to bring society back to 
healthy normal status” (Abdel Meguid, 2005, p. 12, cited in, Shorbagy, 2009, p. 524).  
In the ‘freezer,’ and with the dependence relationship that links the society up with the 
state, Egyptians were found to be more inclined to give away their political rights not to 
render their individual interests volatile. They seem to prefer the status quo if it guarantees 
the least level of supplies bestowed on them by the regime. The comparative research 
conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of the Egyptians’ attitudes before and after 
the 25th January 2011 revolt shows that 53 percent of Egyptian adults preferred a ‘strong 
economy’ on a ‘good democracy’ (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011). ‘The potential 
for the creation of an enabling environment also appears to be undermined by the 
country’s record of democracy and by a security apparatus that is intolerant of any form of 
public display’ (UNDP & INP, 2010). The police institution was found to be unpopular 
especially among older Egyptians, the poor, the less educated, and urban dwellers 
according to the Pew research (PewResearchCentre, 2011). Only 39 percent of Egyptians 
say the police are having a good impact, while 61 percent believe they are having a bad 
effect. Several political, social and economic indicators show how a significant sector of the 
Egyptians is either pessimistic or indifferent about the situation in their country and 
suspect that any change would take place.  
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The Pew research shows that the majority of the Egyptian adults who took part in the 
survey (53 %) rank ‘lack of democracy’ top of their concerns in recent years and 69 percent 
said they were dissatisfied with the way things were going in Egypt. However, a sizable 
proportion of the participants were cautious about transformation to democracy as almost 
a quarter of the research sample (1000 adults) said that a nondemocratic government can 
be preferable in some circumstances, while 16 percent felt politically inefficacious and 
excluded themselves totally from the equation believing that the kind of government they 
have does not concern people ‘like them’. This might have resulted in ‘inherent forms of 
apathy’ and individualism (PewResearchCentre, 2011). With such set of beliefs, it is 
expected that generations grow up with notions of inefficiency and indifference.  
Younger cohorts showed significant degrees of disaffection and disenchantment with 
politics. A considerable proportion of Egyptian youth was found to embrace a set of 
political norms and attitudes that are unfavourable to participation. A survey of 398 
politics students conducted in 1998 revealed that more than one third of the students were 
not interested in politics, although they were reading politics as a subject. Students showed 
moderate levels of political knowledge and 8.5 percent of them seemed completely isolated 
from what was happening in the world (Noweir, 2001). Only 41 percent of the students 
knew the duration of the term of office specified in the Egyptian Institution and, strikingly, 
1.8 percent of them said that presidency was a ‘lifetime job.’ Concerning freedom of 
thought and expression, conservatism seemed to have leaked into these students’ minds. 
56 percent of the student participants believed in religious authority and thought that 
clergy and sheikhs (preachers) should be the reference in every aspect of life and that 
traditions and norms are the limits that define freedom of expression and beliefs. Twelve 
percent of these students believed that their voices were not valuable in influencing politics 
in the country. As might be expected, dependency values accompanied these beliefs. One in 
five students thought that it was ‘entrusted to God to end the rule of a tyrant’ (Noweir, 
2001). Similarly, 62 percent of youth surveyed in the WVS 2005-2008 held the state 
responsible for gratifying their needs and aspirations (UNDP & INP, 2010). 
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This is not to say that youth apathy from active participation in society is solely imposed by 
external factors and higher forces. Rather, Egyptian youth could be joining a common 
generational tendency backwards from public activity, which is argued to be alienating 
citizens from public activity in many countries worldwide (Loader, 2007, p. 1). It also 
seems that a generational gap is widening between youth and their political 
representatives on several levels of political practice. Werdany (2011) ascribes the 
widening gulf between the political leaders and the young generation to the former’s laxity 
in listening to youth and in addressing their needs. For example, President Mubarak used 
to have an annual meeting with students from Egyptian universities, nevertheless this habit 
has been interrupted since 2002. Moreover, Mubarak did not appear at any of the four 
national youth conferences that were held between 2007 and 2010, and Gamal Mubarak, or 
the Prime Minister, substituted for his father as Secretary of the Policy Committee of the 
NDP. Werdany also notes the decrease in youth’s significance in the official discourse and 
adds that the President mentioned the word ‘youth’ only twice in his speeches before the 
People’s Assembly and the Shura Council in their joint sessions, held between 2005 and 
2010.  However, Mubarak’s annual meeting with students is perceived to be a ‘satirical 
play’ in which the students are carefully selected before they rehearse the scenario of the 
meeting in advance, rather than being a real opportunity for free conversation with the 
state president (Werdany, 2011). 
Arguably, this generational chasm is alienating youth even in the opposition camp. Older, 
exhausted faces dominate the Egyptian political arena, and they have very little 
appreciation for youth’s achievements, or even an appreciation of and tolerance with their 
views (Osman, 2010). 
In such a milieu, it was expected that Mubarak’s initiative, announced on February 2005, to 
amend Section 76 of the Constitution to allow more than one candidate to run for the 
Egyptian presidency, would heighten public debate. The initiative was described by local 
media as “an earthquake” (zilzal) and “a new stage” (marhala jadida). Hadia Mostafa, a 
senior writer for the magazine Egypt Today, ascribes the cultural shock that accompanied 
Mubarak’s proposal to the Egyptians’ blemished political culture. 
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The source of surprise lies in the local mentality, where no-one ever dreams of the 
possibility that one day he will become president of the country. ‘The ‘I want to grow up to 
be president someday’ mentality, common among ambitious young dreamers in Western 
democracies, is completely alien to us (Meital, 2009, pp. 264, 265). 
2.2.1. Egyptian youth: Alternative mechanisms for inclusion 
Such internal and external exclusion mechanisms, and the failure to include youth in the 
community, appear to propel them to seek refuge in substitute bodies where they can find 
a frame of reference and guidance. It has been argued that young Egyptians, both from the 
liberal capitalist and Islamic camps, seek refuge in the past in search of their encrypted 
identity and “their own definition of a twenty-first century Egyptian project. They 
represented the need of the millions of young Egyptians to rise above their unfortunate 
situation and to cling to something they could be proud of, some frame of reference, a 
skeleton of an identity” (Osman, 2010, pp. 211, 213). Bayat (1998) states that Islamist 
movements provide an “alternative social, cultural and moral community” for disaffected 
groups that include youth (cited in Assaad & Barsoum, 2009, p. 83). It is argued that youth 
resort to religious groups and institutions (Christian and Muslim) for several reasons, the 
most important of which is the widening chasm between political discourse and what 
political leaders actually do, which makes youth cynical about politicians, while religious 
groups are seen to be keen about their interests. Youth also blame the ‘dysfunctional 
system of governance’ for unemployment and the economic difficulties that they face. Left 
with time on their hands, little to do and much despair, they either become violent or 
withdraw into a spiritual space. Growing up with an ongoing discourse of the failure of 
state and society, while seeing religious movements addressing phenomena like social 
inequalities, class discrimination, corruption and education, makes them a good source of 
psychological reassurance (UNDP & INP, 2010)  
However, Osman (2010) claims that “the accumulating influence of [this] significant 
Salafist sway on Egyptian society is making many young Egyptians more anti-secular, anti-
liberal and anti-Western” (p. 221). The cultural map of the World Value Survey delineates 
how traditional (as compared to secular-rational) and survival (versus self-expression) 
values prevail in Egypt, culturally placing the country in the ‘traditional/survival values’ 
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quarter with a potential proximity to the ‘self-expression’ quarter (see Figure 2.2). On the 
other side of the coin, Egyptian youth who have the opportunity to attain Western-style 
education, which has more inclination towards democracy, are proportionally still small in 
number if compared to students enrolled in public educational institutions, which might on 
the one hand, pose some difficulties in their capability to reach and influence a mass base. 
On the other hand, it may create sensitivity and cultural and ideological clashes when 
different groups of youth from different backgrounds work collectively.  
 
Figure 2.2: The World Value Survey Cultural Map 2005-20082 
Source: (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010, p. 554) 
                                                        
2 This map reflects the fact that a large number of basic values are closely correlated; they can be depicted in 
just two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation: (1) Traditional/ Secular-rational and (2) Survival/Self-
expression values. Each country is positioned according to its people's values and not to its geographical 
location. To a large extent, the two coincide, but the map measures cultural, not geographical, proximity.  
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2.3. Egypt’s dual media environment: Freer communication and limited participation 
Egyptian audiences live in a continuous state of media duality that has long affected their 
perception of their proximate political milieu and has created a chasm between them and 
their society that is deepening by engrained feelings of inefficacy and cynicism. 
Paradoxically, the Egyptian government controls information and acts as a watchdog on the 
state’s performance. The main ‘data bank’ in Egypt, the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilisation and Statistics (CAMPAS), is affiliated to the Presidency and is headed by an ex-
army general. The Central Auditing Agency (CAA) is responsible for controlling and 
evaluating the state’s public sector and economic activities and is also linked to the 
Presidency (Ayubi, 1989). Moreover, creating a Ministry of Information reflects the goal of 
manipulating public opinion by promoting only one viewpoint (Zaki, 1994).  
With the deficiency in Egypt’s state media liberalisation, it is argued that “a vibrant media 
system that encourages civil society, civic participation and political empowerment 
remains a distant mirage” (Iskandar, 2006, p. 17). Indeed, allowing multi-candidate 
presidential election for the first time in Egypt’s political history was an unprecedented 
step upon which many optimistic aspirations towards political reform in the whole Arab 
region arose. Vibrant political activism and feverish waves of dissent that condemned the 
‘automated’ succession of Mubarak’s presidency, accompanied by growing fears of a 
heriditary presidency, in addition to international pressure for reform, have all resulted in 
the announcement of the new legislation. However, despite the fact that the newly 
announced constitutional reforms marked a great change in Arab history, and invited new 
faces to the Egyptian polity, it was arguably too early to place hopes on such reforms that 
would be politically liberalising and transformative (Iskandar, 2006).  
The following pages outline various areas in the Egyptian media environment. They aim to 
shed light on the shortcomings as well as on the new opportunities for participation that 
may have been created recently by the developments that have been made to the Egyptian 
media sector.  
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2.3.1. The Egyptian press 
Although freedom of expression is guaranteed de jure in Egypt, de facto, it is widely 
suppressed. The government, represented by the Consultative Council (the Shura), owns 
what is conventionally referred to as the “national press”. Among the three main categories 
of newspapers in Egypt, national governmental dailies (kawmiya), official party dailies 
(hezbiya), and independent and privately-run publications (mustakila), the state-owned 
publications include the biggest daily newspapers al-Ahram, al-Ahkbar and al-Gomhouria, 
which have huge budgets and prestigious, powerful voices, while the opposition and 
independent press suffers from limited resources and the constraints of governmental 
licensing procedures. It is worth mentioning that while state-owned papers have shown 
consistent loyalty to the governing regime and its policies, some foreign language versions 
of Egypt’s papers have enjoyed more freedom and have strayed from the straight and 
sustained path of political loyalty (Iskandar, 2006). These include al-Ahram Weekly 
(English) and al-Ahram Hebdo (French). However, these publications do not enjoy wide 
scale distribution, which might have put the government at ease in terms of worrying about 
the potential impact they might have had on steering the public opinion.  
Most of the hezbiya newspapers (official party dailies) are, in fact, incompetent and 
ineffectual, since they mostly fall into two categories; those that align themselves with the 
government and compete to gain its blessings, although posing as opposition papers, and 
those that prioritise scandal material over policy issues and which attack the state on 
personal rather than objective grounds. These could thus harm the political arena as 
neither being informative nor as politicising and increasing public awareness. Rather, they 
could be deceptive, that is, they are perceived to be ‘opposition’ newspapers while not 
properly performing that role. This code of practice has also left the opposition fragmented 
and diluted (Iskandar, 2006).  
The third type is the mustakila newspapers. These are independent, unaffiliated papers 
with diverse political tendencies. They include al-Masry al-Youm, al-Dostour, and al-Maydan 
newspapers, which are mostly produced and operated by young, talented practitioners as 
reporters, editors and cartoonists. These have evolved in the last few years, confirming the 
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desire for more freedom (Pintak, 2008, p. 2) and gaining growing popularity amongst the 
increasing numbers of readers who aspire to listen to a third voice. Interestingly, some 
tend consume the whole meal of the Egyptian press and read a sample of each of the three 
types (over optimistic and illusive, over pessimistic and depressive, and more realistic and 
critical) before they decide to take one side or another.  
The press resurgence in Egypt has proved beneficial on the quantitative front. An 
abundance of opposition and independent publications have been produced. Qualitatively, 
these publications have either supported the political stance, refraining from directly 
criticising the regime and its symbols and allies, or resorted to unconstructive political 
dispute. Despite the opposition press having proliferated after enjoying a relatively large 
margin of editorial latitude dating back to 1982, and consecutive waves of reforms and 
openness, this freedom is still operationally defined within the vague parameters of ‘state 
interest’. In practice, journalists have never reached the level of direct criticism of the 
President or the armed forces, although they have criticised particular government 
practices and policies (McDermott, 1988; Zaki, 1994). Egypt’s penal code includes 
numerous provisions that violate international law by imposing criminal penalties of 
imprisonment for “insulting” public officials and institutions, including the president 
(article 179), public officials (article 185), foreign kings or heads of state (article 180), and 
foreign diplomats (article 182) (refworld, 2012). ‘The preservation of the state’ is almost 
the reason behind the government practices of limiting freedom of expression and 
imposing political pressures on practitioners who breach the boundaries. These pressures 
vary and can result in dismissal, censorship, restraints on travel, physical assault, threats, 
arrest, detention, torture, abduction, passport withdrawals and exile. The Emergency Law, 
the Press Law, and penal code provisions confine the media, despite constitutional 
assurances of press freedom. Nearly 35 articles in various laws stipulate penalties for the 
media. Even after amendments to the Press Law in 2006, dissemination of "false news," 
criticism of the president and foreign leaders, and publication of material that constitutes 
"an attack against the dignity and honour of individuals" or an "outrage against the 
reputation of families" remain criminal offences that are prosecuted unscrupulously by the 
authorities (refworld, 2010). Such a restricted milieu cannot be expected to produce high 
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standard reporting, when some reporters would even slide into scandalous reporting. In 
such an oppressive and threatening environment, journalists fear confrontation with the 
political system and consequently tend to enhance self-censorship and refrain from voicing 
criticism (Amin, 2002, p. 127).  
This is not to say that the Egyptian press is empty of thoughtful criticisms of governmental 
policies (McDermott, 1988), yet these may possibly do little in terms of enabling vigorous 
opposition or of informing the public, let alone in educating them civically and politically, a 
virtue that seems to be more widely served by the duality of the broadcasting media 
environment. 
2.3.2. Television broadcasting in Egypt 
Broadcast media is a significant means of reaching and shaping public thought in a country 
with a total adult illiteracy rate of 34% (UNICEF, 2005-2008). Similarly to the press, the 
state also owns and has the monopoly on the broadcast media. Strict censorship is exerted 
over broadcast media outlets to promote the Egyptian state’s point of view and to mobilise 
public thought behind the government’s policy and plans that aim to manipulate public 
opinion and to present the scarce alternative viewpoints via state-owned and state-
operated broadcasting media (Zaki, 1994). Consequently, when compared to the Egyptian 
press, criticising the government is all but absent on Egyptian television, which almost 
intertwine the government (as an institution) with the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
(Iskandar, 2006).   
However, with the wave of globalisation, the media spectrum has witnessed significant 
transformations that have altered media roles, not only in terms of media content, but also 
in the way audiences receive this content. Regional and global television growth has been   
a main feature of the 1990s in the Arab region (Ayish, 2011). As a result, it is argued that 
Arab media no longer echo the interests of the manipulative regimes that control media 
outlets and use them to propagate their development plans. Rather, they serve as a means 
of information and entertainment. However, this notion is contested, even in established 
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democracies where big companies control media and “do not, in fact, contribute to the 
expression of alternative political points of view” (Nasser, 2012, p. 1).   
As might be expected, Egypt, among other Arab countries, was reluctant to join the trend to 
media privatisation, while the Gulf States and Lebanon took the lead. Although the 
privatisation process of Arab media and telecommunications started in the late 1990s, it 
was not until the end of 2001 that Egypt’s first privately owned satellite network, Dream 
TV, was launched (Rinnawy, 2011, p. 150). This paradigm shift was basically pushed by the 
U.S. Bush Administration to incite democratic transformation in the Middle East in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks. It also went in tandem with introducing Gamal Mubarak 
to the Egyptian political scene, as private satellite stations backed the hereditary 
succession project (Nasser, 2012). Cautious steps were taken to emancipate ‘the medium of 
the people’, apparently to keep tight control on a platform deemed to be the most influential 
in reaching the public and shaping their consciousness. These private satellite channels 
have generally abided by the ‘red lines’ rule and have scarcely strayed from the track 
defined by the regime and supported by their businessmen allies who owned those 
channels and made every effort to guarantee that the red lines were clearly understood and 
that borders would not be breached. These red lines, according to Dr. Mohammed Kamal, 
then General Secretary of the NDP, “are regarded as the threshold that should not be 
breached by any form of opinion expression” (Kamal, 2010). That is, when such violations 
intermittently take place, they were met with decisive measurements that range from 
warnings to dismissal and suppressing the display of programmes. 
Several contemporary examples show the code of conduct that the regime followed when 
media practitioners, even in the private and/or independent media, violated the limits and 
harmed the ‘prestige of the State’ (haybat addawla). After the abrupt banning of his TV 
programme on Egyptian television, the ‘Chief Editor’ (Ra’ees al-Tahrir), for undisclosed 
reasons, Hamdi Kandil, a veteran journalist and one of Egypt’s most prominent media 
personalities, started his show ‘Pencil’ (Kalam Rasas) which was featured on Dubai TV. In 
1962,  Kandil’s TV show ‘Press Releases’ (Akwal Assohuf) was suspended because he 
broadcast news about Nasser, then the state president. A consecutive series of programme 
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prohibition has granted Kandil the title ‘banned from the show’ (al-mamnou’ men al-ard). 
In all cases, the reason for suspension was always implicitly understood but never openly 
discussed. Another freedom fighter, Ibrahim Essa, editor of the opposition independent 
newspaper ‘The Constitution’, (al-Dustour), founded in 1995 and revived in 2005 after a 
government crackdown, was sentenced to two months in prison on the charge of 
"Propagating false news and rumours causing general security disturbance and harming 
public interest" and "Intentionally publishing false news that may hurt public safety” 
(refworld, 2008). Essa faced the charges because he dared to discuss the issue of President 
Mubarak’s health in the press. Ironically, both journalists were given several awards for 
their distinguished achievements in journalism. The Arabic Media Watch Institute awarded 
Kandil the prestigious Media Accomplishment Award in London in 2006 (WALEG, 2006), 
and Essa was granted the International Journalist of the Year Press Award for 2011 
(PressGazette, 2011). 
The government has long acted to curb freedom of expression and to set limitations that 
restrict the development of investigative journalism. The turning point occurred with the 
inception of the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV in 1996. With the intention to shake up the 
media landscape, the channel introduced the region to a diversity of voices and a kind of 
critical journalism never before seen in the Arab world. With the arrival of Arab satellite 
television and the so-called “Al-Jazeera Effect”, public attitudes started to shift towards the 
unsteady democracy agenda across the region. A survey of 601 journalists from 14 Arab 
countries showed that 75 percent of the Arab journalists involved in the survey believed 
that to “encourage political reform” is the most significant job of an Arab journalist. Almost 
half of the participants described themselves as “supporters of democratic change”. The 
survey demonstrates that the majority of the Arab journalists fall within the “Change 
Agent” typology; as setting an agenda based on political and social change is their top 
priority (Pintak, 2008, p. 1, 2). Since then, several satellite television channels with 
different affiliations and political leanings have been broadcasting to the Arab region. 
Different trends and diverse voices have been interplaying in shaping the Egyptian, and 
Arab, public consciousness. The Al-Arabiya Satellite Television Channel, for example, has 
been perceived as tilting toward a moderate media discourse and to embracing a less 
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sensational tone when handling political issues if compared to its rival, Al-Jazeera. 
Researchers’ views have varied between framing the performance of Al-Jazeera channel as 
being a genuine representation of pluralistic journalism that contributes to cultivating 
informed public consciousness in the Arab world (Lynch, 2006; El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 
2002), and depicting the channel as being no more than a mouthpiece for Arab and Islamic 
radicalism (Ayish, 2011).  
Western media influence in the Arab region dates back to the 1930s. Among the 
justifications for such a growing interest in the region is the competition over 
disseminating knowledge in an area deemed to be overwhelmingly deprived of information 
due to state control (Iskandar, 2007, p. 5) as well as depicting this boom as being part of 
the ongoing political competition between non-Arab governments that were providing the 
services (Ayish, 2011). Foreign broadcasters, like the U.S.-sponsored al-Hurra and BBC 
Arabic Television, have been analysed through a public diplomacy lens and are seen as 
media outlets that aim to fulfill foreign-diplomacy goals (see for example, Gillespie et al., 
2008). Arab audiences have also been targeted by escalating television broadcasting 
services that have been launched by foreign broadcasters, such as RT Russia Today Arabic, 
France 24 Arabic, and Sky News Arabia, launched in late 2012 (Ayish, 2011).  
Ayish (2002) argues that the initiation of Western-style television channels in the Arab 
world has cultivated new journalism competences that drive challenging and inquisitive 
debates for the benefit of enlightening public opinion. The openness in the media landscape 
has also overwhelmingly benefitted the audiences, who are exposed to richer and more 
diverse content and hence have the choice to navigate the space and select what best suits 
their taste and better gratifies their needs. This change in the media landscape has, to a 
significant extent, ameliorated the access and availability issues that may hinder audience 
activity (Holmes, 2005, p. 58). Audiences are becoming more active in selecting content 
that fits their preferences and media, especially the broadcast and other electronic media, 
have to keep up with their expectations. It could be said, then, that with the abundance of 
media outlets and the growing private and semi-private TV channels, audiences are no 
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longer at the mercy of state-controlled media outlets. On the contrary, these outlets have to 
strive to keep their share of audiences in this competitive growing market.  
When it comes to content, a good example of the new role that the broadcast media have 
been playing since the inception of private and semi-private TV channels can be seen in the 
evolution of talk show programmes and the prominent role that they have been playing in 
highlighting societal problems and in debating important political issues and occasionally 
causing public opinion congestion. A glaring example is the Opposite Direction (al-Ettegah 
al-Mo’aakes), a weekly, live, political, crossfire-style talk show which, it has been argued, 
has been“widening the gap between the governments and the people” (Zayani, 2005, p. 
102).  
The Egyptian talk show scene is lively and crowded. Programmes like al-Ashera Masa’an 
(10 PM) and Tes’een Dakika (90 minutes) and many others have played an essential role in 
bringing citizens face-to-face with their daily problems, creating political proximity to vital 
issues and invigorating debate amongst the Egyptian public. However, with diverse codes 
of practice, modes of address and ways of approach all in one frame, Egyptians, as well as 
other Arab audiences, are said to be living in a ‘schizophrenic’ media sphere where, 
comparing the substance and style of services delivered by national, regional, and 
international providers is far from being favourable to national television. In such a dual 
milieu, Egyptians are becoming “particularly adept at deciphering political agendas” 
(Iskandar, 2006, p. 21).  
However, while privatisation has bolstered journalistic practices and invited more critical 
voices to the Egyptian public sphere, political freedom and cultural liberalisation have not 
followed as a by-product of such transformations. Moreover, competition for audience 
share seems to hamper the role that the media are supposed to play. Their service as a 
means of delivering public messages and promoting ideology has diminished in favour of 
promoting consumer goods and serving the interests of media shareholders. Additionally, 
freedom of expression is still interrupted either by imposing financial pressure through 
controlling advertisements, or by largely hindering its efficacy through the strict policies of 
the regime regarding the dissemination of information (Zaki, 1994, pp. 65,67). Rinnawy 
61 
 
(2011) argues that broadcast media, whether state-run, semi-private, or privately owned, 
still hold to their traditional role as being the mouthpiece of governments aiming to deceive 
audiences and to steer their minds towards a certain political and ideological direction. For 
example, the privately owned television channel, al-Arabiya, abides by Saudi foreign policy 
and al-Jazeera, which claims to be critical of all Arab regimes, follows double standards 
when it comes to the Qatari regime or Gulf state allies. Additionally, commercial channels 
abide by the agendas of their owners, who are, as might be expected, businessmen with 
interlinked relations and shared interests with the regime (Fandy, 2000). This creates a 
state of ‘differential power’ where “the appropriation of knowledge does not happen in a 
homogeneous fashion, but is often differentially available to those in power positions who 
are  able to place it in the service of sectional interest” (Giddens, 1990, p. 44). Accordingly, 
while the shift towards privatisation has provided audiences with a more diverse and 
richer media experience, audiences generally tend to place limited trust in these outlets. 
Moreover, although audiences are becoming more active, in the sense that they can select 
to ‘consume’ their preferred media content, they still have very limited access to these 
media outlets as platforms where they can spell out their opinions and express their 
aspirations as ‘producers’ of content.  
When reciprocity is not the fashion, and political views and activities fall outside the 
borders of the ‘accepted’ realm or threaten the state’s status quo, new media may be 
perceived as an alternative, more open platform for debating politics and developing a 
sense of political efficacy, especially in younger, technology-savvy generations. 
2.3.3. The Internet in Egypt 
Egypt became linked to the Internet in late 1993, two years after the Internet penetrated 
Tunisian society. The service was first provided by the Information and Decision Making 
Support Centre (IDMSC), which is affiliated to the Egyptian Cabinet. At the beginning           
of 1997, Internet services were privatised as the IDMSC started to license Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs). Since then, the service has grown through its sale to other clients, 
reaching a total of 16 private ISPs in the same year, 1997. Currently, 211 ISPs deliver the 
service to Internet users. Link and TEData are the largest ISPs in the Egyptian 
62 
 
telecommunications field. However, those private providers are connected to each other 
via the Telecome Egypt web portals, Egypt's main Telephone Company (Rinnawy, 2011).  
The government was the first user of the new medium. The regime effectively and 
impressively used the Internet as an official mouthpiece. Formal governmental portals, like 
the Egyptian Presidency’s, which was launched in 1999, have served as an archive of all the 
documents relating to the regime. Through the Internet, the regime emphasised speeches, 
made news articles accessible, as well as all the important documents that the regime 
wanted to highlight and bring to the public’s awareness. 
In addition to investing in the Internet for its own interest, the Egyptian government also 
put remarkable effort into paving the information superhighway for a wider public. The 
government embraced a promising 'liberalising' Information Communication Technology 
(ICT). Through collaborative programmes and projects with the private sector, it 
implemented ongoing strategies to enhance telecommunication services and to expand the 
development and exploitation of ICTs. For example, the government launched the ADSL 
service in May 2004 through an initiative established by seven companies. It has also 
facilitated the emergence of IT clubs to the advantage of public in under-served areas. 
Furthermore, the initiative 'Egypt PC-2010 Nation Online' was launched to further increase 
access to the Internet and the ICTs more broadly (Rinnawy, 2011, p. 126). 
Additionally to infrastructure and hardware-related initiatives, the Egyptian government 
has also supported a wide range of ICT capacity-building programs. To this end, the 
Egyptian-Education Initiative (Learning and Technology Policy Framework, 2011) was 
launched as a public-private partnership aiming to build a skills-based knowledge society 
via enhancing the effective use of ICTs and integrating related programmes into all levels of 
education (Egypt's ICT Strategy 2007-2010). A significant increase in the number                 
of Internet users has accompanied these remarkable efforts. Slightly less than a quarter     
of the Egyptian population (more than 17 million) are using the Internet with a usage 
growth of 3,691 percent between 2000 and 2010.  
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Numbers on Internet usage should, however, be read accompanied by consideration of the 
medium’s nature. For instance, there are fewer Internet users than there are TV viewers in 
Egypt (Isherwood, 2008, p.3), but the Internet allows users access to abundant and diverse 
content that is far greater than what they can receive through their TV screens. The 
interactive nature of the Internet also situates the medium in a distinctive spot on the 
media spectrum (Chadwick, 2006, p. 11). Moderate numbers of users do not therefore 
necessarily mean less impact. In the Arab world, statistics on Internet usage should be read 
along with consideration of some regional specifications. Firstly, Internet users in Egypt, 
Morocco and Lebanon, do not, in fact, follow the common pattern of ADSL usage, which is 
three people per line. Ten to twelve people use one ADSL line through sub-distributions 
(Neighbours share the cost of one line and then distribute sub-lines to each other). Such      
a unique phenomenon has made it harder to precisely determine the number of ADSL 
service users. Secondly, most Internet users in Egypt, as well as in the rest of the Arab 
world, have access through public computers in universities, Internet cafés, or are 
collective users, rather than using the Internet through private accounts. Hence, this figure 
for Internet users (17 million) is likely to be much lower than the actual number. The 
number of Egyptians online has witnessed an exponential growth, especially in 2007. Egypt 
ranks among the highest of the developing countries in Internet and mobile phone usage. 
More than 23 million Egyptians used the Internet by the end of 2010, up from 16.6 million 
in 2009.  
As shown in Table 2.1, ICT indicators reported by the Egyptian Ministry of Communications 
and Information Technology (2012) increased remarkably after the 25th January 2011 
uprising. In the wake of the mass revolt, the number of Egyptians online has been boosted 
by 29 percent. Users who access the Internet through mobile phones increased from 8 
million to 10.7 million, while the number of mobile phone subscribers soared from 91 
million to 112 million. Despite the rapid increase in the numbers of Internet users, it could 
not be said that the Internet is a communication medium for mass audiences. The 
information superhighway “remains the province of the elites,” and English and French are 
still the most prevalent languages of interaction (Rinnawy, 2011, pp. 126, 135).  
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Table 2.1: ICT diffusion indicators in Egypt 2011-2012 (MCIT, ICT Indicators in Brief, 2012)4
                                                        
3 The huge increase in the number of “mobile subscriptions” is due to revision of this indicator definition by the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), Then, starting from January 2012, all three NMOs follow the new definition, which states that mobile subscriptions are the subscribers who 
used the service at least once during the previous three months to make or receiv calls or to carry out a non voice activity, such as sending or receiving 
SMS or accessing the Internet. 
4
 Growth rates are calculated as the difference between penetration rates or proportions in different time intervals. 
Indicator  Unit January  
2011 
January  
2012 
Annual growth rate (%) 
Internet Users Million user 23.51 29.53 25.61 
Internet penetration % 30.05 36.31 6.27 
International Internet bandwidth Gbps 132.22 181.85 37.54 
Proportion of household using Internet from 
home 
% 32.67 38.02 5.26 
ADSL Subscription Million subscription 1.43 1.84 28.99 
Mobile Internet users Million users 8.09 10.71 32.41 
Proportion of Internet users to total mobile 
subscription 
% 11.45 12.84 1.39 
Proportion of mobile Internet users to total 
Internet users 
% 34.40 36.27 1.87 
USB modem subscription Million subscription 1.58 2.74 72.69 
Proportion of broadband Internet users of total 
Internet users 
% 86.83 89.55 2.73 
Mobile subscription Million subscription 71.46 91.323 27.80 
Mobile penetration % 91.32 112.30 20.98 
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However, efforts to embrace a digital culture and to implement an ambitious plan to 
reach citizens with personal computers and keep them connected were begun with 
strenuous efforts to control the Internet and to lay siege to its potential political and 
cultural impact. This adds another dimension to the obstacles facing the wide spread of 
the Internet in Egypt and it is also linked to the evident duality of the Egyptian media 
spectrum.  
2.3.4. Internet censorship in Egypt 
Governments who use Western cultural imperialism as a reason for their restrictions 
take pains to control the information highway: through using filtering and control 
software, establishing supervision and controlling bodies on Internet use, as well as 
revising regulations to control access to the Internet. These techniques, which differ 
from one country to another, turn the Internet, like traditional media, into a public 
sphere subject to the usual censorship and sanctions (Rinnawy, 2011, p. 123). 
Despite the aforementioned governmental initiatives, which were taken to enlarge the 
scale of Internet access and, more broadly, to enhance the use of telecommunications, 
ICT diffusion faces serious hurdles that make it very difficult to regard the Internet as a 
means of communication for the masses. Obstacles to Internet diffusion in Egypt include 
both government-designed and implemented measures and informal, normative and 
societal hurdles that work against the boom in the medium. 
Although it is difficult to practise censorship over the Internet, because of the nature of 
the medium as a non-centralised environment of communication, this very absence of 
self-regulation in much new media apparatuses “can also provide governments with an 
excuse to step in.” Reporters Without Borders (RWB) lists Egypt amongst the “wider 
enemies of the Internet” along with other Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Tunisia. While taking several steps to join the information superhighway, the state 
seems to be cautious in allowing citizens free platforms for the expression of opinion. 
Precautionary measures were taken to guarantee that what is given with one hand is 
taken, or at least controlled, by the other. For example, the Egyptian government has 
established two security units within the Ministry of Interior for on-line surveillance 
and monitoring purposes. The General Administration for Information and 
Documentation and the Department for Confronting Computer and Internet Crime were 
responsible for the detention of some bloggers and the blocking of their blogs by the 
authorities (Fahmi, 2009, p. 93). However, even with the state’s control over Internet 
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access, Internet cafés are wide spread and the number of users continues to increase, as 
shown in Figure 2.1. Internet use has risen putting 26.74 percent of the population 
online by 2010.  
 
Figure 2.1: Internet use in Egypt 
Source: (World Development Indicators, 2012) 
 
Political and cultural censorship might be at the top of a long list of obstacles to Internet 
diffusion in Egypt. Additionally to formal regulations that prohibit an uncontrolled 
political public sphere, informal socio-religious rules pose additional limitations on free 
expression and act to keep traditional values intact (Rinnawy, 2011; Abdulla, 2007). 
These formal and informal regulations are used by the government to seize control       
of the Internet in order to minimise the potential impacts of the interactive medium and 
which might challenge its existence, or might not go along with its policies and interests. 
Additionally, the high expenses of Internet use are still one of the main barriers to 
Internet diffusion, especially in rural areas and among less fortunate populations like 
the ‘fellahin’ (peasants). This hurdle goes in tandem with, and is even intensified by, 
high poverty rates. Egypt is one of the Arab countries with a very low Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and very low levels of income. According to the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS), poverty rates in Egypt have increased from 16.7 
to 25.2 between 1999/2000 and 2010/2011. With higher and even increasing poverty 
rates, the government tends to prioritise problems such as food, health care, and 
accommodation, over taking care of other ‘less urgent’ needs, such as education, science, 
and new technology, which recede into the background.  
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Poverty is joined with illiteracy, which adds another hindrance to Internet diffusion in 
Egypt. Total adult illiteracy, according to UNICEF, reached 34 percent between 2005 
and 2008. Higher rates of illiteracy are found among poor people, which increases the 
problems. According to CAPMAS, 36.4 percent of the poor population is illiterate, while 
only 6.5 percent of them hold a university degree. However, although the Internet 
advantages the wealthy and literate, it is argued that this connection does not hold up 
once access is afforded and a certain level of literacy is achieved (Isherwood, 2008). For 
example, the wide spread of Internet cafés has partially ameliorated access problems 
making the Internet available to the less well-off social classes and not limited to the 
cosmopolitan elites (Wheeler, 2006). 
Additionally, digital efficiency poses further challenges for Internet diffusion, which is 
expected to exclude a ‘functional illiterate’ proportion of the 63 percent literate 
population from the Internet use formula. Even for literate people, English-language 
proficiency remains a problem that obstructs the way to the wider spread of the 
Internet in Egypt, as the medium remains dominated by the English-language. 
Nevertheless, “the World Wide Web and Arabic browsers have ameliorated that 
problem somewhat, but the text-based areas such as emails remain problematic” 
(Rinnawy, 2011, p. 136). Finally, problems related to physical infrastructure hinder the 
scale and quality of Internet diffusion, especially in the rural areas and areas far from 
the capital city, Cairo. 
Despite these obstacles and hurdles, the medium has been effectively utilised by several 
groups who found it to be an alternative platform for free expression. Marginalised 
groups and oppressed political, economic, ideological, ethnic, national, cultural, and 
religious trends have used the Internet as an alternative public sphere. In this virtual 
arena, they could counter the obstacles that they face in state-run and highly controlled 
traditional media and circumvent their misrepresentation in mainstream discourse. 
These groups have become the 'main players' in this public sphere (Rinnawi, 2011, p. 
137). They use the Internet as a substitute channel, where they can create opportunities 
to connect to their supporters, engage in a more open discourse, gain solidarity and, 
more importantly, become more culturally involved and effectively engaged in their 
civil society.  
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2.3.5. Creating opportunities via the Internet 
Ever since its inception in Egypt, the country has witnessed the most effective Internet 
use by different groups in the Arab world. The Internet has allowed them a platform 
where they can meet and discuss their ideas, convey their messages and gain support 
and solidarity for their cause. Diverse voices could be spelt out and heard through the 
Internet. For example, different Islamic groups, ranging from radical Islamist 
movements to moderate mainstream Islam, use the Internet in parallel, or as an 
alternative to mainstream media, which is tightly censored by the regime. Rinnawi 
(2011) argues that the Islamic Fundamentalist groups' presence on the Internet makes 
them the most effective players on the Web in the Arab region. They use the Internet as 
the mouthpiece to deliver their message and to build the social and economic capital 
needed for mobilisation. For example, the Muslim Brothers (MB) (Ikhwan) have created 
their own websites, the most important of which is ikhwanonline.com, which was 
founded in Egypt in 1995 to promote their own interpretation of Islam and to represent 
their ideas and activities. Their growth in the digital sphere is exponential to an extent 
that made Lynch (2007) raises concerns about the ‘imbalanced’ power of growth of the 
Egyptian blogosphere upon their entrance, en masse (Lynch, 2007). 
Alongside these websites, there is also a huge number of websites that represent a more 
moderate view of Islam, which is embraced by the mainstream media. These websites 
set out to face the mainstream representations promoted by the regime and to defy the 
state monopoly on the public opinion. One of the very important examples of such 
moderate platforms is the website Islam-online, which operates out of Egypt but is 
funded by Qatari money. The website allows open discourse with people and reaches 
them with a moderate version of understanding Islam, or what is called 'al-Wasat' (the 
middle), which generally characterises the new generation and appeals to them. 
Other who benefit from the Internet in Egypt are the Copts. As a religious minority that 
represents between 10 and 20 percent of the population (Wagner, 1997), Christian 
Egyptians find in the Internet a free space in which to express their views and to project 
the grievances they harbour against the regime’s discrimination and persecution. 
Websites such as coptsunited.com and copts.com are examples of how Christian 
Egyptians utilise the Internet to monitor, comment on and engage with the social, 
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cultural and political public sphere in Egypt. They also use it as a reciprocal 
communication channel between the homeland and Copts in diaspora all over the globe. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights organisations are also 
among the most prominent players on the Internet in Egypt. The websites of the 
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) and the Cairo Centre for Human Rights 
Studies (CIHRS), both perfectly exemplify the way such entities use the Internet 
efficiently to engage with society on the local scale and, most importantly, to reach 
international circles with their cause in order to situate their concerns on the 
international agenda. Both websites are the most important in the Arab world in terms 
of exposing human rights violations, discussing and reporting issues relating to 
democracy. 
Women have also gone a long way in the field of political participation through online 
propagation. Women’s organisations have created their own websites to promote their 
cause and to gain support. The website of the Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights, 
ecwregypt.com is a good example of how the Internet can be utilised in the field              
of women’s emancipation and political empowerment. The website publishes 
intensively on the role of Egyptian women in political life and draws attention to their 
effective role in a patriarchal society where their engagement in public life may be 
strictly controlled by family, society, and cultural norms. There are also numerous 
examples of prominent websites that use the Internet as an outlet for traditional media, 
or as their main medium in and of itself. Websites, such as Masrawy and al-Bawaba, 
serve as main sources of news, especially on sensitive issues that are hardly covered by 
traditional, state-run media. 
In addition to the organised utilisation of the Internet, whether by the government or by 
civil society organisations, which is normally buttressed by better human, financial and 
technical resources and the experience that is needed to build their portals on the web, 
the Internet is also an open space where individual youth can share their thoughts and 
discuss issues of interest that range from personal matters to technical tips and, most 
importantly, political issues. The Internet privileges the young because, unlike their 
elders, using computers has become part of their habitus. (Isherwood, 2008). 
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Youth have become the common denominator among those groups who use the 
Internet to project their grievances and air their aspirations. They are technologically 
savvy, more educated, and more technologically efficient. To sum up, many of the 
aforementioned obstacles to Internet diffusion could be ameliorated when it comes      
to youth. This might nominate youth as one of the most important and influential 
players in the Egyptian digital sphere. As Shapiro (2009) stated:  
[The] flare-up of political activity coincided with the moment Egyptians started to gain 
access to the Internet in large numbers … .. the new technologies and political 
movements grew symbiotically (p. 4). 
Similarly, Shehata (2008) also argues that one of the characteristics that distinguishes 
this wave of youth activism is its “extensive use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) as an organisational and mobilisational tool, and also as a means of 
expressing the view of youth. Given the strict constraints on formal political 
participation, youth were able to use the World Wide Web to create an alternative or 
virtual political sphere” (p. 7).  
This, however, is not to suggest that free opinion expression is necessarily a by-product 
of such conditions; as Egyptian youth do not all have access to the Internet, and even if 
they do they are not all expected to be interested in politics nor inclined to be politically 
active. 
2.4. New media, new publics: Revolting in a repressed environment 
Over the past years, a new cohort of Egyptian youth who mainly belong to the upper-
middle-class and who have attained a Western-style education has risen. They practised 
a new type of social movement and this led to the creation of new civic publics in Cairo. 
Their aim was to draw attention to their role as part of the Egyptian and Arab World 
(Arvizu, 2009). Education is central to shaping younger generations’ normative 
perceptions of participatory values and to moulding youth attitudes to civic 
engagement. Students enrolled in different education systems were found to embrace 
different forms of political culture. For example, students of the English division of the 
Faculty of Economic and Political Science at Cairo University were more inclined 
towards collective action and participation as a means of ending a dictatorship when 
compared to their colleagues in the Arabic section, who were more passive since they 
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had less belief in revolutionary action. This difference was ascribed to the education 
that the former section had gained since in language schools democratic values are 
more promoted than in public (state-owned) ones (Noweir, 2001).  
Outlets for civic participation for youth are very scarce in Egypt and are “permitted only 
at private, elite universities because these campuses are considered less prone to 
violence and are less susceptible to the influence of fundamentalist religious groups” 
(Assaad & Barsoum, 2009, p. 82). However, data from the Survey of Young People in 
Egypt (SYPE) show that in 2009, 11 percent of youth aged 18-29 have never been to 
school, 81 percent of them girls, and only 13.2 percent complete university (Survey of 
Young People in Egypt, 2011). Moreover, only 19.17 percent of students enrolled in 
higher education joined private institutions in the academic year 2004/2005 (Egyptian 
Ministry of Higher Education, 2006). This gives insight into the impact this tiny, highly 
educated cohort –not to mention the even tinier number of privately educated youth- 
might have on the society given the fact that not all of them would be interested in 
politics nor engaged in civic activities.  
In her research into the role of new media in the emergence of youth publics in Cairo, 
Arvizu focused on how creative youth could be when developing new communication 
channels and using them as forms of activism to create alternative public 
communication networks for critical discussion of the state and society. In doing so, 
youth are practising what Caroll and Hacket (2006) call ‘democratic media activism’ 
(DMA) (p. 388). Using new media (in this case, desktop publishing), Egyptian youth 
practise a new type of social movement and participate in the creation of new civic 
publics in Cairo. They have used this new media to print a new type of magazine that 
uses “Arabised English”; Arabic words in English type supplemented by numbers. These 
magazines focus on issues of concern to Egyptian youth, such as identity, participation, 
the authoritarian role of the state and democracy. She argues that through the 
distribution of these magazines among youth, they could “bridge publics in a media-
censored field” (Arvizu, 2009, pp. 385-407). 
Egypt witnessed 1,000 social protests between 1998 and 2004 in which the protest rate 
increased by 200 percent after 2003 (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). The eagerness to 
show discontent and to claim political and socioeconomic reforms was reflected in an 
72 
 
unprecedented number of oppositional demonstrations, rallies and the formation of 
non-violent dissident groups that Egypt witnessed in 2004-2005 (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 
1011).  
Egypt’s first competitive presidential elections and the parliamentary elections of 2005 
“marked a new departure in the Egyptian political sphere, including a shift in the 
domestic political balance” accompanied by the emergence of new movements and of 
the new Arab media space (Meital, 2006, p. 257). Social movements and demonstrations 
that preceded the constitutional reforms, remarkably attracted new faces to the political 
arena in Egypt; young people for whom participation in the demonstrations was their 
“first collective political action” (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1018). Several initiatives of citizens’ 
engagement in politics against the autocratic regime have followed. 
2.4.1. Youth mobilisation since 2000 
Egyptian youth have endured a decade of political demobilisation that began                     
a resurgence with the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in the autumn of 2000 
(Shehata, 2008). For example, in 2000 and 2001, students staged a number                      
of demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinian intifada. Additionally, hundreds      
of students joined the Egyptian Popular Committee for the Support of the Palestinian 
Intifada (EPCSPI) in which they strongly participated in a boycott campaign of American 
and Israeli products, collecting donations and sending aid convoys to the occupied 
territories. In the aftermath of the American invasion and subsequent occupation           
of Iraq, the younger generations joined hundreds of Egyptians in large demonstrations 
in Tahrir Square in central Cairo. In 2004-2005, youth activism went in tandem with      
a national and international shift towards issues of political and constitutional reform. 
In this context, hundreds of young activists joined the Kefaya movement and the al-Ghad 
Party. Additionally, the Youth for Change Group have emanated from Kafaya and 
became vocal actors during the pro-reform protests of 2004-2006.  
Remarkably, these protests, according to Shehata (2008, p. 5), drew national and 
international attention and broke many of the taboos that had characterised public life 
in Egypt for several decades. Firstly, the protestors focused on domestic rather than 
foreign policy issues. Secondly, they challenged a long standing ban on popular 
demonstrations outside university campuses and took to the street without official 
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permission. Thirdly, they directly attacked the president and the security establishment 
in the slogans they raised, breaching the tightly defined ‘red lines’ about directly 
criticising these ‘sovereign’ institutions. Finally, youth introduced an innovative 
repertoire to their protests, such as candle light vigils, which helped to attract attention.    
This wave of youth activism that dates back to Autumn 2000 has occurred largely 
outside existing parties and movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood. This wave 
is also distinguished by being mainly non-ideological in nature. “Most of the youth that 
joined contemporary movements seemed to share a general commitment to the values 
of human rights, pluralism, democracy, and social justice. These activists focused more 
on consensus building and action, rather than on theoretical, ideological squabbles” 
(Shehata, 2008). 
In 2007-2008, the youth political movement diminished due to a general crackdown on 
political mobilisation in Egypt. However, another wave of mobilisation began to gain 
momentum incentivised mainly by the decline in real incomes, as a result of inflation, 
coupled with economic hardship among large segments of the population due to raising 
prices. Accordingly, the years 2007-2008 witnessed unprecedented, yet polarised and 
economically-oriented, levels of strikes and protests by civil servants and factory 
workers. 
In this context, it is worth highlighting two cases that were exceptional to this 
economic-based, civil servants’ led pattern of mobilisation. The first was the strike of 6th 
April, which saw joint mobilisation by textile workers on the one hand, and by young 
urban activists who remarkably utilised SM apparatuses to call for a national strike in 
solidarity with the textile workers on the other. The second is the emergence of ‘We are 
all Kaled Said’ group, which was originally created in the virtual sphere of the social 
networking site, Facebook, to condemn police brutality and to stage protests against 
corruption. These cases are introduced in more detail below. 
2.4.2. April 6th Youth Movement 
The April 6th Youth Movement emerged when a group of young activists branched off 
from the Kefaya opposition group and started the new movement on Facebook as a 
strike group. The new group managed to mobilise a one-day national strike in the Delta 
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city of Mahalla to support the workers and to condemn low salary rates and 
deteriorating living conditions (Pintak, 2008). Albeit, the movement has achieved 
limited success in engaging the masses in consecutive massive scale activism in order to 
put real pressure on the then governing regime. 
Over the past few years, and more evidently since the emergence of the April 6th Youth 
Movement in 2008, several political coalitions have emerged in the Egyptian political 
spectrum. A vibrant political environment has been evolving that has coincided with the 
use of new media technologies like blogs and social networking sites (SNSs) (Howard, 
2010). This political evolution has brought together different political trends and 
ideologies, and has engaged people for whom political participation was happening for 
the first time in their lives. 
In April 2008, a bread crisis evolved and demonstrations took place mainly at a textile 
mill in the Delta town of Mahalla. Thousands of protesters clashed with government 
troops and the violence left several dead and hundreds wounded. With the Mahalla 
riots, dozens of activists were arrested including the bloggers. Esraa’ Abdel Fattah, or 
the so called “Facebook Girl”, a 27 year-old woman who created a group on the social 
networking site that became, according to Saleh (2008), the core for a one day national 
strike in solidarity with the Mahalla workers (Pintak, 2008). However, although the call 
for the general strike was in parallel to the El-Mahalla textile workers’ strike, there is no 
evidence of direct co-ordination between the Facebooker’s virtual activism and the 
workers’ physical mobilisation (Fahmi, 2009, p. 105). Although this massive strike was 
the most important among the 400 that took place in 2008 - that is, it brought 
socioeconomic together with political demands and was led by both workers’ groups 
and networks of young activists, the April 6th Youth Movement usually only mobilise a 
moderate number of participants in proportion to the claimed number of online 
members. The general strike was sustained only for one day and efforts by young 
activists and bloggers to repeat the success on the anniversary of the event in 2009 and 
2010 failed. This might suggest a low level of commitment among its members (Ottaway 
& Hamzawy, 2011). 
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2.4.3. The personification of societal problems: ‘We are all Khaled Said’ 
On 7th June 2010, a 28-years-old man’s death at the hands of two police detectives has 
become a symbol of the youth movement against the Egyptian police brutality that is 
viciously practised in the guise of the emergency law. It has been claimed that Khaled 
Said posted a video on YouTube that shows police handling illegal drugs. The police 
dragged Khaled outside an Internet café and beat him to death, then threw his corpse 
onto the street. A mortuary photo of Said’s battered face was leaked and went viral 
when posted on the Internet, causing a national and international turmoil. The now 
well-known Facebook Page “We are all Khaled Said” was created after Said’s murder to 
condemn the police brutality that has long been practised in Egypt. The page has 
succeeded in bringing the annals of Egyptian police brutality into public focus 
(Londono, 2011). Two police officers have been charged with brutality and they were 
put on trial in July 2010 (Shenker, 2010).  
The wide distribution of the leaked photo of Said’s fractured face on SNSs has brought 
the public, almost for the first time, face-to-face with police brutality and made them 
feel its imminent danger. Violations practised under cover for a long time have been 
disclosed, provoking a collective feeling of resentment and apprehension. The 
experience of security usually rests upon a balance of trust and acceptable risk 
(Giddens, 1990, pp. 35, 36). Bringing such practices to the public’s awareness has 
provocatively alarmed the publics and has drawn their attention to an “environment of 
risk” that could affect many of them. They are no longer safe, as “a situation in which a 
specific set of dangers is counteracted or minimised” (Giddens, 1990, pp. 35, 36) is 
inactive. This deliberate inaction has been legitimised and protected for decades by the 
state of emergency that Mubarak enacted in the wake of his predecessor’s assassination 
in October 1981. 
The Facebook Page ‘We are all Khaled Said’ has succeeded in mobilising several 
demonstrations against police brutality and human rights violations. A number               
of demonstrations have been sparked off in Cairo and Alexandria, the largest had 4,000 
protesters on 25th June 2010 and was attended by the former UN nuclear chief 
Mohamed El-Baradei. This protest was marked by its unprecedented size and scale and 
the presence of the opposition Muslim Brotherhood group, which suggests that Said’s 
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death “has struck a chord” (Shenker, 2010) and has reified long-denied practices. 
Nevertheless, the Facebook Page has failed to upgrade these demonstrations to the 
massive scale necessary to acquire feasible change until the 25th January 2011, when 
massive demonstrations erupted in response, at least in the beginning, to a call for an 
uprising posted on the Page. Said’s plight became a rallying point for protesters in the 
uprising.  
With unbiased viewpoints and with a free ‘double-track’ flow of information all but 
nonexistent, youth and citizens by and large were denied their right to acquire sufficient 
unhampered information about the government’s performance. Spelling out their 
opinion on significant issues, especially in regard to politics or in contradiction to 
authorities’ and elites’ interests was de facto oppressed and de jure punished. These 
circumstances have left youth with the feeling that their voices are not heard or even 
valuable. Furthermore, making these voices heard may cost them their jobs, freedom, 
safety and dignity. This has caused the accumulation of a feeling of dissent among 
Egyptians who cannot maintain a state of apathy and indifference. They were left with 
no choice but to rise up against the regime to make their voices heard. Heater describes 
the logic behind this: “if newly provided political rights cannot in practice be used to 
win sorely needed economic rights – which are, after all, most individuals’ prime 
concern – two outcomes are possible: rebellion or a resigned feeling of inefficacy. The 
latter reaction leads on to disappointment, turning to despair, and mounting crime” 
(Heater, 1999, p. 43). On 25th January, young Egyptians, joined later by angry and 
despairing citizens from both ends of the social spectrum, made their choice and went 
with Heater’s first proposal.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to contextualise the current study by charting the social and 
political circumstances that prevailed under Mubarak’s presidency with a special focus 
on the last decade of his time in office. It has been argued throughout the chapter that 
these ten years witnessed a resurgence in political life where several social and media 
implications have interacted to shape a new political movement that led to the 25th 
January 2011 revolt. In a glance through the manifestations of democratic ills, that 
Egyptian society has suffered over the last three decades, one easily notices that there is 
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an accumulation of the inefficient performance of weak political parties, along with 
erroneous election procedures that yield an unreliable parliament and this would result 
in an authoritarian regime that lacked the prerequisites for the efficient functioning of 
democracy (Zaki, 1994). The parliamentary election of 28 November – 5 December 
2010, that shaped the context for this study, marks the most fraudulent election in the 
history of the Egyptian parliament. Due to the disappointing results of the elections, 
feelings of discontent were dominant and the context was very tense, which strongly 
highlights these elections as one of the immediate incentives for the 25th January 2011 
uprising.  
As this research sets out to explore young activists’ perceptions of the potential of SM 
for mobilisation, this chapter also sought to situate Egyptian youth within the broader 
picture of the environment under which they operate. It paves the way for further 
discussion and a better understanding of young activists’ media use, dispositions and on 
and off-line political practices, which represent the core themes of the current study. 
The chapter discusses the limitations imposed by the authoritarian regime as well as 
the openness that may have created potential opportunities for participation. It 
particularly focuses on the role the Internet and SM may have played in drawing active 
engagement and in empowering Egyptian youth politically. To set a broader ground for 
discussion of the main themes of the research (uses of SM, dispositions and actions) and 
to shed light on the way young Egyptian activists’ dispositions might have shaped their 
tendencies to participation in politics both on and off-line. In the following chapter, I 
draw together these analytical threads and link them to different perspectives on new 
media’s potential for mobilisation as discussed from different points of view in a variety 
of contexts in order to develop a framework to help to analyse and understand the role 
that SM could play in empowering Egyptian youth. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
SOCIAL MEDIA5 USES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
MOBILISATION: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
In Chapter Two, the current research has been contextualised geopolitically and 
literature pertaining to issues specific to youth and political participation in the 
Egyptian society has been discussed. In this chapter, literature on social media’s 
affordances for mobilisation for collective action is reviewed in order to provide              
a theoretical context for the current inquiry about the perceived potential of social 
media (SM) for mobilising collective action in Egypt.  
In this chapter, I first lay out the framework within which literature pertinent to the 
current study is discussed. I then address the ‘why’ question about media functions, 
which is usually approached through the uses and gratifications model (U&G) of media 
effects that distinguishes between instrumental and habitual or ritualistic uses of media 
and their related effects. Media uses represent the common factor that cements the 
remaining sections of this chapter. Four main arguments will be put forward in this 
chapter to validate the need for this research to be conducted. Firstly, it is argued that 
studying the functions of media, rather than measuring the time people spend with         
a certain medium, better suits the nature of the Internet as an interactive platform of 
communication that allows active users to play different roles and satisfy different 
needs. Secondly, introducing new information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
to the realm of contemporary social movements has enabled new forms of organisation 
that are low in cost, but at the same time are non-centralised, loosely-woven, and 
leaderless horizontal networks by their nature. Within such movements, forms of 
flexible identities emerge and develop, fed by goal-directed rather than ideological 
forms of media use. Thirdly, it is argued that the hurdles such loose networks and 
flexible identities might impose while creating an alternative participatory sphere for 
individuals may be diluted by creating opportunities for practice with social movements 
                                                        
5 The current study mainly focuses on Internet applications that enable users to link to, interact, and 
collaborate with other users to achieve certain political goals. The acronym SM (social media) is used 
throughout the chapter to refer to digital networking media that individuals basically use to link to other 
users, whether through computers or smart phones. Research in this area has used various terms, such as 
computer-mediated communication (CMC), new information and communication technologies (ICTs), and 
digital media.  
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where individuals can gain experience and acquire the identity of an activist. These 
opportunities include creating a safer environment for practice where non-politicised 
individuals can breach the fear of the repression barrier and feel more politically 
efficacious. However, creating such opportunities may also create an area of tension 
where individuals become captured by the safe, delusional space of interaction, rather 
than action. Fourthly, it is argued that SM have afforded activists new tools for the social 
construction of their movements and to present alternative frames for their activities 
that are rarely presented on state-run media outlets. These affordances vary from 
activists to non-politicised users of SM. However, there is a possibility that the context 
reinforces the issue if individuals over rely on these media, which may, in reality, harm 
the practice of collective action. In each of these areas, the pros of SM for the 
development and growth of social movements are thus attached to a number of cons, 
which create areas of tension that the current research seeks to tackle. A summary of 
these arguments and areas of tension is presented in Figure 3.1. 
In order to address the objectives of the chapter, I have broken the discussion down into 
seven sections: 
3.1. Framework. 
3.2. Social media functions. 
3.3. Social media uses for social movement organisation.  
3.3.1. Instrumental uses of social media, identification with and commitment to 
social movements. 
3.4. Social media and shaping opportunities in repressive contexts. 
3.4.1. Social media and lower-cost/risk opportunities of participation. 
3.4.2. Social media and political efficacy as opportunity for participation.  
3.5. Social media and mobilising collective action. 
3.5.1. Social media and mobilising frames. 
3.5.2. Different media uses, different participators: Alternative media for 
alternative actions. 
3.5.3. Social media and the significance of collective performance. 
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Section (3.2) addresses the ‘uses’ theme of the thesis and directly informs the answer to 
the research question: why do young activists use social media? Although social 
movement organisation is not one of the main themes of this research, reviewing 
literature on SM and movement organisations still informs the research enquiry about 
young activists’ tendency to move their political activism from the on- to the off-line 
arena. As discussed in Section (3.3), it has been argued that using SM as ‘instruments’ 
for organising movements could facilitate low cost and flexible forms of organisation. 
However, instrumental uses of new communication technology were found to develop 
flexible identities that do not necessarily feed into a commitment to and the 
sustainability of social movements, which may, then, affect individuals’ tendency to 
practise off-line, high cost/risk activism. Section (3.4) aims to address this issue by 
reviewing literature on the role SM may play in creating opportunities for low cost 
practice that might, in turn, help individuals gain the necessary experience and thus 
feed into their feelings of political efficacy. By doing so, this section helps answer the 
research question: how do SM contribute to creating favourable dispositions towards 
practising collective action off-line? Finally, Section (3.5) directly addresses the research 
question: how do SM contribute to mobilising collective action practice off-line? The 
section covers issues relevant to using SM as platforms that are alternative                       
to traditional media, which are normally biased against activists. Issues of framing, 
recruiting, free-riding and collective action repertoires and their relation to uses of SM 
are discussed in this section. Figure 3.1 summarises the research’s main themes and 
shows how arguments discussed in each section relate to areas of tension and gaps that 
have been identified in the literature, supporting the need for this research to be 
conducted.  
The remaining sections of the chapter then pull the threads of previous sections 
together and sum up in a section on the main perspectives discussed throughout the 
chapter (Section 3.6). The final Section (3.7) particularly situates this study in the 
literature and addresses the question of the need to ask and to seek to answer its 
questions. 
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 Figure 3.1: Main themes of research and areas of tension identified  
 
Social media functions 
Instrumental/ ideological 
Mobilising 
collective action 
Creating opportunities in 
repressive contexts 
Organising 
collective action 
A safer 
environment for a 
lower cost practice. 
Instrumental rather than 
ideological uses of social media for: 
lower cost organisation and 
information dissemination and 
non-centralised, non hierarchical 
movement organization. 
 
Social media use for social 
movement framing: political 
environment surveillance and 
unbiased representations of 
activists and movement activities.  
Identity issues (i.e., enforcing 
existing identities or creating 
flexible ones), which could be 
solved, as inferred from literature, 
through affiliation to formal 
organisations and/or practice and 
gaining experience. 
Commitment to movement and 
related issues of movement 
sustainability  
Acquiring and 
sharing skills and 
building agency. 
Credibility and trust 
issues related to 
anonymous interactions, 
and developing illusory 
perceptions of practising 
effective actions online. 
Issues related to the 
negative impact of 
certain uses (i.e., 
entertainment), and 
polarisation of 
discussions due to 
heterogeneity of Internet 
audience. 
 
Social media uses and collective 
action repertoire. Issues related to 
practising collective action off-line 
(i.e., significance and sustainability 
of collective action)  
Suggests the importance of 
hybridity and formal organisations 
and reinforces rational action and 
resource mobilization. 
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3.1. Framework  
Claims about new media’s affordances for social movements’ development and growth 
often include counterclaims about their inadequacies. Inviting the SM component into   
a social movement construct has created areas of tension between proponents and 
opponents of SM’s potential for social movements/revolutions. This tension could be 
situated, for example, in the debate between Shirky (2011) and Gladwell (2010) around 
the role of SM in the Arab uprisings, or the so called Arab Spring. However, as the events 
unfolded, it has been argued that both arguments have become inconsequential and 
irrelevant to the current situation. On the one hand, the Egyptian uprising of 25th 
January grew in size and expanded in its geographical reach despite the shutdown of the 
Internet for five days, which negates Shirky’s deterministic argument. On the other 
hand, Egypt’s SM platforms, after these five days of disconnection, were imbued with 
content that documented that whole period, which refutes Gladwell’s more sceptical 
hypothesis (Iskandar, 2013). Looking at the role SM have been, or might have been, 
playing before the eruption of the Arab uprisings, as seen by young activists in Egypt, 
before enthusiasm about the massive revolts shades the picture, would also serve           
a similar purpose as a more objective evaluation of media effect, and to help avoid the 
naivety of cheerleading for SM as the sole incentive for the uprisings, or from slipping 
into an overestimated claim about a ‘Facebook revolution.’ 
Movement emergence and development have been examined both theoretically and 
empirically, based on different theoretical underpinnings. Resource mobilisation theory 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983) focuses on social movement organisations 
(SMOs) as a force for social change as compared to grievance-based conceptions of 
social movements. Formal organisations as such have been argued to be valuable for 
social movements, especially when the cost of organising collective action are high, as 
they fund and distribute material incentives that are much needed for mobilising action 
and to limit the so-called ‘free-riding’ (Earl & Kimport, 2011). In contrast, grievance, or 
attitude-based approaches, the political process model (Tilly, 1978) suggests that 
resources are not the only essential condition for a movement to emerge and grow, and 
that incentives for participation can emerge within disadvantaged grassroots groups 
who work collectively to facilitate and structure collective action (McAdam, 1982). In 
the same pool, structural and rational choice accounts of participation also break with 
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grievance-based conceptions of social movements. The first ascribes activism to 
structural proximity and network connections, the second to individual cost-benefit 
calculations. Based on the assumption that structural and rational choice theories are 
mutually exclusive and that the strength of each position is the weakness of the other 
(Friedman & McAdam, 1992), it has been suggested that the solution for one of the 
chronic problems of collective action, that is, free-riding (Olson, 1971), is the fusion 
between the two concepts (Friedman & McAdam, 1992). Friedman and McAdam 
suggest that networks mobilise more collective action than rational choice theory and 
its free-rider problem do because potential actors in a collective action are tied to other 
actors. These networks draw individuals into activism, thus evading the need for 
extensive material incentives. These networks, then, draw these embedded individuals 
into collective action by providing incentives (p. 160, 161).  
With the emergence of the Internet and new communication technologies, sociologists, 
political scientists and media scholars have made their efforts to unpack the 
components of social movements with regard to structuring new opportunities for 
collective action by these technologies. In most cases, the networking theory has been 
widely embedded and expanded to the investigation of new media’s influence on the 
emergence and development of social movements (see, e.g., Castells, 1997; Castells et 
al., 2007; Bennett, 2003a, 2003b; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). However, with very few 
exceptions (Hwang, Schmierbach, Paek, Zuniga, & Shah, 2006; Nah, Veenstra, & Shah, 
2006), the vast majority of these studies, as will be shown in the first section of this 
chapter, have dealt with media use as the measure of time that people spend with            
a certain medium, rather than asking questions about active media use and consequent 
influences. These queries have been raised by the U&G perspective of media 
consumption (Palmgreen, 1984), which addresses questions such as why certain media 
are selected, the tasks for which they are best suited, and people’s perceptions of these 
media (Flanagin & Metzger, 2001). Moreover, most of these studies have investigated 
social movements on an ad hoc basis and were implemented as a reaction to an eruption 
of protests. In the aforementioned empirical exceptions that looked at forms of media 
use, participants were not necessarily activists, but rather were dissenters who held 
political opinions that differed from what is promoted in mainstream media.  
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Although not systematically studied through U&G concepts, which basically look at the 
different functions that media serve for active users, studies on media’s influence on 
social movements have associated certain forms of media uses (i.e., instrumental uses6 
that usually aim to achieve certain goals, and ideological or symbolic ones that are more 
normative in nature and aim to establish more solid connections between actors and 
movements) with certain impacts. For example, reasons that drive people to participate 
in collective actions (Klandermans, 2004; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987) have been 
linked to reasons behind media use for participatory purposes to see how motivations 
for practising political collective action might reflect on reasons for using digital media 
for the same purpose (van Laer, 2010). Conversely, using digital media to achieve 
certain political purposes might influence people’s tendency to participate in protests. 
These different media functions seem to create an area of tension for social movement 
scholars, and they also have their impact on conceptions of movement commitment and 
sustainability. Some scholars, for example, see that instrumental uses do not contribute 
to developing an activist identity, nor do they reinforce an existent one (Diani, 2000), 
while others assert that Internet use by social movement organisations develops             
a flexible form of identity that positively influences the practice of collective action and 
allows transnational movements to emerge and thrive (della Porta & Mosca, 2005). To 
set up such an assumption, this chapter first starts with reviewing previous work on 
reasons behind the selection and use of SM and how these may relate to fulfilling 
individuals’ participatory needs through different forms of political practices. 
Across these theoretical foundations and various perspectives, it is possible to discern   
a clear outline that transcends the limits of any single theoretical approach to the study 
of social movements and collective action. Movement scholars from different theoretical 
traditions usually emphasise the importance of three broad groups of factors in 
analysing the emergence and development of social movements. McAdam et al. (1996), 
for example, offered a tripartite framework to enable an understanding of social 
                                                        
6 The uses and gratifications approach distinguishes between instrumental and ritualised uses of media. 
While instrumental uses entail a level of purposive activity that aims to achieve certain goals, ritualistic or 
habitual use is a mild stimulation of audience activity that is considered one of the limiting factors of 
media effects (Ruggiero, 2000). Ritualistic use involves the concept of utility, but little intentionality or 
selectivity (Blumler, 1979). Media functions have been conceptualised differently in social movement 
study. For example, Diani (2000) distinguished between the instrumental and ideological uses that 
involve the construction and development of movement identity that is crucial for involvement in the 
collective action and sustainability of social movements. 
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movements with a special focus on the meso-level organisational dynamics. They 
mainly looked at (1) mobilising structures; (2) opportunity structures; and (3) framing 
processes. Additionally, an overarching factor of media uses is incorporated into the 
discussion to serve the ultimate aim of the current inquiry: investigating whether SM 
might create opportunities for practising forms of contentious political activities off-line 
at the micro-level (with individuals as the unit of analysis) as perceived by a sample of 
young Egyptian activists. This organising framework has been employed for a similar 
purpose in previous research that investigates digital media’s influence on social 
movement development (van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004; Garrett, 2006). 
However, these empirical and theoretical endeavours have primarily investigated the 
influence of time spent online, rather than asking the ‘why’ question about media 
functions.  
3.2. Social media functions 
With the proliferation of the Internet, many scholars have crossed the line from ‘who’ 
and ‘what’ and have addressed the question about ‘why’ a certain audience chooses to 
attend to specific media outlets (Blumler & Katz, 1974; Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 
1974; Swanson, 1987). The last decade has witnessed a digital media boom that has 
significantly affected interest in the impact that ICTs might have on several domains of 
life. This information revolution has particular implications on politics (DiMaggio, 
Hargittai, Neuman, & Robinson, 2001) as it is creating an environment for political 
practice that is distinguished by being information-rich and communication-intensive 
(Bimber, 2001).  
It has been argued that studying motivation rather than impact (boyd, 2008), and 
patterns of use rather than gross hours of use (Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001) aids            
a better understanding of the potentials that certain modalities of media consumption 
hold for enabling political actions. The U&G perspective reinforces active images            
of audiences, specifying that individuals select and use media based on needs and on 
their perceptions of media attributes that might help to satisfy those needs. SM have 
received a level of U&G attention. Albeit, this attention has by and large been focused on 
the general audience, usually college students who tend to be heavy users of SM 
(Cheung, Chiu, & Lee, 2011; Liu, Cheung, & Lee, 2010; Subrahmanyam, Reich, Waechter, 
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& Espinoza, 2008; Stoeckl, Rohrmeie, & Hess, 2007). Few studies have applied the U&G 
rationale to politically interested Internet users (Kaye & Johnson, 2002, 2004), and only 
a small, yet growing, body of studies have deployed the approach to explain how 
Internet users utilise social networking sites (SNSs)—in particular—to fulfill political 
needs (Leung L., 2009; Cozma & Ancu, 2009; Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Gary, Paul, 
& Rekha Sharma, 2008).  
Research on different media outlets (print, broadcast and more recently the Internet) 
has distinguished regular patterns of consumption and related gratifications. Some 
contrast information and surveillance media use with the entertainment or recreational 
functions they serve (Norris & Jones, 1998; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001; Shah, Kwak, & 
Holbert, 2001). Other studies have categorised media uses and functions under a wider 
umbrella of instrumental versus ritualised media orientations (Papacharissi & Rubin, 
2000), or instrumental versus symbolic uses (Diani, 2000).   
The applicable studies of new media functions and their influence on individuals’ 
political practices to date fall into two groups. Some researchers have looked at media 
uses in their relation to conventional political practices and to enhancing democracy 
that is focused primarily on voting and building social capital. A smaller, yet rapidly 
growing, body of research has investigated new media’s potential for mobilisation and 
democratic transformation. These clusters are discussed in the following pages. 
Media uses and conventional political practice: one of the ways to solve the dilemma 
of limited participation in collective action and increased numbers of free riders, as 
Putnam claims, is social capital (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2009, p. 1378). Social capital 
researchers have found results that support the importance and influence of different 
media functions for civic practices at the micro-level. This line of research focuses 
mainly on measuring citizens’ levels of resources, their motivation and attitudes, and 
the knowledge that facilitates their civic participation (Shah, 1998; Brehm & Rahn, 
1997).  
Studies of the relationship between media consumption and the production of social 
capital have mainly started with a focus on traditional media with rather doubtful views 
about media impact. These studies have failed to make a connection between media use 
and social capital production due to the methodological deficiency of looking at media 
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use through the measuring of time rather than by exploring the different functions that 
media serve for individuals. For example, the political scientist Robert Putnam (1995) 
views television viewership as a barrier to civic participation. He argues that time spent 
with media have ‘displacement effects’ on other activities that build the community. 
Putnam concludes that rising rates of television usage and a decline in newspaper 
readership are associated with a decline in civic practices and interpersonal trust. 
Furthermore, it is thought that mass media, particularly television, distortedly depicts 
social reality and cultivates a perception of the world as a mean place (Uslaner, 1998). 
However, such arguments, made by political scientists and sociologists about negative 
media effects on civic participation, have been criticised for being simplistic. They do 
not count on the varied functions that media serve; as they deal with media use as           
a measure of the time that individuals spend with a given medium or media. By doing 
so, they fail to recognise the multiplicity of motives and uses of media. They also 
propose a single mass communication experience (rather than multiple uses and 
motives), and one audience (rather than different types of users) (Shah, McLeod, & 
Yoon, 2001, p. 465). Such generalisations could be misleading, espacially with                   
a communication medium like the Internet; where individuals have different 
experiences that can by no means be regarded as universal (Norris & Jones, 1998).  
Nevertheless, this failure to transcend how much people use media, to considering how 
they use them has been extended to the Internet, yielding ambiguous and oversimplified 
conclusions. For example, Kraut et al.’s longitudinal analysis (1998) concludes that 
intensified use of the Internet corrodes domestic communication. As they write: “like 
watching television, using a home computer and the Internet generally implies physical 
inactivity and limited face-to-face social interaction” (p. 1019). Likewise, Internet use 
was argued to detach people from their social environment. Increases in time spent 
online were associated with decreases in the time people spend socialising and 
attending events outside the home (Nie & Erbring, 2002). Putnam (2000) also extended 
his views about television to the Internet. Although he acknowledges that the Internet is 
an incomparable outlet for free and easily accessed information, he still contends that 
information alone cannot produce the type of community ties and social capital 
required for the development and provision of democracy. Moreover, he raises 
concerns about the absense of important cues in Internet interactions and believes that 
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anonymity deprives the communication process of the important social cues that are 
readily present in face-to-face communication.  
In order to address the issue of collapsing new media use that includes varied activities 
into units of measure such as time online, a group of media scholars has made efforts to 
investigate the relationship between different patterns of media use and civic 
engagement. Research in this area has yielded dichotomous findings. The general 
argument is that the informational and surveillance functions of the Internet have pro-
civic and political consequences, while entertainment and diversion uses (i.e., chat room 
participation) associate negatively with civic participation (Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 
2001).  
In the early days of diffusion, the Internet was compared with traditional print and 
broadcast media. Shah, McLeod and Yoon (2001) found that Internet use patterns more 
strongly influence trust in people and civic participation than do uses of traditional 
media. They assert that patterns of use, rather than Internet use per se, is what matters 
for the study of media influence. In another study that looked solely at the Internet, 
Shah and colleagues (2001) corroborated the previous findings. They found that 
informational uses of the Internet are positively related to individual differences in the 
production of civic engagement, interpersonal trust, and contentment with life, whereas 
social-recreational uses are negatively related to these civic indicators. Both studies 
confirm that the relationship between new media and social capital is dynamic and 
highly contextual. In a more recent study, Shah and colleagues (2005) compared the 
role played by the Internet with traditional print and broadcast media and face-to-face 
communication. They found that online information seeking and interactive civic 
messaging—uses of the Web as a resource and a forum—both strongly influence civic 
engagement more than do other media.  
With the arrival of Web 2.0 technologies and the more active role individual users can 
play in the virtual sphere, media scholars have tried to understand these new media 
potentials for enhancing individuals’ social capital. It has been argued that SNSs are well 
suited to maintaining weak ties cheaply and easily. Hence, these technologies could 
greatly increase the individual’s heterogeneous network          of ties. “If this is true, it 
implies that the technologies that expand one’s social network will primarily result is an 
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increase in available information and opportunities — the benefits of a large, 
heterogeneous network” (Donath & boyd, 2004, p. 80). 
Certain media uses were found to support the production of social capital more than 
others. Informational uses of the Internet, for example, were found to encourage 
discussions about political issues and hence, to strengthen people’s tendency to engage 
in political activities (Nah, Veenstra, & Shah, 2006; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). 
Political surveillance functions were strongly and positively related to practising certain 
forms of political activity on this communicative channel, such as watching news, 
political ads, and direct-to-camera videos (Hanson, Haridakis, & Sharma, 2008). Some 
theorists link both information seeking and discussion of political issues to a common 
set of gratifications sought by users. In particular, Greenberg (1975) argues that the 
‘‘interpersonal utility’’ function explains that people consume news content so that they 
can relay that information to others and discuss issues more persuasively” (cited in Nah, 
Veenstra, & Shah, 2006, p. 231). Cozma and Ancu (2009) found that voters visited the 
MySpace profiles of primary candidates during the 2008 presidential campaign in the 
U.S.A. mainly for social interaction with supporters with whom they shared similar 
interests, followed by the information seeking and entertainment functions.  
While information seeking and entertainment were the strongest gratifications sought 
from the consumption of online political content, they came second after social 
interaction on MySpace and SNSs more broadly. Ellison et al. (2006), for example, found 
that information-seekers on Facebook were found to benefit from their online practices 
more than entertainment-oriented users of SNSs. Although these findings might seem 
consistent with the nature of SNSs as platforms created mainly for social utility 
purposes, they may yet seem at odds with SM’s role in maintaining democratic practices 
or in instigating democratic transformation. That is, it was found that users who rely on 
SNSs for political information are more likely to practise political activities than others, 
which might not be the case on SNSs. Facebook group use for recreational gratifications 
was not found to encourage users’ participation in political events in comparison to 
practising civic activities (Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & 
Bichard, 2010). However, it was suggested that the greater use of Facebook for 
entertainment, rather than for informational purposes, does not necessarily suggest       
a passive audience’s political role due to level of activity that using SM entails that is not 
 90 
 
present when using traditional media. “Entertaining one’s self via Facebook is 
fundamentally different than doing so watching television, due to the increased activity 
necessitated by the site and the connectivity-enhancing benefits” (Ellison, Steinfield, & 
Lampe, 2006, p. 28). This basic functional difference between new (and more 
interactive) and old media uses is expected to produce different influences in terms of 
enhancing (or hindering) political practice (Williams, 2006).  
Media uses and protesting: Extra-institutional politics has also had its share of SM 
influence and consequently of scholarly attention. Social movement organisations and 
individual activists seem to be ardent adopters of new communication technologies 
(Bennett, 2003a; van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, and Rucht, 2004). Functional 
categorisation of media uses, similar to those linked to political participation and civic 
engagement, has been linked, on a narrower scale, to social movement organisation and 
the mobilisation of unconventional collective practices. For example, in his critique       
of the Internet’s and SM’s potential to enhance democracy and undermine 
authoritarianism, Morozov (2012) distinguishes between the ‘instrumental’ and 
‘ecological’ uses of SM. Instrumental uses, according to Morozov, mean that the Internet 
is just a neutral tool and an amplifier, and all that matters is how people utilise it            
to achieve good or bad ends. Ecological uses, on the other hand, mean that the Internet 
transforms both the environment where politics is made, and those who participate in 
politics (p. 8, 12). 
It is inferred from Morozov (2012) and others’ (e.g., Diani, 2000) that instrumental uses 
of media function differently in the realm of social movements. As instrumental uses 
imply a more active role of media users and so entail a positive association with political 
participation, instrumentality may help activists to achieve certain goals that are related 
to organising their movement and to creating positive dispositions that help the 
movement thrive. Yet, as compared to symbolic uses of media, using new media             
as a means to certain ends does not necessarily help to develop and sustain social 
movements as, compared to symbolic uses, they do not feed into building identities and 
developing feelings of commitment to movements. These assumptions are specially 
explored in the following section.  
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3.3. Social media uses for social movement organisation 
An increasing body of research has pointed out that the availability and purposive use 
of digital media, such as websites, blogs and SNSs, has enabled large-scale collective 
action to be organised on individual-level networking structures. Assessed by various 
devices such as computers and mobile phones, such communication affordances lower 
the cost of mobilisation and participation in ways that seem to be altering the 
conventional logic of collective action. Besides the convenience of easier and less costly 
communication, the Internet also seems to have an influence on how movements 
organise by fostering loose ties and ideologically heterogeneous campaigns (Bennett 
2003a). For example, Lupia and Sin (2003) have contested the basic assumptions           
of collective action theories that associate sustained and coordinated action                     
to requisites such as formal organisation and leadership. Earl and Schussman (2002) 
argue that the Internet has facilitated faster communication, broader reach, and has 
expanded mobilisation capacity, allowing for an “entrepreneurial movement 
infrastructure” (p. 155). Along the same line, Bimber et al. (2005) have suggested            
a typology of a fluid collective action space in which a type of entrepreneurial, less 
centralised communication networks emerged among members of conventional 
(hierarchical, centralised) organisations. The success of several online collective 
endeavours has been ascribed to such organisational hybrids (Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 
2006). Bennett (2005) identifies three properties of what he calls “recent-generation 
transnational activism.” He argues that emerging transnational protests like global 
social justice movement and protests against the U.S. war and occupation of Iraq are 
distinguished for their “inclusive organisation models that favour diversity and issue-
linking through distributed networks; social technologies that facilitate these relatively 
decentralised, ‘‘leaderless’’ networks and help explain shifts in the scale of coordinated 
transnational activism; and the political capacities of members of these technology-rich 
networks to communicate their issues and form effective political relationships with 
targets of protest” (p. 203, emphasis in original). In fact, the Internet theoretically 
makes polycentric and non-hierarchical forms of movement organisation possible 
(Gerlach, 2001). 
Contrary to Durkeimian thinking on “mass society theory,” Oberschall stresses the 
importance of prior group coherence to the mobilisation of conflict groups. Starting at 
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zero-level mobilisation with shared interests but no organisation would significantly 
raise a group’s organising costs. A good solution, Oberschall argues, is to build, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, on existing group structure (cited in Tilly, 1978, p. 
81). The Internet seems to afford less-resourceful activists these less costly, more 
flexible prior organisation and more participatory structures (Bennett, 2003a). Earl and 
Kimport (2011) claim that when the costs of organising collective action are lower, the 
necessity of social movement organisations subsides. More generally, the Internet: 
… .. fits with the basic features with the kind of social movements emerging in the 
information age … .. To build an historical analogy, the constitution of the labour 
movement in the industrial era cannot be separated from the industrial factory as its 
organisational setting … .. The Internet is not simply a technology: it is a communication 
media, and it is the material infrastructure of a given organisational form: the network 
(Castells, 2001, pp. 135-136). 
One of the main parameters of social movements that mediate between individual 
networks as organisational form and political capacity and outcome achievement is 
identity building (Tindall, 2002). However, it is worth noting here that I shall not deal 
with identity issues empirically in this research. I am interested only in the extent to 
which certain forms of new media use might influence certain forms of identification, 
and how the latter could influence individual’s tendency to participate                                
in unconventional collective action. 
It has been argued that playing at being an “activist” is a prerequisite to becoming one 
(McAdam, 1986, p. 70) and hence, to participating in collective action. Additionally to 
benefitting social movements at their instrumental level of organisation and supporting 
collective action towards achieving a common goal, new communication technologies 
also seem to resonate with social movements at the normative level (della Porta, 2012). 
Thanks to the Internet, “we are now living in a more selective culture in which people 
are reflexive about their identities as citizens” (Coleman & Rowe, 2005, p. 5). However, 
although new media contribute to organising collective action at lower cost and enable 
forms of organisation that transcend traditional hierarchical models to develop more 
flexible organising structures, this fluidity still creates areas of tension that may feed 
into feelings of dissatisfaction about media’s contribution. For example, using SM as an 
organisational tool develops flexible identities, which raises concerns about 
commitment to, and sustainability of social movements. These speculations are 
discussed in the following section. 
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3.3.1. Instrumental uses of social media, identification with and commitment to 
social movements 
Unlike mass media, “social movements not only seek [audience] attention but also 
support and commitment” (Rucht, 2004, p. 33). Understanding how individuals identify 
with social movements has been increasingly discussed through the media lens (see, e.g. 
Castells, 2010; Pini, Brown, & Previte, 2004; van Zoonen, 1992). SM’s influence              
on developing collective identities is evident in recent research on social movements. 
Bennett (2005) concluded from his analysis of 705 cases around the February 15th, 
2003, antiwar demonstrations in the U.S.A., that participants who relied most on the 
Internet and other digital media for their political information and communication were 
more likely to have strong identification with the global justice movement when 
compared to those who relied less on digital media or more on mass media, like TV, 
newspapers and radio. della Porta and Mosca (2005) found that activists in the anti-G8 
protest in Genoa in July 200I and the European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence                
in November 2002 had used computer-mediated-communication (CMC) to develop 
what they called “non-virtual identities.” That is, using CMC makes activists think about 
and discuss certain topics both before a protest begins and later. It also helps them to 
communicate between one (physical) meeting and another. Due to the Internet’s 
capability to link distant and isolated individuals, it has been argued that the Internet 
fosters pluralist, open identities. Similarly, in his comparison between what he calls 
“direct action networks” and a more familiar model of organisationally brokered, 
ideological and issue-driven coalitions, Bennett (2005) concludes that using digital 
communication has allowed the diffusion of an organising code, or what is often termed 
“relationship-building”, based on meta-frames such as diversity, inclusiveness, and 
social justice. This ‘‘relaxed framing”, or what della Porta (2005) terms “tolerant 
identities”, enables individuals with varied positions to join in remarkably large actions. 
In fact, the Internet has promoted a form of 'individualised identities,' an archetype       
of a networked society, that can nurture, discover and deploy creative forms                    
of organisation through the Web (Castells, 1997). 
Using SM as mobilising structures for social movements thus influences the 
development of a form of identity that is usually flexible and tolerant in nature. This 
identification, on the one hand, relates to certain underpinnings that define its nature; 
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these are affiliations to formal social movement organisations (SMOs) and former 
experiences with collective action or direct contact with activists. On the other hand, 
flexibly identifying with social movements raises some concerns about the life cycle      
of movements and hence creates an area of tension about SM’s potential for supporting 
sustained collective action that is primarily practised off-line. These assumptions are 
discussed below.  
Flexible identification with movements has been valid at the organisational level only. 
In general, the Internet did not seem to have an influence on the identification process 
with the analysed movement (della Porta & Mosca, 2005). In fact, Bennett believes that 
facilitating identity bridging through social technologies has incapacitated “movement 
with weak collective identity and a relatively weak core political agenda” (Bennett, 
2005, p. 225). More recently, Bennett et al. (2008) argued that digital media can 
redefine the dynamics of social movement organisation in that they may enable 
“sustainable interpersonal network organisation on a large scale that is (to varying 
degrees) independent of and in some cases, may act upon conventional institutional 
organisations.” Yet they emphasise that “organisations continue to play important roles 
in connecting and mobilising activists” (p. 271, 272). This role, according to Earl and 
Kimport (2011) resides (among other aspects) in facilitating the “collection and 
strategic deployment of [movement] resources, and in doing so, fund(ing) selective 
incentives” (p. 68). According to resource mobilization theory, social movements 
partially use their resources to provide incentives which might be able to overweigh the 
costs associated with protest and reduce free riding (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). 
With the rapid development and increasing influence of “digitally-networked action” 
(DNA), Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have recently loosened up this organisational 
affiliation condition for movement identification. They articulated a new form                 
of connective action that “invites analytical attention to the network as an organisational 
structure in itself.” They argue that “communication technologies do not change the 
action dynamics in large-scale networks characterised by the logic of collective action 
[but] in the networks characterised by connective action, they do” (p. 753). Other 
researchers have also reached a similar conclusion. For example, Diani (2011) argues 
that networks are in themselves organisational structures that can surpass the 
fundamental units of organisations and individuals rather than being just components 
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of collective action (cited in Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). However, Bennett and 
Segerberg do not exclude off-line exchanges and actions from the equation of sustained, 
politically effective organisation and mobilisation. Rather, they argue that “the flexible, 
recombinant nature of DNA makes these web spheres and their off-line extensions more 
than just communication systems” (emphasis added) (p. 753). 
Previous experience with collective participation was also found to be influential           
in regard to individuals’ identification with social movements. A high percentage of the 
non-organised who participated in previous demonstrations, were found to identify 
with movement in general (della Porta & Mosca, 2005). This suggests that, in the 
absence of formal organising structures and/or prior participatory experience, 
developing an activist identity merely through SM use might be a tough goal to achieve. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that instrumental utilisation, as opposed to symbolic, 
normative or ideologically-oriented use of digital media, might help reinforce existing 
identities but not to create new ones (Diani, 2000). Bimber (2001) empirically 
examined an instrumental model of political information and its relationship to political 
engagement at the individual level. He concluded that instrumental uses of information 
do not predict political participation. Contrary to instrumental-quantitative perceptions 
of theories of behaviour, Bimber suggests that “if information technology is to affect 
political participation, it will likely be through [influencing] attention, salience, affect, 
schema, and other cognitive phenomena involved in the formation of political 
knowledge … .. rather than through simple reduction in cost or increases in the volume 
of political information” (emphasis added) (p. 64). Furthermore, van Laer (2010) argues 
that “using the Internet … .. seems to not be particularly conducive to creating                   
a stronger collective identity or reinforcing the perceived efficacy of the demonstration 
[online and off-line activists] participated in” (p. 359). Using SM to support the 
organising and practising of collective action towards the manifestation of a common 
good thus does not necessarily result in the construction of new participatory identities 
or the turning of non-activists and less-interested citizens into active participants. 
Rather, SM’s contributions build upon pre-existing identities due to prior experience 
and/or formal affiliation to social movement organisation(s). In fact, using digital media 
for identity building might create situations where some participants in protests carry 
signs with whose sentiments they did not agree and they “didn’t even look at it [but 
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were] just waving it’’ (Bennett, 2005, p. 204). Such cases cast doubt on the capacity       
of political practice and the efficiency of the ultimate outcome of collective action (van 
Laer & van Aelst, 2010; Bennett, 2005).  
As for commitment to movements, it has generally been suggested that research           
on social movements has raised some normative rather than instrumental constraints 
that influence different social movements’ use of the media (della Porta, 2012, p. 52).     
A legitimate question here, then, is how these newly-formed, loose, manifold identities 
might reflect on social movements and the sustainable practice of collective action7.       
A range of empirical studies indicates that the digital media are unable to serve 
sustained collective action or to guarantee participants’ commitment to social 
movement. The abundance of the alternatives of associations that are available online 
might foster low level of commitment that links individuals to such fluid structures. As 
Norris writes; “commitments to any particular online group can often be shallow and 
transient when another is but a mouse click away. Most purely online communities 
without any physical basis are usually low-cost, ‘easy-entry, easy-exit’ groups” (p. 4). 
della Porta rang the bells of “depoliticisation” and fragmentation due to social 
movements’ comprehension as “particularist actors” (della Porta, 2012, p. 42). van Laer 
(2010) studied motivations to participate in collective action and Internet use by both 
online and off-line activists. He found that both instrumental motives and collective 
identity motives to participate in collective action only slightly drive activists’ use of the 
Internet, i.e., the belief that something can be changed and that participation                    
in demonstrations is an effective way to do so (instrumental motives), and participants’ 
feeling of group belonging and-group solidarity do not significantly differ between off-
line and online activists. van Laer has thus conversely suggested that using the Internet 
does not particularly fertilise stronger collective identity nor the perceived efficacy                 
of collective action. Earl and Schussman (2002) earlier raised the problem of the 
strength of commitment to social movements. They contended that the rise                      
of “e-activism” has created movement “users” rather than “members.” They argue that 
while using the Internet has enabled the fast growth and wide spread of protests, this 
boom is usually followed by a faster decline in commitment. Along the same line, Garrett 
                                                        
7 It should be noted that these studies were conducted in the context of transnational protests, where 
diversity and flexibility are expected to emerge as a consequence of protesters heterogeneity (see also 
Walgrave & Verhulst, 2009). 
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(2006) argues that technology-enabled additions to the repertoire of collective action 
might constrain the set of actions an activist can perform and may eventually formalise 
the role of activists and limit them. van Laer and van Aelst (2010), although confirming 
the role of the Internet in creating new opportunities for collective engagement, think 
that the Internet has made political action too easy, in some cases limiting the final 
impact of a certain action. As they write “it seems that the new media … ..  more 
fundamentally are unable to create stable ties between activists that are necessary for 
sustained collective action” (p. 1146). Using the Internet for political purposes might, 
then, result in a state of motivational dissonance; where participants have the motives 
for participation, yet these motivations might be spurred by ease of use or the lower 
cost of online practices. Individuals, therefore, may relent on online practices and prefer 
them to taking to the streets, which could hamper the sustainability of the political 
process, since it might not support the creation (or reinforcement) of significant 
participatory parameters such as collective identity and political efficacy.  
Scholars also disagree about the potential of new communication technologies for 
empowering poorer people. While some emphasise a possible equalisation (Myers, 
2002), others instead suggest either a neutral impact or the normalisation of political 
activity (Margolis & Resnick, 2000), or even more concentration of power (McChesney, 
1996). CMC seems to favour the elite over the masses, and it tends to reproduce the 
digital divide and hierarchy, and develops vertical relations instead of interactive, 
horizontal relationships (Rucht, 2003, p. 28). Rucht further suggests that “online 
activism could become a low-cost but also a low-effect substitute for off-line protest (p. 
31).  
Individuals do not make decisions about participation in a social vacuum (Fernandez & 
McAdam, 1988), hence, there are some aspects that are specific to the participatory 
context in authoritarian regimes to which it is worth paying attention when discussing 
collective activism in such contexts. Such contextualisation of understandings sheds 
new light on structural approaches to movements. From a political process perspective, 
it has been argued that “societal environments in which aggrieved groups exist both 
affect their capacities to gather resources, and affect the efficacy of their use of those 
resources once gathered. (Williams, 2004, p. 95) 
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3.4. Social media and shaping opportunities in repressive contexts 
‘Political opportunity’ is a general concept that has received hardly any consensus. It has 
been defined, interpreted and applied differently to a variety of empirical issues in the 
study of social movements. McAdam (1996) has argued that such variant utilisation      
of the concept might put its value at stake. For McAdam, variations in the present use   
of the term stem from three key sources. First, he argues, political opportunities should 
not be mixed with other ‘facilitating conditions.’ He blames several scholars (Gamson 
and Meyer, 1996; Brand, 1990) for example, for mixing cultural factors or processes 
that may create opportunities for movement activity with the opportunities themselves. 
Second, McAdam stresses the importance of specifying the dimensions of political 
opportunity based on the assumption that it is “less a variable than a cluster                     
of variables—some more readily observable than others” (Tarrow, 1988, p. 430). Third, 
McAdam adds another dimension to the relevant dependant variables used to study 
political opportunity. He suggests that ‘movement form,’ along with the ‘timing               
of collective action’ and the ‘outcome of movement activity,’ should be considered as 
one of the dependent variables that is owed, in part, to variations in the nature of the 
opportunities that contribute to the emergence of particular movements. 
However, as the vague utilisation of the concept of political opportunity                              
is acknowledged, the flexibility suggested by its varied use is useful for this current 
inquiry. Discussion in this section mainly focuses on the role new digital media have, 
and still are, playing in shaping the favouring of political dispositions to participation in 
social movements, rather than focusing on political opportunity structures as 
systematic changes in polity and shifts in power that render a given regime vulnerable 
to challenge from different interested actors and groups (some of these changes were 
previously discussed in Chapter Two). In fact, McAdam (1996) asserts that Gamson and 
Meyer (1996) are right to emphasise the importance of the framing of political 
opportunity and the crucial role played by the media in structuring this process. These 
processes, McAdam argues, are important for a full understanding of movement 
dynamics. By doing so, it would be possible to link discussion of such processes to the 
wider political context of the current study, and to gauge whether this context 
represents “cases in which clearly favourable political shifts do not yield the kinds         
of empowering interpretations so necessary to collective action”, and/or “collective 
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action develops in the absence of any significant change in the relative power position 
of the challenging group(s),” (McAdam, 1996, p. 26) and how new communication 
technologies might have contributed to shaping opportunities for involvement in either 
case. 
From the social psychological perspective of social movements and collective action 
analysis, variation in personality characteristics, additional to structural or network 
theories and rational choice theories, may explain participation in collective action. To 
focus the discussion more, and to avoid confusion that might stem from the abundance 
of possible opportunities, coupled with the aforementioned varied use of the concept, 
the discussion builds upon Opp’s (2009) explication of Olson’s (1971) implicit micro-
macro theory of collective action.8 Two parameters of possible opportunities are 
particularly highlighted: lowering the cost of participationwith special emphasis on 
fear                 of repression as a form of high cost/risk normally attached to participation                       
in repressive regimes, and political efficacy that is crucial for participation in such 
excluding, threatening contexts. In other words: 
  
                                                        
8 Opp (2009, p. 50-51) identified four conditions for individual participation at the micro-level. These 
conditions are:  
(1) Selective incentives: The stronger the positive incentives for contributing and the stronger the 
negative selective incentives for not contributing, the more likely individuals are to contribute  
to the provision of the public good. Individuals tend to evaluate incentives against behaviour and 
they participate only if they perceive this behaviour to be rewarding.  
(2) Costs: The higher the cost of contributing to the provision of the public good, the less likely         
is contribution. This proposition entails that individual actors will refrain from being involved  
in collective actions which they perceive to be costly; whether costly means spending money, 
time, or suffering risk due to participation in a repressive context. The more new information 
and communication technology participate in lowering the cost of participation, the more they 
contribute to the provision of the collective good. 
(3) Public good motivation: The more intense the goal of providing the public good is, the more 
likely individuals will be to contribute.  
(4) Efficacy: The higher the influence of an individual’s contribution on the provision of a public 
good is, the more likely an individual will be to contribute. 
If individuals have an intense preference for the public good and believe that their contribution 
will have an impact, then they have a reason to participate in collective action to make this 
public good materialise. Considered together, the public good motivation and efficacy 
proposition are argued to have a multiplicative (or interaction) effect. That is, “the effect of the 
intensity of the motivation to provide the public good depends on the extent to which the 
contribution makes a difference and vice versa” (p. 51). 
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In [Western democracies], ample opportunities exist for forming groups, for mobilising 
new members or personal networks, and for cooperation with other groups. 
Consequently, communication critical of the incumbent government or political system 
can be exchanged without fear of severe repression. These conditions are not met in 
authoritarian societies. Attempts to establish opposition networks are blocked by 
government agencies and are severely sanctioned. Communicating critical opinions to 
friends and acquaintances is also risky (Opp & Gern, 1993, p. 659). 
3.4.1. Social media and lower-cost/risk opportunities of participation 
Recent developments in communication technology have provided easier and safer 
space where individuals can participate in low-cost (and low risk) actions. Such 
developments may change the dynamics of collective action by addressing one of the 
factors that may act as psychological barriers to overt participation in collective action. 
For example, McAdam (1996) lists the ‘state’s capacity and propensity for repression’ 
among his synthesised list of the dimensions of political opportunity It is expected, then, 
that the higher the oppressive reactions towards (and indeed the cost of) public 
political activities, the less likely individuals would be to become involved in such 
actions.  
Applying an approach similar to rational choice’s costs and benefits, or what they term 
the ‘leveraged affordances approach,’ Earl and Kipmort (2011) traced the cost 
affordance of the web and how cost leveraging impacts both on the organisation of and 
participation in protests. They argue that innovative uses of the Web for protest add 
new mechanisms to organisation and the practice of collective action, allowing for more 
flexibility in structure and exercis. Thanks to the Web, Earl and Kimport argue, protest 
has become less costly, and meaningful collective action has become possible without 
the traditional requirement of copresence. As for creating opportunities for the 
organisers, they were more reserved in assuming the possibility of the existance            
of organisation-free social movements. For example, they believe that while Web 
technologies have enabled the organising of events at lower cost, a formal 
organisational presence seems to be crucial to afford cleaning up in the aftermath          
of collective events. However, Earl and Kimport believe that accelerating innovations   
in Web use might allow for movement growth without the aid of formal organisation.  
The safer virtual environment of communication and practice could benefit the non-
politicised (and soft-core activists) who might not have the competences and prior 
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experience necessary to identify with social movements and to participate in collective 
action, especially when their practices fall outside the realm of conventional politics and 
may bring unwanted consequences. In their empirical study of how context affected 
individual protesters against the war in Iraq, Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) argue that 
perceived support from public opinion and the media matters for the inclusion               
of diverse participants and in broadening the scale of protests. On the governmental 
side, they argue that “the more governments (political elites) tolerate and even support 
protest events, the more protest will become further normalised” (p. 1378). It is 
expected, then, that one’s perception of being in a minority, or the inability to weigh 
one’s political stances against another’s in the constituency may induce withdrawal 
from the public realm of political practice; especially for those who are non-politicised 
or less-interested in politics.  
Allowing platforms for the venting of emotions and the shaping and buttressing              
of ideology (Kwon & Nam, 2009), instigating feelings of being more psychologically 
empowered through acts of reading, writing, and commenting on other people’s blogs 
and posting videos on YouTube  (Leung, 2009), and raising one’s self-esteem and life 
satisfaction by the intensive use of Facebook (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; 
Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2008) all act as catalysts for participation, which may then feed 
into individuals’ sense of belonging to their community and may even colour their civic 
identity with a commemorative sense of honour.  
As previously discussed, prior social upbringing and governmental repression are 
expected to alter individuals’ perceptions of themselves as competent agents for change 
in their societies and hence influence their tendency to take part in collective action. 
Such negative perceptions may place those who fear repression and feel inefficacious   
in the “latitude of rejection” rather than the “latitude of acceptance” of collective action 
participation, i.e., “certain prior attitudes will virtually preclude a segment of the 
population from participating in even the safest forms of activism” (McAdam, 1986, p. 
68). These perceptions might apply to a certain cause for which individuals mobilise (or 
are being mobilised), and they can also apply to the issue of involvement itself and how 
meaningful individuals think their participation will be.  
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Researchers have looked at participation versus non-participation among motivated 
individuals. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) provide an interesting outline of the size 
of these respective groups in their study of recruitment to a major peace demonstration 
in the Netherlands. The authors conclude from their pre and post interviews with            
a sample of 114 individuals that 26 percent of interviewees fell within the "latitude of 
rejection" with regard to the demonstration’s goals. Nearly three-quarters of the sample 
thus remained potentially available for recruitment. Yet only four percent actually 
attended the rally, meaning that a majority of 90 percent of those who are attitudinally 
available for activism chose not to participate. McAdam (1986) ascribes the difference 
between attitudinal affinity and actual participation fairly slightly to the role                    
of individual attitudes (and the background factors from which they derive). He 
assumes that this withdrawal may be due to the lack of prior contact with a recruiting 
agent who could have highlighted the significant social costs of non-participation           
to potential participants. However, McAdam’s explanation applies for recruitment         
to low-risk and cost-free forms of activism. Similarly, issue-attitudes did not also seem 
to drive individuals’ tendency to participate in protests following the Three Mile Island 
(TMI) accident in Pennsylvania.  In their empirical comparative study of the 
mobilisation processes between activists and free riders, Walsh and Warland (1983) 
found that 87 percent (288 of 330) of the TMI opponents and 98 percent of the TMI 
supporters were objective free riders. To illustrate the reasons behind this high 
percentage of free riders, the researchers asked activists to guess why persons who 
were essentially in agreement with their local social movement organisation’s goals did 
not become actively involved with the group. They also asked the free riders why they, 
themselves, did not become involved. The activists mentioned “political powerlessness” 
most frequently, and only four percent gave reasons that could be classified as "overt 
free riding." Interestingly, none suggested communication or recruitment shortcomings 
as a possible explanation. The largest number (26 percent) of free riders, on the other 
hand, said they had never heard of their local protest group. Familial preoccupations 
were the second most frequently mentioned reason (18 percent) (p. 773). 
However, these effects have been widely analysed and discussed in Western 
democracies, where participatory context differs significantly from that in authoritarian 
regimes. In such regimes, policing protests and the state’s repressive responses to anti-
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government activities “have raised the stakes of virtual and physical protest,” (Lim, 
2012, p. 557) hence, assessing these influences in regard to specificities of totalitarian 
regimes might draw different perspectives to the picture.   
Starting from McAdam’s (1986) argument that “safe” forays into activism may have 
longer-range consequences [as] they place the new recruit “at risk” of being drawn into 
more costly forms of participation through [a] cyclical process of integration and 
resocialisation,” (p. 69) it is suggested that SM allow an opportunity for online safe 
activism that might lead to street participation. However, SM might not be suitable        
in themselves for inducing high-risk activism that is normally practised off-line.             
To further clarify this argument, according to McAdam, the gist of high-risk 
participation is not in providing an opportunity for safe practice per se, which could be 
afforded online. Rather, this safe practice, as shown in the quotation below, needs          
to involve ongoing processes of activist identity acquisition that eventually raise the 
appeal of more demanding activism, which requires more direct interaction with real 
activists. In other words: 
Each succeeding foray into safe forms of activism increases the recruit's network 
integration, ideological affinity with the movement, and commitment to an activist 
identity, as well as his receptivity to more costly forms of participation. It is this type     
of gradual recruitment process that is likely to foster high-risk/cost activism (McAdam, 
1986, p. 70). 
Studies such as those of Taylor (1989) on abeyance structures and Melucci’s (1986, 
1996) work on networks’ and movements’ latency, suggest that “movements in less 
repressive societies have ways of perpetuating themselves and biding time during times 
of low opportunity, in order that they might re-engage when opportunities improve” 
(cited in Crossley, 2002, p. 112). SM could thus serve as less contolled spaces where 
activists could safely bide their time and re-organise themselves during times of high 
risk or polity closed to practice. They can also be spaces where resistance cultures are 
cultivated and nurtured. Additionally, some studies, e.g., those of Scott (1985, 1990), 
point to the possibility that subterranean resistance cultures emerge in the context       
of highly repressive regimes. Such cultures might not engage in overt protest actions    
to avoid drastic consequences, such as detention or execution, but they generate and 
produce resistance identities and beliefs. These cultures, Scott argues, embody gestures 
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and symbols of resistance that are woven into the fabric of everyday life (cited in 
Tarrow, 2011).  
One of the main attributions of SM that benefits activists in repressive regimes is the 
allowance of anonymous interactions between different media users. Social 
psychologists suggest that this anonymity may be most important for excluded and 
marginalised cohorts who are otherwise alienated from interactions outside their 
group, e.g., single mothers working at home, gay men, or rural poor populations 
(McKenna & Bargh, 2006). Anonymity may also loosen the ties of social status and allow 
for a more mutually inclusive environment of interaction. It has been argued that 
“textual communication via the Internet strips away the standard visual and aural cues 
of social identity—including those of gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status—
plausibly promoting heterogeneity” (Norris, 2004, p. 5).  
Nevertheless, communicating anonymously may diminish the locus of the 
communication process as it polarises debates rather than creating a common ground 
between the different lines of debated thought and contrasting points of view (Sunstein, 
2002). While heterogeneity allows for the inclusion of more diverse populations on the 
Internet, as Norris (2004) suggests, communicative cues are important for the 
development of social identity. Putnam (2000), although he has acknowledged the 
Internet as an incomparable outlet for free and easily accessed information, has still 
contended that information alone cannot produce the type of community ties and social 
capital required for the development and provision of active participation. He believes 
that anonymity deprives the communication process of important social cues that are 
readily available in face-to-face communication. Anonymity on the Internet may harm 
the development of social movements as “participants in computer-base groups find it 
harder to reach consensus and feel less solidarity with one another.” Consequently, they 
develop “a asense of ‘depersonalisation’ and [become] less satisfied with the group’s 
accomplishments” (p. 172). Communicating from behind a pseudonym might also shake 
activists’ credibility and limit their opportunities to meet people off-line to enact their 
activism in the real, and even more threatening, sphere. Internet resources that are 
anonymous and lack interpersonal connections among users (e.g., bulletin 
boards/mailing lists) are deemed less trustworthy (Johnson & Kaye, 2000). Further,      
it has been argued that the anonymity and deindividualisation of Internet membership 
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in numerous groups “may replace real world interactions to the detriment of the 
solidarity and singular purpose associated with social movement” (emphasis added) 
(Lim, 2012, p. 557). 
Moreover, it seems that businesses like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube still conceive   
of themselves as platforms mainly designed for fulfilling social utility and entertainment 
purposes. Using pseudonyms may benefit activists in circumventing government 
censorship and in avoiding authority harassment, but doing so on Facebook is 
considered a violation of the company’s user agreement. For example, the company 
actually shut down one of the protest-group pages in December, 2010. Supporters 
eventually persuaded Facebook to restore the page. While Google has signed the Global 
Network Initiative—a compact for preventing Web censorship by authoritarian 
governments—Facebook has refused to do so (Howard & Hussain, 2011, pp. 46-47).  
To summarise, anonymity as a parameter of safety in the online sphere is paradoxical 
for collective activism in authoritarian contexts. On the one hand, it may benefit 
oppositional groups and allow them safer opportunity for inclusion and practice, yet it 
may, on the other, cause some difficulties in relation to commitment and the building of 
mutual trust and credibility, that are much needed in sustaining collective, 
unconventional practice in reality. For example, Earl and Schussman (2004) found that 
hostile state reactions to online activism increase the potential costs to activists, which 
propel many activists (or organisers) to stop organising. On the other side of the coin, as 
time passes, dictators develop adaptation strategies and utilise new communication 
technologies to crack down on activists on- and off-line. In fact, new communication 
technologies can afford authoritarian governments what Morozov (2012) called “the 
post-protest clean up.” Facial recognition technology, voice analysis, and mobile 
tracking negate the anonymity thesis and could all be used to identify protest 
participants. 
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3.4.2. Social media and political efficacy as opportunity for participation  
The relationship between political efficacy, media and political participation has been 
established by different threads of research. Generally, it has been argued that 
purposive use of media as sources of information and platforms for interaction grants 
individuals new skills, allows them opportunities to hone their existing ones and share 
their transferable skills and learn from others (i.e., Gennaro & Dutton, 2006). Feeling 
politically influential may raise their feelings of being powerful and capable                      
of influencing their political environment, which eventually results in more 
participation (Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 2010). In other words: 
Perceived efficacy plays a key role in human functioning because it affects behaviour not 
only directly, but by its impact on other determinants such as goals and aspirations, 
outcome expectations, affective proclivities, and perception of impediments and 
opportunities in the social environment (Bandura, 2000, p. 75). 
In a country like Egypt, where the regime suppresses opposition and hinders active 
political participation, especially when it contradicts the elites’ interests, it is expected 
that individuals may accumulate a feeling of inefficiency; as they tend to believe that 
exerting change is beyond their capabilities (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982).  
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) have described the concept of political efficacy as 
“the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen 
can play a part in bringing about this change” (p. 187, cited in Kenski & Stroud, 2006, p. 
174). Political efficacy includes both internal and external aspects. According to Niemi 
et al. (1991), “beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and 
institutions to citizens’ demands” define external efficacy whereas citizens’ 
“competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics” describes internal 
efficacy (p. 1407, 1408). 
Proponents suggest that SM have the potential to increase individuals’ feeling                  
of political efficacy. They can enhance external political efficacy because they enable 
ordinary citizens to construct their own messages, address and interact with publics, 
and hold officials accountable. The Internet also makes access to information about 
politics and discussions of political issues more convenient and much easier for 
individuals. In that sense, new communication technologies may enhance individuals’ 
internal political efficacy. Internet anonymity is one of the communicative attributes 
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that helps individuals with less experience in politics to communicate their views more 
confidently. Cornfield (2003) suggests that the Internet makes people less embarrassed 
about their political competence, he writes “the anonymity [the Internet] offers may 
assuage the fear of public embarrassment” (p. 106, cited in Kenski & Stroud, 2006, p. 
175). Interacting anonymously provides “structural protection” (Tedesco, 2007, p. 
1184) of individuals’ characteristics. This could bolster individuals’ morale to become 
involved in political issues without necessarily worrying about their safety and their 
government’s reactions to their online activities. Through analysing Internet survey 
data in the United Kingdom, Gennaro and Dutton (2006) found that Internet experience 
had a significant impact on political interest, political efficacy and online political 
participation.  
These studies mainly found connections between political information–seeking on the 
Internet and political attitudes and participation. However, another body of research 
has shown more sceptical views on the Internet’s influence on political attitudes and 
has leaned more towards supporting the role traditional media (i.e., newspaper and 
television) use could play in this regard. For example, Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) 
found that the impact of Web-based forms of communication on political efficacy, 
knowledge, and participation is limited compared to the impact of traditional 
communication. They found that particularly those who use the Web for entertainment 
purposes were less likely to feel efficacious in their potential role in the political process 
and were also less knowledgeable about current events. In a study they conducted later, 
Nisbet and Scheufele, (2004) found that Internet campaign exposure only had a modest 
influence on political efficacy, political knowledge, and campaign participation.  
On the other hand, opponents suggest that the Internet might bring about a decline       
in political efficacy, knowledge, and participation. For example, there are many 
complications in finding accurate and accessible political information online (Kenski & 
Stroud, 2006, p. 176). Many believe that Internet campaigns have “inherently weak 
mechanisms of information quality control,” and that the “Internet is a better medium 
for disseminating information and opinions than for building trust, developing 
coherence and resolving controversies” (Clark & Themudo, 2003, p. 114). Further, 
external efficacy may decrease if individuals attempting to contact their representatives 
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were discouraged by receiving either a formal letter response or no response at all 
(Johnson & Kaye, 2003).  
Other studies, however, did not find that the Internet was positively related to efficacy 
(Kaye & Johnson, 2004; Jennings & Zeitner, 2003; Johnson & Kaye, 2003; Lin & Lim, 
2002). For example, McCluskey et al. (2004) identified two distinct forms of efficacy: 
actual efficacy and expected efficacy. They researched how community integration and 
media use affect these two distinct perceptions of efficacy. Their community survey 
study showed that only television news use was a significant predictor of evaluations   
of actual efficacy. Newspaper reading and Internet information exchange were 
significant only after community integration was entered into the regression equation. 
Contrary to expectations, informational Internet use had a negative effect on the 
evaluations of desired citizen efficacy, suggesting it reduces expectations of political 
influence. Interestingly, they found that the efficacy gap predicted collaborative and 
individual participation differently. Individuals were more likely to disengage from 
collaborative acts when their perceived influence was far from their desired level          
of influence. Instead, they were more likely to engage in individual modes of political 
participation when their self-perception of their actual influence failed to meet their 
expectations (p. 446). Looking at efficacy as a precedent to media use, Kaye and Johnson 
(1996) found that self-eﬃcacy emerged as a major predictor of how individuals used 
the Internet for political information. Self-efficacy influenced whether individuals used 
the Internet for guidance and for information seeking/surveillance needs. However,      
in 2000, self-eﬃcacy was not a predictor. This ﬁnding, Jonson and Kaye suggest, 
indicates that the Web is no longer viewed as much as a place for those with a strong 
sense of self-eﬃcacy as it was in 1996, but has become a venue for mainstream users 
who are less activist in nature (Kaye & Johnson, 2004, p. 219). In 2002, they further 
examined the associations between Internet motives and political attitudes (trust in the 
government, interest in politics, likelihood of voting, strength of party affiliation, and 
self-efficacy). Their study showed that political attitudes were more strongly linked      
to information-seeking/surveillance and guidance motives than to the entertainment 
motives of Internet use (Kaye & Johnson, 2002). 
High levels of activity in media use have the potential to develop a sense of political 
efficacy. Advanced information seeking, which requires effort, time and resources,         
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is necessary to develop efficacy (Bandura, 1986). Differences have been reported 
between exposure to (or use of) a certain communication medium and reliance on that 
medium, which involves higher levels of selectivity and activity. Pinkleton, Austin, and 
Fortman (1998) found that active media use was a significant predictor of external self-
efficacy when controlling education and cynicism.  
Individuals usually play an active role in SM sphere, which influences their feelings       
of empowerment and political value. They produce and share media content, rather 
than playing the passive role of mere receivers. To borrow Bandura’s words, they use 
SM technologies to build their agency as “producers of experiences and shapers              
of events” (2000, P. 75). Tedesco’s (2007) pre-test/post-test experiment on Web 
interactivity―interaction with the Web (user-to-system), with the content (user-to-
document) or with other users (user-to-user)―reveals that increased interactivity 
opportunities on political websites increase political information which, in turn, 
increases the likelihood that participants will value activities (such as voting) as an 
important engagement activity. The level of activity that users exert in e-discussions 
influences the potential impact that involvement has on their political capacity. For 
example, some Internet users do not actually participate in discussions but, rather, they 
are quiet observers, or ‘lurkers’, who never participate, whereas others frequently 
participate in discussions (Ha, 1995). Kenski and Stroud (2006) categorised Internet 
use under the headings: information, entertainment and interaction purposes. They 
found that Internet access and online exposure to political information are significantly, 
but rather slightly, associated with political efficacy, knowledge, and participation. Lee 
(2006) found that using the Internet for information, entertainment, and interactive 
purposes positively influenced internal, but not external, political efficacy. He proposed 
that the Internet could increase political efficacy by helping users interact with 
politically active social groups. Wang (2007) looked at two components of political use 
of the Internet: information seeking and opinion-expression and how they influence 
political attitudes and political participation in Taiwan. He found that expressing 
opinion on the Internet can predict political interest, political trust, and political efficacy 
better than seeking information on the Internet. This finding emphasises the 
proposition that higher levels of activity and interactivity on and through SM are 
associated with higher levels of political efficacy. Similarly, Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) 
 110 
 
found that combining discussion with political information on the Internet increased 
political efficacy. 
Media reliance involves a degree of the perceived importance of given medium/media 
that positively influences levels of efficacy. Bandura (1997) has noted that media use 
helps develop political knowledge and instigate additional information seeking, and can 
thus enhance efficacy. He suggests that satisfaction is key to this process as individuals 
may turn to other information sources if their needs are not fulfilled. Media can induce 
political involvement if individuals believe they benefit from the information sources 
they provide (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001). The perceived importance of communication 
modalities and related feeling of satisfaction also increase the levels of efficacy. 
Individuals may rely on a certain medium, but yet not watch (or read) sufficient levels 
of news to achieve high levels of political activity and efficacy (Miller & Reese, 1982). SM 
are alternative platforms that offer abundant information and allow more autonomous 
transmissions through which individuals can circumvent the state’s hegemony over 
mainstream media. This autonomy allows individuals to select media channels and 
information sources that better satisfy their needs and feed into their sense of efficacy. 
Accordingly, if individuals refrain from consuming mainstream media content due         
to feelings of cynicism against the political system and state-run media, then it is 
expected that their levels of alternative media use and related feelings of efficacy might 
increase. 
SM provide alternative structures to formal organisations. Belonging to these structures 
(i.e., online activist groups) gives individuals a sense of belonging and generates feelings 
of efficacy that emerge from participating in group discussions and activities. It has 
been found that organisational participation produces feelings of personal efficacy 
(Sayre 1980; Neal & Seaman, 1964, cited in Friedman & McAdam, 1992). However, such 
association was ascribed either to a raised feeling of political efficacy and the 
meaningfulness of activism that is based on more engagement in organisational 
activities, or to the high level of information that increases the chances that members 
will be more informed about movement activity (Friedman & McAdam, 1992). In both 
cases, SM increase discussions about certain issues that concern the group (activity) and 
disseminate information about the movement and its activities.  
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Forming and joining political groups and interacting with others online also make 
individuals feel that they are in a majority and that their opinions and actions are 
worthwhile. Belonging to a network has a special potential for increasing political 
efficacy, especially in repressive states. These networks may contribute to the 
distribution of social power. In China, it has been suggested that the “incremental 
structural change brought to society by the Internet through expanding users’ social 
network could cultivate an active online opinion expression environment” (Shen, Wang, 
Guo, & Guo, 2009, p. 467). The researchers found that Internet use was positively and 
directly associated with online opinion expression, which eventually feeds into political 
participation. This connection was partially amplified in sizable social networks while 
Internet efficacy was found to be irrelevant to individuals’ political use of the medium. 
In other words, state hegemony on the Internet might have shaken people’s beliefs        
in the medium’s capacity to bring about any feasible change. As Shen et al. write, “it 
seems possible that the insignificant relationship between Internet use and Internet 
efficacy implies the psychological consequence induced by state censorship [which] has 
successfully stifled people’s willingness to speak out through eroding their beliefs about 
the power of the Internet” (p. 467, 468).  
Expanding people’s social networks offers another benefit that is relevant to practising 
collective action. In addition to facilitating opinion expression, as Shen and colleagues 
(2009) found, expanded social networks have the potential to make individuals feel that 
their actions (or opinions) areto use Olson’s (1971) expressionnoticeable. SM make 
this visibility possible. For example, an individual can notice how the size of his online 
group increases on Facebook, how people react to his/her posts (i.e., the number of 
likes, shares and comments), how many followers s/he has on Twitter, or how many 
hits a video s/he uploaded on YouTube gets. However, Referring to Opp’s (2009) 
structuralisation of Olson’s theory of collective action, Olson hypothesises that, at the 
macro level, the individual contribution in a large group is not noticeable (and thus not 
efficacious). This might lead to the suggestion that the larger the online group, the less 
efficacious members of the group will feel which, in turn, reflects negatively, on their 
contribution to collective action or public good.  
The Internet also serves a similar goal in democratic contexts. Both traditional and 
electronic discussion networks were found to contribute to political participation 
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around the Iraq War amongst opponents to the War who used the Internet as a tool      
to develop an understanding of the conflict. When individuals oppose the actions           
of government and find themselves in the opinion minority, online political discussion 
was a complement to face-to-face political discussion for political activism (Nah, 
Veenstra, & Shah, 2006, p. 241). Political cynicism might lead efficacious individuals     
to act collectively outside the convention of political practice. Unlike the politically 
apathetic, “those who believe they can accomplish social changes by perseverant 
collective action, but view the governing systems and office holders as untrustworthy, 
favour more confrontive and coercive tactics outside the traditional political channels” 
(Bandura, 2000, p. 78)  
The practice of deliberation is, in itself, a political skill that bolsters individuals’ sense   
of personal efficacy, and that is conversely driven by self-efficacious perceptions about 
one’s self (Lasorsa, 1991). The digital world is a fragmented, hyper-pluralistic space. 
Heterogeneity and disagreements are expected to arise more often in large groups.       
In this case, cognitive dissonance is more likely to arise, and “to avoid cognitive 
dissonance, it is simpler to exit than to work through any messy bargaining and 
conflictual disagreements within the group.” (Norris, 2004, p. 4). This opt-out 
inclination shakes commitment, hampers group solidarity, and eventually weakens 
collective action configuration. It has been also argued that “much online discussion is 
irrelevant to the ‘real’ world of policy and politics.” As “rational citizens seek outcomes 
from their participation and meaningful outcomes often depend upon there being a link 
between the virtual world of complex political relationships and institutions,” (Coleman, 
2001, p. 120), new media deliberations might not significantly contribute to their 
acquisition of skills and related sense of efficacy, especially when these deliberations do 
not bridge the online environment with the off-line arena. In such a case, individuals 
may refrain from becoming involved in collective action and so ride free on other 
people’s efforts or, in Bandura’s (2000) terms, they turn to proxy efficacy.  
According to social-cognitive theory, people might perceive their capabilities as agents 
personally, proximally, or collectively. In some circumstances, people might refrain 
from utilising their personal efficacy and ascribe the achievement of their goals to other 
agents in their environment due to perceived difficulties, such as the high cost                 
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of participation. Such a tendency might, however, harm the efficiency of mobilisation 
and collective action manifestation. As Bandura (2000) writes, in many activities: 
… .. people do not have direct control over social conditions and institutional practices 
that affect their lives. Under these circumstances, they seek their well-being and security 
through the exercise of proxy agency. In this socially-mediated mode of agency, people 
try to get their people who have expertise or wield influence and power to act on their 
behalf to get … .. outcomes they desire. People also turn to proxy control because they do 
not want to saddle themselves with the arduous work needed to develop requisite 
competences, and to shoulder the responsibilities and stressors that the exercise            
of control entails. These dissuading conditions dull the appetite for personal control (p. 
75). 
It may be a valid suggestion, then, that if SM serve as a platform where opportunities are 
created, or tools offered through which opportunities are seized, they, by extention, 
might mediate between the two ends of organising and mobilising collective action. 
Creating opportunities, however, does not necessarily guarantee that individuals would 
take advantage of them, or that collective action would be unavoidably executed. 
Opportunities should be dealt with as a mediating factor between movement and 
protest (Crossley, 2002, p. 112) rather than as a cause for such an effect. Nevertheless, 
the virtual space might, at different levels and scales, intersect with and pour into 
reality to support and/or supplement overt collective action towards acquiring                
a communal outcome. 
3.5. Social media and mobilising collective action 
To this point, I have dealt with issues relating to different SM functions and their 
contribution to social movement organisation. I have also reviewed literature on the 
role of the Internet and SM in creating opportunities for political practice through 
building favourable dispositions. In this section, more precisely, I will review literature 
on the mobilisation theme. In particular, I am going to draw more attention to issues    
of framing social movements, the varied roles played by different SM users and their 
reflection on the significance of collective action performance and sustainability. 
Organisation, or mobilising structures, combined with favouring opportunities or pro-
participation dispositions might offer groups certain structural affordances for action, 
yet they alone are insufficient to account for collective action. Most important are the 
“shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation [which mediate] 
between opportunity, organisation and action” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p. 5). 
 114 
 
The social psychologist Bert Klandermans (1987) distinguishes between the formation 
of ‘mobilisation potentials’ or recruitment networks, and consensus mobilisation. The 
mobilisation process starts with the formation of mobilisation potentials. In the heart   
of the process of forming mobilisation potentials lies the process of ‘framing’. This 
framing process is a crucial initial step that the social movement takes in order               
to address the wider audiences with meanings they can comprehend and thus can 
comply with the movement’s demands (Tarrow, 1998).  
It has been argued that SM may change the space of politics by affording actors new 
opportunities for being seen and heard. In fact, “political actors who want to accomplish 
things requiring public visibility will always turn to the media” as they "have become 
the major sites, the privileged space of politics in late modern society” (Dahlgren, 2001, 
p. 84). 
In the remainder of this chapter, literature on the potential role of the Internet and SM 
in mobilising collective action is reviewed. This section first starts with reviewing 
literature on framing collective action. I then discuss how collective action is mobilised 
and what drives people (or demotivates them) to engage in off-line collective action. In 
doing so, special consideration is paid to the role that SM play with regard to both 
parameters of collective action. 
3.5.1. Social media and mobilising frames 
Social movement framing denotes “an active, process-derived phenomenon that implies 
agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 
136). Normally, political activities that fall outside the spectrum of convential politics or 
are perceived as a threat to the status quo are neglected, or misrepresented by 
meinstream media. Activists usually fall prey to unbalanced coverage and biased 
treatment of their activities in state-run media. Transformations in new communication 
technology have nevertheless allowed activists new affordances and brought with them 
new opportunities for media users to play new, more active roles in the shaping             
of population consciousness. The SM allow activists alternative platforms for 
representation and action. The term ‘alternative media’, or ‘radical media’, as Downing 
(2001) prefers to label it, refers to “media production that challenges, at least implicitly, 
actual concentrations of media power, whatever form those concentrations may take in 
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different locations” (Couldry & Curran, 2003, p. 7). In Downing’s articulation (2001, p. 
3), “radical alternative media constitute the most active form of the active audience and 
express oppositional strands, overt and covert, within popular cultures.” These media 
are “generally small scale and in many different forms, that express an alternative vision 
to hegemonic policies, priorities and perspectives” (p. v).  
With the rapid spread of new communication technologies, users are no longer passive 
consumers of media content. Rather, they have the opportunity to spontaneously 
comment on and share this content attached to their own comments and viewership 
recommendations. Furthermore, they can also produce their own content and convey 
their own messages to audiences within their circles of communicative interaction. SM 
have indeed introduced “changes in the technological and cultural opportunities for 
protest [causing] the blurring of borders between the senders and receivers, producers 
and users” (della Porta, 2012, p. 46), to the extent that will make “the distinct[ion] 
between information producers and consumers … .. increasingly difficult to draw” 
(Bennett, 2003b, p. 34). Studies on alternative media have especially highlighted these 
media’s potential for aiding individuals, at a micro level, to practise decentralised forms 
of news production that free activists from mass media organisations’ hegemony          
on news production. For example, Bennett (2003b) discusses how the rise of global 
activist networks has challenged mass media power. He concludes that with the advent 
of interactive communication and information systems, “people who have long been    
on the receiving end of one-way mass communication are now increasingly likely          
to become producers and transmitters” (p. 34). As Dahlgren (2009, p. 190) puts it, “the 
open and accessible character of the net means that traditional centres of power have 
less informational and ideational control over their environment than previously.” 
Social movements are no longer limited to the closed circles of their supporters, they 
can transcend their own followers to the general constituencies by using SM                    
to permeate the borders between “inward-oriented” and “outward-oriented” 
communication. They have opportunities to produce and disseminate uncensored 
messages and outreach to wider audiences. CMC bypasses the intermediation                  
of traditional media and favours “disintermediation”: movements present themselves 
directly to the general public with low cost, especially facilitating resource-poor actors” 
(della Porta & Mosca, 2005, p. 166). 
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SM, as alternative platforms of communication and informational dissemination, have 
advantaged activists in achieving dual interrelated goals: political environment 
surveillance and social movement framing. On the one hand, the Internet allows 
ordinary individuals to scan their environments, spot their governments’ misconduct, 
and act as watchdogs transmitting information about these misconducts to the wider 
public, as: 
The powerful have been spying on their subjects since the beginning of history, but the 
subjects can now watch the powerful, at least to a greater extent than in the past. We 
have all become potential citizen journalists who, if equipped with a mobile phone, can 
record and instantly upload to the global networks any wrongdoing by anyone, 
anywhere (Castells, 2011, p. 413). 
Specific changes in the media field have increased both activists’ and non-activists’ 
capacity to produce information. These changes include: “(1) new ways of consuming 
media, which explicitly contest the social legitimacy of media power; (2) new 
infrastructures of production, which have an effect on who can produce news and in 
what circumstances; (3) new infrastructures of distribution, which change the scale and 
terms in which symbolic production in one place can reach other places” (Couldry, 
2003, p. 44). Such changes have not only blurred the borders between media producers 
and consumers, but they also have significant influence on the “symbolic and normative 
construction of the relations between media and social movements, journalists and 
activists” (della Porta, 2012, p. 49). Ordinary citizens can become journalists, so 
journalism is citizen-controlled. Such journalistic practice is frequently part of protest 
movement practices. Consumers become producers (prosumers, produsers), the 
audience becomes active (Fuchs, 2010, p. 178). 
As Rheingold notes (2002), advances in personal, mobile informational technology are 
increasingly providing the structural basis for the existence of novel kinds of highly-
informed, autonomous communities that coalesce around local lifestyle choices, global 
political demands, and everything in-between. The rise of what has been termed 
“innovative public accountability systems” has been widely ascribed to the emergence 
of such technologies (Bennett, 2003b, p. 19). That is, the manifold networks                     
of connected citizens and activists have transformed the so-called ‘dumb mobs’               
of totalitarian states into ‘smart mobs’ of politicised, socially active citizens who are 
interconnected by communication gadgets, such as notebook computers and cellphones 
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(Kahn & Kellner, 2004). Smart mobs “consist of people who are able to act in concert 
even if they don’t know each other.” Thanks to communication and computing 
technologies, they can “act together in new ways and in situations where collective action 
was not possible before” (emphasis in original) (Rheingold, 2002, p. 191).  
Through critical media, activists disseminate “counter-information” and practise 
“counter-hegemony” that includes the voices of the excluded and the oppressed (Fuchs, 
2010). One aim, Fuchs continues, is “to give voices to the voiceless, media power to the 
powerless as well as to transcend the filtering and censorship of information by 
corporate information monopolies [and] state monopolies” (p. 179). These media have 
arguably reversed Foucault’s (1977) metaphoric vision of power dynamics in society. 
New ICTs allow challengers to observe elites and hence to have the potential to invert 
Foucault’s oppressive self-regulation model of the panopticon (Garrett, 2006). SM allow 
activists to circumvent the distortion introduced by mass-media filters, reaching new 
levels of editorial control (Myers, 2000). A content analysis of 17 global justice 
movement websites from around the globe indicates that this movement is effectively 
using the Internet to promote a coherent frame (van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002). Activists 
have traditionally created their own news media as a means of bypassing gatekeepers, 
but new technologies have dramatically reduced the resources required (Rucht 2004, p. 
44). They give challengers the opportunities to spread new forms of online frames that 
have the potential for speedy propagation. 
Activists have the potential to shape, or alter, people’s consciousness through 
operations of ‘schemata’ and ‘scripts,’ which have normally been the territories of state-
run mainstream media. These operations “assume an active processor who                       
is constructing meaning rather than a passive recipient. They imply agency, providing    
a natural fit with strategically oriented social movement paradigms” (Gamson, 1992, p. 
65). It has been argued that the active agent of schema theory disappears when 
institutions such as the state and mass media collaborate to produce a quiescent 
political consciousness. As Gamson puts it, “in the face of such deep rooted institutional 
and cultural power, the possibilities of changing political consciousness seem remote” 
(p. 67). So, as they actively construct meanings about their movement in new 
communication media, activists create a fundamental “ambiguity between the passive 
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and structured on the one hand, and the active and structuring on the other” (Crook & 
Taylor, 1980, p. 246). 
As producers of news, activists can bypass news organisations’ control and disseminate 
their own conceptualisation of their movement to their audiences and potential 
supporters. SM afford them a variety of abilities that can be utilised to construct 
meanings and build the image of their movement. For example, information may be 
channeled in different forms and modalities that range from texts and static documents 
to audio-video and more dynamic content, which adds more cues for a richer 
communicative transaction. According to media richness theory, rich media are those 
that have the ability to provide immediate feedback, allow for variety in language, have 
a personal focus, and provide multiple cues (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Activists can also 
select certain content and highlight certain viewpoints to other users and audiences      
in their networks. For example, they can share links to certain content on Facebook 
accompanied by their own comments and interpretations to exert certain influence. 
Varied communication modalities of text, images, and audio-video messages also give 
activists more control and strength in the face of frames fragility and vulnerability         
to tampering. They can repeat their messages constantly and update them instantly      
to reach larger numbers of potential supporters, to accommodate new events, and         
to achieve consensus. Moreover, they can provide evidence for their anecdotes and raise 
“the evidential basis for a master frame’s diagnostic claims,” (p. 140) or what Snow and 
Benford (1992) call the “empirical capability,” in the face of meaning constructions 
propagated by mainstream media.   
The non-centralised organisation of digital networks allows for a relatively open public 
sphere in which newly constructed frames and ideas (or the so called memes) of protest 
can travel with relative ease, speed and global scope, affording social movements wider 
spread and sizable expansion. Memes themselves travel autonomously in the time and 
space created by the Internet. This fluidity resolves the limitations of ideological 
communication which bound the flow of ideas to particular places, groups, times, and 
spaces (Bennett, 2003b). Within this space, communication formats, or memes, have the 
advantage of travelling virally, defying the old two-step model of communication 
transmission. In such a swarm-like flow of communication, the meme, the 
communication technology (personal digital media), and the social contact (network) 
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travel in chaotic yet patterned ways (Bennett, 2003b, p. 33). This model, Bennett 
continues, is similar to what Castells (1996) signifies when he talks about the flow         
of spaces and the space of flows.  
In addition to their instrumental use for the exposure of a regime’s misconduct, and for 
altering the biased agenda and distorted frames of mainstream media, SM have also 
been used to construct realities that resonate with social movements’ vision of certain 
issues and causes at the normative level. New avenues for democratic representation 
have been opened and it has become possible to “grassroot the networks and to 
network the grassroots” (Castells, 2011, p. 413). Developments in new media have 
reconfigured and reinforced politics on individuals’ everyday life; allowing for the 
construction of new situations through the use of technology and media to increase the 
realm of freedom, community, and empowerment, and to promote “a revolution             
of everyday life” (Kahn & Kellner, 2004, p. 93). New communicative affordances have 
expanded the cultural opportunities for movement activity by making the creation        
of the “innovative “master frame” within which subsequent challengers can map their 
own grievances and demands” (McAdam, 1996, p. 25) possible and more commensurate 
with their resources.  
However, constructing meanings and reaching a level of cultural consensus is                    
a controversial issue in some theoretical lines of social movements. For example, the 
resource mobilisation perspective imparts more significance to material incentives at 
the cost of cognitive and ideational dimensions of collective action. As for new media’s 
contribution in this regard, it has been shown hitherto that the Internet redefines 
traditional information gatekeepers and authoritative elites, and blurs distinctions 
between producers and consumers of information (Carpini, 2000), and hence, 
contributes to crystallising sentiments in collective action. Yet, this contribution also 
invites certain limitations. The absence, or the bypassing, of gatekeepers could also be   
a source of problems for activists (Castells, 1997). Such problems relate to the quality 
and quantity of created, distributed and acquired information. SM help to promote 
‘counter public spheres’ for democratic activists as well as for racists and other 
unsavoury types of radicals (Dahlgren, 2004, p. xiii). While useful information became 
available, impurities are also invited when filters are removed. Differentiating accurate 
information from fabrications becomes more difficult and information efficacy becomes 
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questionable. Conspiracy theories may be confused with well-substantiated claims 
(Wright, 2004, p. 85). This increases the responsibility on both organisations and 
individuals. Organisations must work to stand out from others that are less credible, 
and individuals must develop new strategies for weighing up the claims themselves 
(Lebert, 2003). Publication unconstrained by gatekeepers also introduces the risk         
of ‘information overload.’ In such a fluid environment, “news organisations may be 
transformed from gatekeepers to brokers that use their expertise and credibility to link 
information consumers and producers” (Garrett, 2006, p. 215). Additionally, le Grignou 
and Patou (2004) observe that activist websites can sometimes contribute to ‘frame 
clouding’ (Snow et al., 1986, p. 478) distorting the thematic construction of the 
movement and belying its visibility(cited in le Grignou & Patou, 2004, p. 172). 
Concerns have also been raised about the capacity of alternative media to reach beyond 
those who are already politically interested and active, and to form a bridge between 
mobilisation, the grassroots and the general constituency. Scholars have discussed the 
issues of the digital divide and the limited influence of virtual collective action (see e.g., 
Curran, 2003; Rucht, 2004; della Porta & Mosca, 2005; Gennaro & Dutton, 2006; van 
Laer & van Aelst, 2010).  
Movement framing is not a straightforward process. Activists cannot simply construct 
and impose their own view of reality on their potential supporters. Rather, they always 
have to face the challenges of counter framing by movement opponents, bystanders, and 
the media (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625). It has been argued that increasing 
dependence on SM in contentious activity is a source of threat to social movements 
because it creates new opportunities for demobilisation efforts. In many cases, elites 
and their allies own and/or control the infrastructure on which new media depend. If    
a particular use becomes too threatening, challengers may be denied access                     
to resources, or a system’s architecture may be modified to prevent undesirable uses. 
For example, if activists depend on cellphones to coordinate action, disrupting the 
cellphone service may have a demobilising effect (Garrett, 2006, p. 210). One recent, 
striking example is the Internet being shut down for five days after the massive uprising 
of January 2011 broke out in Egypt. The country's four main Internet service providers 
(ISPs) abruptly stopped shuttling Internet traffic into and out of the country 
(DailyRecord.co.uk, 2011) to curb the mass turnout of anti-government demonstrators. 
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Mobile phone data service was also cut off across Egypt for a shorter time, but text 
messaging services (SMS) remained disrupted during the continuing protests (Arthur, 
2011). Such a move of suppression was aimed at limiting the crucial role of mobile 
phones as they “enhance the autonomy of individuals, enabling them to set up their own 
connections, bypassing the mass media and the channels of communication” (Castells, 
Fernández-Ardèvol, Linchuan, & Sey, 2007) usually controlled by the state. 
3.5.2. Different media uses, different participators: Alternative media for 
alternative actions 
One way of thinking about the value of new communication technologies for 
mobilisation and their effect on collective action is to distinguish between various types 
of actual or potential political actors. From Gamson and Meyer’s (1996) perspective,      
a social movement is “a field of actors, not a unified entity.” It is thus useful to think       
of a social movement as “an internal process of contention within movements with 
different actors taking different positions” (p. 283). 
SM outlets are distinguished from the early waves of the Internet in that they allow 
active users to play different roles. As discussed previously, users of SM transcend being 
active consumers to become producers of media content. A set of scholarly U&G 
research has distinguished between creators and non-creators of media content. 
Creators of user-generated media (UGM) practise different forms of activities to gratify 
their needs. They produce/consume media content and interact with content and/or 
with other users to gratify needs that, according to Shao (2009), are fulfilled by the 
“easy to use” and “let users control” media attributes. An online survey of 489 
webloggers and videobloggers showed that content generators were motivated by the 
satisfaction they feel out from practising the activity itself. On the other hand, non-
producers or ‘lurkers’ were the most de-motivated by factors of time consumption and 
technical restrictions –especially for video blogging (Stoeckl, Rohreier, & Hess, 2007). 
Using different media platforms (mainstream versus alternative) is associated with 
performing different forms and levels of political action (conventional versus 
unconventional). Mainstream media usually tend to withhold “mobilising information” 
especially when they deal with controversial or negative contexts (Lemert & Ashman, 
1983). Alternative media, on the other hand, afford unconventional political actors the 
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opportunities to frame their movement, circumvent their misrepresentation in biased 
mainstream media, and mobilise popular support for their cause at significantly lower-
cost. Hwang et al. (2006) found that antiwar opinion holders, who felt that their views 
differed from those presented in mainstream media, sought out alternative online 
sources for perspectives about the war. Perceptions of what has been termed “media 
dissociation” were argued to stimulate dissenters’ information seeking and related 
political behaviours. Boyle and Schmierbach (2009) distinguished three types                 
of participators in relation to their media use. ‘Traditional participators’ were more 
inclined to rely on mainstream news media outlets, such as newspapers, television and 
Internet. ‘Participators in protests,’ on the other hand, were more inclined to use 
alternative media outlets, such as protest-oriented Internet and protest-oriented print 
media. ‘Heavy participators’ (those who engage in both traditional and protest 
activities) were more prone to rely on alternative media. The researchers conclude that 
mainstream media content may be largely irrelevant to non-traditional means                 
of influencing the political process, as they rarely offer mobilising information or frame 
protest as a favourable activity. Conversely, the digital networking media afford protest 
participators new mechanisms for organisation and mobilisation. They help them          
to connect to organisations (e.g., Web links), coordinate events (e.g., protest calendars), 
share information (e.g., YouTube and Facebook), and converge two or more of these 
functions (e.g., links to Twitter and Facebook posts). These technologies also function as 
archives of memory records or action repertoires that can be passed on to other users 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Such innovative functions may be beneficial in providing 
mobilising information for non-politicised individuals and reinforcing views and 
standpoints for those who are newly introduced to political practice. They open               
a window on practices with which these newcomers are not familiar, and provide them 
with the know-how and information that they need to become involved in the political 
process.  
The same communication medium can also be utilised for diverse purposes by different 
users. The Internet, for example, benefits engaged and disengaged citizens differently. 
For the disengaged, the Internet allows political elites and organisations to reach out for 
them easily and more efficiently. For example, social movement organisations create 
their own websites and use e-mail services to spread the word and to reach out to their 
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potential supporters. For engaged citizens, the Internet provides various and more 
convenient forms of activities, such as online petitioning. The Internet and related 
technologies provide ways to sustain, expand and improve the quality of this 
engagement (Carpini, 2000, p. 347). Gibson et al. (2000) have developed a typology       
of Internet users in their examination in four nations of the relationship between social 
capital, Internet connectedness and political participation. They found that Internet 
connectedness has different consequences for socialisers (who use the Internet for 
relationship building), utilitarians (who use the Internet to ‘do’ something, such as find 
information), and game-players (or recreational users), in terms of building social 
capital and increasing political participation. While online socialising has the strongest 
positive effect on social capital, socialisers were also the only type of Internet users 
whose Internet use has a significant effect on political participation, yet in a negative 
direction. This led the researchers to conclude that, “while online socialising may lead to 
higher levels of off-line socialising and civic engagement in one’s community, it appears 
to make one less likely to engage in specifically political organisations and activities” (p. 
15). 
3.5.3. Social media and the significance of collective performance 
Process approaches are mostly oriented on self-organised small-scale community media 
that enable citizen participation. The danger that lies in this orientation is that such 
media will remain insignificant and be unable to have a transformative political 
potential because they are unable to reach a mass public and therefore are unable to be 
embedded in a large counter-public sphere. Such media tend to produce fragmented 
unconnected publics that are only accessed by isolated subgroups and undermine the 
possibility for a large sphere of political communication that is accessed by all exploited, 
oppressed, and excluded groups and individuals (Fuchs, 2010, p. 177) (emphasis added). 
A good point from which to start a discussion on the capacity of collective action may be 
Olson’s (1971) insights about The Logic of Collective Action. In his view on when 
individuals can act collectively, Olson identifies a critical null hypothesis: 
 If the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and if they would 
all be better off if that objective was achieved, [then] the individuals in that group would, 
if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective (p. 1).  
He then bonds the hypothesis with certain conditions that might nullify the logic            
of collective action, concluding that:  
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Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests (p. 2) 
(emphasis in original). 
Lupia and Sin (2003) have engaged with the logic of collective action in respect of the 
role of the communication technologies that were not originally integrated into Olson’s 
argument. They argue that the emergence of new communication technologies has 
altered the basic assumptions of interpersonal communication upon which Olson built 
his view of group work. They conclude that: 
Technologies that reduce the cost of sending information long distances (or to many 
people) can reduce organisational costs, increase noticeability, and make ineffective 
communicative networks effective. If group members' interests are sufficiently common, 
or if they interact in contexts that induce them to share information, these technologies 
can also make selective incentives a more viable recruitment strategy … .. In particular, 
evolving technologies can erase the disadvantages of being large - which should change 
the rule of thumb that many people use to distinguish latent groups from other kinds (p. 
329).  
Lupia and Sin’s logic can be traced back to and linked with Oliver and Marwell’s (1988) 
argument that the group’s size is a paradoxical element in collective action. For them, 
what matters is the relationship between potential contributors in the critical mass. 
They argue that the problem of collective action lies in “whether there is some social 
mechanism that connects enough people who have the appropriate interests and 
resources so that they can act” (p. 8) (emphasis added). This might be a valid argument 
for communication technologies and SM. These technologies have made, and are still 
making, this connection between sizable, interested and resourced groups possible. 
However, this is not to suggest that SM and new communication technologies are, or 
could be, the viable solution to collective action problems. One may agree, as discussed 
earlier, that SM have enabled members of larger groups to cross physical and time 
barriers and learn more about each other at a lower cost, which may negate Olson’s 
argument about small group size as a precondition for the configuration of collective 
action. Yet, with new communication technologies added to the picture, careful 
consideration should be given to the space/place where certain actions and their 
consequent implications take place. Technology-enabled large groups might not cross 
the borders of the virtual communicative sphere afforded by these technologies (as 
discussed earlier). Technology (and the large groups they support) might thus not be 
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sufficient in themselves to enable sizable, significant collective action on the ground. 
Rather, social movements may run the danger of limiting political action in the 
communication network (Earl & Kimport, 2011).  
The hybridity of online (inter)activism and off-line activism has been recommended by 
a number of political communication and sociology scholars. As Tilly (2004) contends: 
“Neither in communications nor in transportation, did the technological timetable 
dominate alterations in social movement organisation, strategy and practice. Shifts       
in the political and organisational context impinged far more directly and immediately 
on how social movements worked than did technological transformations” (p. 104). van 
Laer (2010) has recently flagged the risk of over reliance on the Internet by social 
movement organisations, and has stressed the importance of crossing the online border 
to reach for their own off-line constituency. In the former case, van Laer argues, 
organisations may face the danger of diluting the movement and so suffer serious 
consequences for their own maintenance as well as the movement(s) they represent 
and support. This sphere-
bridging is crucial for broader 
practice and the 
sustainability of influential 
collective action, and to 
create a “favourable breeding 
ground for future action and 
mobilisation” (Walgrave & 
Verhulst, 2009, p. 1378).  
In their research for the 
action repertoires of social 
movements, van Laer and van 
Aelst (2009, 2010) have 
identified circumstances 
where the Internet creates 
new problems for collective 
action. In some cases, they argue, the Internet has still not made collective action easy 
enough, while in others it has made it too easy, thus reducing the final political impact  
Figure 3.2: A Typology of a new digitalised action repertoire 
Source: van Laer & van Aelst (2010, p. 1149) 
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of a certain action. It may be true that the Internet has expanded the toolkit of social 
movements by hosting modified tactics and “creative functions.” Yet, these tactics are 
nothing but traditional tools of social movements that have become easier to organise 
and coordinate by the affordances of the Internet (for example, email petitions can be 
seen as an extension of an existing protest technique, see Figure 3.2), thus “the shift 
towards new Internet-based actions and tactics relying on the Internet [still] has not 
resulted in the replacement of the old action forms, but rather complemented them” 
(van Laer & van Aelst, 2010, p. 1150). Lupia and Sin (2003) earlier mentioned similar 
problems in “mak[ing] communication more difficult (by allowing key individuals to 
better mask their activities), increas[ing] the relative benefits of free riding, or 
increase[ing] the utility people can achieve without collective goods” (p. 329).  
Free-riding can happen online as well (i.e., lurking). Some forms of online 
communicative interactions do not rise to the level of influential participation that 
entails individuals benefitting from collective goods. Jesover (2001, p. 8) distinguishes 
between online ‘serious practices’ and ‘entertaining practices’, as he tries to encourage 
infrequent users (or passers-by) to take online communication more seriously, rather 
than perceiving ‘interactivity as gimmick’ (cited in le Grignou & Patou, 2004). This 
online ‘passer-by’ is seen as a new version of Olson’s free-rider “in so far as his/her 
activity can consist of paying a subscription, collecting information more or less related 
to [social movement organisation’s] targets, and ‘chatting’ or holding conversational 
discussions on the discussion list” (le Grignou & Patou, 2004, p. 174). 
A combination between on- and off-line communicative organisation and mobilisation 
might be more influential in terms of achieving a social movement’s goals. Exerting 
efforts in the virtual sphere does not seem to be echoed influentially in reality. An 
experimental study that tests the influence of exposure to mobilising information, either 
by face-to-face interaction or on websites, indicates that Web-based mobilisation only 
has a significant effect on online participation, whereas face-to-face mobilisation has      
a significant impact on off-line behaviour, suggesting that mobilisation effects are 
“medium-specific” (Vissers, Hooghe, Stolle, & Mahéo, 2012). Breindl’s (2010) research 
illustrates that while activists organise themselves online, they keep an eye on 
influencing policy-making, which entails a degree of integration between the on- and 
off-line arenas, or what Breindl termed “Internet-based communities.” These 
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communities “aim at intervening in “traditional” politics by focusing on power 
demonstrations in the off-line realm” (p. 69). Similarly, Bennett (2005) defines the 
political capacity of transnational activist networks through two dimensions: being able 
to shape public debate about the issues in contention, and developing effective political 
relations with protest targets to influence political change on those issues (p. 208). As 
he writes, “social technologies generally combine online and off-line relationship-
building aimed at achieving trust, credibility and commitment as defined at the 
individual rather than the collective level” (p. 205). della Porta and Mosca (2005) 
describe cyberspace as “a new resource to increase [activists’] chances of success,” 
confirming that “there is no sign that off-line and online environments [are seen] as 
alternative to each other [but rather] they are more and more integrated and 
overlapping” (p. 186). Other scholars strongly assert that a sharp distinction between 
the on- and off-line spheres should be completely rejected, since both realms are 
profoundly intertwined (Bimber, 2000).  
A possible approach to researching the media and collective action repertoires, then,     
is to think of collective action and the media as holistic environments of interwoven 
layers. The conceptualisation of collective action as a toolkit (similar to Bourdieu’s 
habitus), and media as an environment (similar to Bourdieu’s field) (Bourdieu, 1990) 
allows us to look at different forms of media and communication modes that are 
expected to shape different opportunities for activists, defining their roles, and 
influencing their capacity to reach out to a wider group of potential participants with 
their informative, mobilising messages. This process of media convergence creates         
a “media ecology” for activists, which is characterised by being multifaceted and rich    
in communication channels (Mattoni, Berdnikovs, Ardizzoni, & Cox, 2010, p. 2). In 
Mattoni et al.’s words: 
Always, today’s media ecology revolves around the intertwining of multiple platforms, 
applications, supports and outlets. Different levels of communication flows overlap: 
from the mass broadcasting of global television to the information provided by national 
print press; from local community street televisions to widespread user-generated 
content spread in social networking sites (p. 2). 
Such an environment brings together forms of face-to-face interaction, many-to-many, 
and mass communication allowing for a continuous flow of communication between 
what Bennett (2005) has termed micro, meso and macro media. This convergent media 
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ecology, in turn, allows for a hybrid repertoire of collective action (Laer & Aelst, 2010) 
where media-based and media-supported actions collide to achieve a desirable 
collective outcome. 
In a society like Egypt, online political practice is not normatively integrated due to 
structural and/or technological inefficiencies. By the time this research began in late 
2009, less than a quarter (21.1 percent) of the Egyptian constituency was online (Egypt: 
Internet Usage and Telecommunications Report). As the Internet’s new communicative 
affordances have benefitted “those who have crossed the digital divide,” (Bennett, 
2003b, p. 20) it is expected that the limitations of digital inequalities would reduce the 
numbers of potential online recipients and possible contributors. This, in turn, excludes 
the poorer and less-educated, and influences the contributors’ capabilities to support    
a viable form of influential ‘Internet-based’ activism, so while the Internet and SM have 
expanded the toolkit for activists and enabled large numbers to assemble in loose 
networks with minimal resources, a hybrid ‘repertoire of collective action’ (McAdam, 
Tarrow & Tilly, 2001) that fuses the virtual with the real is crucial should they aspire to 
acquire significant change and yield feasible outcomes for the collective. SM, Hands 
(2011) writes, should be articulated as “a new element into the revolutionary process, 
in which new dynamics and new capacities need to be absorbed and understood.” This 
was evident in the configuration of the massive uprising of January 2011, which was 
arguably enabled by the creation of “a complex socio-technical system … .. not only 
between social media and the more traditional media, but also between mediated and 
face-to-face networks” (Lim, 2012, p. 244).  
3.6. Summarising: 
1. Recent reflections on collective action point to opportunities for contemporary 
social movements in terms of reduced costs and the organising of movements        
on the basis of more non-centralised, loosely-woven, leaderless horizontal 
networks within which forms of flexible identities emerge and develop. 
2. However, at the same time they also point to the barriers and hurdles that such 
loose networks and flexible identities might impose while they create an alternative 
participatory sphere for individuals. 
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3. These opportunities that SM create include providing a safer environment for 
practice and the acquisition of experience individuals need for activist identity 
building. Easing the fear of repression might incentivise non-politicised and less 
interested individuals operating under authoritarian forms of governance. 
4. “Personal agency and social structure operate interdependently. Social structures 
are created by human activity, and socio-structural practices, in turn, impose 
constraints and provide resources and opportunities for personal development and 
functioning” (Bandura, 2000, p. 77). Taking this conceptualisation to new 
communication technologies, it is suggested that (inter)activity in new media 
creates social structure (networks), within which individual users may have 
opportunities for competence building and contribution. This reciprocal connection 
suggests that personal agency (or efficacy) adds up to the provision of communal 
agency. Even if deliberations are thus dispersed and groups are fragmented in the 
virtual sphere, individual interactions and the related know-how processes may 
still eventually increase networks of activists and bolster their feelings of power 
and efficacy. In fact, Bandura asserts, “high perceived efficacy is vital for successful 
functioning regardless of whether it is achieved individually or by group members 
working together” (2000, p. 77). 
5. The costs of political practice and efficacy are not new parameters of political 
practice, but they acquire considerable meaning in real existing autocracies and 
societies undergoing (or aspiring for) political and social transformation.  
6. Nevertheless, these opportunities may carry barriers within them and cast doubts 
on the essence and sustainability of social movements. This also raises concerns 
about the capacity of the political process as practised through new media 
apparatuses. 
7.  By participating in the virtual (and more convenient) sphere, non-politicised 
citizens face the danger of being deluded by a feeling of being politically active and 
hence entitled to a collective outcome, while they might actually be dwelling on, 
rather than participating in, political life.  
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8. These participatory qualities point to the role of new media use (at the individual-
level) in mobilising a sizable population to engage in off-line collective action, with 
particular emphasis on the reasons behind both media uses and collective political 
practice. 
3.7. The need for this study 
This thesis explores how different uses of SM function as facilitators (or de-motivators) 
of collective action as perceived by a sample of young Egyptian activists. This study was 
conducted prior to the eruption of the 25th January 2011 revolt, portraying a picture of 
Egypt before the revolt and during what turned out to be the preparatory period that 
led to the uprising. Generally, introducing new media to the realm of social movements, 
along with the eruption of wide scale domestic and transnational protests, prompted 
different prognoses about new media affordances for movements’ development and 
growth. Technological determinists go so far as proposing that revolts are themsevles 
by-products of portals like Facebook and Twitter. On the other hand, sceptics believe 
that collective action has always been possible with the support of far less innovative 
forms of communication. Between these two ends of the spectrum lie more moderate 
views and several areas of tension. Figure 3.1 summarises these areas of conflict and 
outlines the ways they relate to and affect other themes in the current research. 
As shown from the previous review:  
 New media have enabled new forms of mobilising structures that are less costly, 
more flexible and polycentric. However, use of these media has been attached to the 
development of tolerant identities that enable collective action across borders. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of such tolerant identities casts doubts on the 
sustainability of social movements, since they entail weak links to movements and 
shake feelings of commitment. However, it has been argued that an activist identity 
might be developed through affiliation to SMOs and practice, which represents 
another field where new media may contribute to social movements’ development 
through the creation of opportunities that afford practice and skills acquisition. 
 SM also contribute to social movements, especially in repressive contexts, by 
affording activists low risk/cost spaces in which to practise their activities. 
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However, practising politics online, especially for the less interested and the non-
politicised, may encourage an illusory sense of activism and hence, mar individuals’ 
tendency to move to the off-line sphere. Additionally, communicating anonymously 
raises some concerns about the credibility of the unidentified communicator. As for 
acquiring the skills necessary for political practice, SM also provide a platform 
where activists can hone their skills and transfer them to their fellow citizens. 
Nonetheless, the fluidity of cyberspace allows an easy-in, easy-out fashion of group 
membership, which also shakes commitment to movement and hampers group 
solidarity. Heterogeneity of online groups also results in polarisation and hence 
casts doubts on the influence of online deliberation on enhancing individuals’ 
political skills. 
 SM afford activists ways to interpret, attribute and socially construct their 
movements and the activities that help them circumvent state-run media-biased 
representations. However, being able to frame movements does not necessarily 
account for collective action. Concerns have been raised about the irrational use     
of SM that might lead to obscuring ideas and promoting vague frames. Contrary      
to assertions about the importance of socially constructed shared ideas in collective 
action (i.e., political process model), proponents of the resource mobilisation 
perspective attach little significance to ideas and sentiments to the benefit                
of material incentives. These contradictions are worth looking at, especially             
in a context like that of the Egyptian society, where framing shared sentiments        
of collective action through SM might not outweigh the importance of geographical 
availability (being able to afford participation in terms of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs) of the constituency to take part in off-line collective action 
although, in terms of numbers, Egyptian youth may seem available, as discussed in 
the last chapter. 
 SM have also expanded the activists’ toolkit or their repertoire of collective action 
and afforded them varied ways of political practice. However, heavy reliance on the 
Internet may push collective action adrift, as it is practised mainly online. Internet-
based action has been distinguished from and compared to Internet-supported 
action. It has been argued that a hybrid of both would be more beneficial for the 
efficient practice of collective action. 
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To tackle these areas of tension, the current research seeks to answer the 
following central question: 
How do young Egyptian activists perceive the potential of social media for mobilising 
collective action? 
Subsidiary questions include: 
RQ1. Why do young activists use social media?  
RQ2. How do social media contribute to creating opportunities (favourable dispositions) 
for practising collective action off-line? 
RQ2.1. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
feelings of fear of repression? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ2.2. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
feelings of being politically efficacious? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ3. How do social media contribute to mobilising collective action practice off-line? 
RQ3.1. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
tendency to practise politics online? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ3.2. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
tendency to practise politics off-line? And if so, in what ways? 
Raising these questions also helps in addressing the following gaps identified in 
the literature: 
 Much of what is known about contemporary technology and social movements        
is focused basically on the level of social movement organisations and how 
individuals associate with these organisations and use new media under their 
umbrella. The studies that investigate individual actors’ use of new media on a daily 
basis to shore up their collective political practices are scarce. 
 Additionally, most of these studies were conducted in democratic contexts, where 
policing protests takes different forms and is on levels other than those                      
in authoritarian regimes; where authorities normatively crack down                          
on demonstrators. These contextual differences are expected to have significant 
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influences on individuals’ tendency to become involved in unconventional political 
practice—as well as in shaping movement outcomes— whether these individuals 
are politically active, or non-politicised citizens.  
 Most of the studies that have looked at the relationship between new media use and 
mobilising collective action have done so through a political and socio- 
psychological lens, with less emphasis from a media perspective. Linking media 
uses and the reasons that underpin them is less researched in this field. This 
scholarly work has focused on media use mostly as a dependent variable since 
researchers have started their research paradigm either from affiliation to social 
movement organisations, or because they are motivated to contribute to collective 
action. 
 A mounting body of research has been, and still is, investigating the growing role    
of new media, especially following the eruption of several huge uprisings, both       
on domestic and international sites. However, these studies are mostly responsive 
scholarly reactions to certain events that have taken place when debate about the 
role of new media is usually ignited. As Shirky (2011) argues, “the ability to turn 
people out on the street is the end of a long process rather than a shortcut” (cited in 
Morozov, 2012). Hence, empirical study of more stable issue advocacy networks     
is needed to shed light on important contextual aspects and on opportunity creation 
that might be eclipsed by these event-centred, post-uprising studies. 
 Most of the studies that have looked at the relationship between Internet access and 
online exposure to information and political efficacy have focused mainly                 
on conventional forms of political participation, such as voting. The mobilising 
potential of the Internet related to the influencing of individuals’ political attitudes 
has rarely been explained outside the electoral context or in relation to more 
unconventional activities, such as protesting. 
 Most of the research that has been conducted on new media and mobilisation relies 
on quantitative methods of investigation and studies that mix quantitative findings 
with activists’ views and perceptions about new media potential for mobilising 
collective action are scarce. Mixed methods help to achieve insightful scrutiny into 
activists’ anecdotes. 
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The chapter that follows (The Research Methodology) outlines the research design and 
explains its rationale. It also describes how the research questions are tackled. 
 
 135 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Chapter Four outlines elements of the research design and explains how the research 
process unfolded. This chapter comprises two main parts; the first introduces the 
research’s theoretical framework, and the second discusses the methods used for data 
collection and analysis to provide answers to the research questions. In the first part of 
the chapter, I outline the concept of political opportunity which leads the discussion on 
the research context in Chapter Two. I also discuss the uses and gratifications approach 
(U&G) in order to show how the main research themes –media uses, dispositions, and 
outcomes – and the related variables, are expected to relate to each other and how they 
are placed within the suggested paradigm of the current research. 
The second part of the chapter introduces the main research questions and discusses the 
methods used to address them. It also provides an operational definition for each 
research variable, and demonstrates the ways those variables are measured. The 
chapter then presents an organisational structure of the qualitative and quantitative 
techniques used to collect the data needed to answer the research questions, and 
discusses the structure of the instruments used for data collection as well as the way 
those instruments correspond to different research variables. Ethical considerations are 
thoroughly discussed in the second part. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the 
procedures of analysing the data yielded in order to provide a coherent interpretation 
of the main research question.  
Within these parts, the chapter is organised into six sections: 
4.1. Research aims and rationale. 
4.2. Theoretical approach to the research design. 
4.2.1. The political opportunity structure. 
4.2.2. The uses and gratifications approach. 
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4.3. Research questions and design. 
4.3.1. Research questions. 
  4.3.2. Research population and sampling procedures. 
4.3.2.1. Sampling for the quantitative survey study. 
4.3.2.2. Respondents’ profile. 
4.3.2.3. Sub-sampling for the qualitative focus group discussions. 
 4.3.3. Data collection: Methods and sources. 
  4.3.3.1. The mixed methods design.  
4.3.3.2. The quantitative research. 
4.3.3.3. The qualitative research. 
4.4. Data analysis strategies.  
4.5. Ethical guidelines. 
4.6. Conclusion. 
4.1. Research aims and rationale 
Broadly stated, this study aimed to: 
Investigate the perceptions of a sample of young Egyptian activists about the potentials 
of social media (SM) for mobilising collective action. 
More specifically, the study aimed to: 
 Identify and explain the range of uses of SM for political activism as reported by a 
sample of young Egyptian activists. 
 Appraise the potential implication of these media affordances as seen through 
young activists’ critique of these media and as related to the degree to which 
young activists feel satisfied (or not) with SM’s contribution to their political 
activism.  
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 Reveal and analyse the young Egyptian activists’ political dispositions that appear 
to relate to their purposive use of SM and that are expected to contribute to 
shaping their tendency to engage in different forms and levels of political activism.   
 Illuminate ways in which young Egyptian activists utilise SM tools to shape their 
movement and mobilise sizable off-line collective action.  
4.2. Theoretical approach to the research design 
I construct a dialogue between the users (young Egyptian activists), the tool (SM) and 
the context (Egyptian polity), to explain how activists negotiate the opportunities 
allowed in their society by utilising the novel tools available to them to achieve certain 
goals. The main focus of this dialogue is the individual. Activists’ perceptions of the 
democratic potential of SM are unpacked by asking questions about the reasons behind 
the utilisation of such media apparatuses, how activists’ political dispositions may 
correlate to that utilisation, and how they might bridge their practices to political 
activism outside the boundaries of the virtual sphere.  
The rationale of the U&G approach guides the research to delineate the instrumentality 
of SM for mobilisation perceived and stated by a sample of young Egyptian activists. In 
order to provide a balanced picture of the economic rationality of media use suggested 
by this approach, it was beneficial to conduct this assessment with respect to the 
context of the Egyptian polity, which may encompass openness and/or repressive 
aspects. Such opportunities and hurdles may be expected to offer the reasons why, and 
the ways in which, activists use SM as part of their repertoire for political mobilisation. 
In order to address the research’s subject matter, I blend concepts and hypotheses from 
theories of democratic transformation with hypotheses from the communication 
theories on media use and impact. Drawing on assumptions from U&G helps to 
understand why young activists use SM to engage in politics in order to acquire social 
and political change. Since those activists do not work in a vacuum, using the concept   
of political opportunity helps better understand and analyse activists’ utilisation of SM 
platforms with respect to the context within which they operate and the contextual 
openings they may utilise or create. In the following sections, these conceptual 
frameworks are discussed consecutively. 
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4.2.1. The political opportunity structure 
The current research builds on the umbrella concept of political opportunity. In Chapter 
Two, I explained how dynamic opportunities in the Egyptian political environment may 
have been imposed on the decision-making of political engagement and have allowed 
activists the openings in which to create their own opportunities, and to what extent the 
Internet and new communication technologies might permit them to create those 
opportunities. 
The aim of using the concept in the current research strays from empirically applying 
the theory of political opportunity structure to test how political opportunities in a 
given polity may trigger, channel and mobilise – or demobilise – activism. Rather, the 
concept is used, firstly, to provide a contextual background for the study by introducing 
certain aspects of the political opportunities permitted in the Egyptian polity, and to 
give a sense of the environment within which young political activists have emerged 
and have been operating. Secondly, the concept also helps explain how the given 
opportunities in this environment – if any - may affect activists’ incentives to use SM as 
platforms for mobilisation to circumvent challenges and create alternative 
opportunities within that context. Thirdly, overarching the analysis and the discussion 
of the research findings with the concept of political opportunity helps to delineate the 
mechanisms by which conditions in the polity can translate into the achievement           
of certain outcomes. It would be also beneficial to compare and contrast those 
mechanisms with the ways ‘media opportunities’ – that are perceived by the activists – 
can work to achieve the same goal. 
The political opportunity was firstly used as a framework by Eisinger (1973) to explain 
why protests emerged in some American cities during the late 1960s. The political 
opportunity structure has since been applied for various research purposes, yielding 
numerous versions of the concept. Scholars have used the concept flexibly by adding 
and removing aspects. However, while “diversity of approaches may provide credible 
answers to particular problems, it also produces a situation in which the same terms are 
used to describe completely different factors” (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p. 1459). 
Moreover, some analysts do not use conceptual statements in concert with analytical 
examinations of the cases they discuss. 
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Aiming to conceptualise the political opportunity, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) specified 
three areas to which analysts need to pay more attention when applying political 
opportunity frameworks. First, are the specifications of the analysed issue – or 
constituency – and polity writ large. Political opportunity theory, Meyer and Minkoff 
stated, was developed in advanced industrialised nations, which requires prospective 
assessment of the aspects of political opportunity structure according to its relevance 
and applicability in the context studied. There is thus no one universal definition that 
applies to all issues and constituencies. Second, the intended outcome of the political 
opportunity should be assessed and operationally defined; as social mobilisation and 
changes in public policy do not necessarily move in concert – and it could be acceptable 
to conflate opportunities for both. In some cases, they argue, undesirable changes          
in polity may trigger mobilisation. Meyer (1993b) found that activists’ outreach and 
success in mobilising support outside the institutional realm was mostly spurred by 
hostile and belligerent governmental policies, and was associated with repression         
of institutional trajectories of political change. Third, it is crucial to assess what factors 
help translate opportunities into collective action, and whether activists are aware        
of these factors. Moreover, some analysts do not use conceptual statements in concert 
with analytical examinations of the cases they discuss (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). 
Although using the concept flexibly has resulted in overlapping concerns, it also permits 
the practicalities to exert more focus on certain aspects of the structures studied, which 
are expected to be more relevant to the research objectives and the society studied. 
Embracing a specific definition of the political opportunity structure where key factors 
are prospectively assessed thus helps to clearly articulate the discussion and makes it 
easier to follow. I will adopt a flexible, yet clear operational definition of the concept 
that helps me situate my argument within the researched context, and analyse the 
findings with regard to the specifications of the Egyptian society. The concept is utilised 
as an orientation for understanding a certain case – SM and action mobilisation in Egypt 
- rather than being transferable to other causes or constituencies, albeit that it could be 
useful in understanding similar issues in comparable societies especially given the 
eruption of waves of massive demonstrations that swept the Arab region in late 2010 
and early 2011. 
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For the purpose of my research, I use the concept of political opportunity structures 
within the operational definition suggested by Tarrow (1996) as being “consistent – but 
not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors 
which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form 
social movements” (Tarrow, 1996, p. 54). 
Certain components of the political opportunity structure of the Egyptian polity are 
introduced in Chapter Two in order to give a sense of the research environment and the 
way it might reflect on activists’ utilisation of SM as platforms for mobilisation. This 
helps me answer the question ‘how can repression draw the SM opportunity?’ I argue 
that certain repressive aspects of the political environment in Egypt might have 
incentivised activists to use SM platforms as an alternative political arena for sizing up 
and mobilising ‘networks’ of supporters for their cause in order to create pores in that 
repressive structure and to practise politics more rigorously off-line. In this sense, I 
argue that SM platforms might represent an environment where activists may practise 
activism to circumvent certain repressive aspects of political opportunity structures     
in Egypt. I thus suggest that SM platforms – as used by activists for political 
communication – could structure a parallel ‘media opportunity’ which affords them 
with novel organisation and mobilisation mechanisms and enables them to take actions 
that might challenge repressive aspects in their political environment, and/or might 
buttress certain opportunities allowed in that environment. Figure 4.1 demonstrates 
this argument.  
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Figure 4.1: Political structure and social media opportunity for 
mobilisation 
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Tarrow (1998) has identified a number of factors for the study of the political 
opportunity in a given polity. They include: 1) state strength, 2) state’s prevailing 
strategies towards challengers, 3) state’s modes of repression and social control – as 
well as 4) the opening of access to participation for new actors, 5) political realignment 
within the political system, and 6) changes in the state’s capacity or will to repress 
dissent. To avoid abusing the flexibility of the concept, I introduce the structure of the 
political environment in Egypt with a special focus on the state’s modes of repression 
and social control, and the opening of access to participation for new actors. 
Zaki (1994) argued that it is unjustified to presume that political actors would act 
consistently and rationally based on a logical assessment of the contextual constraints. 
This argument suggests that following structural elements and rational calculations 
alone does not help delineate how people act. Exogenous political environments may 
also secrete political variables that are specifically relevant to a certain issue. Those 
political variables will serve as the forces that may tend to challenge and destabilise the 
power of the authoritarian regime and might help in answering Meyer and Minkoff’s 
question: ‘how do political opportunities work’ (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). Some of those 
variables might be outside activists’ scope of control, such as population growth, or the 
rise of an educated middle class cohort in Egyptian society, and the “demonstration 
effect” of protests (Tarrow, 1998). For example, the “demonstration effect” has been 
amplifying in Egypt since 2003, gaining momentum after the 2005 parliamentary and 
presidential elections, with a shift in the dominant incentive from the socio-economic to 
being more politically based (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). Some political opportunity 
analysts argue that looking at activists’ perceptions of the opportunities they might have 
is more important than the actual actions. In Chapter Two, political opportunities 
allowed or oppressed in the Egyptian polity were thoroughly discussed within a scheme 
of selected variables which are then reflected in the empirical study to show how 
activists perceive their political environment and the opportunities it may provide, and 
how this perception might shape their political dispositions and related uses of SM for 
mobilising purposes. 
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4.2.2. The uses and gratifications approach 
As the media are one of the main components of the opportunity structure which may 
enhance or deter individuals’ active participation in politics, and rather than asking 
questions about whether media is good or bad, I put more focus on the individual media 
users to research how they perceive the potential of SM for mobilisation, and how they 
consequently utilise its apparatus to achieve that purpose. I begin by describing and 
explaining activists’ uses of social networking sites (SNSs) for mobilising purposes. In 
the process of situating those uses within the broader social and political context, 
activists responded to a set of questions regarding their political and psychological 
dispositions. This helped me to investigate how activists perceive certain elements of 
their political environment that might guide their media utilisation and reflect on their 
related actions, both on- and off-line. 
To bring those concepts and variables together in a theoretical framework and to help 
to understand the way they might relate to each other in a coherent design, I framed my 
study in the rationale of the U&G approach. The aim was to lead the research by this 
umbrella approach and to shed light on why and how individual activists purposively 
use SM platforms to communicate about politics within a given context. 
According to Blumler and Katz (1974), the logic of the U&G approach, based in 
functional analysis, is derived from: 
(1) the social and psychological origins of (2) needs, which generate (3) expectations of 
(4) the mass media and other sources, which lead to (5) differential patterns of media 
exposure (or engagement in other activities), resulting in (6) need gratifications and (7) 
other consequences, perhaps mostly unintended ones" (cited in Morris & Ogan, 1996, p. 
46). 
The needs that individuals thus seek to satisfy are determined by their social 
environment, which includes their age, gender and group affiliation. 
Active audience represents the core of U&G research. The approach suggests that 
individuals are active consumers of mass media content in several ways: they use the 
media most useful to them; they use the media because they are motivated to do so, or 
they use the media as means of resistance to influence. However, in this theory, it is 
essential that media use is directed by certain goals and needs that audience members 
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seek to satisfy by selecting particular media, and by being exposed to particular content 
(Balnaves, Donald, & Shoesmith, 2009). 
By being active, individuals build their selection of different types of media on their 
expectations of the role those media might play in fulfilling their needs or the goals it 
helps them achieve. Whether those needs are satisfied and expectations are met as the 
likely outcome that individuals look forward to gaining from their active usage of the 
selected medium may reflect on their decision to continue using a particular medium to 
gratify their needs.  
Classics of U&G go back to the 1940s, when the research showed a greater interest        
in entertainment communication than in political communication. The most famous 
U&G work in political communication is Blumler and McQuail’s Television in Politics 
(1969). They compared users and non-users of political material in the mass media 
during the 1964 British general election. They found that British voters used the mass 
media to guide them on how to vote and to reinforce voting decisions they had already 
made, to monitor the political environment, for excitement, or because they might use 
the information they acquired through interpersonal communication. Those who 
avoided politics in the mass media did so because it aroused feelings of alienation, or 
because of participants’ party affiliation, or because non-users did not find political 
content relaxing (Orbell, 1969). 
Since its inception in the 1940s, the approach has gathered waves of criticism 
accompanied by, or followed by, several shifts and developments in research traditions. 
Early U&G research was criticised for (1) over-reliance on self-reports, (2) being 
unsophisticated about the social origins of the needs that drive people to use the media, 
(3) being gullible about the possible relation between both the self and society and 
certain kinds of audience satisfaction, and (4) paying more attention to the diversity of 
the audiences used, rather than to the constraints of the text (Katz, 1987).  
Waves of developments in the approach included identifying and operationally defining 
different social and psychological variables to serve as the antecedents of different 
patterns of media consumption (Wimmer & Dominik, 1994, cited in Ruggiero, 2000). 
This tendency marked a shift in U&G research from being primarilly descriptive – 
aiming at classifying qualitative gratification statements into certain meaningful 
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categories – towards a more functionalist perspective (Ruggiero, 2000) that attributed a 
more active role to audience members than had older studies (Klapper, 1963). 
However, the approach was also criticised for considering audience members to be 
highly rational and very selective. In response, both dependency and deprivation 
theories were developed which suggested that high levels of attachment to media for 
some individuals could be ascribed to certain conditions, such as confinement to home, 
low income, and some forms of stress (Ruggiero, 2000). Further, Ruggiero (2000) 
argues that the notion of the active audience is barely accepted outside the United 
States and Western countries, which results in different methodological approaches 
when researching the U&G of media content.  
U&G was also criticised for being too individualistic: it does not show how, or predict 
beyond, the people studied, nor does it account for the societal implication of media use. 
However, with the emergence of new communication technologies, scholars are urged 
to challenge those reproaches as, Ruggiero (2000) suggests, U&G provides a typology of 
uses that could consist a fundamental base of data through which other studies could 
further examine media use. Moreover, Perse & Dunn (1998) argue that any serious 
attempt to understand the social and cultural impacts of new media technologies should 
be preceded by understanding how and why people are making use of that media. 
Methodologically, Massey (1995) argues that the approach faced a major difficulty 
about the way it could empirically assess audience activity and media use without 
involving the effects of researchers. Consistency in results when asking people what 
uses they make of the media and what gratifications they sought from that use, made 
the survey an appropriate tool for researching gratifications as it showed a degree of 
pattern regularity and predictability (McQuail, 1987). However, Massey builds on 
Denzin (1970) and Deutcher’s (1966) view to argue that consistency is not in itself a 
guarantee of veracity. Moreover, she argues that the pre-existing lists of uses do not 
necessarily encompass users’ own media uses and gratifications, and that the 
quantitative data collection method does not allow participants the opportunity to 
express their own experience with the media (Massey, 1995). 
However, other mass media scholars suggest that traditional models of U&G may still 
provide a useful framework from which to begin to study Internet and new media 
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communication (December, 1996; Kuehn, 1994; Morris & Ogan, 1996). Perceived as a 
“cutting edge theoretical approach”, U&G has been deployed in the preliminary stages of 
each new mass communication medium; newspapers, radio and television, and then the 
Internet (Ruggiero, 2000). Researchers have applied the approach to investigate why 
individuals use the ‘new’ medium, how it affects their attitudes, and how this relates to 
the broader cultural and social context. Concurrently, mass communication research 
has shifted from the study of the effects the media have on their audience to focus on 
the functions the media serve. This shift came in alignment with the notion of the ‘active 
audience’ (Kippax & Murray, 1980), and with the Internet’s nature as, “a medium with 
the capability to empower the individual in terms of both the information he or she 
seeks and the information he or she creates” (Singer, 1998, p. 10).  
With the emergence of new media, the nature of audience activity has changed from 
barely being the active selectors, viewers, and interpreters of media content, to 
possessing greater control on the information superhighway, to being able to negotiate 
the content and create their own. The ordinary media audience can also have their own 
audience; they can address other media users, albeit they may be limited to their circle 
of friends and acquaintances, and their audience may be very fragmented. Lin (1996, p. 
2) argued that this functionalist approach provides the “means–ends orientation [for 
the perspective] and opens up a world of opportunities for studying mediated 
communication as a functional process that is purposive and leads to specific 
psychological or social consequences” (cited in Ruggiero, 2000, p. 27). This might 
suggest that research on interactive media can focus on the ‘functions’ the media offer 
active users in order to enable them to ‘influence’ another circle of users (i.e., mobilising 
political activism). 
SNSs have drawn the attention of U&G scholars, yielding many studies that have 
identified different use constructs for SNSs. Nevertheless, most of the research has been 
done with general Internet users, with a special focus     on the media’s ‘social’ aspects, 
and only a few studies have applied the U&G rationale  on politically interested Internet 
users (Kaye & Johnson, 2002, 2004), or have deployed the approach to explain how 
Internet users utilise SNSs, in particular to fulfill political needs (Leung, 2009; Cozma & 
Ancu, 2009; Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Hanson, Haridakis, & Sharma, 2008).   
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In addition to the scarcity of the studies that illuminate the area of the political uses of 
SM outlets, which were originally generated for social and personal purposes, the vast 
majority of those studies have examined the incentives associated with SM use within    
a social and political environment that entirely differs from the structural elements       
of Egyptian society within which the audience targeted for the current research operate. 
These social circumstances are expected –according to U&G research- to produce 
different uses and gratification outcomes that result from, or are associated with, using 
particular media (Rosengren, 1976). Seeking to provide an answer to the first research 
question: ‘Why do young Egyptian activists use social media?’ attempts to address this 
empty area. 
Suggested modification of social media use classification 
Modelling the uses measures in the U&G approach could illuminate this research 
inquiry for several reasons. First, it suits the nature of both the active users and the 
interactive medium. Second, the idea of active audiences and interactive platforms goes 
in tandem with applying a basic condition for the practice of active citizenship, i.e., the 
subjective perception of one’s self as an active citizen. Audience activity is thus a 
prerequisite for using SM as a resource from which activists can learn how to build the 
civic capacities that they need to practise politics. 
Studies of media gratifications (e.g., Rubin, 1993) have resulted in several classifications 
of the needs that people aspire to fulfill through their active media use. Two broad 
categories that direct the active audience’s media consumption were suggested. The 
first is ‘instrumental’, where audience activity is goal-oriented and characterised by 
selectivity, intentionality, and involvement; they seek to achieve certain goals through 
their media consumption. Audience use of the media may also be ‘ritualised’ or habit-
oriented and focused on time-passing objectives rather than planned goal-achievement 
behaviour.  
In the case of examining the uses and gratifications of newer media, researchers tend to 
build on and adapt measures from traditional use incentives that have been 
accumulated from previous research, taking into account the nature and context of the 
new media (Papacarissi & Rubin, 2000). Previous research on media motivations has 
introduced several adaptations to measures of use in response to changes in the media 
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landscape. For example, researchers identify ‘convenience’ as a significant gratification 
that is sought based on the easiness of use of Internet applications (Kaye & Johnson, 
2003; Papacarissi & Rubin, 2000). Similarly, SM use items (see Section 4.3.3.2) were 
modified from Internet U&G literature (e.g., Papachrissi & Robin, 2000; Korgaonkar & 
Wolin, 1999; Flanagin & Metzger, 2001; Song et al., 2004 and Stafford et al., 2004; Kaye 
& Johnson, 2004). As SNSs are basically utilised to meet strangers and maintain 
relationships with current friends (Newport & Scholl, 2009), and as ‘network size’ was 
found to have an impact on political engagement (Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009), 
‘networking’ was added to the SM use scale to allow respondents to indicate whether 
they use SM to build their own community of potential supporters in order to reach out 
to a larger audience with their political views and mobilising messages.  
Additionally, another dimension was added to the uses of SM battery. This modification 
builds on the uniqueness of the Internet, which distinguishes the medium’s outcomes 
from those derived from earlier television studies (Greenberg, 1974; Rubin, 1983). It 
also resonates particularly with the interactive nature of the SM, which entails that 
communicative interactions run over the SNSs involve other users, who share content 
with and comment on other users’ messages. This adaptation stems from the 
assumption that individual exposure to the media serves to satisfy needs originating 
from internal (personal) and social (group) origins (Lenart, 1994, p. 31), and it hence 
implies users’ tendency to work collectively with others and to have an impact on 
political life. I suggest that the reasons for using SM for political purposes could be ‘self-
directed’ and/or ‘other-directed’. Activists may use SNSs for personal purposes, such as 
to look for certain information that they need to make their mind up about certain 
issues (guidance). They may also use them for collective reasons, such as to help others 
decide on important issues, or to influence how they could do that (guiding). They may 
also use SM platforms to propagate their own opinions and views within their networks 
(information seeking/disseminating). Intrinsically, by being connected to the nature of 
the medium, users could use SNSs to aggregate friends and acquaintances and to gain 
more potential supporters for their views and standpoints (networking). 
Based on U&G’s theoretical framework, which suggests that, from a psychological 
perspective of communication, people’s media use is drawn by certain needs or wants 
that they seek to gratify, three main themes are addressed in this research; media uses, 
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dispositions and the outcomes of media consumption. These themes, related sets of 
variables, and suggested connections are delineated in Figure 4.2 and then discussed. 
4.3. Research questions and design 
4.3.1. Research questions 
This study aims to explore the reasons for the active utilisation of SM by young Egyptian 
activists prior to the 25th January uprising. It attempts to gauge the weight of SM as 
platforms for political mobilisation as perceived by a sample of activists. In doing so, I 
also attempt to understand the relationships between the contextual factors 
represented -for the purpose of this study- in political and psychological dispositions 
(political efficacy and fear of repression perceptions) and demographics, by seeking 
answers to the following questions and related sub questions: 
RQ1. Why do young activists use social media?  
RQ2. How do social media contribute to creating opportunities (favourable dispositions) 
for practising collective action off-line?  
RQ2.1. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
feelings of fear of repression? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ2.2. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
feelings of being politically efficacious? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ3. How do social media contribute to mobilising collective action practice off-line? 
RQ3.1. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
tendency to practise politics online? And if so, in what ways? 
RQ3.2. Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ 
tendency to practise politics off-line? And if so, in what ways? 
Figure 4.2 delineates the research design. The expected associations between the 
research variables, presented in the research questions and sub questions, are also 
demonstrated in this Figure. 
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4.3.2. Research population and sampling procedures 
Defining the research population provides a basis from which to decide on a sufficient 
and suitable sample strategy. It also indicates the extent to which extrapolations can be 
made from a research sample (Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock, 2010). Specific 
research objectives were used to define the research population. Egyptian citizens, aged 
18-35, who describe themselves as being politically interested and active represent the 
pool of selection for the current research. Using the Internet –and especially SM- for 
political communication was also one of the main criteria according to which 
participants in the current research were selected. 
4.3.2.1. Sampling for the quantitative survey study 
A non-random sampling (non-probability sampling) technique was used to acquire         
a sample of Egyptian political activists for the purpose of this research. In such                 
a sampling style, the sample units are selected purposively, based on the research 
objectives. The selection-chance of each research unit is unknown and cannot be 
calculated. Accordingly, it cannot be guaranteed that every unit of the research 
population has an equal chance of being selected (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & 
Murdock, 2010). Under the non-probability sampling umbrella, a snowball sample was 
accumulated for the purpose of this study. 
Snowball sampling: is a form of convenience sample. Within this approach to sampling, 
initial contact with a small group of people relevant to the research topic is made. These 
initial contacts are then used to establish contact with others (Bryman, 2004). Practical 
reasons have led to compiling the sample for this research by using snowball-sampling 
techniques. As the research objectives and research population are defined, no list of 
activists exists that might be used as a sampling frame that should contain all (or most) 
of the units of the population. Given the nature of the current research and the context 
of the study, snowball-sampling is an appropriate technique for participant selection. 
Recommendations made by the initial contacts are valuable in dealing with trust issues 
and in introducing the researcher to groups of activists who might otherwise be difficult 
to reach and who might refrain from discussing their political activities with strangers. 
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A problem with snowball sampling is that it is usually unrepresentative of the 
population. There are therefore concerns about external validity and the ability to 
generalise which loom, especially within the research’s quantitative element. However, 
it has been suggested that snowball sampling may be a better approach than 
conventional probability sampling if the aim is to trace connections (Bryman, 2004). 
To acquire the survey study sample, I drafted a flexible participation programme which 
was used as a guide for obtaining the research sample. I began by gaining contacts and 
building a network of connections before starting the actual field work. The main 
determinants of the sampling population were: political interest, use of SM and age 
group. As activists may or may not be affiliated to a political party or social movement, 
and to avoid acquiring a sample that reflects an inaccurate reading of the target 
population, when approaching initial contacts it was, as much as possible, taken into 
account that they represented different schools of political thought in Egyptian society. 
Potential nominators were contacted to start a process of referencing possible 
participants. Although the snowballing technique may yield a moderate-sized sample 
(Denscombe, 2010), it was likely that activists would have been highly active                   
in organising and attending several events in the time period that preceded the 
parliamentary elections of 28th November 2010, and afterwards. This was expected      
to enhance the possibility of reaching a sizable number of potential participants during 
those events. Prior to starting the data collection process, I distinguished a number       
of activists to contact in the preliminary stages of the field work. Amongst those were:  
 W.A., an activist and well-known blogger. 
 M.A.E., the creator of the El-Baradei for the Presidency_2011 group on Facebook and 
a member of the National Association for Change (NAC). 
 A.G., an activist and member of the National Association for Change (NAC). 
 A.Ma., an activist and co-founder of the April 6th Youth Movement. 
 A.F., an activist and member of the al Wasat political party (being founded at the 
time). 
 N.S., an activist and member of the Socialist Renewal Movement. 
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Nominators helped to introduce the researcher to activists in each research site, thus 
breaking the ice and building the mutual trust that was much needed for co-operation 
and to acquire sufficient, reliable information. This helped to move the research readily 
to the qualitative stage of data collection. Figure 4.3 represents how the research 
population and the different samples relate to each other. Although participants’ 
consent to use their real names and aliases in this thesis was obtained before the data 
collection started, I prefer at this particular time to preserve their safety and I made       
a decision that they should not reveal their real names despite their wishes. On the one 
hand, I am concerned about providing protection to participants and keen not to cause 
them any harm for taking part in my research. On the other hand, this is not a historical 
account that aims at connecting certain events with those who made them. Rather, the 
main focus of this research is how these young activists perceive SM’s contribution       
to their mobilisation efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Research population and samples 
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1996). Accordingly, the selected demographic variables correspond to certain issues in 
the Egyptian polity that are relevant to young Egyptians’ geographical availability and 
related tendency to practise politics as delineated in Chapter Two.  
As shown in Table 4.1, the gender ratio is 39.8 percent male and 60.2 percent female (n 
= 362, missing = 5))9. 64.9 percent are university students, 24.3 percent are university 
graduates, and only 8.2 percent hold higher degrees (n = 357, missing = 10). 
Consistently, more than half of the participants fall into the age cohort between 18 and 
22, while only 4.4 percent are between 30 and 35 years of age (n = 362, missing = 5). 
38.1 percent of participants reported a monthly income range between 1000 and less 
than 3000 EGP. Equal proportions of respondents (21%) reported that they earned 
between 3000 and less than 5000 EGP, and 5000 – 7000 EGP, and the smallest 
proportion of respondents fell into the higher income category of more than 7000 EGP 
(n = 346, missing = 21). Respondents were asked to indicate which social networking 
site(s) they use to communicate with others. Facebook was by far the most visited site 
(90.9%), followed by YouTube (50.6%). Respondents who reported that they used the 
interactive comment section in electronic newspapers (15%) were slightly greater in 
number than those who used Twitter (12.3%), and weblogs were the least popular 
amongst respondents (7.3%). Table 4.1 describes the research sample’s spread by 
participants’ demographic characteristics. 
  
                                                        
9 367 partoicipants completed the questionnaire for the current research. However, for some questions, 
some cases were missing and this explains the difference in the total number of research sample (n) for 
some variables. 
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Table 4.1: Research sample distribution by demographics 
Demographic variables                      Sample Distribution 
 Frequency % 
Gender   
Male 144 39.8 
Female  218 60.2 
Education   
University student 238 66.7 
University graduate 89 24.9 
Higher degree 30 8.4 
Age   
18 to 22 234 64.6 
22 to 26 43 11.9 
26 to 30 38 10.5 
30 to 35 16 4.4 
more than 35 31 8.6 
Income   
1000 to less than 3000 140 40.5 
3000 to less than 5000 77 22.3 
5000 to 7000 77 22.3 
more than 7000 52 15.0 
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4.3.2.3. Sub-sampling for the qualitative focus group discussions 
Participants who expressed their willingness and readiness to take a further step in the 
research by providing their contact information in the questionnaire represented the 
sampling frame for the subsequent qualitative part of the research. Questionnaires were 
collected and revised in order to identify these prospective participants, bearing in 
mind the link between each group of questionnaires and the initial contact who led to 
each group’s assignment. Subsequently, selection from willing respondents was made 
within those groups so as to guarantee homogeneity and trust between each discussion 
group, given the research topic’s sensitivity. By following this, the sample for focus 
groups compiled combines the advantages of both ‘pre-constituted’ and ‘researcher-
constituted’ groups; as the aforementioned networks act as the former, meanwhile, I 
had the chance to make selections from among those willing networks of participants 
and to exert a degree of control over the sample’s composition.  
Besides homogeneity, selection was also directed by diversity in gender, age, income, 
political background and degree of activism within the assigned homogenous groups, as 
revealed by preliminary analysis of the quantitative data. This guarantees 
distinguishing influential young activists, running vigorous discussions and obtaining 
various views on the research topic. However, the main factor that directed the 
stratification of the groups was participants’ willingness to take part in supplementary, 
deeper discussions. Willing respondents were contacted and invited to participate         
in a group discussion. This yielded three complete focus group discussions (FGDs) with 
20 participants and an average group size of seven participants. Table 4.2 shows the 
qualitative sample of the research. 
4.3.3. Data collection: Methods and sources 
4.3.3.1. The mixed methods design  
Data for this research come from applying mixed methods strategies yielding 
quantitative and qualitative information. Using this approach provides a deeper 
explanation of the phenomenon studied by bridging the quantitative findings with the 
participants’ qualitative narratives under the broader umbrella of the research context. 
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Table 4.2: Research sub-sample distribution 
Name Gender Age Profession 
1 HA. Male 22 Student 
2 SA. Female 21 Student 
3 RA. Female 22 Student 
4 MD. Male 23 Student 
5 MA. Male 23 Student 
6 MH. Male 27 Student 
7 MD* Male 22 Student 
8 A.A. Male 35 Lecturer at the Faculty of Engineering 
9 W.B. Male 33 Chief accountant 
10 A.M. Female 26 
Journalist 
11 I.B. Male 21 Student 
12 M.Da. Male 23 
Blogger 
13 A.Ma. Male 30 Financial control 
14 SO. Male 22 Student 
15  I.Z. Male 23 Student 
16 H.B. Male 18 Student 
17 M.E. Male 19 Student 
18 M.S. Male 26 Communication engineer 
19 M.M. Male 28 Online editor 
20 A.Y. Male 35 Poet and activist 
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As the research is guided by the theoretical approach of political opportunity, within 
which activists’ perceptions of SM’s potential for mobilisation is discussed and 
explained, this research falls into the ‘transformative mixed methods’ category as 
suggested by Creswell (2009). According to this general strategy, the theoretical 
framework leads the research design, which contains both quantitative and qualitative 
data. Under this lens, both sets of data were collected ‘concurrently’, as both 
quantitative and qualitative data are merged together to provide an inclusive analysis of 
the research subject.   
In most cases, the general findings begin by demonstrating what participants say in the 
questionnaires. These findings are subsequently considered in the context of what 
respondent’s say in FGDs. The data retrieved from surveying a sample of young activists 
is quantitatively analysed to examine how these activists perceive SM’s potential for 
mobilising collective action, as well as building up a profile of SM users that reflects the 
sample distribution according to the main demographic variables studied (see Table 
4.1). While this horizontal view is essential in describing the studied phenomenon 
through acquiring information about a varied set of selected factors that may relate to 
SM use by politically active participants, supplementary qualitative group discussions 
were conducted to provide a deeper vertical scope for understanding, and to extend the 
analysis by allowing participants the opportunity to elaborate beyond the suggested 
classification of representative alternatives that are suggested for each research 
variable, as introduced in the questionnaire. This is expected to enrich the discussion 
and expand my understanding of the research subject. In addition to capturing their 
media uses, dispositions, and actions through numerical data and statistics, qualitative 
methods help by holding more profound accounts of the experiences that participants 
have regarding their SM and political practices. In other words, researching the 
questions quantitatively helps to answer the inquiry ‘what’, while the qualitative 
trajectory deals more with the questions ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ Moreover, “biases inherent 
in any single method could neutralise or cancel the biases of other methods” (Creswell, 
2009, p. 14).  
The quantitative step in the empirical data collection was conducted alongside the 
qualitative data collection, although applying the questionnaire was a step ahead in 
order to sample participants for the FGDs. This roughly concurrent timing is more 
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manageable, given the tensions in the political environment researched, the security 
difficulties that I expected to face, the nature of the research sample, and the limited 
time allocated for visiting the field.  
 Advantages and limitations of the mixed methods design 
Using a mixed methods design helps to interpret the findings within the understanding 
of the political opportunity and the U&G theoretical framework. Additionally to 
enriching the discussion, integrating qualitative discussions into the analysis addresses 
one of the shortfalls of U&G research as being over reliant on quantitative methods to 
address media uses. Additionally, this mixed design helps to reach well-validated and 
corroborated results through comparison of the two sets of data to determine if there is 
convergence, differences, or some combination of the two. Collecting the data 
concurrently is also less time, and hence less money consuming, which makes it more 
convenient, given the limited time and resources allocated for the conduct of the field 
work. 
On the other side of the coin, this mixed strategy has a number of limitations. 
Investigating a phenomenon through two distinct methods requires great effort and 
sufficient experience. It may also be hard to demonstrate and discuss how data               
of different forms may relate. Moreover, it may be difficult to resolve discrepancies that 
may emerge while comparing the results, although discrepancies can be addressed by 
procedures, such as conducting additional data collection, or gaining new insight from 
the differences in the data (Creswell, 2009, p. 214). 
4.3.3.2. The quantitative research 
 The survey instrument 
The main method for data gathering in this thesis builds on quantitative methodology. 
The first part of the current research involves asking participants directly about their 
views, perceptions and activities around the main research question. A printed self-
administered questionnaire was designed to deliver questions on a number of selected 
research variables, corresponding to a set of questions that the research aims to answer. 
This way of delivering questions to participants is meant to be highly structured and 
 159 
 
standardised, which may therefore minimise the influence of the human factor on the 
data-collection procedure and to increase the sample reliability. Self-implementation 
guarantees that questions are presented and answers are recorded directly by 
participants and no intermediary is involved in the data collection process (Deacon, 
Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 2010). Although printed self-completion questionnaires 
may resemble online self-completion ones, the ‘interactive element’ of the latter implies 
commonality with face-to-face discussiona ‘in which respondents interact with the 
source of questions’ (Gunter, Nicholas, Huntington, & Williams, 2002).  
Prior to starting the snowballing technique by disseminating questionnaires among 
initial contacts, who then circulated them amongst their networks, a training session 
was held to make sure that the nominators are familiar with the instrument. The 
research topic and research aims were thoroughly explained to and discussed with the 
first contacts. Careful methodical instructions about the structure of the questionnaire 
and how respondents should fill them in were conveyed in this session. Activists were 
then allowed sufficient time to review the questionnaire and ask questions. I received 
comments about the questionnaire’s length, and the possibility of and preference for 
uploading it online. Initial contacts mentioned that it would have been less time 
consuming and safer to respond to an online questionnaire, especially for participants 
in the later stages of the research. I received inquiries about the way participants should 
respond to some (e.g., multipartite questions). After receiving these comments,                
a number of questions were omitted from the questionnaire for the sake of clarity given 
that they would not affect the research design nor hamper the capability of the survey 
instrument to address its questions. Some of the omitted questions also addressed 
variables that might have, if included, overloaded the research design and complicated 
the statistical tests of the suggested correlations. Moreover, a question about interest in 
politics was also removed from the questionnaire, given that the participants are 
politically active, which implies a degree of interest in politics. See Appendices 1 & 2 for 
questionnaires in English and the version translated into Arabic. 
Questionnaires were collected and primarily revised for completion and consistency. 
Participants who mentioned their willingness and readiness for a second foray into the 
research represented the sampling frame for the subsequent qualitative part of the 
research, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.3. 
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 Operational definitions and corresponding measurements of the main variables 
The main research question revolves around the way activists perceive the potential SM 
may have for mobilising political action to acquire social and political reform. Under the 
umbrella of a U&G rationale, several variables were determined to assess activists’ 
perceptions of SNSs as an apparatus for mobilisation. The core question to which the 
participant activists were introduced addresses activists’ uses of SM. They were asked 
questions about the reasons for which they utilised SM outlets for political purposes. As 
U&G suggests, media sought gratifications precede and hence may be influenced by 
motivational antecedents, which may also act as intrinsic incentives for media selection. 
Rosengren (1974) suggested that communication motives result from the interaction 
between demographics, communication needs and social and psychological factors 
(cited in Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Sheldon, 2008). Those antecedents may interfere 
in directing individuals’ selections from different media to satisfy certain needs. They 
may relate to individuals’ social, psychological, political, and/or cultural background. 
For the purpose of the current research, a set of questions about demographic 
characteristics was included in the questionnaire, as mentioned previously, to serve as a 
prospective background for the activists’ perceptions. They were introduced to the 
research design in order to demonstrate the way participants perceive SM’s potential to 
mobilise off-line collective action mediated by the specificities of the context within 
which they are operating.  
Based on this rationale, and as shown in Figure 4.2, the main research variables are:  
 Uses of SM. 
 Political dispositions. 
 Online political activism. 
 Off-line political activism. 
 Demographic variables. 
The first data set relating to those variables was collected via a survey of a snowball 
sample of young Egyptian activists. The survey instrument was thoroughly discussed 
with academics in Sociology, Education, Communication Studies, Political Science and 
Statistics before its application. Accordingly, changes in question wording, order and 
the general design of the questionnaire were applied before the actual fieldwork took 
place (see Appendix 1). 
 161 
 
To help to design the questionnaire, research variables were operationally defined        
in order to guarantee a collective understanding of research variables and terms and    
to conserve clear, empirical testing of the research questions. In the next section, the 
process and series of actions used to measure each variable are demonstrated.  
SM use is an aggregate of two questions. Respondents were asked to indicate: 
(1) Since when have [they] used SM platforms for political communication: 
 Less than six months. 
 Six months to a year. 
 One to two years. 
 Two to three years. 
 More than three years. 
(2) The average time on a typical day [they] spend discussing or practising politics on 
SM: 
 Less than an hour. 
 An hour to two hours. 
 Two hours to three hours. 
 More than three hours. 
 SM use constructs: this question mainly seeks to explore the general dispositions 
that influence [young activists’] actions taken to fulfill a need or want (Papacharissi & 
Rubin, 2000). This perspective reinforces active images of audiences. 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, a significant enhancement was applied to the profile of the 
political uses of SM. An additional dimension was added to some use constructs on the 
scale. Rather than focusing solely on the individual needs that an activist seeks to 
satisfy, a parallel set of uses was included on the suggested scale in order to gauge the 
activists’ tendency (if any) to address, work with and/or influence others through their 
political practices on SM. Although interaction via SM platforms involves the presence of 
other users, users may perceive themselves to be individuals who are more inclined to 
engage with the content the medium provides, rather than seeing themselves as 
members of a larger group and hence aiming their communication to share their 
experience with other users of the medium. Accordingly, the proposed SM uses scale 
encompasses individual and collective uses of the medium. This dichotomous 
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perspective is expected to have an impact on SM users’ dispositions and perceptions     
of their participatory environment and, hence, on the degree and scale of their tendency 
to practise politics online and in real life. Six SM use constructs are identified with slight 
adaptation from previous research (Kaye & Johnson, 2004, p. 207). General definitions 
of the six use constructs are as follows: 
1. Guidance: Individuals who are looking for political advice, and who are generally 
interested in accessing information to guide their political decisions. 
 Guiding: is defined as actively providing political advice and helping others to 
make decisions on political issues. 
2. Surveillance: Information seeking is a more purposeful activity than guidance and 
is defined as actively searching out specific political information and keeping an eye 
on the political landscape. 
 Disseminating information: Is defined as actively providing or drawing attention 
to specific political information. 
3. Entertainment: Individuals seeking entertaining political information for 
relaxation and amusement purposes. 
4. Social utility: Using the Internet to reinforce decisions and to arm individuals with 
information to use in discussions with others. 
5. Convenience: Seeking political information from online sources, and/or practising 
political activities online, because it is convenient and easier to do than turning to 
traditional sources. 
6. Networking: Individuals seeking to build up networks of acquaintances to enhance 
their capacity to reach larger audiences. 
Scale wording and reliability measures 
Due to time limitations and constraints in the field, the development of uses of SM 
profile took a certain route that is slightly different than the standard U&G procedure 
usually followed in order to develop an initial profile of Internet uses (Stafford, Stafford, 
& Schkade, 2004). Rather than starting with an open ended question to acquire 
information about the needs which young activists use SM to gratify, then building          
a scale based on a thematic analysis of responses to that question in order to assess uses 
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of SM, the current research builds on previous literature on SM U&G (Park, Kee, & 
Valenzuela, 2009) to construct a scale of SM uses.  
Respondents indicate their reasons for using SM for political purposes on an index of 19 
items split into six use categories. Participants were instructed to indicate the level of 
importance they perceived for each of the 19 descriptive trait terms on a five-point 
semantic differential scale, where 1 meant ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 meant ‘strongly 
agree.’ Internal consistency was measured among the uses test items; Cronbach’s α 
(alpha) was calculated to determine the reliability of the test scores of each sought 
gratification category. The value of Cronbach’s α reflects the inter-correlations among 
test items and it generally increases as the inter-correlations among test items increase. 
Each use category represents a single construct composed of items that measure             
a different substantive area, hence, Cronbach’s α is the most appropriately used internal 
consistency estimate of reliability of use for test scores (Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 
2005). However, a high alpha (α) does not imply that the measure is unidirectional. 
Dimensionality may be checked by performing exploratory factor analysis. 
Guidance (Cronbach’s α = 0.76): the question reads:  
I use social networking sites for political communication… 
(1) To help me decide how to vote in the future.  
(2) To help me decide about important issues.  
(3) For unbiased viewpoints.  
(4) To help me convince others to vote in the next election.  
(5) To help other users decide on important issues. 
 
Information seeking (Cronbach’s α = 0.68): the question reads:  
I use social networking sites for political communication… 
(6) To find specific political information for which I am looking  
(7) To keep up with main issues of the day.  
(8) Because it is an easy way to disseminate information.  
(9) To help me draw other users’ attention to certain political information. 
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Networking (Cronbach’s α = 0.67): the question reads: 
I use social networking sites for political communication… 
(10) To join a group or groups that share the same political interests with me.  
(11) Because it is an effective tool to reach a large number of people.  
(12) Because it helps me organise political events on a large scale. 
Social utility (Cronbach’s α = 0.65): the question reads:  
I use social networking sites for political communication… 
(13) To give me something to talk about with others.  
(14) To use as ammunition in arguments with others. 
Entertainment (Cronbach’s α = 0.79): the question reads:  
I use social networking sites for political communication… 
(15) Because it is entertaining.  
(16) Because it helps me relax. 
Convenience (Cronbach’s α = 0.75): the question reads:  
I use social networking sites for political communication… 
(17) Because engaging in an online activity is less time consuming.  
(18) Because engaging in an online activity is less money consuming.  
(19) Because I can get what I want with less effort. 
 Dispositions were assessed in this study by looking at young Egyptian activists’ 
perceived feelings of political efficacy and fear of repression. 
(1) Political efficacy is defined as an individual’s belief that performing a particular 
behaviour will be associated with positive outcomes (Neuwirth & Frederick, 2004). 
Scale wording and reliability measures 
Political efficacy was measured with a four items index (Cronbach’s α = 0.64) adapted 
from previous research (Bimber, 2001). Respondents were asked to express to what 
extent they agreed or disagreed with four items on a five-point scale, where 1 meant 
‘strongly agree’, and 5 meant ‘strongly disagree’: (a) Politics is too complicated for 
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someone like me to follow, (b) There is not much point in participating in political 
campaigns: one person’s participation will not make any difference, (c) People like me 
do not have a say in government, and (d) Politicians do not care about what people like 
me think. The first two items measure the internal political efficacy , whereas the last 
two items measure the perceived external political efficacy 
(2) Fear of repression is operationally defined as the general perceived feeling of being 
unsafe due to one’s public expression of political views and confrontation with 
authorities, and the related anticipation of being abused, harrassed or arrested if (s)he 
expressed opposing opinions to the regime, either in reality or online.  
Scale wording and reliability measures 
Fear of repression was measured by a scale composed of three items on a five-point 
scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.68). Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the items: (a) I worry about being emotionally or physically harrased if I go on the 
street to participate in a political activity, (b) I feel worried about expressing my 
political opinion in public, and (c) Egyptian citizen could face violations which make 
him/her worry about his/her safety. On this scale, responses ranged from 1 ‘strongly 
agree’, to 5 ‘strongly disagree’.  
 Outcomes of SM use 
While gratifications sought are measured in relation to what incentivises individuals to 
use SM, the gratifications obtained are determined by what the audience think they gain 
from using the media (Sheldon, 2008).  
 Behavioural outcomes of SM use include forms of political activities participants 
report that they practise on SM platforms, as well as forms of political activities 
reported to be practised off-line. 
(1) Online political participation was operationalised as the amount of practice          
of forms of political activities on SM platforms. This is measured by the frequency          
of practice of those types of political activities, as stated by the participants. I used seven 
items to gauge the political use of SM.  
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Scale wording and reliability measures 
The online political participation variable was measured with an aggregate scale 
composed of seven items (Cronbach’s α = 0.87) where 1 meant ‘never’, and 5 meant 
‘very often’. Respondents were asked whether in the past year they had (a) Joined or left 
a group about politics, (b) Started a social or political topic for discussion, (c) Posted 
links to news stories relating to a political or social cause, (d) Posted links to videos 
relating to a political or social cause, (e) Created or invited others to participate in an 
event related to a political or social cause, (f) Signed an e-mail or web petition, and (g) 
Forwarded a political e-mail or link to another person.  
(2) Off-line political participation is another dimension that was added to the 
behavioural outcome of SM use. It is used for the purpose of bridging the online and the 
off-line contexts and to give insights into whether online political engagement (online 
behavioural media outcome) would result in, or relate to, off-line political engagement 
(off-line behavioural media outcome).  
Off-line participation was operationally defined as the number of political activities 
practised off-line. This is measured by the frequency of practice of different types of 
political activities. Eight items were used to gauge participants’ stated off-line political 
participation. As suggested in previous research (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003), using an 
index allows me to look at the impact of using SM on a full range of activities, and helps 
me to develop a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between online 
activism and off-line participation. Additionally, the items used correspond to different 
variables that are also tested in the current research, as well as to the political context  
of Egypt in the last decade. For example, it is argued that participants will refrain from 
consuming the ‘National’ media content due to its biased treatment in favour of the 
regime and, hence, they feel sceptical about what these media present. Given that their 
political activities may fall outside the traditional, or ‘accepted’ realm of participation as 
defined by the regime and allowed by its’ laws, activists are also expected to perceive 
‘National’ media as being hostile and biased against them and their activities and views. 
Correspondingly, an item about contacting mainstream media on political issues was 
included in the index.  
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Similarly, Egypt has witnessed a vibrant political environment in recent years, marked 
by young citizens practising forms of political activities (for the first time, for most        
of them) demanding political and social reform. These activities ranged from attending 
meetings, signing petitions, to demonstrating and protesting. These forms of activities 
were thus also included in the index to allow participants to report on them. Moreover, 
a marked openness in Egypt’s political structure was changing the system of election    
of the state president from a referendum to running a multi-candidate presidential 
election, which implied that, for the first time in twenty five years, change was possible, 
and citizens’ voices might have a value. As the research was applied after the 
parliamentary elections of 2010, and prior to the presidential elections of 2011, 
additional items on voting were added to the index. 
Scale wording and reliability measures 
To measure off-line political participation, a scale was constructed consisting of eight 
items (Cronbach’s α = 0.89) adapted from previous research (e.g., Bimber, 2001; Feezell, 
Conroy, & Guerrero, 2009), where respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point 
scale (where 1 meant ‘never’, and 5 meant ‘very often’) whether, in the past year, they 
had (a) Expressed political opinion through mainstream media (written a letter to the 
editor of a newspaper or magazine, or called a live radio or TV show to express a 
political opinion), (b) Volunteered for a campaign or other political cause, (c) Organised 
or participated in organising a political event, (d) Attended political meetings or 
speeches, (e) Participated in demonstrations or protests, (f) Displayed a political button, 
a sign or sticker, (g) Voted in an election, and (h) Tried to influence how others would 
vote. 
 Attitudinal outcomes of SM use (SM satisfaction) involve the degree to which 
participants think that using SM for political communication has helped in meeting their 
expectations generally.  
SM satisfaction: with slight changes to the measures used in previous research 
(Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000), I use a single item to measure the degree of satisfaction 
with SM as platforms for political engagement. I asked respondents to indicate: “over all, 
how satisfied [they were] with the job SM do in providing [them] with the things [they] 
are seeking”  
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 Demographic variables: Respondents were also asked questions about their gender, 
age, education, and the monthly income of their household. 
 Applying the survey instrument 
The actual fieldwork was run between 14th November 2010 and 10th January 2011. 
Initial contacts were crucial for the data-collection process. They facilitated approaches 
to activists and the building of trust relationships with otherwise tight social networks, 
especially considering the tense context in which the field work took place, the 
sensitivity of the topic, and the related and expected suspicion and confusion. 650 
questionnaires were disseminated amongst initial contacts, who started the 
snowballing technique by suggesting events and meetings where potential participants 
could be approached and/or by recommending other initial contacts. Participation in 
the study was voluntary. The response rate was 56.46 percent, with a total of 367 
complete questionnaires. These complete questionnaires went through data entry and 
evaluation processes after excluding 35 questionnaires for inconsistency or non-
completion. On one hand, some respondents refused to co-operate, which may be 
explained by the aforementioned factors, or their lack of interest in taking part in the 
research. On the other, non-cooperation was sometimes covert; as some respondents 
avoided revealing their views by choosing not to answer some of the questions, which 
accordingly led to the omission of the incomplete questionnaires.  
4.3.3.3. The qualitative research 
 The focus group discussions (FGDs) 
As the research progressed on the quantitative trajectory, a purposive sample was 
drawn from among the activists who participated in the survey study to further discuss 
issues and themes relating to the research topic. A hybrid of methods was used for 
delivering questions to a secondary sample of participants. Follow-up FGDs were 
designed to combine the virtues of open-response questions with the closed-response 
format. Morrison (1998) and Barbour and Kitzinger (1999) stated that focus group 
research is gaining more popularity as a qualitative research method in communication 
and cultural studies (cited in Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock, 2010). It also 
contributes to an understanding of the social context of media use. Additionally, it helps 
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discuss in more detail the implications of the suggested modification of the SM use 
measure so as to gauge young activists’ perceptions of the potential of SM for 
addressing others.  
 Discussion guidelines 
A set of questions was used to lead the group discussions and to guarantee that 
participants do not stray from the discussion line, albeit expressing their opinions 
freely. These questions were only used to guide the discussions. The groups were led 
flexibly to give participants the chance to tell their stories and to elaborate more           
on their perceptions of SM, their personal political experiences, and their experiences 
with the authorities – if any. These questions were articulated so as to cover the main 
research themes and variables. They also expanded beyond these variables in order to 
allow participants to elaborate on their own dispositions and experiences, and to link 
their views to the context within which they practise politics. 
 Inerview questions (flexibly delivered) 
1) What sorts of SM do you use to communicate with others about politics?  
2) For each mentioned medium, what are the reasons for using that particular 
platform for political engagement?  
3) Do you feel that using SM empowers you politically?  
 If yes, please tell me how? 
 If no, please tell me why?  
4) What do you think are the advantages (and disadvantages) of using SM for political 
purposes (elaborate on the unique features of SM)? 
5) Why do you participate in politics despite the threats that you might face? 
6) Could you please tell me about your personal experience with authorities 
concerning your activism (harassment, threats, torture, etc.)? 
7) Is it significant to your activism that interaction via SM can be anonymous? (Do you 
think that new media features help you cross participation barriers? How?) 
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8) Considering the circumstances that Egyptian society is currently going through, 
how you think using SM might enhance political engagement and feed into 
participation in politics off-line (using SM as a channel to off-line activism and 
vice versa)? 
9) What do you think are the impacts of practising political mobilisation via SM on 
political engagement online?  
10) How would you compare that impact with the impact of off-line activism? 
11) Are you satisfied with the role that SM play in this regard? 
 Conducting the FGDs 
Respondents who provided their contact information and who were selected to 
participate in the face-to-face group discussions, were contacted to arrange a mutually 
convenient time and venue for conducting the FGDs. Interviewees were informed at this 
point about the estimated length of the discussions, which was expected to range from 
45 minutes to an hour and a half. As for the venue, arrangements were made in advance 
to obtain a quiet, private, undisturbed and well-equipped location to avoid the 
possibility that things would go wrong. In that carefully selected site, seating was 
arranged in a way that allowed fluent interaction between the researcher and the 
interviewees and that helped to engage all parties without putting the researcher           
in a central position. 
During the discussions, participants were given the option to use pseudonyms, rather 
than their real names, to guarantee their anonymity in the recorded material. I used 
name tags to be able to address the participants by the names they chose in order to 
enhance the discussion’s flow. However, participants preferred to use their real names, 
which were then hidden in the analysis as aforementioned. The average number of 
seven participants in each discussion group helped minimise nervousness, as well as 
stimulating discourse and exchange. 
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4.4 Data analysis strategies  
Data collected for this study went through two stages of analysis: 
First: analysing the quantitative data that was yielded by applying the questionnaire 
instrument. This analysis proceeded in several steps: 
(1) I used descriptive statistics to build up a profile of the participants. Frequencies 
were run on demographics, uses of SM, and contextual factors.  
(2) Mean and standard deviation were calculated to answer the first research question 
by ranking the SM use incentives participants reported. They describe the central 
location of the data and its spread, respectively. 
(3) Pearson product-moment correlation (r) was calculated to answer the research 
subquestions. 
(4)  Partial correlation was calculated for each contextual factor to test its mediating 
impact –if any- on the correlation tested between online and off-line participation.  
(5) Linear regression was conducted to answer the third question. Uses of SM were 
entered as the dependent block, and dispositions (political efficacy and fear of 
repression) were entered as the independent block.  
Second: analysing the qualitative data that was yielded from conducting the FGDs and 
using the quotations. All the discussions were recorded on minidisk and transcribed in 
full. The discussions were then translated from Arabic into English. A sample of 
discussion quotations was selected to be translated by two other colleagues to 
guarantee the validity and reliability of translation. Qualitative data were analysed 
simply by listening repeatedly to discussions and transcribing them. Then I went over 
them several times to identify and organise quotations that supported the research’s 
themes, and to identify additional ones that might have emerged from activists’ 
repertoires. 
4.5. Ethical guidelines 
As this study might have presented some concerns, especially in relation to prevention 
of harm, given the nature of the research subject and the circumstances surrounding the 
application time, general ethical considerations around informed consent, 
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confidentiality, anonymity, and participants’ safety were addressed in designing and 
conducting the research. To avoid making participants in this research and the 
researcher vulnerable to any kind of threat or danger, I followed certain procedures and 
ethical precautions so as to guarantee both sides’ safety, as well as the validity of the 
data collected. 
As for the quantitative study, participants’ informed consent was acquired prior to their 
response to the questionnaire. This involved providing participants with detailed 
information on the research objectives, the researcher’s affiliation, the funding body, 
and the procedures related to the saving and utilisation of the data (British Sociological 
Association (BSA), 2002). Participants were given a detailed information sheet which 
stated the aim of the research, what participation involved, why they were chosen, their 
right to withdraw at any point in the study, and a guarantee of confidentiality. The form 
was translated from English to Arabic (see Appendices 1, 2), and all participants were 
given the Arabic form to guarantee a common understanding of the information, and    
to avoid inconsistency that might result from misinterpretation. On the questionnaire, 
an introductory section recapped the basic information about the study, and reassured 
participants of confidentiality and anonymity. The title of the research and the contact 
information of the researcher were also clearly stated, and the use of information that 
the project revealed for ‘scientific reasons only’, was also assured. As to the structure of 
the questionnaire, personal questions were postponed to the last section, and                   
a question about religion was omitted in order to avoid sensitivities, given the tension 
that may have been caused by incidents that took place prior to and during the time 
period during which the survey instrument was applied10. Participants responded 
anonymously to the questionnaire. It was clearly stated at the end of the questionnaire 
that the research would be pursued on a supplementary qualitative trajectory, and 
respondents were invited to take part in FGDs. Providing participants’ contact 
information was optional, and it was clearly stated that this was a preliminary step in 
beginning sampling procedures for the follow up FGDs. 
                                                        
10 On New Year's Eve 2010, at least 21 people were killed and 70 hurt in the Egyptian city of Alexandria 
when a bomb blew up outside al-Qiddissin Church (Saints). It was claimed that the targets were Copts, 
who responded with fury to the overnight attack, marching on a nearby mosque, where they clashed with 
police. Earlier, on November 25th, violent clashes erupted between Coptic Christians and riot police over 
the construction of the Church of the Archangel and the Virgin in al-Omraniya, Giza (BBC, 2011).  
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Participants who showed interest in taking part in a further step in the research were 
contacted in the way they preferred, as mentioned in the questionnaire. Contact was 
made at a suitable time to avoid disturbing participants. It was clearly stated that 
respondents would participate in a group discussion that would last for about an hour 
and which would cover issues relevant to those in the questionnaire. Prior to the 
discussions, the aim of conducting FGDs was fully explained to participants as part        
of the prerequisites for acquisition of their consent, as well as to urge them to elaborate 
as much as possible when telling and sharing their repertoires and personal 
experiences of the research’s subject. In most cases, I contacted potential participants 
and gave them information via e-mail, supplemented by calling them on their mobile 
phones (if numbers were provided) to avoid delay in case some respondents did not 
check their e-mails often. At this stage, participants were informed verbally about this 
part of the study. I also brought a printed copy of the information sheet to the 
discussions and checked that interviewees had read it through. Participants’ consent    
to record the discussions was acquired prior to conducting the FGDs, and their right     
to withdraw at any point was guaranteed. I also delineated how the recordings would 
be stored and how the data would be dealt with. During the discussions, personal 
questions were postponed to the end, and participants were given the right not              
to answer questions on age and income if they chose not to (these are considered 
sensitive topics in the Arab region, especially when revealed in the presence of others). 
Participants were also given the choice to use pseudonyms during recorded discussions 
if they wished to remain anonymous.  
Participating in the FGDs might involve more risk –if there were to be any– as they take 
longer, participants are known to each other, and their voices are recorded, so their 
views are attached to their personalities. However, participants voluntarily provided 
their contact information on the survey as a sign of agreement to taking part in the 
FGDs. They were also allowed ample time to rethink participating in further discussions, 
and to change their minds at any point if they had any concerns. Additionally, their 
informed consent was acquired, both verbally and in written form. It is also worth 
mentioning that the snowballing technique helped provide a friendly research 
environment; as groups of participants were built through networking techniques, 
which implies that participants were already acquainted with each other. 
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As well as acquiring their informed consent, I was also keen to avoid causing any harm 
to my subjects due to their taking part in my research.  Before starting the actual 
fieldwork and interviewing participants, approval and security clearances from the 
relevant Egyptian authority were obtained. I had them on hand at every research scene 
to show as proof of permission to work with participants and to ask questions on the 
research subject, if this were to be required. These included my national ID and a proof 
of affiliation as a Ph.D. student at the University of York. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the theoretical foundation of the empirical study and has 
discussed issues relevant to data collection and analysis. It began by delineating the aim 
and rationale of the study. A brief discussion of the concept of ‘political opportunity’ 
then followed to inform the presentation of the socio-political context of this thesis 
(Chapter Two). The chapter then moved on to discuss the U&G approach and how this 
informs the study’s application and helps to answer its questions. A significant 
alteration was suggested to the U&G instrument to better suit the nature of SM, as 
interactive platforms of communication, and to help address the research questions. 
Operational definitions and related measurements of the main variables of the study are 
thoroughly discussed. The chapter also discusses the pros and cons of using a mixed 
methods approach for data collection, and moves forward to outlinine the sampling 
procedures and data collection instruments used for both the quantitative and 
qualitative studies. Ethical guidelines have been taken carefully into consideration         
in order to preserve the rights of participants in my study and to protect the collected 
data, given the sensitivity of the topic studied and the significant developments that 
Egyptian polity has recently been undergoing. This theoretical and methodological 
foundation underpins and informs data analysis and discussion which occupies the 
thesis’ following chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MAPPING THE ONLINE SPACE OF PARTICIPATION: YOUNG 
ACTIVISTS’ USES OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Analysis in this chapter aims to illuminate young Egyptian activists’ uses of social media 
(SM) prior to the 25th January revolt. It has been argued that studying patterns, rather 
than gross hours, of media use helps a better understanding of the potential that certain 
modalities of media consumption hold for enabling political actions (Shah, Kwak, & 
Holbert, 2001). This chapter mainly focuses on the reasons behind SM use, activists’ 
self-reported satisfaction about their purposive use of SM and the differences between 
users as shaped by their demographic characteristics. Data from questionnaires and 
FGDs are presented in this chapter to answer the research question: Why do young 
Egyptian activists use social media? Young activists’ uses of SM were first quantitatively 
assigned at the individual level across a range of activities in order to contextualise 
subsequent qualitative analysis of their prospects to mobilise collective action, to gratify 
(or not) their active media uses. 
In this chapter, I begin by presenting a picture of the young activists’ self-reported uses 
of SM, as revealed by questionnaire and FGD data. In doing so, I pave the way to link 
these uses to the way young activists perceive the role of SM in promoting participatory 
dispositions (Chapter Six) within a broader analysis of activists’ perceptions of SM as a 
resource for the mobilisation of collective action (Chapter Seven). 
Three main arguments are made in this chapter. First, young Egyptian activists were 
using SM as instruments to achieve certain goals prior to the 25th January revolt. These 
uses weigh differently and serve to fulfill different needs that mainly focus on 
addressing non-politicised citizens, rather than on gratifying the personal needs of 
participant activists. This tendency to address others validates the suggested alteration 
of the media use scale to add an ‘other’ dimension to it in order to capture the 
interactive traits of SM and to allow participants to report on their tendency to address 
potential supporters with their mobilising messages. Second, it is argued that young 
activists realise several deficiencies in SM that explain the revealed differences in 
weight between SM use constructs. These deficiencies mainly relate to the nature of the 
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Internet as a non-centralised space of communication. Participants believe that the 
effeciency of SM is hampered by a marred culture of utilisation that may result in 
addressing other SM users with distorting messages. Participants suggested a 
purposive, integrated strategy of SM utilisation in order to avoid the polarisation of the 
audience and the stratification of mobilising message. Third, it is contended that SM are 
becoming more of a mainstream outlet in the Egyptian polity. Quantitative data 
revealed that demographics (gender, age, income and education) moderately influence 
young activists’ uses of SM (only 11 significant correlations from 24). This finding 
suggests that, in due course, activists may be able to reach out to a public audience on a 
more varied scale and of a much larger size than previously. 
This chapter is organised into four main sections and subsections: 
5.1. Understanding what young activists use social media for. 
5.1.1.  Social media for guidance. 
5.1.2. Social media for surveillance. 
5.1.3. Social media for convenience. 
5.1.4. Social media for networking. 
5.1.5. Social media for social utility. 
5.1.6. Social media for entertainment. 
5.2. Social media satisfaction and its perceived implications for the mobilisation of 
collective action. 
5.2.1. Structural fluidity and defective social media culture. 
5.2.2. Social media’s perceived credibility and reliability. 
5.2.3. Social media and the perceived erosion of the off-line practice of collective 
action. 
5.3. Understanding which young activists use social media for what. 
5.4. Conclusion. 
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5.1. Understanding what young activists use social media for 
Users of SM are active in their utilisation of these interactive communicative platforms. 
Differences in uses were argued to have a significant influence on individuals’ political 
practices that are not revealed by looking merely at the time measurement of online 
experience, but through exploring individuals’ various uses of new media that 
correspond to the rich experience they have with such media (Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 
2001; Norris & Jones, 1998). In this section and its related subsections, young activists’ 
uses of SNSs are assessed across a range of communicative activities. Hypothesised 
relationships between media uses and participants’ characteristics (gender, age, 
education and income) are then tested to explore whether demographic variables can 
explain differences (if any) in young activists’ uses of SM. 
Each of the following subsections begins with what respondents said in the 
questionnaires. These findings are subsequently considered in the context of 
respondents’ typical comments from FGDs to explain more about how young activists’ 
perceive the potential of SM to fulfill each reported need. As we recall from the last 
chapter, uses of SM were adapted from previous uses and gratifications (U&G) research 
(e.g., Kaye & Johnson, 2004; Kim & Kim, 2007). ‘Networking’ was added to the scale to 
allow respondents to indicate whether they use SM to build their own community of 
friends and aquaintances in order to reach a larger group of potential supporters with 
their mobilising messages. Respondents indicated reasons for using SM on an index of 
19 items that was split into six media use categories: guidance, surveillance, 
networking, social utility, entertainment, and convenience, where 1 meant ‘strongly 
disagree’ and 5 meant ‘strongly agree.’ For each set of uses, Cronbach’s α (alpha) was 
measured to determine the internal consistency of reliability of media uses test scores 
(Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005). After quantitatively delineating young activists’ 
uses of SM, qualitative data from focus group discussions (FGDs) were introduced to the 
analysis (in Section 5.2) to highlight participants’ critique of SM’s contribution to 
mobilising collective action. 
As seen in Table 5.1, activists’ practice of politics on SM platforms was drawn by six 
types of needs that weighed differently in leading their active utilisation of the SM 
apparatus. Politically active Internet users primarily used SM to seek political guidance 
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(M = 16.7, SD = 3.6, α = 0.76). Acquiring and disseminating information followed with a 
slight difference (M = 16.2, SD = 2.4, α = 0.68). Convenience and networking followed (M 
= 11.8, SD = 2.4, α = 0.75), (M = 11.1, SD = 2.3, α = 0.67) respectively. Social utility 
ranked fifth on the uses schema (M = 7.7, SD = 1.5, α = 0.65). Entertainment was the 
least significant reason for practising political communication through SM (M = 6.47, SD 
= 2.3, α = 0.79). Figure 5.1 illustrates the proportional weight of each SM use construct 
as reported by the young activist participants. 
Table 5.1: Young activists’ uses of social media 
SM use constructs 
 
I use social networking sites for . . .  
 
Cronbach’s α Factor Score 
Mean SD 
Guidance  0.76 16.7 3.6 
Surveillance  0.68 16.2 2.4 
Convenience  0.75 11.8 2.4 
Networking  0.67 11.1 2.3 
Social utility 0.65 7.7 1.5 
Entertainment  0.79 6.5 2.3 
 
Table 5.2 shows in more detail the young activists’distribution by their SM uses. As 
appears from the table, participant activists tend to agree more than to disagree that 
using SM for political communication helps them achieve certan goals relevant to their 
political activism. Using SM for guidance about voting decisions is the only exception to 
this finding. The research sample is almost equally distributed between those who are 
not decided about (35.4%) and those who disagree with (35.1%) SM’s potential as 
platforms where they can get political advice. Young activists seem not to perceive SM 
as suffecient tools for informing political decisions. This finding is discussed and 
explained in more details in Section 5.2 about SM satisfaction and its perceived 
implications for the mobilisation of collective action. 
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Table 5.2: Young activists’distribution by social media uses 
SM use constructs Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Missing cases 
F % F % F % F % 
Guidance          
To help me decide how to vote in the future.  107 29.6 128 35.4 127 35.1 5 1.4 
To help me decide about important issues.  231 63.6 98 27 34 9.4 4 1.1 
For unbiased viewpoints.  194 54 121 33.7 44 12.3 8 2.2 
To help me convince others to vote in the next election.  127 35.9 118 33.3 109 30.8 13 3.5 
To help other users decide on important issues. 205 56.8 106 29.4 50 13.8 6 1.6 
Surveillance          
To find specific political information for which I am looking  263 72.8 72 19.9 26 7.2 6 1.6 
To keep up with main issues of the day.  307 85.3 45 12.5 8 2.2 7 1.9 
Because it is an easy way to disseminate information.  315 87.5 38 10.6 45 12.5 7 1.9 
To help me draw other users’ attention to certain political 
information. 
233 65.3 90 25.2 34 9.6 10 2.7 
Networking          
To join a group or groups that share the same political 
interests with me.  
185 52.2 109 30.8 60 17 13 3.5 
Because it is an effective tool to reach a large number of 
people.  
207 58 97 27.2 53 14.8 10 2.7 
Because it helps me organise political events on a large scale. 275 77.7 52 14.7 27 7.7 13 3.5 
Social utility         
To give me something to talk about with others.  276 76.5 68 18.8 17 4.7 6 1.6 
To use as ammunition in arguments with others. 227 64.5 100 28.4 25 7.1 15 4.1 
Entertainment          
Because it is entertaining.  203 56.8 78 21.8 76 21.3 10 2.7 
Because it helps me relax. 131 36.9 88 24.8 136 38.3 12 3.3 
Convenience          
Because engaging in an online activity is less time consuming.  240 66.7 69 19.2 51 14.2 7 1.9 
Because engaging in an online activity is less money 
consuming.  
272 76 58 16.2 28 7.8 9 2.5 
Because I can get what I want with less effort. 278 76.8 62 17.1 22 6.1 5 1.4 
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5.1.1. Social media for guidance 
As Table 5.1 shows, guidance was the strongest reason drawing activists’ political use 
of SM (M = 16.7, SD = 3.6). Respondents indicated that they used SM for unbiased views 
and to decide on important issues. Guidance could be pursued by reviewing other users’ 
comments on certain news stories. HA. expressed typical participants’ views on the 
viability of electronic newspapers in making sense of the public sphere and informing 
activists’ political decisions: 
I always login to the websites of electronic newspapers like al Masry alyoum and read 
the readers’ comments to build an impression of what people think and whether they 
are with or against posted news. When it comes to issues that concern public opinion, I 
think it is useful to visit those interactive websites to see how the collective thinks.  
MH. did the same thing: 
I follow certain websites that have a main purpose in their messages and which I feel 
have a stance towards the current events; such as opinion polls and discussions … .. such 
as al-Jazeera and the BBC. I get to know people’s attitudes and their opinions towards 
certain issues, so I can assess the direction of the majority. For example, I read the users’ 
comments on the BBC and I also use al Masry al-Youm.  
RA. agreed with HA.: 
I also use websites like Masrawy and electronic newspapers for the reasons mentioned 
by HA.; to read people’s comments and to know how the collective thinks. 
Although SM may not be perceived as a primary source of news, since they were created 
primarily as platforms where friends could meet and connect, this finding is, on the one 
hand, consistent with previous research on Internet use for political information. For 
example, Kaye and Johnson (2004) found in their survey on politically-interested 
Internet users during the 2000 presidential election that users were primarily drawn to 
online sites for voting advice, followed by entertainment/social utility reasons, then 
convenience (Kaye & Johnson, 2004). Zhang et al. (2010) also found that 40 percent of 
general users of social networking sites (SNSs) who participated in the survey had used 
MySpace and Facebook for political information. This might be explained by the time 
during which those studies were conducted; as Internet users are expected to utilise 
their preferred websites to fulfill needs relating to the presidential campaigns. Along the 
same lines, the current research was conducted at a time that witnessed significant 
political incidents, like the parliamentary election of November 2010; the sectarian 
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clashes between Muslims and Christians, and the upcoming presidential election, which 
was due in September 2011, and which might have caused Internet users to seek 
political advice on certain issues. During such times, such incidents and events are 
expected to invigorate political discussions and heighten the debate about related 
issues, which might incentivise individuals to seek political guidance in order to make 
up their minds or to reach an opinion on certain matters.  
On the other hand, another dimension of uses was added to the guidance factor (as 
explained in the Methodology Chapter) to reflect SM’s interactive trait. Interactivity 
entails the presence of other users and enables activists to influence potential 
supporters through their active, purposive use of media. This additional dimension 
might have pushed the guidance factor to the lead in SM uses schema as young activists 
aimed to influence others’ political decisions. H.B., typically, remarked: 
Social media play a crucial role in our engagement and mobilising efforts; it gives us the 
space that traditional media suppress, and it hence enables us to reach those who do not 
take to the streets and have no other means to know what really happened there.  
Participants believe that being able to guide and convince others is crucial for their 
mobilising efforts, For example, a video posted on YouTube by a young woman named 
Asmaa Mahfouz, at 10:30 am on 24th January 2011, was – along with an invitation 
posted on the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Page on Facebook – assumed to be the spark of 
the massive demonstrations that took place in Tahrir Square on the 25th of January. 
Asmaa urged Egyptian citizens to participate in protests by saying: 
Tomorrow is 25th January, the day we have been waiting for. The day we all worked so 
hard for. The most beautiful thing about it is that those who worked on this were not 
politicians at all. It was all of us, all Egyptians, we worked hard. Children no older than 
14, they printed the posters and started distributing them after prayers. Old people in 
their 60s and 70s helped as well … .. All of Egypt awaits tomorrow, I know we are all 
nervous right now and anxious, but we all want to see tomorrow’s event happen, and 
succeed. I would like to tell everyone that tomorrow is not the revolution, and is not the 
day we will change it all. No. Tomorrow is the beginning of the end. Tomorrow, if we 
make our stand, despite all the security may do to us, and stand as one in a peaceful 
protest, it will be the first real step on the road to change, the first real step that will take 
us forward and teach us a lot of things. Our solidarity in planning is a success in itself. To 
simply know that we must demand our rights. That is success (Mahfouz, 2011). 
However, young activists think that only a small number of those who believe and trust 
in the content of the Internet would act accordingly. Yet this proportion, in A.Y.’s view, 
is sufficient to realise change and even to topple what he calls the ‘aging regime:’ 
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The core of the mobilisation process is the capability to convince people. The Internet 
users can judge its content and choose whether to believe it or not. This level of trust 
and reliability is the determinant of whether a further action will be taken or not. In 
other words, if a million individuals read a certain statement on the Internet and did not 
believe it, they would not take action, but if they do believe it, we expect that an average 
of 10.000 will react to it. This is the way things happen, not all people move. But, I 
believe that the real value does not lie in the number in itself, rather, it lies in our 
credibility and our capability to mobilise people. If we can really mobilise 1% of the 
population, we can definitely make the ‘ageing’ regime fall. 
Using SM to convince and mobilise others, rather than to inform young activists’ 
political decisions, was supported by previous research. For example, Feezell, Conroy 
and Guerrero (2009) argue that “information is more likely to be reinforcing and 
therefore mobilising, but not enlightening and therefore educational” (p. 16).  
5.1.2. Social media for surveillance 
The second strongest reason for using SM, as shown in Table 5.1 and figure 5.1, was 
seeking and disseminating information (M = 16.2, SD = 2.4). Acquiring and 
distributing information followed political guidance with a slight difference; as 
respondents mentioned that their use of SM was drawn by the need for surveillance. 
Using SM for monitoring activists’ political environment included communicating to find 
specific political information for which they are looking, to keep up with the main issues 
of the day, to disseminate information, and to help participants draw other users’ 
attention to certain political information. Previous research found that political 
surveillance motives were strongly related to certain forms of media-related political 
activities, such as watching news, political advertisements, and direct-to-camera videos 
(Hanson, Haridakis, & Sharma, 2008). Additionally, SNSs have special features that 
enable users to post links to news stories from other websites accompanied by their 
own comments, which may reflect their own opinion on the story, or to add an 
attractive title that draws members of their network’s attention to what is posted and 
urges them to consume media content (to read the news story, or watch the video) and 
to interact with it. Users can also create their own stories, broadcast their videos, and 
share them with others on websites like YouTube. Castells (2011) describes how public 
actions are “exposed to the decentralised surveillance of millions of eyes [which makes 
all of us] potential paparazzi” (Castells, 2011, p. 413). 
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 Informational uses of SM, as revealed by survey data and participants’ narratives, 
appear to follow two practices. The young Egyptian activists used SM to gather, 
generate, and disseminate what della Porta and Mosca (2005) called ‘functional 
information’ to serve informative, or what della Porta and Mosca (2005) termed 
‘cognitive’, functions to expose the regime’s misconduct and to circumvent national 
media’s biased representations. They also used SM to disseminate technical information 
and relay certain participatory instructions to their supporters. These two dimensions 
of the informational uses of SM fall under the young activists’ perceptions of SNSs as 
alternative platforms to the traditional, state-run media that are usually seen as 
unreliable, biased sources of information. They use SM to seek out, collect and diffuse 
‘non-mainstream’ information (Dahlgren & Olsson, 2009). 
As for diffusing information (both informative and technical), several examples can be 
extracted from the FGDs. H.B. noted: 
I think that social networking sites play a significant role as alternative media. It can be 
said that the traditional media outlets are blocked. It is also almost the same case even 
for the independent or the (opposition) press, which does not operate objectively or 
reveal facts as they are. Social networking sites could thus serve as ideology-promotion 
forums for certain movements. It has more credibility in broadcasting events.  
Activists have been utilising SM as “primary sources” (Dahlgren & Olsson, 2009, p. 202) 
for disseminating, rather than gaining, information. They uploaded first-hand 
information relevant to their activities and that might differ from state-run (and 
independent) media representations, or highlight a different angle of events. H.B. 
started by stating that he ‘thinks’ that SNSs are important alternative platforms that 
enable activists to deliver quality information that is more credible, reliable, and far 
reaching than the traditional media, which serve the terms of elite interests and allow 
no, or limited, space in which they can let their voices be heard. Moreover, SM not only 
substitute for state-run media, but also for independent media, which are supposed to 
present a different point of view but are still perceived as being unbalanced in their 
coverage.  
The young activists’ primary concern is to address others and illuminate areas that 
might be dimmed or smeared by other media resources. Direction is very significant in 
this regard, while previous studies have found that different uses of the Internet are 
mainly focused on gathering various kinds of information (i.e., Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 
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2001), participants in the current study stated that they used SM as a means to 
disseminate information. The young activists diffused informative messages to raise 
others’ consciousness of certain incidents relevant to their activism. They also circulated 
technical information to achieve certain goals, like urging others to conduct certain 
course of actions, or giving instructions on how to particpate in certain events. Previous 
research supports this directional disposition of media activism. Butler et al. (2002) 
found that individuals volunteer for online groups to achieve goals that have personal 
and altruistic underpinnings. This emergent directional disposition is expected to 
reflect on perceived media influence as tools that promote participatory dispositions 
(discussed in Chapter Six), and to mobilise off-line collective action (explored in Chapter 
Seven).  
Using SM to address and mobilise others has benefitted activists in many ways. 
Immediacy of information delivery is an additional advantage that SM have afforded 
activists and, hence, it has enabled them to take timely informed decisions and act 
promptly. I.Z. asserted that: 
The immediate delivery of information has advantaged us a lot in the first wave of the 
demonstrations we staged to support Khaled Said’s cause in Lazoghly and in the march 
in Sherief Street … .. The idea is that: such incidents should be published instantly on the 
Internet to draw people’s attention and assert that the game is not yet over. 
I.Z. made the point that activists used SM platforms to send a strong message to 
authorities and to challenge their manipulative ways of obliterating facts and enforcing 
certain agendas on the so-called ‘national’ media and, hence, on public opinion. Forcing 
certain content onto the mainstream media might result in reaching less technologically 
advantaged citizens. New media ‘fluid’ technologies may help citizens to interrupt the 
manipulated agenda of the national media to “support a greater variety of issue agendas 
and information access points” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 120).  
When traditional media are censored by the government and their reliability are 
broadly questioned, people tend to mistrust the ‘National’ media and to turn to the 
Internet as an alternative source of information (Tsfati, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). 
Participants think that SM serve as on the run news portals that aggregate several 
sources of news on one portal for their rapid consumption. As W.B. remarked, 
“Facebook, of course, enables us to catch up with the news and interact with people 
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promptly.” Although activists asserted that news gained from SM should be treated with 
caution and its reliability should be verified, (these perceptions are discussed in more 
detail in Section 5.2.2), when it comes to their activism and unconventional practices, it 
is worth mentioning that young activists realised that SM are essential means for 
gaining information. H.B., explained how Facebook was their main source of 
information about the massive demonstrations which broke out in Cairo's Shubra 
district in January 3rd 2011 to protest against the bombing of the Church of Saints in 
Alexandria (BBC, 2011): 
The news I follow on Facebook completely differ from that I read in newspapers, and 
this is what happened in the Shubra demonstrations. Youths were beaten and 
kidnapped, albeit, al-Masry al-Youm newspaper only mentioned the damaged vehicles 
and some financial losses. 
M.E. described how joining political groups on SM substitutes for traditional news 
media sources, especially when it comes to activists’ dissident activities:  
I joined the Khaled Said group [on Facebook] to know what happens in demonstrations 
because they post details on their page. The same applies to the April 6th Movement, 
Justice and Freedom, and Socialist Reform groups. For example, there were 
demonstrations in Shubra, then we knew that some youths were arrested from a 
message sent on the group page. I join the largest number of groups to follow the news. 
They are like a newspaper to me (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Hwang et al. (2006) found that antiwar opinion holders who felt that their 
views differed from those presented in mainstream media sought out alternative online 
sources for perspectives on the war. Perceptions of what has been termed “media 
dissociation” were argued to stimulate dissenters’ information seeking and related 
political behaviours. 
On the other hand, SM benefitted participants’ activism as means of distributing, rather 
than acquiring, information. A.Y. explained how using the Internet helped circumvent 
censorship and opened a window for the free expression of political opinion: 
The reason why I  insisted on launching my website on the Internet is that when I 
decided to write on politics, I found that all fronts of free speech were completely 
blocked, or allowed under certain conditions. And as I am not the kind of person who 
can bargain with his own beliefs to meet such conditions, or peel off his skin to satisfy 
people who control those opinion platforms, I decided from the very beginning to create 
my own platform where I could express my beliefs and relay my opinion the way I want 
at any time. 
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SM have enabled activists to address wider audiences, whether directly through 
reaching out to potential supporters online, or indirectly via forcing their messages onto 
the traditional media agenda, or what could be termed the ‘mediatisation’ of the 
Internet, and hence, influence off-line audiences.  Images and stories posted by bloggers 
and activists about police harassment and brutality were found efficient in spurring 
Egypt’s mainstream media to cover the authorities’ violations against citizens (Shapiro, 
2009). For example, police officers were convicted of sodomising a minibus driver after 
the posting of cellphone video footage of the incident by the well-known Egyptian 
blogger, Wael Abbas. The case of the brutal murder of the young businessman, Khaled 
Said, was also taken to court after a photo of his mangled face was leaked from the 
mortuary and uploaded onto Facebook, which vehemently brought the cause to the 
focus of mainstream media and the broader public. This direction of information flow 
(Internet-mainstream) may be beneficial in a society with high rates of illiteracy and 
low levels of Internet penetration, as well as moderate levels of Internet self-efficiency, 
which makes mobilisation through SM a harder goal to achieve. For example, 
independent newspapers like al-Dustur have brought the Internet experience to readers 
without Internet access by re-printing the important weblogs on a special page 
(Shapiro, 2009). 
Conversely, forming a bridge between traditional media content and new media 
platforms, or what has been labeled the “internetisation” of the media (Dahlgren, 2009, 
p.40), was found to afford activists a qualitatively wider platform from which to 
disseminate information, address public opinion and open certain topics up for debate. 
Equally, activists could conversely highlight selected mainstream media content and 
bring it to the consciousness of new media users. Cottle’s (2011, p. 652) analysis brings 
him to a parallel conclusion: 
New social media and mainstream media often appear to have performed in tandem, 
with social media variously acting as a watchdog of state controlled national media, 
alerting international news media to growing opposition and dissent events and 
providing raw images of these for wider dissemination. 
5.1.3. Social media for convenience 
Using SM as a convenient tool for mobilising political actions through which 
participants could lower the cost of organisation, as well as participation or, in the 
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participants’ terms, lowering the ceiling of sacrifice followed using these media for 
surveillance. Participants considered practising politics on SM to be less time, money, 
and effort consuming in comparison with other forms of political activism (M = 11.8, SD 
= 2.4). Convenient tools for mobilisation and a safe environment for participation are 
benefits that SM afforded young Egyptian activists. Participants explained how creating 
convenient circumstances for political participation are crucial in urging more 
individuals to join. A.Y. remarked: 
Online, people also do not have to pay anything, or exert any significant effort to gain 
information or to get involved in politics … .. and this is exactly what we are trying to 
enforce when mobilising the public behind our cause; lowering the cost, especially the risk.  
Previous research arrived at similar findings. For example, Shao (2009) found that users 
of User-Generated Media (UGM) were driven basically by “easy to use” and “let users 
control” media attributes (Shao, 2009). On the other hand, non-producers, or “lurkers”, 
were most de-motivated by factors of time consumption and technical restrictions, 
especially for video blogging (Stoeckl, Rohreier, & Hess, 2007).  This may suggest that 
political participation on media platforms might be preferred to getting involved in 
political activities outside the virtual sphere and, hence, raises questions about 
individuals’ willingness and capacity to link their online engagement to the off-line 
arena, which could be expected to cost them more time and effort. It might also impose 
challenges on activists to mobilise publics to get involved in more ‘costly’ - albeit more 
effective - forms of participation.  
Lowering the physical and financial cost of participation, as revealed by A.Y.’s comment 
above, raises the issue of online biographical availability, or what can be termed the 
‘cybographical availability’ of supporters and potential particiants. Studies on social 
movements show that biographical availability is an important element in explaining 
differences in the mobilisation of populations (McAdam, 1986; Tindall, 1994; Tindall, 
2002). Biographical availability can be defined as “the absence of personal constraints 
that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time 
employment, marriage, and family responsibilities” (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). However, 
online availability is not necessarily associated with, nor does it lead to biographical 
availability or off-line political practice (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven), 
especially in repressive regimes, where fear of confronting authorities is expected to 
 188 
 
impair some people’s tendency to move from the online, safe space of interaction to the 
off-line, threatening place of action. 
Safety adds another dimension to convenience in the underpinnings of the uses of SM. 
Earl and Kimport (2011) argue that easing the fear of repression lowers the cost of 
protesting in authoritarian regimes. Participants commented on SM’s affordances in 
terms of providing a more convenient arena for safer political practice. MH. Remarked: 
I express my political opinion via social networking sites because I cannot talk in the 
street, or in reality more broadly. For instance, when I am at the university, I feel fear 
and an incapability to express my opinion. 
MA. added: 
Basically, there is no other way to express myself and my opinion. Any activity outside 
the Internet’s ‘borders’ would be tightly restricted and limited. I think the least I can do 
is to speak my voice out and convey my ideas to others.  
However, it is worth noting that while lowering the cost of organisation and 
participation is one of the main affordances that new media have brought to social 
movements (i.e., Bennett, 2003a), using SM for its convenience gave way to the benefits 
of guidance and information dissemination. This could be attributed to activists’ 
expressed worries about limiting activism in the virtual sphere due to the ease of 
practice and low expenses temptations. Fear plays a dual role in motivating 
unconventional political actions: it can function as a motivation for ‘online’ activism – as 
individuals enjoy high levels of freedom of expression in relatively less-censored 
cyberspace. Fear could also work as a potential demotivator of ‘off-line’ activism – as 
public confrontation with authorities is expected to threaten individuals’ safety and 
well-being. The impact of fear is thus well-situated to explain the expected preference 
for practising politics online, especially for the less-experienced and non-politicised 
citizens, and the consequent difference in participation rates between the online and 
off-line arenas, as expressed by some participant activists (off-line participation is 
discussed in Chapter Seven). As A.A. summarised it: 
I do not underestimate the importance and significance of social media platforms. Yet, it 
should be recognised as a source of information not a space of action. 
Realising the impact of fear might also have caused the networking use of SM to drop 
behind guidance, information seeking and convenience, as activists perceived risk as an 
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obstacle to their mobilising activities, which may prevent individuals from challenging 
their fear off-line as they might have done online.  
5.1.4. Social media for networking 
“One of the real magnetisms of the technology is its ability to enable users to interact 
with people and views beyond the reach of their normal social networks” (Wheeler, 
2006, p. 6). Aiming at mobilising other users to their cause, networking was expected to 
strongly drive activists’ political activities on SM in order to enlarge their reach capacity 
and widen the circle of mobilisation. However, networking uses of SM (M = 11.1, SD = 
2.3) receded to the benefit of guidance, information seeking and dissemination, and 
convenience, which raises questions about SM’s capacity for building communities and 
organising collective action, as perceived by young Egyptian activists. 
Surman and Reilly (2003) stressed the importance of building communities in order to 
mobilise publics. They view online mobilisation as “online efforts to move people to 
action – to protest, intervene, advocate, support [arguing that] such efforts are much 
more about relationships and community than information” (emphasis added) (p. 48). 
As the questionnaire data reveal, SM provided paticipants with valuable tools for joining 
online political groups, reaching out to greater numbers of people, and organising 
political events on a large scale. Joining groups or ‘liking ’ certain pages on Facebook 
could develop a sense of virtual community around a political idea or leader 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). Previous research has also found that maintaining 
communities of certain interests was one of the pravailing reasons for blogging (Nardi, 
Schiano, Gumbrecht, & Swartz, 2004; Li, 2005).  
Participants used SM to build and associate with their personal political networks. 
Although many of the participants are not affiliated to particular social movement 
organisations (SMOs) or political groups, they still managed to utilise SM as fluid 
mobilising structures. SM “identify a host of digital networking mechanisms that account 
for keeping the mobilisation together” (Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008, p. 273). This 
practical perspective, which I call the networking preparatory mobilisation, may (or may 
not) create a collective ideology among community members that may be embodied on 
several occasions and at events for which the groups call. This ideology acts as the 
“connecting tissue” (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 117), or the “in-between bond” (Ardent, 1973) 
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that cements emerging networks and coalitions. For example, Khaled Said became an 
iconic figure and a symbol of police brutality in Egypt after the launch of the Facebook 
Page ‘We are all Khaled Said’ (Londono, 2011) and his cause was vigorously echoed in 
the Tahrir Square protests which commenced on 25th January 2011.  
It is evident, then, that SM were shaped by individual activists as means for individual-
level network bridging outside the boundaries of formal organisations. There is reason 
to think that this less binding, more supple form of organisation which has developed 
through SM apparratuses resonates more with the non-politicised individuals who are 
new to politics; as this non-formal organisation was found to “offer individuals easier 
opt-in, opt-out mechanisms for affiliation and participation … .. that are often facilitated 
by social networking and digital communication technologies” (Bennett, Breunig, & 
Givens, 2008, p. 270). This is not to say, of course, that SM platforms, and digital 
communication technologies more broadly, are the sole resources of organisation and 
trust building, yet their significance in bridging to others in an oppressed environment, 
where an anti-democratic media system is mainly dominated by the state and a handful 
of businessmen, cannot go unnoticed.  SM communication helps maintain reality-
developed thick bonds and to establish new evidence-based thinner ties with 
newcomers to the political sphere. A similar emphasis was noted in M.S.’s remarks: 
Posting links and uploading videos depicting solidarity campaigns with the arrested 
activists and posting information of the intensive support that we received from lawyers 
and human rights organisations until the case was solved and we were set free, gave a 
push forward and made other citizens believe that they are not solo and that pressure 
would bear them more rights.  
However, activists continued to express their awareness of the limited capacity of the 
SM apparatus to breach the borders of the virtual sphere and extend the mobilising 
effect on the ground. These limitations, which I discuss in Section (5.3), clarify the 
unexpectedly light weighting that networking had in explaining young activists’ active 
use of SM. 
5.1.5. Social media for social utility 
Young activists who took part in this research were slightly motivated by social utility 
reasons (M = 7.7, SD = 1.5). Young activists used information they gathered from SM 
platforms to support their views in political discussions. Activists found SM portals 
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valuable for providing them with an array of topics to discuss with others, as well as 
providing them with information that they can use to refute others’ arguments. 
However, social utility moderately underpinned young activists’ utilisation of SM. Young 
activists believe that free expression is an added value to SM and that this attracted 
them to use its apparatuses to have their say. Typical of this free expression focus was 
A.A.’s FGD comment: 
Facebook is a more open society. Youth from different political trends feel that this is the 
only place where they can enjoy a wide margin of freedom. Ibrahim Essa11 once said: 
‘true free press is the Facebook press.’ I think by that he means freedom allowed on 
Facebook. There are many restrictions and limitations, but Facebook is wider and more 
open. Yes, it might not be organised or intellectual, yet it is freer. 
This deliberative function of SM also has a social side to it, which is to be expected given 
the nature and key purpose of communicating via SM. Since their inception, SNSs have 
been perceived as platforms for meeting new friends and maintaining relations with 
current ones. This social dimension of Internet use is evident in U&G research (e.g., 
Stafford, Stafford, & Schkade, 2004). Leung (2009) found that users of User Generated 
Media (UGM) were the most motivated by the desire to be recognised. Interaction with 
the recipients of the content they produced was the most stimulating media attribute of 
their online content generation activity. These interactions and discussions, according 
to Leung (2009), were found to feed into the building and reinforcing of a cyber 
community with common interests. Moreover, studies about Internet use for political 
news have identified social utility as one of the main incentives for media use (Kaye & 
Johnson, 2004). Social interaction with like-minded candidate supporters was the main 
need that voters who visited the MySpace profiles of primary candidates during the 
2008 presidential campaign in the U.S.A. sought to gratify (Cozma & Ancu, 2009).  This 
implies that users of SM, even when discussing politics and mobilising activism on SM 
platforms, are doing this in the light of understanding the nature of the medium. They 
communicate politics ‘socially’ and perceive sociality as the premium trait of the 
medium. Additionally, it should be taken into account that some political issues, such as 
the presidential races utilized in Cozma and Ancu’s research, are expected to evoke 
                                                        
11 Ibrahim Essa is a prominent Egyptian Journalist who is known for his opposition to the Mubarak 
regime. Essa is the editor of The Constitution opposition independent newspaper (Al-Dustour), founded in 
1995 and revived in 2005 after a government crackdown, and he was sentenced to two months in prison 
on a charge of "Propagating false news and rumours causing general security disturbance and harming 
public interest" and "Intentionally publishing false news that may hurt public safety" (refworld, UNHCR: 
The UN Refugee Agency, 2008)  
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political debate that may draw audience attention and invigorate public discussions 
between candidates’ proponents and opponents, which might explain the emergence of 
the deliberative uses of SM prior to or during election time, when most of the previous 
research was conducted. Similarly, the current research took place after the Egyptian 
parliamentary election in November 2010 and during what became the preparatory 
phase for the January 25th revolt, which explains participants’ tendency to use SM to 
discuss political issues that surround those incidents. 
5.1.6. Social media for entertainment 
Young activists who took part in this research also expressed a degree of agreement 
with entertainment as a motive for practising politics via SM. They were drawn the least 
to use SNSs for entertainment reasons (M = 6.47, SD = 2.3). Seeking amusement and the 
need to relax had very little to do with participants’ political communication over SM 
platforms. Previous research showed mixed results on the relationship between 
entertainment and political consumption of the Internet. Consistent with this finding, 
past research found that Facebook group use for recreational gratifications was not 
associated with encouraging users’ participation in political events, in comparison to 
practising civic activities (Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & 
Bichard, 2010).   
Conversely, habitual entertainment and information seeking were the most dominant 
reasons for using YouTube during the 2008 U.S.A. presidential primaries (Hanson, 
Haridakis, & Sharma, 2008). Entertainment/social utility was the second strongest 
reason that drew politically interested Internet users to access political information 
during the 2000 U.S.A. presidential elections (Kaye & Johnson, 2004). Those findings, 
although they contradict previous research on the reasons behind using political media 
content, as well as the current research, are still consistent with the nature of the SM 
which were created primarily as a place for social interaction. Consuming (and creating) 
political content on SM might also be propelled by the entertaining aspect and the 
excitement that is expected to accompany the following of presidential contests and 
unconventional politics, since it was found that consuming entertaining political 
‘infotainment’ media content may enhance political engagement, especially the 
‘intention to vote’ and ‘interpersonal political discussion’ (Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005). 
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Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that participants in this research are 
politically active, which may readily suggest that their utilisation of SM would be goal-
driven to achieve political aims, rather than being done accidently while being 
entertained. They are expected to use SM as tools to perform certain function. Their 
uses will thus be instrumental rather than being of a habitual nature and inclined to 
passing time and having fun. Such habitual uses of media were argued to limit the 
media’s potential influence on individual users due to the low levels of activity they 
entail (Ruggiero, 2000). Perceiving SM interactivity as passing time and entertainment 
may disguise online actions as a “mere gimmick,” rather than as “serious practices” 
according to le Grignou and Patou (2004, p. 174). Such perceptions might render 
activists in danger of diluting their online political practices and their related 
consequences. 
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Figure 5.1: Young Egyptian activists’ reported uses of social media 
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5.2. Social media satisfaction and its perceived implications for the mobilisation 
of collective action 
The degree to which individuals are satisfied with a certain action influences their 
intentions to continue, stop or change the way they perform this action (Klandermans, 
2004, p. 372). From a rational action perspective, individuals decide to practise and/or 
to continue practising a certain action upon comparing the demands and supply of such 
an action. As for media use, the U&G approach similarly suggests that users continue to 
use a certain medium based on the degree to which such a medium serves to gratify 
their pre-assessed needs (Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). It is to be expected, then, that 
such assessments of SM influence would reflect on young activists’ future decisions 
about using SM to resource their activism and also about the goals which they utilise 
media tools to achieve.  
Young activists’ satisfaction with the contribution of SM to their political activism was 
measured by a single question in the questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate 
whether they very weakly, weakly, to some extent, strongly or very strongly believe that 
SM are providing them with the things they are seeking (see Chapter Four and Appendix 
1). Table 5.3 shows young activists’ distribution according to their reported feelings of 
satisfaction about SM contribution. 
Table 5.3: Young activists’ distribution by social media satisfaction 
 
I’m satisfied with the 
job SM do in providing 
me with the things I’m 
seeking . . . 
very 
weakly 
weakly to some 
extent 
strongly Very 
strongly 
total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
14 3.9 68 18.7 195 53.7 69 19 17 4.7 363 100.0 
Missing: F = 4 (1.1%) 
As shown in the Table above, the majority of participant activists (53.7%) are ‘to some 
extent’ satisfied with the job that SM deliver in terms of resourcing their political 
activism. Only 4.7 percent of the research population are very strongly satisfied with 
SM’s contribution. 
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As discussed in Section 5.2, influencing others’ political decisions and disseminating 
information were the strongest reasons for the young activists who participated in this 
study to use SM. The extent to which SM contributed to gratifying activists’ 
mobilisation-related needs was further discussed in the FGD. While there are several 
functions that SM contributed to achieving for young activists, data from FGDs also 
revealed that there are some aspects related to SM’s influence on the young activists’ 
movements, which they believe that SM did not necessarily contribute to gratifying. 
5.2.1. Structural fluidity and defective social media culture 
Several themes about the perceived limitations of SM as tools for mobilising collective 
action emerged during the FGDs. Young activists believe that there are several pitfalls 
that may dissolve their media-enabled mobilisation repertoire and, hence, deter SM’s 
contribution to citizens’ empowerment. The first deficit is related to the non-centralised 
organising structure of SM, which relates to the way users communicate over SM 
platforms, or what SO. termed a lack of SM culture. SO. suggested a convergent approach 
to better utilise SM affordances: 
Utilising social networking sites for political mobilisation lacks two important aspects: a 
higher degree of organisation in regard to the way political activists use the medium, 
and a fundamental level of social media culture. I mean, how to supplement the use of a 
social media platform by convergence with other social media. For example, I can use 
Twitter as an add-on to Facebook, and improve practice by uploading related videos on 
YouTube … .. I cannot expect efficient performance when 20 groups are created to 
discuss the same issues and to accomplish the same goals. We should create a system of 
alternative media that we can use when independent media channels and significant talk 
shows are suppressed. This will enable an autonomous institutional form of alternative 
media that can reach the broader public (emphasis added). 
SO. believes that the polycentric organisation of the Internet results in structural 
fluidity. Thanks to the Internet, creating groups online has never been easier. Users can 
create groups online for all sorts of reasons which render some of these groups void of 
essence and meaningful influence. Instead of defective SM culture, SO. suggested a 
convergence culture that would fine-tune the focus of their message to their supporters. 
Convergence culture allows for “the flow of content across multiple media platforms,” 
(Jenkins, 2005, p. 2) and hence makes possible a holistic media experience and a 
stronger mobilising message. Providing multiple communicative cues was found to 
create a rich media experience in which immediate feedback, variety of language, and a 
personal focus are provided (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Jenkins and Deuze (2008, p. 6) 
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explain how shifts in media infrastructure have allowed grassroots to practise bottom-
up consumer-driven processes of control that might circumvent traditional gatekeepers’ 
and agenda setters’ monopoly over the media: 
[S]hifts in the communication infrastructure bring about contradictory pulls and tugs 
within our culture. On the one hand, this ‘democratisation’ of media use signals a 
broadening of opportunities for individuals and grassroots communities to tell stories 
and access stories others are telling, to present arguments and listen to arguments made 
elsewhere, to share information and learn more about the world from a multitude of 
other perspectives. On the other hand, the media companies seek to extend their reach 
by merging, co-opting, converging and synergising their brands and intellectual 
properties across all of these channels. In some ways, this has concentrated the power of 
traditional gatekeepers and agenda setters and in other ways, it has disintegrated their 
tight control over our culture. Convergence, therefore, must be understood as both a 
top-down corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process. 
Taking the lead from SO.’s views, M.S. added that SM’s potential for empowerment 
could be raised by applying ‘efficient economy of the web:’ 
I believe that social networking sites could be the most important mobilising platform in 
Egypt if invested efficiently. … .. As for the limited proportional numbers of those who 
take to the streets when compared to online supporters of a certain cause, I think this 
difference is due to the irrational use of the medium. Creating a group and inviting people 
to related events only because you are fascinated about a freak idea and want to 
aggregate people to come and applaud this idea, no matter how silly it is, will eventually 
mar the credibility of the source and the medium. Moreover, the abundance of groups 
will result in a disturbing glut of messages and notifications, which might lead users to 
abandon most of these groups (emphasis added). 
An abundance of online groups, in participants’ points of view, might on the one hand 
polarise potential supporters, who would be stratified between multiple online groups 
that support the same cause. On the other, this structural fluidity of the Web would also 
put members of online groups off by the gush of messages they receive from these very 
similar groups. Taking a lead from SO.’s argument, M.S. suggests that similar groups 
should co-ordinate their efforts and mobilise for their cause harmoniously. 
5.2.2. Social media’s perceived credibility and reliability 
Information-related uses of SM ranked first across the media uses board. Using SM as a 
means to influence others’ decisions and to address them with certain information, 
rather than to inform activists’ decisions and gain information, is thought to be the 
reason behind the precedence of informational uses of SM over other use factors. 
Participants expressed several views during the FGDs that support these inferences.  It 
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seems that relying on SM to support activists’ own decisions does not explain much of 
participants’ use of these media. Lack of SM’s perceived credibility as a primary source 
of information was the most reported explanation for this finding during the FGDs. 
Recent research shows that perceived credibility is an essential parameter that guides 
the selection of different types of media sources for news consumption in an 
information-rich environment (Yuan, 2011 & Kiousis, 2001). However, this significant 
condition does not apply to SM from the participants’ points of view. The role that SM 
might play in stimulating, or enhancing, their political participation by “enabling them 
to encounter and make sense of events, relationships and cultures of which they have 
no direct experience” (Coleman & Blumler, 2009, pp. 42, 43) was often criticised by 
young activists.  
Activists think SM are reliable tools for disseminating functional information relevant to 
their activism. However, as primary sources of information, participant activists think 
that SM are less credible, less organised and, hence, less reliable sources of news 
compared to more traditional sources. W.B. started by telling that Facebook ‘of course’ 
is a valuable resource when it comes to keeping updated on current events and timely 
engagement with the content, as well as other users. He compared electronic 
newspapers and SNSs as sources of self-political guidance: 
Sometimes news presented on Facebook is not always accurate. It is more a kind of 
‘public journalism’, this is why I sometimes find it more appealing to interact with, but 
when I seek more credible information, I log into electronic newspapers’ websites which 
are more organised. 
The young activists criticised SM as platforms for informing political discussions, for 
lacking professional mediation. SM allow for political deliberation that is hardly “… .. 
mediated, with professional communicators rather than ordinary citizens talking to 
each other and to the public through mass media of communications” (Page, 1996, p. 1). 
This means that for the politically experienced citizens, SM are not perceived in and of 
itself as an efficient arena for comprehending the political sphere. They realise SM’s 
deficiencies in terms of offering a “central organising idea or story line that provides 
meaning to an unfolding strip of events [and a coherent frame that] suggests what the 
controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). 
They believe that news frames are better presented on the electronic newspapers, 
where journalists can identify and classify information and “package it for efficient relay 
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to their audiences” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). More recent research shows that reliability is one 
of the problems that computer-mediated-communication raises within social 
movements (e.g., Rucht 2003). Clark and Themudo (2003) arrived at a similar 
conclusion. They argue that Internet campaigns have “inherently weak mechanisms of 
information quality control,” and the “Internet is a better medium for disseminating 
information and opinions than for building trust, developing coherence and resolving 
controversies” (p. 114). 
Accordingly, participants tended to selectively consume news on SM as they stressed 
the importance of dealing cautiously with SM as primary news sources, and the 
necessity to consume their content through a critical lens. A.Ma. cited several reasons 
for preferring electronic newspapers over Facebook as a platform for gaining 
constructive political guidance: 
Electronic newspapers are more organised than Facebook. Writers have certain ideas 
that they discuss, and users who post comments on the news stories show a level of 
awareness.  
Participants think that political discussions on SM platforms are polarised, which makes 
it harder for media users to follow these discussions and extract valuable information 
from them. Similarly, Johnson and Kaye (2010) found in the study they conducted 
during the 2004 U.S.A. presidential election that politically interested Web users 
perceived all online media as being only moderately credible. Young activists basically 
made their point through comparing SM with more traditional online news sources, like 
electronic newspapers. The perceived quality of information drew participants to rely 
on electronic newspapers more than on SM to acquire accurate, reliable information. 
Past research has also found that news gathered from SNSs, like MySpace, Facebook, 
and YouTube, did not add much to users’ political knowledge or to democratic discourse 
when compared with the impact of using other news sources, like cable news and 
traditional media (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). Along the same lines, Thelwall (2008) 
concluded from his comparative exploratory study of SNSs and weblogs that news has 
no place on the former. A.A. discussed what the participants meant by organisation: 
I think that Twitter, Facebook, and the like are ‘illusory spaces.’ They are far from reality, 
compared to electronic newspapers and, hence, less effective. I feel that electronic 
newspapers are more serious. People who write in these newspapers are basically 
writers and journalists, thus they are politicised and the posted comments and feedback 
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on their work are almost at the same level. But on social networking sites and blogs, the 
situation is a bit chaotic and not goal-directed, which evokes questions about its genuine 
political value (emphasis added). 
A.A. is doubtful about the political efficacy of SM in terms of acquiring information. He 
delineates the aspect of organisation and how it affects activists’ tendency to use SM as 
sources of information. For A.A., SM are misleading and ‘far from reality’ when 
compared to electronic newspapers. Discussions on SM do not follow a certain theme 
and they lack professionalism, which affects the quality of discussions on these 
platforms and may cause polarisation, rather than developing the communicative 
exchange. This obscuring divergence of online discussions was ascribed to the nature of 
the digital world: a fragmented, hyper-pluralistic space. Heterogeneity and 
disagreements are expected to arouse cognitive dissonance which, again, feeds into 
more withdrawals from discussions. It has been argued that “to avoid cognitive 
dissonance, it is simpler to exit than to work through any messy bargaining and 
conflictual disagreements within the group” (Norris, 2004, p. 4). 
Young activists expressed their preference for electronic newspapers and, to a lesser 
extent, blogs, for debating political issues, compared to other online platforms. H.B. and 
M.E. emphasised this point while discussing the pros and cons of Blogger and Facebook 
where M.E. highlighted the ‘added value’ of Blogger: 
H.B.: I think that ‘Blogger’ has lost its popularity for Facebook. No one uses it. I used to 
have a blog, for example, but I dissolved it because Facebook allows me to integrate my 
blog as well. It saves me logging into ‘Blogger’. Facebook can converge more than one 
medium. 
M.E.: I think that ‘Blogger’ has an added value. It allows you to ‘search’ because it is 
archived on Google and, hence, any topic you search for would appear in the search box. 
For example, I have a blog which thousands of users visit accidentally while they search 
on Google. Accordingly, I do not believe that ‘Blogger’ has lost its appeal. In Egypt, blogs 
are most popular for political topics. 
H.B. and M.E. asserted that blogs were more suitable for communicating politics than 
Facebook. Additionally to thematic discussions, they discussed another side of 
organisation. Reaching the politically interested is perceivably more achievable through 
blogs because the topics discussed are archived on Google, so it is easier to reach more 
potential supporters via thematic blogs if compared to limiting the communication to 
certain groups of friends and acquaintances that a user has on Facebook, some of whom 
might not necessarily be interested in politics. This finding corroborates the results that 
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Thelwall (2008) reached in his exploratory study of SNSs and weblogs. He found that 
engagement with mass media news was less frequent on general social networking 
environments, like MySpace and Facebook, than it was on blogs. Through analysing 23 
online environments (13 SNSs and 10 blogs), Thelwall found that blogs ranked higher 
than social networking spaces in both the average proportion of politics pages and 
politics links to pages. Yet it is worth noting that the gap between blogs and SNSs, 
according to Thelwall, was not large enough to assert that politics is irrelevant to online 
social networks if compared to blogs. Thelwall added that the difference was more 
present when comparing those sites with professional or semi-professional blogs 
(Thelwall, 2008). Moreover, it should be noted that Thelwall reached this finding by 
comparing weblogs with general SNSs and so such findings do not necessarily exclude 
SM from the political communication spectrum, especially when users of these 
platforms are politically interested. In fact, Iskandar (2013) thinks that using SM is 
fundamental for keeping records of collective action and archiving protests, which 
renders "cyberactivism a standardised practice of collective action, [yet] it has also 
inadvertently led to a highly busied online environment filled with sometimes 
incoherent and inconsistent messaging” (Iskandar, 2013). 
5.2.3. Social media and the perceived erosion of the off-line practice of collective 
action 
SO. argued that utilising aggregate media portals helped activists build a favourable 
participatory disposition among individuals, or what SO. called public status and thus 
enabled them to mobilise action on a larger scale. He remarked: 
By [converging several SM platforms] we might be capable of creating a desirable public 
status that could encompass a larger number of youth and incentivise them to 
participate. These platforms should thus work in concert with each other. 
However, young activists think that SM has a limited capacity to breach the borders of 
the virtual sphere and extend the mobilising effect to the off-line arena. A.A., typically, 
explained: 
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I think the main problem is that practising politics in Egypt is still immature, this is why 
people tend to practise virtual political activism. I mean, if there was real political 
participation, people would not have spent their time chatting. Rather, they would take 
to the streets and play the role properly. For example, when the Kefaya (Enough) 
movement first started, we had 1500 registered members online, but how many were 
actually on the streets? In fact, you barely find 150 or 200 protesters in any protest 
(emphasis added).  
Similarly, Smitten (2008) argues that although the Internet has leverages that may 
enable online communities to act politically, there are also limitations that can make the 
“… .. predominant effect of political action of online communities [is] the arousal of 
public attention as a sign of successful articulation of interests” (p.51). Some political 
online communities, according to Smitten, lack organisation around well-defined 
political objectives, and even if they assess those objectives, they may face the difficulty 
of accessing the political system, especially in dictatorships and non-pluralist societies. 
This may impose difficulties in bridging online activism to the off-line context to make 
social and political change feasible. Additionally, the inner structure of online 
communities does not follow a certain law of organisation. The aforementioned non-
centralised form of Internet organisation poses questions on the quality of the 
“decision-making” and “policy-formation” of these communities and serves as a 
justification for taking them lightly in the political arena. Moreover, Smitten suggests 
that online communities could get help to organise off-line events through co-operation 
and co-ordination with traditional pressure groups, thus taking advantage of their 
contacts and experiences (Smitten, 2008, p. 51). Nevertheless, boyd (2008) argues that 
activists are not being realistic in their evaluations of the potential of SNSs for 
empowering ordinary citizens.  
Although SM have provided activists with more convenient organisational and 
participation tools, as individuals practise politics conveniently they may run the risk of 
perceiving themselves to be active participators, while they are actually debating about 
politics rather than taking part in it. Participants believe that practising politics on SM 
platforms may erode actual participation and limit collective action to the virtual 
sphere. Relying on Jenkin’s notions about media convergent culture, drawing an analogy 
between Jenkin’s notions about the influence of media convergence on media use (new 
and traditional) and participants’ perceptions of the influence of on- and off-line mash-
ups on political practice (virtual and real), delineates participant activists’ views about 
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proportional differences between online interactors and off-line actors. Jenkins (2005, 
p. 6) argues that: 
On the one hand, convergence represents an expanded opportunity, since content which 
succeeds in one sector can spread across other platforms. On the other, convergence 
represents a risk since once you move filmgoers from theaters to cells one wonders if 
they will return again. 
Similarly, it can be said that once you move protesters from streets to SM one wonders 
if they will return. Based on the results discussed hitherto, Table 5.4 summarises SM’s 
perceived deficiencies in relation to different categories of media use. 
Table 5.4: Uses of social media and their perceived deficiencies 
Social media uses Social media’s perceived deficiencies 
SM for guidance Organisation fluidity and disparity of online groups 
SM for surveillance 
 Non-reliable primary source of information 
 Selective credibility of functional information 
SM for convenience 
 Illusory space of practice 
 Eroding off-line collective practice  
SM for networking 
Irrational utilisation resulting in multi-structural 
basis of social movement and glut of online group 
formation and content production  
SM for social utility 
Non-thematic deliberation leading to the obscuring 
of meanings and the hindering of skills acquisition 
 
5.3. Understanding which young activists use social media for what  
Addressing this question entails exploring whether: 
Demographics (age, education, gender and income) have direct impact on the range 
of young activists’ reported uses of social media.  
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It has been argued that the rise of an educated middle class cohort is one of several 
aspects that might have an impact in destabilising the power base of an authoritarian 
regime in several ways (Pinkney, 1994). In this section, I look at the demographics of 
the participant activists and discuss how they might have functioned as the antecedents 
of their SM uses. 
Previous research on the social origins of media gratifications has shown that different 
demographic variables have predicted different media uses. Reasons for using media 
were found to be different between men and women, as well as among different age 
groups (Kippax & Murray, 1980; Rubin & Rubin, 1981). As for the Internet gratifications 
and demographics, studies have suggested different trends since the inception of the 
medium. Internet users were primarily males of high socio-economic status, according 
to earlier studies (i.e., Busselle, Reagan, Pinkleton, & Jackson, 1999). More recent 
studies offered evidence that new media technologies are becoming more popular with 
the mainstream audience, which may imply less demographic influence on Internet 
gratifications than on general media ones (Kaye & Johnson, 2004). Nevertheless, it is 
argued that “although the online population is beginning to diversify, the Internet 
cannot yet claim a committed, non-elite mass audience” (Bucy, 2000). 
The Pearson correlation (r) was calculated to investigate how participants’ age, 
education, and monthly income might relate to their SM uses, as they are considered, 
according to the U&G approach, to be the basic antecedents for media uses which can 
project the needs that individuals seek to satisfy by using the media (Papacharissi & 
Rubin, 2000). Gender is a categorical variable12, hence, a T-test was calculated to 
capture any of the expected differences between males and females in relation to their 
SM uses. Results are shown in Table 5.5, and are summarised in Figure 5.2. 
  
                                                        
12 A categorical variable (sometimes called a nominal variable) is one that has two or more categories. 
Such a variable can be classified into categories, but there is no clear intrinsic ordering to those 
categories. If the variable has a clear ordering, then that variable would be an ordinal variable. 
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Table 5.5: Correlations of uses of social media and demographics 
Demographics Social media use correlates (r) 
Guidance Serveillance Networking Social 
utility 
Entertainment Convenience 
Gender (T-test)  ــ 0.130*  ــ 0.130*  ــ 0.068 0.144** 0.178** 0.036 
Age 0.119* 0.096 0.043  ــ 0.080  ــ 0.120*  ــ 0.009 
Education 0.000 0.067 0.017  ــ 0.152**  ــ 0.163**  ــ 0.065 
Monthly income  ــ 0.107  ــ 0.168**  ــ 0.116*  ــ 0.129* 0.032  ــ 0.072 
Significance * (p > 0.05) ** (p > 0.01) 
 
According to the correlation analysis, demographics have a moderate influence on SM’s 
sought gratifications. As shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.2, only 11 of the 24 tested 
demographics-SM correlates were found to be statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that differences in some demographic characteristics of young Egyptian 
activists accompany changes in their purposive media use, but this does not necessarily 
mean that gender, age, income and education are causally efficacious in relation to SM 
use, nor does it suggest that this association should be the case for all young Egyptian 
activists. It is thus not suggested here that SM would necessarily break traditional 
barriers to activism. Gender was positively correlated to SM uses. There were 
significant differences in the gratifications sought from SM between males and females, 
as shown by the T-test results. Males’ use of SM was more drawn by guidance and 
information seeking than females (p < 0.05), while females used SM for social utility and 
entertainment reasons more than males did (p < 0.01). No significant differences were 
detected for networking and convenience needs. 
Networking and convenience might be considered the intrinsic gratifications that are 
mostly related to the nature of SNSs and related needs that can be fulfilled through its 
platforms, regardless of users’ characteristics or their goals. Generally, the Internet is an 
‘easy to use’ medium that costs users little time, money or effort to communicate, as 
long as they have a level of profeciency and can use the medium efficiently. Additionally, 
SNSs were originally created as spaces where users could meet their friends and build 
up networks and communities of common interest, and users, both males and females, 
seem to utilise SM platforms with this understanding. 
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Age correlates were the least significant among the demographics. It is significantly and 
positively related to guidance uses (r = .119, p < 0.05), and negatively to entertainment 
uses (r = - .120, p < 0.05). Older respondents are more likely to utilise SM for political 
guidance, while younger respondents are more drawn by entertainment needs in using 
SM. 
Previous research has consistently detected some differences in Internet use due to 
demographics. For example, Hollenbaugh (2011) found that age and gender, among 
other antecedents, positively predicted bloggers’ motivations for posting on their blogs 
except for the ‘professionalism’ and ‘get feedback motives’. Li (2005) also found that 
women were more inclined to blog about internal topics, such as interests and hobbies, 
in comparison to men, who perceived the blogosphere as a space for discussing ‘public 
events’ or ‘remote topics’. Nevertheless, Li (2005) found that the gap between men and 
women was overcome in the blogosphere, since no gender differences were identified in 
terms of blogging history. In this sense, the lag in adopting new technology between 
men and women seemed to be overcome in the blogosphere. 
Monthly income was significantly and negatively related to information seeking (r = - 
.168, p < 0.01), and to a lesser extent to networking (r = -.116, p < 0.05), and social 
utility (r = -.129, p < 0.05). 
Education was strongly and negatively associated with the social utility (r = - .152, p < 
0.01) and entertainment uses (r = - .163, p < 0.01) of SM. That is, higher educated users 
are less likely to use SM to gratify social utility and entertainment needs. 
It is also worth noting that the only use construct that did not significantly correlate 
with participants’ demographic characteristics was ‘convenience.’ Additionally, using 
SM for ‘networking’ only negatively correlated with monthly income. This suggests that, 
among the research sample, using SM to circumvent limited resources is a fundamental 
purpose that is embraced by all activists, regardless of their gender, age, educational 
level and/or income. However, young activists’ capability to build communities of 
supporters and to recruit potential participants through SM, seems to be influenced 
only by their financial resources. Using SM for convenience and networking are thus 
expected to link to young activists’ online-off-line political practice, which is the focus of 
the third research question, addressed in Chapter Seven. 
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Findings discussed hitherto suggest that demographics generally have little to do with 
participants’ reasons for using SM to mobilise political actions. Previous research 
corroborates this moderate impact of demographics on media use (Kaye & Johnson, 
2004). This suggests that the Internet is being mainstreamed into Egyptian citizens’ 
lives through different mechanisms. Several factors have helped incorporate the 
Internet into a wider sector of the mainstream audience’s lives. For example, in  2002, 
the Egyptian government embraced an ambitious project to expand access to 
information communication technologies (ICT) throughout the country, focusing on 
socio-economically disadvantaged communities. The initiative included offering 
discounts on computers and 512 kbps ADSL subscriptions for three years by 2008, due 
to the agreement signed between the Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology (MCIT), the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA), 
the Egyptian National Post Organisation (ENPO), and the Computer and Software 
Department at the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce (Internet Filtering in 
Egypt, 2009).  
This initiative might have helped in filling the blank area between users and non-users, 
and hence, to lessen the impact of socio-economic standards on ICT motives. 
Additionally, a wide sector of the population who are not rich enough to have Internet 
Figure 5.2: Young activists’ uses of social media by demographics 
Positive correlation 
 Negative correlation 
 
 
Guidance 
Surveillance 
Convenience 
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Social utility 
Entertainment 
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access at home, and who are not employed in white collar professions where employees 
can access the Internet from work, have integrated Internet use into their daily lives by 
regular visits to Internet cafés, where they managed to use the Internet for an average 
of 12 hours per week (Wheeler, 2006). Building on narratives of Internet café users in 
Egypt and Jordan, Wheeler argues that through “Internet use, political debate is 
promoted. Class, gender and national boundary lines are regularly and openly 
breached” (p. 6). 
Activists were realistic in viewing the limitations of mobilising ‘mass’ support beyond 
SM platforms. These limitations could be culturally or socially-based. One of the culture-
related barriers to bringing people together, which communication through the Internet 
has helped bridge, is gender boundaries. Previous research showed how using the 
Internet has enabled political manoeuvre in the Arab World and has created a more 
relaxed environment for interaction between males and females (Wheeler, 2006). 
Another limitation may be ascribed to the Internet penetration rates in Egypt, along 
with illiteracy rates. Internet users compose only 21.2 percent of the population and are 
located mainly in urban areas. Only 4,077,520 of those users are on Facebook, with a 
penetration rate that slightly exceeds 5 percent (Internet World Stats, Egypt, 2010).This 
suggests that over 63 million individuals are excluded from the audience targetted by 
activists’ online activism – given the fact that they are not expected to reach or target 
the whole 21.2 percent of the population since they do not represent a homogenous 
group in terms of age, interest, income and education. Moreover, being an active user of 
SNSs requires a certain level of technology-literacy that enables users to search for, read 
and comment on media content. This could be expected to add another obstacle to 
mobilising activism through SM platforms, given the total adult illiteracy rate, which 
implies that 34 percent (UNICEF, 2005-2008) of the Egyptian population are totally left 
out of direct online mobilisation efforts. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to answer the research question on the reasons behind Egyptian 
activists’ use of SM to mobilise collective action. Media use is argued to be one of the 
factors that are expected to shape political practice. A double-track channel of 
communication is crucial for the resurgence of mobilisation and collective action 
practice. That is, to engage in politics, individuals need to be informed about important 
issues and to be able to voice their opinions to large publics.  
Through analysing quantitative data and supporting the analysis by qualitative 
comments taken from group discussions, the findings revealed several needs that 
activists seek to gratify by using SNSs for political communication. Young Egyptian 
activists use SM as instruments to achieve certain goals. Results indicate that these 
goals are more directed at disseminating information to inform and influence other 
non-politicised users’ decisions, rather than being directed at achieving individualistic 
goals. This is evident from activists’ critique of SM affordances and their perceived 
influence in fulfilling activists’ pre-assessed needs. This directional disposition of SM 
capacity is expected to influence their perceptions about SM’s role in promoting 
participatory dispositions that are much needed to increase the possibilities of 
participation in collective action.  
A number of perceived media deficiencies and limitations have also emerged from the 
FGDs and were found to have connections with certain types of media gratifications that 
are sought. Both the gratifications sought and the media deficiencies were discussed 
with an understanding of the political and social environment in Egypt, where unbiased 
view points and a free ‘double-track’ flow of information are all but nonexistent and 
citizens are denied their right to both acquire sufficient, unhampered information about 
the government’s performance, and to voice their opinion on significant issues in their 
society, especially when it comes to politics or when it contradicts authorities’ and 
elites’ interests. These circumstances have left citizens with a feeling that their voices 
are not heard, nor are even valuable, but moreover, voicing views may cost them their 
jobs, freedom, safety, or dignity. Consistent with such an environment, activists were 
found to be most motivated by information-related reasons for using SM platforms. 
Acquiring and providing political guidance, as well as obtaining and disseminating 
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information, were the most prevalent reasons behind activists’ political utilisation of 
SM. Those underpinnings of use were found to be moderated by activists’ perceptions of 
SM as being ‘somewhat’ reliable sources of information. Censorship also emerged as an 
incentive to information seeking and dissemination uses. 
To shed light on potential predictors of activists’ SM uses, correlations between gender, 
age, education, monthly income and different media use factors were tested. Findings 
revealed that demographics have a moderate impact on determining activists’ uses of 
SM (see Figure 5.2). This finding might suggest that SNSs and, more broadly, 
communication via the Internet may gain more popularity among citizens. It also 
supports the assumptions of previous research, which suggests that demographics, 
according to McLeod and Becker (1981), predict media gratifications only moderately in 
comparison to political attitudes (Kaye & Johnson, 2004). These attitudes, along with 
other participatory dispositions, are the main focus of the next chapter, which mainly 
discusses how informational uses of SM were utilised to transfer activists’ experience to 
the non-politicised frame of recognition in order to promote participatory dispositions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOCIAL MEDIA USES AND YOUNG ACTIVISTS’ CONTEXTUAL 
PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL DISPOSITIONS 
 
This chapter sets out to investigate young Egyptian activists’ perceptions about their 
political environment. It mainly looks at how young activists’ different uses of social 
media (SM) might influence the way they evaluate their context and their agency and, 
accordingly decide on practising politics off-line, limit their activism to the virtual 
sphere that is demobilised by the perceived constraints of their environment, or 
practise a hybrid of both, to different degrees and scales based on those evaluations and 
predispositions. The research question that articulates these proposed relationships 
enquires: How do social media contribute to creating opportunities (favourable 
dispositions) for practising collective action off-line?  
It has been argued that “we cannot study the power of groups by looking only at their 
resources; we also need to model the context in which decisions are taken” (Dowding, 
1996, p. 85). This chapter, then, moves from focusing on media uses, discussed in the 
previous chapter, to a focus on young activists’ dispositions and the characterisations of 
their participatory environment. This chapter considers young activists’ participatory 
dispositions in two dimensions: 
 Young activists’ perceived fear of repression. 
 Young activists’ perceived political efficacy. 
Two arguments are made in this chapter. These arguments mainly relate to 
participants’ reported distinctions between themselves (as political activists) and non-
politicised individuals, on the one hand, and their perceptions about their political 
environment and agency as influenced (or not) by media use (introduced in Chapter 
Five) on the other. One argument is that young activists exhibit a preference for direct 
experience with political activism, and confrontation with authorities, as a means to 
defeat their reported feelings of fear of repression. However, they believe that SM can 
provide a safer environment, where the non-politicised can be introduced to politics 
and can gain experience at lower cost/risk levels and, hence, can be ready for more 
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costly actions. Two, it is argued that using SM helps both, young activists and the non-
politicised (from participants’ points of view) to acquire political skills and feel more 
politically efficacious. SM benefit young activists as platforms for political debate, 
through which they can enhance, learn and share political competences. This SM 
affordance was found to relate mainly to certain SM uses, but not to others. 
Instrumental, and mainly informational, uses (i.e., guidance and surveillance) correlated 
positively to political efficacy, while only entertainment (habitual use) was significantly, 
but negatively, associated with participants’ feelings of political efficacy.  
In authoritarian regimes, it is argued that young people need to be mobilised as                
a citizenry as well as a democracy (Machacek, 2001). Individuals’ legal, political and 
social relationship to the society to which they belong need to be defined to enable an 
active practice of citizenry (Wallace, 2001). People tend to make their decisions about 
the actions they are about to take based on their evaluations of the consequences and 
outcomes of their deeds. Under repressive governance systems, where taking part in 
politics, especially unconventional forms of activism, might bring about unwanted 
consequences, and as citizenry might be vulnerable to changing circumstances (Helve & 
Wallace, 2001), young activists are expected to make certain evaluations of their 
participatory environment before they decide what forms of action they will take part 
in, when and how. Previous research has distinguished a welcoming, safe environment 
and meaningful participation and engagement among several other dimensions              
of critical youth empowerment (Jennings, Parra-Medina, Hilfinger-Messias, & 
McLoughlin, 2006). Comparison of their political stances and decisions against the 
perceived patterns and trends of public opinion was also found to affect individuals’ 
political decisions and actions (Dalton, 2002). Individuals’ confidence in their ability to 
participate significantly in politics was also found to be relevant to relying on the 
Internet, as well as their perceptions about the utility and the comprehensiveness of the 
medium (Ognyanova & Ball-Rokeach, 2012; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). In the current 
research, two variables were selected to represent the young activists’ attitudes of, and 
perceptions about, their participatory environment: the reported fear of repression and 
their perceived sense of political efficacy.  
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Accordingly, this chapter is organised into three main sections: 
6.1. Social media uses and young activists’ perceived feelings of fear of repression. 
 6.1.1. Breaching fear is a real life experience. 
 6.1.2. Social media for evidence-based mobilisation. 
 6.1.3. Social media for fear-proof participation. 
6.2. Social media uses and young activists’ perceived feelings of political efficacy. 
6.2.1. Challenging the regime-induced feelings of inefficacy. 
6.2.2. Social media as a hub for collective learning and civic preparation. 
6.3. Conclusion. 
Each section begins by displaying the participants’ profile in relation to the variable 
under study. To focus the analysis and particularly to address the research question, 
further relationships are then tested so as to assess how the young activists’ use of SM 
may relate to their political dispositions and the ways in which they perceive their 
political reality and the significance of their active participation. 
6.1. Social media uses and young activists’ perceived feelings of fear of repression 
Participants in the current study are young activists who are expected to have 
experience in political activism, expectancy of and readiness to bear its risks and costs. 
However, they are also aware of the dangers and consequences that may accompany 
‘going public’ and confronting the authorities, especially through contentious forms of 
activism. Fear of repression was measured by a scale, composed of three items on a five-
point scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.68) (see Chapter Four and Appendix 1). On the scale, 
responses ranged from 1 ‘strongly agree’, to 5 ‘strongly disagree.’  
As seen from Table 6.1, the majority of the research sample across the Table generally 
agrees that practising political activism in Egypt brings about bad consequences, 
ranging from harrassment to assault. Nearly one third of the participants have worries 
about being harrassed if they practise street politics (n = 117, 32.2%). 
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Table 6.1: Young activists’ distribution by fear of repression  
Perceived fear of repression Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
I worry about being harrased if I go on street 
to participate in political activity* 
96 26.4 117 32.2 73 20.1 46 12.7 31 8.5 363 100.0 
I feel worried about expressing my political 
opinion in public** 
46 12.7 84 23.3 87 24.1 90 24.9 54 15.0 361 100.0 
An Egyptian citizen could face violations 
which make him/her worry about his/her 
safety*** 
152 42.1 134 37.1 50 13.9 16 4.4 9 2.5 361 100.0 
Missing: * F = 4 (1.1%) ** F = 6 (1.6%) *** F = 6 (1.6%) 
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However, participants feel less worried as activism becomes less contencious and 
confrontational. Almost a quarter of participants (24.9%) believe that they should 
express their political opinion in public. Making inferences about other citizens (i.e., the 
non-politicised), 42.1 percent of young activists strongly expect that safety issues would 
deter Egyptian citizens from practising politics.  
In order to explore how these reported worries about confronting authorities might 
relate to young activists’ use of SM, the following correlation is explored: 
Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ feelings of fear 
of repression? And if so, in what ways? 
As discussed in Chapter Five, young activists have been using SM to achieve several 
purposes, the strongest of which is guidance (M = 16.7, SD = 3.6), and the weakest is 
entertainment (M = 6.5, SD = 2.3). For each of the examined political dispositions 
variables, Pearson product-moment correlations to SM use constructs were calculated 
to explore whether these uses directly influenced participants’ dispositions (see Table 
6.2). Results are first reported from the self-administered questionnaires. Data derived 
from the focus group discussions (FGDs) are then used to further survey and discuss the 
quantitative findings.  
Table 6.2: Correlations between social media uses and perceptions of fear of repression  
Dispositions SM use correlates (r) 
Guidance Serveillance Networking Social 
utility 
Entertainment Convenience 
Fear of 
repression 
 ــ 0.044  ــ 0.046 0.002 0.171** 0.142** 0.135* 
Significance * (p > 0.05) ** (p > 0.01) 
It has been anticipated that using SM for guidance, surveillance and networking would 
link positively to young activists’ reported feelings of fear. Contrary to this assumption, 
instrumental uses of SM, as shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1, were found to be 
irrelevant to participants’ perceptions of a fear of repression. Fear of repression seems 
not to deter young activists from using SM instruments to communicate politics and to 
mobilise support for their movement. However, it is worth noting that using SM for 
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guidance and surveillance purposes associated negatively, yet not significantly, with 
reported feelings of fear, i.e., participants who feel threatened by the authorities due to 
their active practice of politics may be less inclined to use SM repertoires to achieve 
political goals. Conversely, using SM for informational purposes (both informative and 
technical) does not seem to influence young activists’ calculations of threats in their 
polity. It thus seems that young activists do not rely on SM as a means of “addressing 
their environment [through] engage[ing] in cognitive mechanisms of identity shift and 
attribution of threats and opportunities” (della Porta, 2005, p. 178), which stresses the 
tendency to use SM instrumentally, rather than for ideological and identity-related 
reasons. 
The networking correlate was positive but insignificant, which suggests that young 
activists who fear confronting the authorities may be inclined to create and join online 
communities of like-minded others in order to feel that they are in a majority and to 
interact in a friendly environment. Such groups were found to develop a sense of virtual 
community around a political idea or leader (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). The 
positive direction of the insignificant correlation between SM networking and fear also 
suggests that young activists tend to invite people to support their cause online when 
the off-line arena is tightly controlled by authorities, which makes contacting and 
recruiting supporters off-line more threatening and costly.  
More interestingly, fear of repression was associated significantly and positively with 
habitual uses of SM. High levels of fear of repression strongly and significantly correlate 
with using SM for social utility (r = .171, p < 0.01), entertainment (r = .142, p < 0.01), 
and, to a lesser extent, for convenience reasons (r = .135, p < 0.05). As may be recalled 
from Chapter Five, and supported by recent research on the Internet and social change 
(i.e., Earl & Kimport, 2011), young activists perceive lessening feelings of anxiety and 
fear as one of convenience affordances of SM. They believe that SM not only allow them 
an opportunity for mobilising support for their movement that overcomes the problem 
of scarce resources, but they also constitute a safer sphere, where the less-experienced 
and the non-politicised can practise politics at lower-risk levels.  
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Figure 6.1: Correlations between the young Egyptian activists’ reported uses 
of social media and political dispositions  
Guidance M = 16.7, r = 0.119 
Convenience M = 11.8, r = 0.135 
 
Networking M = 11.1 
Surveillance M = 16.2, r = 0.111 
 
Social media uses  
Social utility M = 7.7, r = 0171 
Entertainment M = 6.5 7.7, r = .142 
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r = - .123 
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It is also worth pausing and thinking about the social utility/fear of repression 
correlation. Debating politics implies an informational form of SM use that might put 
users in danger if they, for example, hold and publicly express opinions opposed to 
those of the government. However, individuals may feel safe as they debate politics on 
SM platforms for several reasons. First, they usually interact with friends and 
acquaintances whom they know off-line, or whom they know online through a common 
friend. Additionally, online discussion groups are usually composed of like-minded 
members, who hold similar opinions, which makes the participatory environment less 
hostile. Last, but not least, anonymity in the virtual sphere offers a good cover for those 
who wish to express their political views, yet fear unfavourable consequences. 
According to social psychologists, communicating anonymously may be most important 
for excluded and marginalised cohorts who are otherwise alienated from interactions 
outside their group (McKenna & Bargh, 2006). These reasons explain why debating 
politics on SM platforms tends to help activists breach their fear more than it imposes 
threats on their communicative activism, as seen in Table 6.2. 
The findings discussed hitherto generally suggest that individuals tend to ease their 
feelings of fear by ‘soft’ (or habitual), rather than ‘core’ (or instrumental) utilisation of 
SM. As may be expected, less demanding activities on SM give young activists the 
opportunity to give vent to their feelings of fear. In the U&G approach to media 
influence, habitual, or ritualistic, use of media involves the concept of utility, but little 
intentionality or selectivity (Blumler, 1979), which, in turn, associates such uses with 
limited effects if compared to instrumental uses of media. In other words, ‘soft-core’ 
young activists, who use SM habitually and exert relatively less effort in communicating 
about their cause compared to those who use SM instrumentally, are those who have 
stronger feelings of fear of repression and so are expected to be less-engaged in more 
demanding, and indeed less effective, forms of online communication. Distinction 
between different types of media uses and users was welcomed in media studies as it 
gauges the richness of mass communication experience as well as highlighting 
variations between audience members (Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001, p. 465). A 
distinction between activists and non-activists was typically demarcated by participants 
during the FGDs, as will be shown below. 
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To explain these results more fully and to put them into perspective, participants’ 
perceptions about their SM use and fear of authority, which they expressed during the 
FGDs were analysed. Participants’ views took on two main dimensions: first, activists’ 
perceptions of SM’s potential as media users or content consumers, which explains the 
evident lack of a significant correlation between instrumental media use and fear of 
repression (Section 6.1.1). Second, young activists as mobilisers aim to address other 
fellow citizens through producing, sharing or highlighting certain media messages, 
where I argue that SM have the potential to stimulate relaxed dispositions amongst the 
non-politicised others and to reassure them that taking part in changing their society 
will not necessarily harm them (Sections 6.1.3). These two dimensions intersect in 
Section 6.1.2. 
6.1.1. Breaching fear is a real life experience 
The young activists are more inclined to agree that practising politics in Egypt make 
them vulnerable to certain safety-related consequences (Table 6.1). Yet, it seems that 
their purposive use of SM does not feed into breaching this fear barrier, nor alter their 
dispositions in this regard. As shown in Table 6.2, young activists’ reported feelings of 
fear of repression did not relate significantly to their instrumental uses of SM. This 
might suggest that other factors are in process, bolstering the young activists’ 
propensity to participate in such a threatening environment. 
Young activists believe that the street is a suitable arena for practising politics. 
Accordingly, they also believe that reality is where they should face associated potential 
dangers and breach the psychological barriers to active political engagement in order to 
achieve feasible change. A.Ma. argues, typically, that breaching fear is a state of mind or 
a ‘status’ that we all (Egyptian youth) need to reach: 
I was arrested more than once in demonstrations and it meant no problem to me. The 
problem was in the first time. I mean, the barrier was broken, and then many barriers 
fell apart. This fear-breach makes the whole difference; it creates a status. I think that 
we all need to breach the barriers. 
When fear feelings were discussed with the young activists during the FGDs, they 
agreed that, for them, as politicised citizens, real life experience is what really counts in 
realistically assessing what might accompany their activism. They argue that 
confronting authorities has actually given them more confidence and has enabled them 
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to resume what they had been doing. In fact, the young activists feel proud of 
confronting authorities and being detained, for years in some cases. Several examples of 
this celebrated confrontation were given during discussions. A.M. explains how activists 
feel a great sense of pride as they face threats, and how such confrontation acts as a 
catalyst for comradely support and solidarity: 
… .. now it is a matter of honour to say that activist X was arrested on that day, at that 
time, and is now held in the police station, and let’s go to visit him and show some 
support.  
I.B. explains how experience matters when it comes to breaching the fear barrier: 
I was taken to the State Security many times. What made me fearless and even 
indifferent is that I was practising politics in college, knowing who the secret agents and 
the informers are. They were known to all activists at the university. 
MH. describes himself as a ‘sustained customer at the State Security’ since he started 
engaging in politics. MH. was sentenced to 12 years and in return for his release, 
security forces demanded that he stop practising politics or, as they call it, ‘the call’ 
(Daa’wa). He was amongst other political prisoners who benefitted from the U.S.A. 
administration’s pressure on Egypt, among other Middle Eastern countries, to employ 
democratic reforms and invalidate the emergency law in the shadow of the 9/11 
attacks. In the following quotation, MH. discusses how his jailers: 
… .. felt that [our] release was inevitable, as our solitary confinement was illegitimate in 
the first place. They started to negotiate our release and tried to make deals with us to 
benefit from each one. Those who lost their initiative and had already decided to 
abandon politics, were released, but they kept in prison those who still have the 
endeavour. I realised, then, that they had reached their threshold and that they would 
eventually set me free. They tried to gain as much as they could, and my role was to 
believe in myself and not to give up and also to gain as much as I could. When they got 
fed up with me, and other activists, they released us. 
These results stress the importance of experience in collective action as an essential 
condition for a movement to grow.  Similarly, it has been found that actual experience in 
collective participation influences individuals’ identification with social movements. A 
high percentage of the non-organised, who had participated in previous 
demonstrations, were found to identify with movement in general (della Porta & Mosca, 
2005). These results thus support the suggestion made in Chapter Three. That is, in the 
absence of formal organising structure and/or prior participatory experience, 
developing an activist identity merely through SM use might be a challenging goal to 
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achieve. For participant activists, reality is where they build such experience. As for 
non-politicised citizens, young activists believe that SM may help them, first, promote    
a sense of solidarity and build trust relations with them through providing evidence      
of participants’ activism. Participants’ views about using pseudonyms while 
communicating online show a preference for using real names. I.B. elaborated on the 
reasons to avoid anonymity and the ways it could harm activism:  
Some things force us to create an account under our real names. I made my account and 
I was the admin of the ‘My Right’ (Haqqy) group at Cairo University. This group has 
several ‘admins’, amongst which is the main account of the movement, ‘My Right Cairo’. 
However, the amount of communication the anonymous and vague account of the 
movement receives is far less than it is with the accounts that indicate the name of           
a certain person … ..This is because people want to communicate with a real person, not 
with a nickname (emphasis added). 
Participants agree that communicating with their real names, on the one hand, 
preserves their credibility and facilitates linking their on- and off-line activism together. 
Participants believe that communicating anonymously deprives online interaction         
of a significant cue and may diminish the locus of the communication process. It 
polarises the debates rather than creating a common ground between the different lines 
of debated thought and contrasting points of view (Sunstein, 2001). Additionally, they 
are keen to create chances for networking in the real world, and to communicate from 
behind a pseudonym may raise trust issues and hinder off-line activism accordingly. On 
the other side of the coin, participants assert that their real identities are already known 
to the authorities and that anonymity is no shelter. M.M. summarises participants’ 
typical points of view: 
Most of the political activists use their real names on Facebook because they are well 
known to the police and they are not afraid of any pressure from security forces. If 
authorities want to arrest one of us, they will get him/her from the demonstrations, not 
from Facebook because of something s/he wrote. 
Second, SM could also comprise a “safe foray” into activism (McAdam, 1986, p. 69) and 
so make up a more appealing repertoire of collective action through which the non-
politicised can start experiencing political activism at lower cost/risk. These two 
dimensions are discussed consecutively hereafter. 
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6.1.2. Social media for evidence-based mobilisation 
The young activists use SM to provide evidence of their safety and to reassure the non-
politicised that participation ‘will not cast [them] far behind the sun’13 (will not harm 
them). In M.S.’s words: 
Through social networks, [the non-politicised] gained courage and accumulate a sense 
that political engagement could be affordable in our society. For example, when we were 
arrested in the case of solidarity with the victims of the explosion at the Church of Saints 
in Alexandria, our active friends and colleagues who usually take to the streets, played a 
significant role in supporting our case and spreading the word through the online 
networks. This conveyed a message to other ‘online-only’ friends that, no matter what 
happens, the arrested will not stand-alone facing authorities … .. simply, practising politics 
would not cast them far behind the sun (emphasis added). 
To introduce the non-politicised citizens to politics and urge them to take part in costly 
collective actions, the young activists believe that it is crucial to help those citizens, who 
do not normally take to the street or have direct experience with collective action, to 
comprehend what the activists actually do and to be able to realistically weigh up the 
consequences that might accompany confronting the authorities in off-line counter-
political activities. They believe that SM are beneficial tools for providing evidence of 
those consequences. M.E. explained, typically: 
The images we upload after the protests usually offer several benefits. It is that as soon 
as we finish protesting and upload the photos on the Internet, many people take to the 
streets … .. People joined protesters from the Khaled Said Group at Lazoghly Square, 
despite not having joined the march at the beginning. Again, protesting at Lazoghly 
Square was more risky, because it was close to the Ministry of the Interior, but because 
people saw the pictures and saw youth who participated, they had the guts to join and 
participate.  
Archiving activism using rich media tools and various communicative cues (text, 
images, voice and video) brings the street experience to the non-politicised individuals’ 
frame of recognition and makes identification with a movement easier. This, as M.E. 
believes, has ‘made the whole difference.’ Non-politicised citizens can easily recognise   
a tangible experience rather than struggling to identify with an abstract idea. I.B. 
described how he and his colleagues have archived their activities and related incidents 
and have instantaneously made valuable information available to other users through 
the ‘networks’. Such disclosure, from the standpoint of activists, could cause a state       
                                                        
13 ‘Casting someone behind the sun’ is a saying usually used in Egypt to express peoples’ concern about 
bad consequences that opposing the government will bring.  
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of identification with remote experiences, the realisation of which is made much easier 
through the pictures uploaded. Most importantly, it could be inferred from the extract 
that these practices can create trust in political action itself; as citizens come to realise 
that participation does not simply make people disappear without a trace. I.B. described 
in detail how the ‘networks’ resourced their activism and sustained their movement: 
Fifteen minutes after we were arrested [after demonstrations in solidarity with Khaled 
Said’s cause in Lazoghly and Sherief Street], a list of our names was available online, 
including a detailed record of the injuries. This was fundamental to mobilising another 
cycle of protests and strikes in front of the Syndicate of Journalists and the General 
Attorney’s office, right after the demonstrations. This is a valuable advantage that was 
made available by the networks.  
By disseminating information about their activism through SM platforms, the young 
activists seek not only to create dependency relationships with, and have an impact on, 
individuals (micro-level), but also on groups and organisations (meso-level), and other 
social systems (macro-level), as they seek to affect the political system (Ognyanova & 
Ball-Rokeach, 2012). This may be achievable through the establishment of a 
relationship with the news media. For example, “social media variously [act] as a 
watchdog of state controlled national media, [alert] international news media to 
growing opposition and dissent events and [provide] raw images of these for wider 
dissemination” (Cottle, 2011, p. 652). 
It can be said, then, that the young activists utilise SM technology to construct a self-
determined sphere of subpolitics, which they, then, monitor with as perfect an 
understanding of the uncertainty surrounding them as the ephemera of the situation 
will allow (Schudson, 1998, cited in Axford, 2001)). This constructed sphere of sub-
politics is valuable in mobilising the non-politicised and less interested citizens to join 
the activists’ cause, traverse their fear and cross the online borders into the off-line 
arena. SM is the young activists’ verifying tool, which they utilise to bring their 
experience to the online-only participants’ frame of recognition.  
6.1.3. Social media for fear-proof participation 
The young activists believe that SM could be beneficial in promoting affordable political 
action. They use SM repertoires to engage the newcomers and the less interested 
individuals in low-cost political activities. They agree that SM is a safer place to 
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communicate politics. For them, lowering the cost of participation, especially when it 
has to do with people’s safety, is crucial for practising unconventional political activities 
in a repressive environment. A.A. remarked: 
Many people want to participate, but there are also many limitations and psychological 
barriers which they try to overcome by participating in the virtual political community.  
A.Y.  explained: 
Online, the government does not have our fingerprints. They cannot chase us easily, so, 
people feel safer to engage in politics online … .. and this is exactly what we have been 
trying to enforce when trying to mobilise publics behind our cause; lowering the 
threshold of risk. In the last strike in Alexandria in solidarity with Khaled Said, all 
strikers had to do was to dress in black and stand in silence looking at the sea and 
reading from the Bible or the Q’uran to show dissent and condemn police brutality, it 
was a great success. 
I.B. commented on the same event: 
People participated widely regardless of being political activists or not … .. what was 
required was so minimal, therefore there was larger participation. The more you lessen 
the sacrifices and responsibilities, the more participation you get. 
The young activists believe that SM contribute to raising the perceived rationality          
of collective action as they lower the costs of participating in political actions to the 
benefit of achieving certain sought outcomes. Within the SM environment, the non-
politicised can gain more courage, since they interact with activists and communicate 
politics safely. For example, M.S. believes that: 
Social networking sites have enabled large numbers of citizens to speak from behind the 
keyboard. Now they can break their silence and express their opinion openly with no 
fear of security oppression (emphasis added). 
Perceiving SM as a safer platform from which to practise politics helps better 
understand how the context of an authoritarian regime might nominate online practices 
to be an alternative solution so citizens can express their oppressed opinion and engage 
in politics. As revealed in Table 6.2, activists perceive practising politics on social 
networking sites (SNSs) as being more convenient than in other arenas – especially 
when compared to reality. They explained how their perception of SM convenience uses 
could be ascribed to the supressing political environment in Egypt, where freedom of 
speech and the right to assembly are restricted. Since 1981 and until people revolted on 
25th January 2011, Egypt has been ruled by the National Democratic Party under                      
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a permanent state-of-emergency law. “An estimated 18,000 Egyptians [were] 
imprisoned under the law, which allows the police to arrest people without charges, 
allows the government to ban political organisations and makes it illegal for more than 
five people to gather without a license from the government. Newspapers are 
monitored by the Ministry of Information and generally refrain from directly criticising 
Mubarak. And so for young people in Egypt, Facebook, which allows users to speak 
freely to one another and encourages them to form groups, is irresistible as a platform 
not only for social interaction but also for dissent” (Shapiro, 2009, p. 2).  
SM could thus serve as a mediated arena for political outspokenness on the 
controversial issues facing Egyptian society. As Vitak et al. (2009) argue, Facebook 
might have the potential to provide a low-risk arena from which users can interact with 
one another about politics, which might be highly beneficial for discussing sensitive or 
inappropriate issues, such as politics and religion (Vitak, Smock, Zube, Carr, Ellison, & 
Cliff Lampe, 2009). This corroborates the evident positive correlation between the 
reported feeling of fear and using SM for social utility reasons (see Table 6.2). For 
example, SM users can communicate with each other ‘anonymously,’ using different 
identities and pseudonyms, and thus create a safer environment where they can 
communicate politics more freely. Along the same lines, MA. typically stated that: 
On Facebook and the Internet more generally, there is no censorship. For example, when 
I call a friend over the telephone, I do not rule out that the Telecom is eavesdropping. As 
for the Internet, I believe censorship is unachieveable. 
M.S. added: 
Basically, there is no other way to express myself and my opinion. Any activity outside 
the Internet ‘borders’ would be tightly restricted and limited. I think the least I can do is 
speak my voice out and convey my ideas to others.  
These typical extracts corroborate arguments from previous research in authoritarian 
contexts. For example, Rahimi (2003) argues that “Cyberspace gives dissidents a safer 
way to expose the corruption and abuses of authoritarian regimes and enables activists 
a retreat from autocratic institutional spaces, in which speech is kept strictly under 
supervision” (p. 111) (emphasis added). 
However, it seems that providing evidence of safety and enjoying secure practice online 
does not necessarily encourage people to take to the street or to practise politics off-
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line. Fear of repression played both roles: as a stimulator of ‘online’ activism, as 
freedom of expression is allowed more on the Internet, as well as a prospective restraint 
on ‘off-line’ activism, which involves more serious threats to individuals’ safety and 
well-being. This fear impact may thus explain the expected difference in participation 
rates between the two arenas, as expressed by participant activists (online-off-line 
participation is the core focus of Chapter Seven).  
Young activists perceived the fear impact as an obstacle to mobilising political activties 
beyond the virtual sphere. The high cost of practising politics off-line may deter 
individuals from challenging their fear off-line as they might have done online. MH. 
implies in the following extract how the limited opportunities for participation and 
retreating to SM as an alternative platform might hollow out the practice of politics and 
convert it to a mere act of anger release that does not lead to meaningful participation 
or feasible change: 
Security strains are very tight now on the ground. They let people speak out on media 
platforms and vent their anger online. 
6.2. Social media uses and young activists’ perceived feelings of political efficacy 
Political efficacy was measured with an additive four items index (Cronbach’s α = 0.64) 
adapted from previous research (Bimber, 2001). Respondents were asked to express to 
what extent they agreed or disagreed with four items on a five-point scale, where 1 
meant ‘strongly agree’, and 5 meant ‘strongly disagree’(see Chapter Four and Appendix 
1). 
As seen in Table 6.3, participants hold stronger feelings of internal efficacy (items one 
and two) compared to their feelings of external political efficacy (items three and four). 
Although about one-third of young activists tend to feel that they are politically 
competent and that they can easily follow politics, slightly more than one-third of the 
sample agreed that ‘there’s not much point in participating in political campaigns and 
that one person’s participation will not make any difference.’ Participants’ responses to 
external efficacy items reveal that they realise the restraints of their political 
environment. 38.7 percent of the surveyed young activists (n = 141) strongly agreed 
that they do not have a say in government, and almost half of the sample (45.5 percent) 
strongly agreed that politicians do not care about what they think. However, 
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participants’ negative perceptions of political efficacy and their tendancy to feel 
politically powerless in terms of influencing their polity might also stem from the nature 
of the sample, which combines hard-core and soft-core activists. While hard-core 
activists are expected to feel more politcally efficacious, soft-core and less-experienced 
activists’ perceptions might have tilted the balance. 
These results suggest that young activists’ functioning may be marred by their 
perceived feeling of efficacy “because it affects behaviour not only directly, but by its 
impact on other determinants such as goals and aspirations, outcome expectations, 
affective proclivities, and perception of impediments and opportunities in the social 
environment” (Bandura, 2000, p. 75). In order to explore how young activists’ use of SM 
may enhance, diminish or be irrelevant to their reported worries about confronting 
authorities, the following correlation is examined: 
Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ feelings of 
being politically efficacious? And if so, in what ways? 
As seen in Table 6.4, informational uses of SM correlate positively and significantly with 
young activists’ feelings of political efficacy. The more young activists use SM for 
unbiased views and to decide on important issues, the more they feel capable of 
exerting change in their society (r = 0.119, p > 0.05). The more young activists use SM to 
gain and disseminate information, the more they also develop a feeling that political and 
social change is possible, and that they can participate in bringing about this change (r = 
0.111, p > 0.05). 
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Table 6.3: Young activists’ distribution by political efficacy  
Perceived political efficacy Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
F % F % F % F % F % F % 
Politics is too complicated for someone 
like me to follow* 
28 7.7 71 19.5 76 20.9 113 31.0 76 20.9 364 100.0 
There’s not much point in participating in 
political campaigns: one person’s 
participation will not make any 
difference** 
68 18.6 128 35.0 84 23.0 51 13.9 35 9.6 366 100.0 
People like me do not have a say in 
government*** 
141 38.7 127 34.9 52 14.3 34 9.3 10 2.7 364 100.0 
Politicians do not care about what people 
like me think**** 
166 45.5 119 32.6 44 12.1 21 5.8 15 4.1 365 100.0 
 
Missing: *F = 3 (0.8%) ** F = 1 (0.3%) *** F = 3 (0.8%) **** F = 2 (0.5%) 
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As may be recalled from Chapter Five and Table 5.1, young activists have mostly been 
using SM for guidance (M = 16.7, SD = 3.6), and surveillance (M = 16.2, SD = 2.4) 
purposes. It was argued in Chapter Five that informational uses as such have been 
mainly directed at serving certain functions (informative and technical) which the 
young activists seek to achieve through their active and purposive use of SM. It can be 
said, then, that the more young activists use SM for functional-informational purposes, 
the more they acquire new political competences and feel politically efficacious. In other 
words, the more they use SM as instruments for change, the more they tend to face 
forcible oppression, and defeat the vulnerability to discouragement that could deter 
them from participating in activating social and political changes. As Hacker (2000) 
argues, engaging individuals in message construction provides interactive opportunities 
that should increase learning about political issues and the political process. 
This finding links to what Gibson et al. (2000) found in their study of different types of 
Internet connectedness and political participation in four nations. They found that those 
who use the Internet to ‘do’ something, such as to find information, or what researchers 
called “utilitarians”, are more inclined to develop a sense of social capital and to 
participate in politics. By working together, the young activists can learn transferable 
skills that are much needed to build their agency. It has been argued that online tools 
have the ability to aid the maintenance of ideologically homogenous social networks 
(Ognyanova & Ball-Rokeach, 2012). Conversely, it was found that “perceived collective 
efficacy fosters group motivational commitment to their missions, resilience to 
adversity and performance accomplishments” (Bandura, 2000, p. 75), which confirms 
the reciprocal relationship between the instrumental uses of SM and efficacy. Carpini 
(2000) argues that the evolution of the Internet, and particularly of SM, have helped to 
overcome the causes of disengagement that are attached to conditions which stimulate 
engagement in public life generally. These conditions include motivation, perceived 
opportunity for involvement and a knowledge-based ability to take part in the civic 
realm. Carpini asserts that “what is missing is the belief that becoming involved in 
public life in any way that involves politics, government, or organised collective action is 
likely to be effective or satisfying” (p. 344).  
These findings seem, however, to contradict Lee’s (2006) proposal that the Internet 
could potentially facilitate increased political efficacy by helping users interact with 
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politically active social groups. This discrepancy might stem from the different roles the 
Internet plays in terms of enhancing individuals’ feelings of internal and external 
political efficacy. Lee found that using the Internet for information, entertainment and 
interactive purposes positively influenced internal, but not external, political efficacy.  
Table 6.4: Correlations between social media uses and political efficacy perceptions 
Significance * (p > 0.05) ** (p > 0.01) 
On the contrary, habitual uses of SM, as seen in Table 6.4, do not seem to feed into 
young activists’ feelings of political power. Social utility and convenience uses were 
found irrelevant to the participants’ sense of political efficacy and their perceived ability 
to exercise the aspired change in their society. However, social utility correlated 
negatively, yet insignificantly, with young activists’ feelings of political efficacy, which 
implies that “socialisers” (Gibson, Howard, & Ward, 2000) may develop feelings of 
incompetence, which may then negatively influence their inclination to become 
involved in politics. Similarly, Gibson et al. (2000) concluded from their aforementioned 
study that “while online socialising may lead to higher levels of off-line socialising and 
civic engagement in one’s community, it appears to make one less likely to engage in 
specifically political organisations and activities” (p. 15). Entertainment is the only type 
of habitual uses of SM that correlated significantly, but negatively, with young activists’ 
perceived political efficacy (r = - 0.123, p > 0.05). The more young activists use SM to 
feel relaxed and to pass time, the less they feel politically effective and vice versa. It 
could be suggested, then, that acquiring, sharing and transforming skills over SM 
platforms may not necessarily promote political action; as it might not trigger the 
feeling of political empowerment but, rather, could stimulate an illusory perception of 
being active participants in the virtual space, and increase the numbers of free riders 
accordingly. Additionally, high levels of disconnectivity, illiteracy and poverty deprive 
large numbers of people of the prospective leverages of SM use and thus hamper the 
Dispositions SM use correlates (r) 
Guidance Serveillance Networking Social 
utility 
Entertainment Convenience 
Political efficacy 0.119* 0.111* 0.072  ــ 0.005  ــ 0.123*  ــ 0.081 
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escalation of the size of the promoted action (or of achieving collectivity) through SM 
mobilisation. These propositions are explored in the following chapter. 
The young activists’ views on their perceived sense of political efficacy and SM’s 
contribution to creating a sense of political powerfulness focused mainly on two points 
of view: (1) challenging the regime-induced feelings of inefficacy, and (2) SM as a hub 
for collective learning and preparation.  
6.2.1. Challenging the regime-induced feelings of inefficacy 
Generally, participants were inclined to report feelings of political inefficacy that leaned 
towards external more than internal inefficacy. Participants realise the constraints        
of their political environment, which intertwine with the cultural heritage which does 
not necessarily favour participation. They ascribe perceptions of lack of political efficacy 
to such external constraints rather than being an innate trait of a lack of the capability 
to function. They have doubts about their context and whether their voices will be 
heard or their aspirations achieved. The following extracts represent how participants 
recognise their externally-induced political weaknesses. 
MH.: The regime claims that we are not qualified for fully fledged democracy. This is 
shocking; it is not possible that a whole population is not qualified for democracy 
(emphasis added). 
MA.: To say that people are not qualified for democracy is a justification made by the 
regime not to apply democratic transformations. Although the majority of the 
population are illiterate, but it is still a false claim to say that people are not qualified for 
democracy. You cannot assert that this majority knows nothing. The average person can 
choose … .. if a certain choice is explained s/he will participate.  
MH.: The problem does not reside merely in understanding different issues, and 
realising the extent of effectiveness one’s opinion could have in the final results. The 
other problem is that we do not have the culture of listening to other opinions (emphases 
added). 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the young activists believe that Egyptian society suffers 
chronic political and social conditions and relies on supernatural powers to resolve 
their problems. W.B. typically outlined: 
W.B.: Authorities have all the tools, so the majority has now reached the limit where 
they wish authorities to have the guidance. Their only hope for change is divine 
intervention. 
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Participants, however, believe that SM have infused new life into Egyptian politics, and 
offered younger generations a “new beginning.” 
6.2.2. Social media as a hub for collective learning and political preparation 
I was imprisoned for several years. During that time I did not know how the world had 
changed. When I was released, I realised that the world has changed dramatically and I 
found the Internet. This was my new beginning (emphasis added) (MH., 2010).  
The young activists utilise SM as platform for an Internet-based hub for learning and 
sharing political experience. Participants mainly highlighted anonymity and 
interactivity as the main attributes of SM that help them engage in processes of mutual 
information transmission and deliberation through which they share transferable skills 
with their fellow citizens. These conventions were found to have a positive impact on 
citizens’ dispositions and behaviours. RA. and MH. highlighted anonymity as a reason to 
think that SM could contribute to developing feelings of political efficacy. They believe 
that SM provide favourable conditions for discussing politics. SM free the 
communication process from some constraints that may deter less politicised 
individuals from taking part in political discussions,  
RA.: The main added advantage of discussing political issues through social networks is 
that they give a sense of comfort with a greater degree of freedom during the discussion. 
MH.: People started to join online groups as a means of self-expression. Some people do 
not reveal their identities, and they can eventually gain the necessary confidence that is 
much needed for opinion sharing and comprehension.  
RA. and MH. believe that anonymity benefits political communication, not in terms       
of providing security cover for activists (as discussed in Section 6.1), but with regard to 
generating a sense of inclusion for individuals who may feel alienated from interactions 
outside their group. Social psychologists have similarly stressed the importance             
of anonymity for excluded and marginalised cohorts who would otherwise feel socially 
alienated (McKenna & Bargh, 2006). Norris (2004) explained how “textual 
communication via the Internet strips away the standard visual and aural cues of social 
identity—including those of gender, race, age and socio-economic status—plausibly 
promoting heterogeneity” and, hence, loosens the strains of social status and allows for 
a more mutually inclusive environment of interaction (p. 5).  
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However, Gastil (2000) suggests that face-to-face deliberation is more appropriate in 
the political arena if compared to computer-mediated-communication (CMC). He argues 
that the complexity of political decisions, the diversity of participants and the necessity 
for group cohesion, and the degree to which CMC can reduce the independent influence 
of social status, give face-to-face deliberation a powerful advantage over deliberations 
that are mediated by computers. This might suggest that those who feel more politically 
efficacious (and use SM instrumentally) will be more inclined to practise politics off-
line, where they can work on complex issues, unravel the uncertainties of their 
ambiguous environment and build trust-based relations with other citizens.  
Allowing an interactive platform that brings citizens together to communicate politics in 
a fashion that resembles face-to-face communication bolsters their sense of political 
efficacy (Gastil, 2000). Participants believe that changing their society is a multi-stage 
process. They discussed how SM interaction could contribute to the stage of shaping 
opinions and empowering individuals. MH. started by stating that: 
Social networking sites are like an outlet that makes me feel that I still have a say and 
can do something. 
Through interacting with other users online, participants could achieve the sense that 
their opinions were important and worth listening to. They also have the opportunity to 
demonstrate to other less politicised users and newcomers to the political arena that 
their concerns are important and their voices heard. This relationship between medium 
interactivity and political efficacy was established in previous research. For example, 
Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) found that Web exposure alone did not produce significant 
changes in political efficacy for participants. Only when Internet political information 
was coupled with deliberation did it increase political efficacy. MH. explained the 
psychology of opinion formation through interaction:  
Interaction has a psychological aspect. Interacting with any event starts when you 
accommodate an idea. Then you interact with it internally. Finally, you start to form an 
opinion. This will lead you to think of how to make changes happen.  
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W.B. explained: 
It is a preparatory phase. We are preparing ourselves for a certain following stage, the 
time for which is not known to us. Nevertheless, we are building the base and getting 
ready for that stage so that we can afford what it takes. 
Tedesco (2007) reached a similar finding in his experimental study of Web exposure 
and interactivity effects on political information efficacy and young adults’ tendency     
to vote. He found that user-to-document and user-to-system forms of interactivity        
on political sites are positive indicators of young adults’ feelings of significance in the 
political process and to their recognition of the importance of voting when compared   
to Web exposure. Political interest was another interpretation of efficacy in Tedesco’s 
study, and as the young activists are normally expected to have an interest in politics, 
this might also have fed into their reported feelings of (internal) political efficacy.  
Using SM in a communication fashion that entails working with other users, learning 
and sharing experiences and skills, could feed into the young activists’ “shared beliefs in 
their collective power to produce desired results, [which are] a key ingredient of 
collective agency. [That is] a group’s attainments are the product not only of the shared 
knowledge and skills of its members, but also of the interactive, co-ordinative and 
systematic dynamics of their transactions” (Bandura, 2000, p. 75).  
M.S. corroborates this finding: 
Social media have brought together politicised and non-politicised youth and facilitated 
interaction and transforming skills. Through interaction with political activists, youth 
can learn from those who actually practise politics how to get involved. 
Wielding power collectively could help the non-politicised follow politics more easily, 
believe that their participation would make a difference, feel that they do have a say in 
government, and/or that they can make their voices heard by the politicians. These 
judgments have been argued to influence the choice of activities and environmental 
settings, as well as the amount of effort individuals are willing to exert and how long 
they will persevere in the face of impediments (Bandura, 1982). It can be said, then, that 
SM serve as one of the young activists’ platforms for preparation and practice, where 
they can raise their sense of efficacy. Whether this sense of efficacy would feed into the 
young activists’ actual performance and practices, and how, is the main focus of the 
following chapter.  
 234 
 
To conclude, the young activists held two opposing views about the possibility                
of making change materialise. While MH. believes that technology-supported social 
movements are rapidly evolving, A.Ma. embraced a rather cautious approach, believing 
that with such technologies they might end up enjoying ‘virtual political efficacy:’ 
MH.: Social mobilisation is evolving rapidly and many groups and social movements 
have been formed, like April 6th, Kefaya, National Association for Change (NAC), and 
many others. New communication technologies have helped make these efforts possible. 
Eventually, these efforts will follow a natural course of unification and all these efforts 
will adopt a common agenda. Otherwise, it would be impossible for these fragmented 
groups to face the governing powerful National Democratic Party (NDP). We learn from 
history that social movements come together and embrace the collective aim of change. 
A.Ma.: There are many agents and elements of change. Platforms of free expression are 
available but none of this is feasible on the ground. The freedom they give you is 
something as if they imprison you then give you a microphone to speak freely, but you 
shouldn’t dream about exceeding that limit. 
It could be said, then, that SM afford young activists opportunities for less costly 
mobilisation while enabling the non-politicised citizens the opportunities for less risky 
participation. However, creating opportunities might shape movements, but not 
necessarily lead to explicit acts of protest. Such acts, especially in authoritarian contexts, 
would lead to imprisonment or even execution. In Crossley’s (2002) words: 
We should distinguish between movements and their overt acts of protest, and that we 
should view opportunities as a factor mediating between movement and protest, 
perhaps determining the latter in some cases, but much less causally efficacious              
in relation to the former. Movements can form, albeit in a subterranean manner,              
in a diverse range of opportunity structures, though such structures will shape the ways 
in which they can be predicted to act and the success they are likely to achieve (pp, 111 
& 113). 
In fact, scholars disagree about the potential of new communication technologies for 
empowering poorer people and enabling them to act. While some emphasise a possible 
equalisation (Myers, 2002), others suggest instead either a neutral impact and 
normalisation of political activity (Margolis & Resnick, 2000), or even more 
concentration of power (McChesney, 1996). New communication technlogies seem to 
favour the elite over the masses, and further tend to reproduce the digital divide and 
hierarchy, and develop vertical relations instead of interactive, horizontal relationships 
(Rucht, 2003, p. 28). Rucht further suggests that “online activism could become a low-
cost but also a low-effect substitute for off-line protest (p. 31). Perceptions of the 
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potential of SM to mobilise off-line collective action comprises the core focus of the 
following chapter. 
6.3. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to scrutinise the young Egyptian activists’ perceptions of their 
political environment as a prerequisite of their participation in politics and to examine 
the extent, if any, to which the SM are perceived as shapers or mediators of the 
construction or direction of their political dispositions. As for SM, use constructs that 
were discussed in the previous chapter were included in the analysis. Two variables 
were defined as significant dimensions of the political environment in Egypt prior to the 
25th January revolution: activists’ sense of fear of repression, and their feelings                
of political efficacy. It was expected that the more the young activists use SM 
instrumentally, the less they fear repression, and the more they feel politically 
empowered, the more they are expected to practise politics off-line (which is the main 
focus of the next chapter). 
Contrary to what was expected, no empirical evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship was found between the instrumental uses of SM and participants’ feelings 
of fear of repression. SM was found to be irrelevant to guidance, surveillance and 
networking, and no functional effects of the media were detected. However, it has been 
found that habitual uses of SM correlate positively and significantly with feelings of fear, 
which proves the reverse hypothesis. As for political efficacy, using SM instrumentally 
(except for networking) was significantly relevant to the participants’ feeling of political 
competence and of their capability to exert significant changes in their society.  
The qualitative data provided several explanations for the findings and delineated how 
the young activists did not perceive the SM as sufficient platforms in and of themselves 
for education purposes and in gaining holistic evaluations of the public sphere. Rather, 
they could be efficiently used to address the public and to achieve cognitive 
mobilisation goals, especially for the non-politicised youth. SM was found to be effective 
in providing relevant information for proving activists’ credibility and accountability for 
those who do not take to the streets and do not witness the events. Moreover, it was 
also utilised to open a window on political life and to motivate those who might be less 
interested in politics or who are practising it for the first time. Direction was found very 
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significant in this regard. For the politicised youth who already practise politics, and 
who are the main focus of the current research, SM are not seen as spaces for political 
learning. It is rather a tool through which they can address their fellow young citizens, 
who are less interested in, and less aware of, current events in order to raise their 
cognitive awareness and subtly engage them in politics. For the former purpose, the 
participants perceive SM as a non-organised space within which it is difficult for              
a constructive discussion to evolve. As for the purpose of engaging the non-politicised in 
politics, participants believe that SM are their tools with which to verify their narratives 
and to counterbalance the traditional, state-owned media biases against them and their 
practices, especially the non-practitioners. Whether the young activists’ political 
dispositions might reflect on their tendency to practise politics online and/or off-line is 
the focal point of the following chapter.  
 
 237 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
SOCIAL MEDIA USES AND THEIR PERCEIVED CONTRIBUTION 
TO LINK TO THE OFF-LINE SPACE 
 
Young Egyptian activists use various repertoires of collective action mobilisation            
to achieve the transformation of their authoritarian polity. This chapter, building on and 
linking to the two previous chapters, focuses on young activists’ perceptions about 
social media’s (SM’s) potential to engage their constituency in collective action. This 
chapter particularly aims to answer the research question: How do social media 
contribute to mobilising collective action practice off-line? A focus on off-line actions 
illuminates how SM could (or could not) contribute to achieving political change             
in Egypt, as perceived by a sample of young activists who use SM apparatuses as part    
of their repertoire of collective action mobilisation. This focus on off-line practices pulls 
together the threads of media uses explored in Chapter Five, along with building 
participatory dispositions, discussed in Chapter Six, to contribute (or not) to achieving   
a mobilisation outcome of collective action practice beyond the borders of the virtual, 
more convenient and less costly/less risky space of SM. 
Building mainly on data from focus group discussions (FGDs), this chapter explores SM’s 
perceived role in mobilising off-line collective action across three areas of prospective 
contribution: 
 SM’s perceived contribution to framing youth movements. 
 SM’s perceived contribution to recruiting prospective participants in collective 
action. 
 SM’s perceived contribution to mobilising collective action off-line. 
This chapter, then, seeks to explore and explain perceived differences (if any) between 
participant activists about SM’s contribution to the practice of collective action. 
Correlations between political practices on- and off-line and the demographic 
characteristics of participants (measured by gender, age, income and education) are 
examined thereafter to meet this goal, building mainly on quantitative data from the 
questionnaires. 
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Three arguments are made in this chapter. First, that young activists in the research 
sample use SM to frame their movements and construct meanings relevant to the cause 
they mobilise a constituency to support. Building on their aforementioned perceptions 
of the defective fashion of utilising SM for social movement organisation and 
mobilisation, or what participants termed SM culture, young activists expressed their 
preference for using SM as an interactive hub of repertoires where they can enrich 
recipients’ experience and raise possibilities to support their cause by using several 
communicative cues in their message on one aggregate platform. Participants also 
highlighted the significant role frames of sentiment can play in balancing the high risk 
potential participants may meet on the streets and in urging them to take part                 
in practices that might seem costly in terms of cost-benefit calculations. Second, 
consistent with the reported half way down rear ranking of networking within the range 
of SM uses, discussed in Chapter Five, and, third, although SM contribute to giving non-
politicised citizens a safer environment for the practice of less-costly political activities 
and to build their political competences, delineated in Chapter Six, yet, in line with the 
perceived deficiencies of SM, discussed in Chapter Five, basing activism on SM was 
perceived to erode actual practices off-line and to delude online debaters into believing 
that they were actively taking part in the political process. Several explanations of 
participant activists’ perceptions about SM’s contribution to mobilising collective action 
were discussed against a backdrop of the massive uprising of 25th January 2011. 
This chapter in organised into two sections: 
7.1. Social media’s perceived contribution to mobilising collective action: Bridging 
structure and agency problems. 
7.1.1. Uses of social media and online political participation. 
7.1.1.1. Social media surveillance and promoting a common threat frame. 
7.1.1.1.1. Frame marketability: Cost versus threat mobilising frames. 
7.1.1.1.2. Social media convergence for cohesive framing of the youth 
movement.  
7.1.1.1.3. Social media and frame dissemination. 
7.1.1.2. Social media networking and recruiting potential supporters. 
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7.1.1.2.1. Social media and recruiting for low and high risk activism. 
7.1.2. Instrumental uses of social media, young activists’ political dispositions and 
mediating a bridge to off-line collective action. 
7.1.3. Social media’s perceived contribution to mobilising off-line collective 
action. 
7.1.3.1. Social media and the shaping of repertoires of collective action. 
7.1.3.2. Social media mobilisation against a backdrop of the 25th January 
2011 revolt. 
7.2. Conclusion. 
7.1. Social media’s perceived contribution to mobilising collective action: Bridging 
structure and agency problems. 
This section focuses on  young Egyptian activists’ perceptions of the role SM played in 
creating opportunities for mobilising political activism prior to the 25th January 2011 
revolt. The analysis of the participants’ views builds on Bourdieu’s argument that “social 
practices are generated through the interaction of agents, who are both differently 
disposed and unequally resourced, within the bounds of specific networks which have a 
game-like structure and which impose definite restraints upon them” (cited in Crossley, 
2002, p. 171). It has been argued in Chapters Five and Six that young activists have been 
using SM as instruments to achieve their pre-assessed goals. These uses are mainly 
focused on disseminating functional information that is aimed particularly at lessening 
feelings of fear of repression and on providing evidence of activists’ otherwise mere 
anecdotes to convince non-politicised others, or online-only participators, to engage     
in more costly/risky collective actions. Purposive use of SM was also found to increase 
feelings of political efficacy for young activists, as shown in the questionnaire data, and 
also for non-politicised citizens, as revealed from FGD data. However, during the FGDs, 
participant activists evaluated SM and raised some concerns about their potential for 
mobilising off-line collective action. These aforementioned deficiencies, discussed          
in Chapter Five, were expected to influence young activists’ perceptions of the 
production of a desired outcome as supported by their SM activism. In the following 
section, I first start by exploring the relationship (if any) between young activists’ 
reported uses of, and political activism on, SM portals. The aim is to set the context for 
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discussing activists’ perceptions about SM’s potential for mobilisation in light of their 
reported media uses and perceived deficiencies. 
7.1.1. Uses of social media and online political participation 
 
In order to explore how young activists’ reported uses of SM might relate to their online 
political activities, the following correlation is explored: 
Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ tendency to 
practise politics online? And if so, in what ways? 
Linear regression analysis was run to answer that question. Results are shown in Table 
7.1. Quantitative results from regression analysis are presented here, before I move      
to scrutinising young activists’ perceptions of SM’s contribution to online activism 
through analysing FGD data. References are also made to findings discussed in Chapters 
Five and Six. 
Table 7.1: Linear regression analysis of predictors of online activism 
SM use constructs Standardised Coefficients 
Beta ( ) 
Significance 
Guidance .020 .771 
Surveillance .227 .002** 
Convenience - .046 .452 
Networking .291 .000** 
Social utility -.207 .001** 
Entertainment -.125 .035* 
Significance * (0.05) ** (0.01) 
 
 Guidance: as seen in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1, using SM for guidance was not 
significantly related to practising politics on those platforms. Recent research showed 
how Facebook users differentiate between practising different forms of political 
activities on the website, as they slightly accept expressing political opinions on 
Facebook, but perceive the medium as being inappropriate for attempting to persuade 
others to change or embrace political beliefs or activities (Vitak, Smock, Zube, Carr, 
Ellison, & Cliff Lampe, 2009).  
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The lack of a significant correlation between guidance and online activism goes               
in tandem with activists’ expressed deficiences of SM as being less credible and thus less 
reliable as a primary source of news if compared to other sources, such as electronic 
newspapers. It is true that guidance came first among SM’s reported uses, yet this was 
explained by the young activists’ need to influence the non-politiciseds’ political 
decisions and practices, which are not assessed by the questionnaire instrument used 
for the purpose of this research. This directional emphasis explains the precedence        
of guidance across the SM’s uses schema, as well as the lack of significant association 
with online political practices as defined by activists’ guidance uses of SM. 
 Convenience (less money, effort, and time) was also found irrelevant to practising 
politics online, which implies that young activists are willing to devote their time and 
effort to achieving their goals via the practice of political activities on SM. However, 
lowering cost, as may be recalled from Chapter Six, was seen as a valuable addition        
to young activists’ efforts to attract non-politicised and less-interested individuals         
to engage in political activities online.  
Contrary to what was expected in Chapter Five, the evident absence of a significant 
relationship between convenience and online political practices might be ascribed, first, 
to participants’ perceptions of SM as being less costly tools for organisation, rather than 
for participation. Second, as for participation, young activists, as may be recalled from 
Chapter Six, seem not to value SM as spaces of significant political practice. They believe 
that “Twitter, Facebook and the like are illusory spaces” (A.A., 2010) that have “enabled 
large numbers of citizens to speak from behind the keyboard” (M.S., 2010), but which 
have not necessarily urged these large numbers to take to the street to upgrade their 
online ‘clicktivism’ to on-the-ground ‘activism.’ Individuals may thus be captured in        
a ‘monitorial’ mode of citizenship, which is fed by an ingrained sense of fear                      
of repression if they overtly challenge the regime that suppresses them; as citizens 
calculate the risks that may be associated with political action prior to getting involved 
(Schudson, 1998).  
 Social utility: the more activists were driven by debating about politics, the less they 
practised political activism online (β = - 0.207 , p < 0.01).  
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 Entertainment: the more young activists sought entertainment online, the less they 
participated in politics via SM (β = - 0.125 , p < 0.05).  
Social utility and entertainment were the least sought gratifications leading young 
activists’ use of SM (see Figure 5.1). As mentioned previously, the more young activists 
use SM to debate about politics and to pass the time and relax, the less they practise 
politics online. As discussed in Chapter Six, such habitual uses of SM correlated 
negatively and significantly with stronger feelings of fear of repression, and they did not 
influence (convenience and social utility) or even correlated negatively (entertainment) 
with young activists’ feelings of political efficacy (see Tables 6.2 and 6.4). It has been 
argued that ritualistic or habitual use is a mild stimulation of audience activity that is 
considered one of the limiting factors of media effects (Ruggiero, 2000) due to little 
intentionality or selectivity being involved (Blumler, 1979). More recent research 
similarly showed that reliance on SNSs, such as YouTube, Facebook, and MySpace, was 
positively related to civic participation, but not to political participation or confidence in 
government. Researchers ascribed this finding to the main purpose for which SM were 
created. They explained that these media are mainly geared toward maintaining 
relationships with friends and can, hence, have the potential for stimulating community 
involvement, rather than political participation (Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 
2010, p. 86).  Figure 7.1 builds on Figure 6.1 and further represents the correlations 
between the uses of SM and young activists’ reported online activism. 
During the FGDs, the young activists corroborated this finding. They typically believe 
that debating politics on SM portals does not necessarily encourage political activism. In 
A.A.’s words: 
We should not turn information into debate and lock political activism in Facebook 
pages. What we should do is to aggregate people and take to the streets.  
 Surveillance significantly related to practising politics online. That is, the more 
young activists were driven by acquiring and disseminating information, the more they 
practised political activities on the Internet (β = 0.227, p < 0.01).  
 Networking: regression analysis shows that the more young activists sought to 
gratify their needs to form and join political groups online and to reach out to large 
numbers of potential supporters, the more they used the Web for political activism (β = 
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0.291, p < 0.01). This finding is typically consistent with the nature of SM as a platform 
for  maintaining already established relationships and, less broadly, for fostering new 
ones (boyd & Ellison, 2007), it also reflects young activists’ desire to enlarge the size of 
their network of acquaintances as a prerequisite for mobilising others, as suggested in 
recent research (Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009). As may be recalled from Chapter Five, 
participants’ utilisation of SM for networking purposes was not interrupted by their 
demographic characteristics. Gender, age, income and education were found to be 
irrelevant to the networking uses of SM. This finding, along with findings from 
regression analysis, suggests that, within the boundaries of the sample of the current 
research, young activists’ online political activism for the purpose of networking is not 
interrupted by their demographic characteristics. 
Informational and networking uses were the only positively connected the uses of SM  
to online political practice, as revealed by the regression analysis. Consistently, during 
the FGDs, young activists mainly raised issues relevant to these media functions. Young 
activists’ views about mobilising other citizens to participate in political activities that 
aim to achieve political, social and economic changes in Egyptian society particularly 
evolved around two main themes: (1) promoting a common threat frame, (2) recruiting 
potential supporters. In the following pages, each of these themes is discussed                 
to capture the young activists’ perceptions of SM leverages and their weaknesses for 
mobilising change in their polity, as related to their purposive media use. 
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Figure 7.1: Uses of social media and online-off-line political participation mediated by political dispositions 
               SM uses X dispositions (see Figure 6.1) 
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7.1.1.1. Social media surveillance and promoting a common threat frame 
As shown in Chapter Six, surveillance correlated positively and significantly with young 
activists’ feelings of political efficacy (see Table 6.4 and Figure 6.1). Additionally, 
regression analysis in Section (7.1.1) also shows that participants who reported using 
SM to gather and disseminate information tended to practise political activities online (β 
= 0.227, p < 0.01). As may be recalled from Chapter Five, young activists mainly used SM 
to disseminate informative and technical information relevant to their activism. 
Participants, however, perceive SM as an inefficient platform for gaining news, due        
to structural fluidity of the Internet. During the FGDs, participants discussed how the SM 
could help them frame and disseminate mobilising messages that appeal to the public.  
In SM terms, participants believe that they can create a public status that people can 
endorse and then act accordingly. MH. typically remarked: 
I mean that, after all, this is actually a crisis of a community that is not able . . .14 if we are 
able to produce a true and healthy status for people to interact with then the number [of 
participants] will increase. So what matters is, in fact, the constructed status itself 
(emphasis added).  
SM have enabled the young activists to scrutinise politicians and elites and to make the 
few visible to the many. For example, M.M. believes that: 
Twitter is all about status, which you could deliver to many people, very fast. 
Participants mainly discussed their role as media “produsers” (Fuchs, 2010, p. 178) who, 
in addition to consuming and circulating media content, compose and convey their own 
messages. As revealed in the FGDs, participants all agreed that SM are benificial tools for 
framing their movement, or for “highlighting symbols that will be familiar enough          
to mobilise people around [in order to] maintain the movements’ integrity against the 
claims of inherited culture” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 119). Through their informational uses    
of SM, they sought to frame certain issues by creating what Gamson (1992) dubbed the 
‘signature matrix’, which includes several condensing symbols (catchphrases, taglines, 
exemplars, metaphors, depictions, visual images) and reasoning devices (causes and 
                                                        
14 The participant was discussing the case of El-Baradei and how he has not been able to gather millions 
or hundreds of thousands in demonstrations due to the strategies and tactics he uses to work on the 
ground and interact with people. He believes that El-Baradei was not able to create the appropriate tactics 
to increase the numbers of people who gathered around him in Fayoum in thousands to tens                       
of thousands.  
 246 
 
consequences, appeals to principles, or moral claims). They utilise SM to transfer the 
salience of issues, their attributes and the salience of politics to a wider circle of publics. 
Participants discussed how their SM activism had been successful in enunciating              
a public status or a “master frame” that could mobilise an entire social movement sector 
(Tarrow, 1998, p.131).  
SM have allowed participants to inform the public agenda, especially on the 
unconventional level of political practices. An explicit example on the “process through 
which agendas are built or through which an object that has caught public attention by 
being big news, gives rise to a political issue” (Lang & Lang, 1981, p. 448) is the well-
known case of Khaled Said, or ‘the spark of the revolution’, as he came to be known. SO. 
Summarised: 
When [Kaled Said’s] photo was leaked on the Internet, it caused a reverse impact. People 
humanely sympathised with the case and the shocking morgue photo went viral on the 
Internet. The public had a rallying point. (emphasis added). 
M.M. emphasised: 
The Khaled Said page is one of the largest Arabic political pages on Facebook. This is an 
indication that the case has become very popular in society, at least for the Facebook 
community.  
The young activists, as SM users, are sceptical about the content SM provide. Yet they, as 
producers/users, or produsers, tend to rely on SM to address less politically interested 
citizens. “In spite of the negative coverage of social protest in the mainstream media, 
protest activists are dependent on the news media to get their voices heard in the 
corridors of power and be seen in the public space” (Kumar, 2009, p. 137). This 
dichotomous stance, combining elements of both the limited and strong effects of SM, 
links to the argument that media effects are limited by an interaction between media 
and recipients (Scheufele, 1999); as the “media discourse is part of the process by which 
individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which 
journalists … .. develop and crystallise meaning in public discourse” (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1987, p. 2). Activists, as citizen journalists, attempt to frame images               
of reality using the available, less costly apparatuses of SM, while realising (as discussed 
in Chapters Five and Six) their limitations with regard to allowing for a constructive 
discourse to develop among the SM audience. On the one hand, the agenda-setting effect 
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of SM is not enacted at the ‘users’ level. The participants tend not to rely on SM as their 
primary source of news and comprehension. As may be recalled from Chapter Five, 
young activists believe that SM lack a sufficient level of credibility as primary sources   
of news, which corroborates this observation. On the other hand, the participants 
expressed the importance of SM as available platforms for opinion expression and 
information dissemination. They, as produsers, use the utilities of SNSs to circumvent 
the barrage of information that circulates through the normally biased state-run mass 
media by framing political issues that do not receive sufficient, impartial, or any, 
attention from the so-called ‘national’ media.  
It can be said that young activists have been counter-framing political issues through 
providing a different perspective on current events and disseminating unconventional 
political information to the increasing SM audiences. This process of SM counter-
framing could “enhance the autonomy of individuals, enabling them to set up their own 
connections, bypassing the mass media and the channels of communication” (Castells, 
Fernández-Ardèvol, Linchuan, & Sey, 2007) controlled by the state.  The young activists 
believe that they can interrupt the state hegemony in shaping the public’s awareness 
through its national media representations of important issues and events. For example, 
SO. asserts that: 
Social networks have benefitted us in so many ways, such as the speed of transferring 
information. We can instantly show youth what we have seen and experienced that they 
might not usually read in newspapers. We are members of the April 6th Youth Movement. 
We were beaten and mistreated and we all suffered from injuries. All newspapers, 
including opposition newspapers, merely reported that there were fights. This is 
something we actually lived through.  
SO. explained how such informative messages could verify their activities, which are 
mostly neglected or distorted in the national media spaces. They provide several 
communicative cues to convey their rich experience to the non-practitioners and hence 
raise the possibilities of having an influence on their attitudes and future actions.  
It could be said, then, that the form of journalism the young activists have been 
practising was not merely “holding a mirror up to reality … .. it was, at the least, the 
composition of reality and the composition was entering into our own deliberations- 
and more, our understandings of who we are and what we were about” (Gitlin, 2003, p. 
xiv).  
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One of the most successful frames employed by the youth movement was the 
prospective common threat that was presented through the case of Khaled Said’s 
murder. Although participants have been active in mobilising the public behind the 
cause of change and the confronting of corruption and police brutality, it was not until 
the cause was dubbed as an imminent common danger that the public, especially youth, 
started to join. Diffusing the frame ‘We are all Khaled Said’ on a Facebook Page has been 
successful in establishing the link between police brutality and the regime’s corruption, 
as symbolised in Said’s murder, and Egyptian youth as the prospective victims who 
might be in the same posion if they remained passive. M.S. explained: 
The status [We are all Kaled Said] and the mind set it has created played a very 
important role … .. the idea is not just chanting ‘Down with Mubarak’, or demanding 
bread, or condemning the emergency law. The idea is that there must be a common 
cause that can mobilise all youth to participate.  
It is argued that actors in certain issue areas are more prone to use information 
communication technologies (ICTs) than actors in other issue areas (Donk, Loader, 
Nixon, & Rucht, 2004). The nature of the issue, the aims activists seek to achieve, and the 
context within which they operate, drive their selection and use of media to serve their 
goals. In the case of Said’s murder, visibility was significantly important to expose the 
regime’s misconducts, raise the public’s awareness and trigger off a wave of protests 
against the regime’s violations. The iconic image of Kaled Said’s mangled face was worth 
a thousand words. It represents a meme that travels autonomously and virally in the 
fluid sphere of the Internet, breaching the ideological limitation of communication 
(Bennett, 2003b). This image was sufficient to convey the message and refute 
allegations about Said dying after swallowing a roll of marijuana to cover the incident.  
Contrary to the assumptions of the theory of spectacle, which states that the ‘image’ 
derives its power almost exclusively from the medium of broadcast and that with the 
Internet, there is no such thing as the ‘image’, as the Internet does not provide a field     
of visibility in the same way as broadcasting does, it seems that, in Khaled Said’s case, 
SM have worked against these assertions and caused “a concentration of the attention of 
the many on a particular monumental event or representation” (Holmes, 2005, p. 31). 
The image is used as the profile picture of the Facebook Page ‘We are all Khaled Said’, 
where repeated and long lasting representation over time has turned the image into an 
‘icon’ (Holmes, 2005, p. 31) that has become, along with its connotations, ingrained       
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in the public consciousness. It could be said that long-term discreet security practices 
have been embodied and Kaled Said’s case has been personified through the viral 
spread of his photo on SM platforms. Mona El-Tahawy, a prominent American-Egyptian 
Journalist and activist, terms this phenomenon the power of the “I”, where individuals 
are shocked by others’ experiences and then they feel empowered by these experiences 
of people whom they perceive as being close or similar to them (El-Tahawy, 2011). SM 
have been playing a significant role in uncovering domestically committed shocking 
practices and violations and thus in bringing to the public’s consciousness experiences 
that would have been otherwise kept in the dark.  
M.E. typically, explained how Said was portrayed as an ordinary middle class, non-
politicised young man who, nevertheless, had fallen prey to police brutality: 
People were compassionate with [Kaled Said] because he was a middle class, ordinary, 
young man. He was not a political activist. He is, to some extent, similar to people on 
Facebook. All this happened to him although he was not affiliated or connected to any 
political activity in particular. They firstly felt compassion for him as a humanitarian 
case, and, secondly, they felt the danger.  
Young activists stressed that Said was using Facebook like many other youths. They 
wanted to make clear that activism through Facebook, although it provides a safe 
environment for the practice and exchange of experience, especially for the non-
politicised, as outlined in Chapter Six, does not necessarily save them the risk                   
of confrontation with authorities, nor does it suffice for achieving the aspired change. 
Activists sought to make people feel that they were all at risk and that passivity,              
or walking next to the wall as people usually call it in Egypt, does not help avoid 
unwanted consequences. In RA.’s words: 
A young man similar to you has been tortured and brutally killed without doing 
anything. He only uses Facebook, the same as you and I do, yet all this happened to him 
without even taking part in any demonstration. This means that this could happen to any 
of us. This is the motive that may contribute to solving the controversy from my point of 
view. That I don’t do anything political, I avoid any suspicious behaviour and I walk just 
next to the wall, but nevertheless, I could get into trouble and the wall may collapse on 
my head, like what happened to Kaled. So, it does not matter anymore; we are all at risk 
(emphasis added). 
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7.1.1.1.1. Frame marketability: Cost versus threat mobilising frames 
The ‘We are all Khaled Said’ frame has emerged as “a flexible and adaptable residue       
of oppositional framing that [has] become a permanent feature of the political culture” 
(Tarrow, 1998, p.131), especially for youth who built personal attachments to Said’s 
case. Although participants mentioned that they had been working on this frame for 
three years before individuals started to respond, they perceive it to be a successful 
social construct in mobilising people to take part in several forms of collective action. 
This success of the emotional bond was coupled with lowering the risk at the events in 
which the activists have been inviting individuals to take part in. Low risk activities 
were found to be efficient in accumulating a sense of commitment and eventually           
of incentivising individuals to take part in more contentious or high-risk activities.  
Participants conducted a comparison between the value of lowering the cost                    
of participation and of appealingly framing their movement with regard to the impact   
of each technique on mobilising collective action in the Egyptian polity. This comparison 
brings to mind the differences between rational action theory (RAT) and political 
process theory (PPT) in regard to influencing people’s tendency to engage in collective 
action. The RAT suggests that prior to deciding on taking action, individuals weigh 
potential gains against the required costs (money, effort, etc.) of conducting that action. 
In order to decide to participate, incentives are needed to convince individuals that 
participation is beneficial and rewarding (Crossley, 2002). On the contrary, political 
process theory suggests that grievance-based incentives can emerge amongst non-
resourceful groups, and sentiments are crucial in motivating people to take action 
(McAdam, 1982). “At a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect 
of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem” 
(McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996, p. 5).  
During the FGDs, participants drew on examples of the influence of high cost 
(participation in convoys in solidarity with the people in Gaza), and the influence            
of threat frames (disseminating pictures of police violations and torture) on individuals’ 
tendency to participate in collective action. Participants believe that the Gaza War that 
broke out during the winter of 2008–2009 aroused feelings of anger amongst the 
Egyptian people. The war created a status, or a frame, that favours participation. 
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Nevertheless, participation in political activities that condemned the war did not exceed 
the margin between activists and the non-politicised. As may be recalled from Chapter 
Six, fear of repression did not significantly relate to activists’ political participation        
in reality. Participants outlined that real experience with, and confrontation of, authority 
is what counts when it comes to breaching the fear barrier. As for the non-politicised 
and less-experienced individuals, however, H.B. believes that the capability to mobilise 
collective action resides in lowering the cost of participation, or lowering the ceiling       
of sacrifice, in H.B.’s words, but not necessarily in creating a public status with which 
people can interact: 
I disagree with M.S. about this idea of the public cause or status. I think that among most 
of the cases that had an impact on the Egyptian people was the war on Gaza. We saw 
convoys and many invitations were flagged on Facebook. But because the ceiling was 
still high and participation involved travelling, I believe that participation in the convoy 
was limited to political activists. An event as such is mainly counted for activists by a 
hundred percent.  
H.B. believes that the high cost/risk of participating in Gaza’s convoy outweighed the 
anger sentiments that the War on Gaza aroused. Furthermore, he thinks that threat 
frames could harm the level of participation rather than increasing it. For example, H.B. 
thinks that uploading the picture of Said’s fractured face on Facebook might be 
perceived by the public as a negative signal of the consequences that participation could 
bring. It might be regarded as a form of increasing the cost of taking action and hence 
might demobilise people and hinder participation. H.B. engaged with M.E.’s views about 
uploading pictures of torture online as a mobilising frame: 
There are two points of view: M.E., on the one hand, said that the images of torture and 
people getting arrested can urge other people to participate, even if they are not political 
activists. On the other hand, we can say that torture is also considered a form of the high 
ceiling that could make people feel threatened and hence refrain from participation. 
These two techniques [uploading images of torture and lowering the cost of 
participation] are just opposite to each other. 
Showing images of torture has confronted people with a reality which they did not 
previously know about or, at least, of which they had no proof. This opportunity              
to enlighten public opinion might not have been possible without open access to and 
purposive use of SM. SM have enabled young activists to put individuals face-to-face 
with a reality beyond their immediate experience. However, some activists have argued 
that showing such shocking images might create constraints to action within the 
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external environment of the participants; as it might raise the perceived cost                    
of participation and result in feelings of anxiety and fear developing. Yet most 
participants agree that such images may serve to formulate and promote the opposite 
frame. As people come to realise the imminent danger in their polity, they may perceive 
passivity and non-participation as being more costly than taking chances and becoming 
involved in contentious political actions in order to condemn violations of their rights. 
In the same light, it was found that a sense of shock often incentivises individuals to join 
collective action as they come to realise the regime’s hatred and injustice. Such shocking 
feelings were found to encourage youth to question their cultural framework and not   
to take things for-granted (McAdam, 1986).  
Presenting personalised thematic frames of protests through digital media was also 
found effective in aggregating larger and more diverse numbers of participants. Placing 
the average citizen at the centre of the proposed action helped to raise the strength       
of engagement (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). In the same way, it can be understood why 
protesters remained in Tahrir Square at the January 2011 events, even after the police 
has started to react brutally and to crack down on demonstrations, causing hundreds    
of deaths. They might have been shocked by the police brutality, which instigated more 
actions. They might also have realised that staying in the Square could maximise their 
gains, as the regime has already started to respond to some of their demands, whereas 
returning home would put their lives in danger as they became known to the regime. 
Although such choices might not seem rational in the ordinary sense of the word, in this 
case, rationality entails acquiring “the capacity … .. to identify courses of action which 
would enable [agents] to maximise the realisation of their desires and weigh up the 
relative costs and benefits of a particular course of action” (Crossley, 2002, p. 58). 
Activists used the common threat frame as a rallying point and raised the iconic image 
of Said during the 18 day revolt that started on 25th January, 2011. Other frames then 
emerged in Tahrir Square; the most prominent of which was: bread, freedom and 
human dignity, and, in other forms: bread, freedom and social justice. These frames 
serve what Gamson calls an ideological “package” that can represent a variety of precise 
claims (Gamson, 1988). A variety of insurgents who engaged in the massive protests     
in Tahrir Square in 2011 have accommodated this “master” frame of common threat     
in their struggle for change against elites and opponents. 
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7.1.1.1.2. Social media convergence for cohesive framing of youth movement 
As may be recalled from Chapter Five, young Egyptian activists believe that one of the 
deficits of using SM for mobilising collective action relates to the way individuals use 
SM, or what participants called SM culture, which stems from the non-centralised 
organisation of the Internet, and which may create organisational problems for the 
youth movement at the online structural level. The fluidity of the online space allows 
users to create their own groups and construct their own messages, which may result in 
crowded and distorted messages and hence obscures the meanings of these messages, 
deviating from the achievement of the goals for which these messages were constructed 
in the first place. This fluidity of the new media environment was argued to help 
activists bypass traditional information gatekeepers and authoritative élites (Carpini, 
2000), and so contributes to shaping and highlighting sentiments in collective action. 
Consistent with the participants’ perceptions, meaning construction unconstrained by 
gatekeepers also introduces the risk of ‘information overload’ (Garrett, 2006, p. 215), 
and might contribute to what Snow et al. (1986, p. 478) have called ‘frame clouding’ 
(cited in le Grignou & Patou, 2004, p. 172) by distorting the thematic construction of the 
movement and obscuring its visibility. 
However, young activists think that they might be able to overcome the problem             
of framing their movement through using SM, by utilising media leverage  combining 
several communicative cues on one platform, or what is usually labelled ‘media 
convergence’ (Jenkins, 2005). Structural changes in the new media environment have 
also made “the integration of telecommunications, data communications and mass 
communications in a single medium,” or the process of convergence (van Dijk, 1999, p. 9) 
possible. Participants agree that using SM as a hub for integrated communication media 
enables them better reaching cognitive consensus as a prerequisite for mobilisation.     
In SO.’s words: 
By doing so [converging social media affordances on one platform], we would be able to 
create a desirable status that could encompass a larger number of youth and incentivise 
them to participate. These platforms should then work in concert with each other. 
According to van Dijk (1999, p. 9), the integration trait of ‘multimedia’ can occur            
on several levels (infrastructure, transportation, management, services, and types of 
data). Participants typically believe that combining information and communication 
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services on the Internet (services level), and putting together sounds, data, text and 
images (types of data level) helps activists to better compose and share their socially 
constructed ideas of collective action. “Media extend the availability of information 
across time and space, making it visible to new observers in new contexts … .. 
convergent media make the invisible visible” (Meikle & Young, 2012, p. 129). Several 
representative examples demonstrate how SM have benefitted the young activists in 
using so many communicative cues to make their cause more convincing to the less 
engaged others: 
RA.: I think convergence is very good. Users can watch a video from YouTube on 
Facebook. So we use different media together to convincingly address our targetted 
audience. 
I.B.: A movement can create a group on Facebook as a means of publicity. Twitter, on the 
other hand, is beneficial in transmitting breaking news from the scene. It is very good for 
headlines and news alerts. In 2005, we could post on Twitter and then our posts were 
being sent as SMS messages to our followers. 
M.S.: There is also ‘Blogger’. It is a site for blogs hosted by Google. It allows us to upload 
articles, accompanied by photos and videos as well. 
H.B.: Facebook allows me to integrate my blog as well as addressing more people … .. 
Facebook combines more than one medium. 
Similarly, della Porta and Mosca (2005) concluded from their study of the use of 
Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) by the Movement for Global Justice that, at 
the cognitive level, the movement made wide use of the opportunities offered by the 
new media to create unmediated flows of communication with their constituency and 
with public opinion. However, choosing and constructing appealing frames does not 
necessarily suffice to mobilise collective action since young activists need to reach out to 
the wider public with their mobilising frames. della Porta and Mosca also noticed that 
although the Internet enables the production of alternative information and helps to 
spread information with important agenda-setting effects, the passage from micro- to 
mass-media is still problematic and social movement initiatives risk being lost in 
cyberspace (2005, p. 186). 
7.1.1.1.3. Social media and frame dissemination 
A case such as Khaled Said’s (and many others) was not expected to find its way onto 
the state-controlled mass media. In this particular case, using SM has helped the young 
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activists counter-frame the issue. They created drama and spectacle, passion and 
emotion, conflict and threat aspects (Rucht, 2004; Gitlin, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 1984; Gamson 
& Wolfsfeld, 1993) which, on the one hand, might link the wider publics to the issue and 
prompt emotional identification. On the other hand, it might force the issue onto the 
mass media agenda as a forcefully interesting case to cover. This relationship with 
traditional media may create a “multiplier effect” (Isherwood, 2008) and SM’s message 
could reach larger audiences. As Mathes and Pfetsch (1991, p. 33) put it, “the success of 
counter-issues of gaining coverage in the alternative press leads to a ‘spill-over effect:’ 
the issue spills like a wave from the alternative into the established media.” This frame 
amplification and bridging is, according to Snow et al. (1980), required for the adopton 
of mobilising structural forms, or ways of engaging in collective action (McCarthy, 
1996). 
Highlighting certain content, and directing individuals to selected messages, enables the 
young activists to trigger and orient attitudes and behaviours, such as selective 
exposure (Ball-Rokeach, 1998), newspaper readership (Loges & Ball-Rokeach, 1993), 
participation in public deliberation (De Boer & Velthuijsen, 2001), political perceptions 
(Halpern, 1994), and voting decisions (Davies, 2009). Figure 7.2 draws on Scheufele’s 
(2000) overview of framing research to delineate how the young activists use SM to 
create their own frames in order to balance or refute the elites’ frames. Supported by 
the power of personal communication and the assistance of mainstream media, the 
young activists may manage to spread the word and stimulate certain issue 
characteristics amongst wider circles of audiences beyond the borders of the virtual 
sphere, thus addressing the problem highlighted by della Porta and Mosca (2005), 
mentioned in the previous section. 
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Based on the assumption that “mass-mediated information in general is incomplete, 
slanted, or in other ways coloured by the intentions of the communicator” (Scheufele, 
1999, p. 105), it could be said that young activists have been using SM to provide 
additional, if not alternative, sources of information for individuals’ active processing, so 
as not to render them prey to the partial representations of news media. SM also serve 
as a platform for reflective, yet not constructive, discussions about mass media content, 
which can lead to better comprehension of current events. Activists see a potential in 
addressing the non-politicised and less-experienced young citizens through SM in order 
to spread the word, expose the regime’s misconduct, and to construct and promote        
“a mentally stored cluster of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” 
(Entman, 1993, p. 53) and so raising the possibilities for their active participation. MH., 
for example, uses electronic media “to help [him] convince someone with [his] opinion 
and make him change his mind.” By doing so, the participants are not only concerned 
with drawing the public’s attention to certain issues and forcing them onto the national 
media agenda to widen the scale of attention, they also aim to select ‘‘some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’’ (Entman, 1993, 
p. 52).   
As mentioned in Chapters Two and Five, the illiteracy and Internet penetration hurdles 
may hamper the marketability of the constructed frames. They can pose significant 
challenges to the young activists’ ability to reach out to mass audiences and acquire 
change merely through SM apparatuses and the Internet more broadly. To effectively 
and significantly spread the word, to amplify and bridge their constructed frames, the 
young activists seek to reach individuals, groups and institutions beyond cyberspace’s 
borders. They understand that, “if content had remained strictly on Facebook, its 
audience would have been limited to those who are members of certain groups, and 
would not likely have been disseminated in ways that proved pivotal to the media 
coverage” (Ghannam, 2011, p. 16). A concern is expected to shape or influence 
participants’ perceptions of SM’s potential to recruit supporters for youth movements, 
which is the main focus of the following section. 
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7.1.1.2. Social media networking and recruiting potential supporters 
As shown through the regression analysis in Section (7.1.1), seeking to gratify young 
activists’ need for networking via SM was positively related to engagement in poltical 
activities online (β = 0.291, p < 0.01). In the FGDs, participants discussed how they 
perceive SM’s potential for reaching out for supporters and enlarging the size of their 
network as a prerequisite for mobilising collective action, which has been suggested in 
previous research (Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009).   
Activists need not only to choose mobilising structures and appealingly frame them as 
usable and appropriate to the social change tasks to which they will be put, but they also 
need to target supporters with these frames on both the internal – adherents and 
activists of the movement itself – as well as the external levels, including bystanders (or 
lurkers in the case of online users), opponents and authorities (McCarthy, 1996, p. 149).  
A.Y. explained the mechanism of recruiting participants via SM for the National 
Movement for Change to support El-Baradei’s nomination for presidency: 
M.A.E. created the Facebook group ‘El-Baradei for presidency of Egypt_ 2011’ and 
invited me to join. I joined the group as one of the administrators. After El-Baradei 
announced his intention to join the presidential race in 2011, I started, through my 
personal website and the database I built, to promote the Facebook group. Consequently, 
the number of group members rose within two weeks to reach 20.000. Dr. El-Baradei 
was referring to the members of the Facebook group as the number of his supporters, 
stressing the link between the Facebook group and the mobilising campaign (emphasis 
added). 
MH., explained how SM have benefitted young activists in addressing the less-politicised 
public and recruiting potential participants into their movement in order to exceed the 
activists’ limit of participation: 
In authoritarian regimes, aggregating efforts, by their nature, do not exceed the margin 
of activists and politicised youth, thus social networking sites could be considered the 
only pathway we, the activists, can take to reach sizable numbers of non-politicised 
youth. Discussing political issues through these websites may help incentivise youth to 
support [certain] issues. 
It has been argued that structural factors take on more importance than psychological 
ones as determinants of individuals’ tendencies to engage in collective action, especially 
when it comes to taking part in low-risk forms of activism (McAdam, 1986). 
Participation in high risk/high cost activities, however, is argued to be more dependent 
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on higher levels of ideological commitment (McAdam, 1986). However, this level            
of commitment may be developed through engagement in low-risk/low cost activities 
where individuals can build up their competences and acquire the identity of an activist 
(Crossley, 2002). McAdam notes that an agent’s acquired disposition towards politics 
may be adapted by means of participation in political activities: 
First, through his friends, he will almost surely meet activists whom he did not know 
previously, thus broadening his range of movement contacts and increasing his 
vulnerabilty to future recruiting appeals. Second, in talking with others at the rally and 
listening to the scheduled speakers, our budding activist may well develop a better and 
more sympathetic understanding of the … .. movement. Finally, the behavioural norms of 
the rally may encourage the recruit to ‘play at’ being an activist for the duration of the 
event (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). 
The young activists think that SM could be a well-trodden, structural path to activism. 
They are valuable platforms for meeting non-politicised individuals, discussing politics, 
conveying views and raising possibilities for future recruitment. SM has benefitted them 
in constructing communities of supporters and prospective participants. As the less-
politicised become more acquainted with the participatory process, they may acquire 
the behavioral norms necessary for the process of ‘activist identity’ development. M.S. 
mentioned how he and his colleagues have been working on the case of Khaled Said and 
recruiting people for three years, but it was not until individuals identified with the 
group and formed a shared status (ideological commitment) that significant forms         
of activities started to materialise on the ground: 
The point is not that we spent three years working on Khaled Said and did not achieve 
the same accumulation of youth who participated actually, from online to off-line. But 
from my point of view there was no stimulating and real case to make these youths 
participate. There was no real status to embrace them all. 
Although socialisation in Egypt might not be supportive of active involvement in politics, 
and the supressive environment might be demobilising (as discussed in Chapter Two), 
creating networks of potential participants still seems to young activists to be efficient 
in overcoming or diluting such psychological demeanors of political participation for a 
margin of the online population of the Egyptian polity. The young activists have 
managed to mobilise low-cost, less threatening collective activities. SM has been 
efficient in generating a structural basis for the youth movement. Through SM, the 
young activists have been able to recruit networks of non-politicised individuals who 
may, in due course, develop the ideological commitment that is essential for becoming 
 259 
 
involved in high-risk activities. MA. stressed the importance   of the networks for 
mobilising sizable effective actions: 
I believe that large numbers of activists, their strength and the impact they can have on 
the Egyptian polity relies on their relationships to a large number of youth via social 
networks. Without these networks, the number would not be as large or have the same 
strength or impact. 
Young activists believe that SM give them an opportunity to circumvent the tight control 
imposed by the regime, to link to non-politicised citizens and to mobilise support for 
their cause. Although they believe that streets and confrontation with authorities are 
where, and what, breaks their reported feelings of fear of repression at the practice level 
of collective action, as shown in Chapter Six, SM has benefitted them at the 
organisational level. M.S. typically remarked: 
Social networks in Egypt are almost the most important tool for mobilising the Egyptian 
public. In authoritarian societies, normal methods for mobilising people are limited to 
groups of activists and politically-interested youth, thus social networking sites may be 
considered the only pathway those activists can take to reach large numbers of non-
politicised youth. Discussing political issues through these websites can help to 
incentivise youth to support certain political causes. 
I.B. stressed the importance of realising the role of SM as platforms for discussion. He 
explained how minimising the levels of sacrifice and risk for the less-politicised citizens 
may be the pathway to mobilising people from outside the activists’ zone: 
I think that social networking sites, like Facebook, are tools for disseminating 
information and means for discussion among group members who actually know each 
other off-line. In order to use it to mobilise a mass group that exceeds the activists and 
people who already know each other, then we have to lower the ceiling for our 
expectations. This is required at some point and may be useful. 
It can be said, then, that the young Egyptian activists have composed closely-knit 
networks whose members have basically met off-line. Through active practice, they 
developed skills and a better understanding of the movement and eventually developed 
an ‘activist’ form of identity. Their relatively greater readiness to become involved in 
off-line and, indeed, high-cost activities, stems from and depends upon greater levels of 
ideological commitment than merely upon structural factors. The less- or non-
politicised, on the other hand, are unorganised and loose-knit networks. These atomised 
individuals are targeted by the young activists, who normally aim to mobilise low-cost 
activities. Such activities are expected to appeal to the non-politicised more than 
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activities that might draw bad consequences and pose threats. Similarly to M.S.’s views, 
Opp and Gern (1993) have suggested that network formation is possible in 
authoritarian regimes through communicative exchanges: 
Even in societies ruled by authoritarian regimes, politically homogeneous personal 
networks may develop. In everyday communication, subtle signals indicating a partner’s 
political views may be exchanged. Reactions to such signals provide an impression of the 
partner’s political attitudes. If the initial interactions convey similar political views, step-
by-step communication may begin that results in the recognition of the partner’s critical 
views and may result in the establishment of a personal relationship (p. 662). 
These findings corroborates the assumption made in Chapter Three that SM have the 
potential to allow an opportunity for online safe activism that might lead to street 
participation. SM offer a low-risk and thus more appealing environment, where non-
politicised citizens can gain participatory experience. It was demonstrated in Chapter 
Three that previous experience, along with affiliation to social movement organisations 
(SMO), is required for identification with social movement (della Porta & Mosca, 2005) 
that is crucial for practising collective action. However, experience alone seems not to be 
sufficient for collective action practice, especially at high-risk levels. Gaining experience 
at low-risk levels could eventually incentivise individuals to engage in more costly 
activities only if this practice can trigger a “cyclical process of integration and 
resocialisation” (McAdam, 1986, p. 69).  
7.1.1.2.1. Social media and recruiting for low and high risk activism 
SO. distinguishes between recruiting participants for low-risk and high-risk events. He 
highlighted another condition for recruiting participants in high-risk events: 
The more you reduce sacrifices and responsibilities, the more participation you get. But 
if you demand more effort … .. participation will be triggered by personal influence. 
(emphasis added). 
SO. agrees with I.B. that participation on SNSs entails little responsibility and costs 
participants less than they might expect to bare if they engaged in off-line, and normally 
more risky, political activities. This makes SO. believe that personal connection and 
face-to-face communication is required to build mutual trust between participators       
in collective action. Scholarly views of the Internet as “a better medium for 
disseminating information and opinions than for building trust, developing coherence 
and resolving controversies” (Clark & Themudo, 2003, p. 114) support this finding. For 
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example, Vissers et al. have recently conducted an experimental study where 
participants were exposed to potentially mobilising information, either by way of face-
to-face interaction or by website. The results indicate that web-based mobilisation only 
had a significant effect on online participation, whereas face-to-face mobilisation had a 
significant impact on off-line behaviour. The researchers concluded that mobilisation 
effects are “medium-specific” (Vissers, Hooghe, Stolle, & Mahéo, 2012). 
Social movements seek either or both qualitative and/or quantitative impacts when 
they target their potential audience. Some social movement groups seek profound 
impact on a limited number of people instead of more superficial impact on large groups 
or the ‘masses.’ Others are more interested in attracting public attention and support 
and see this as a key means to impress and influence policy makers. In the former case, 
Rucht (2004) argues, face-to-face communication is more beneficial in achieving quality 
mobilisation of more committed supporters, while for the latter goal, mass media, such 
as newspapers, radio, television and the World Wide Web are crucial for wider diffusion 
of movements. However, in some cases when personal change is a primary goal, Rucht 
continues, “the mass media may become a central reference point in so far as a relatively 
small impact on many people, in its aggregate effect, may dwarf an intensive impact on 
just a few individuals” (p. 32).  
This suggests that SM are beneficial in reaching out for large audiences, but only small 
numbers of these audiences would be available for costly involvements, due to trust and 
commitment issues. Figure 7.3 summarises young activists’ perceptions of SM’s 
potential for reaching out for constituency. It represents how they seek to address the 
mass public through a combination of direct experience, primary sources of information 
and new media tools, with respect to their limited ability to reach the masses solely 
through SM. 
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A.Y. corroborated this suggestion:  
The social media experience is a matter of proportion between numbers of people in the 
virtual reality and those who take to the streets. I noticed that on my personal web site 
and in the national campaign to support El-Baradei’s nomination for presidency as well 
… .. There was a reasonable level of mobilisation behind the ‘change’ project and this was 
the real challenge. If the ‘change movements’ succeeded in promoting this project among 
Egyptians, it would create a quantitative and a qualitative critical mass which could lead 
to real change on the ground without the need for international support or undesirable 
balances of power (emphasis added). 
As individuals gain experience in the low-risk, online environment these fragmented 
online networks of supporters might eventually become more tightly-knit, giving a path 
to the movement’s growth. Participants, however, think that this development could not 
happen in the virtual sphere. Participants thus believe that both parameters of 
participation in low and high risk collective events are needed to recruit supporters 
online and mobilise participation off-line. As discussed in Chapter Six, and corroborated 
thus far, participants believe that ‘lowering the ceiling of sacrifice’ (or lowering the risk) 
can encourage more people to join and reduce the numbers of free riders. They believe 
that personal contact and trust building is crucial for upgrading activism from the 
virtual sphere to reality, even at such low-risk events. This view supports McAdams’ on 
the importance of personal connection with activists, mainly for recruitment to low-risk 
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Figure 7.3: Recruiting potential supporters through social media 
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and cost-free forms of activism. McAdam (1986) assumes that withdrawal from taking 
part in collective action, although individuals are attitudinally available for participation 
(belong to a latitude of acceptance), may be due to the lack of prior contact with               
a recruiting agent who might have highlighted the significant social costs of non-
participation to potential participants. Participants’ views about exceeding online 
recruitment and low-risk participation to off-line and more risky activism (or activating 
the online latitude of acceptance to produce off-line participation) also confirm 
McAdam’s argument about recruitment for high-risk events. As may be recalled from 
Chapter Five, participants have implicitly stressed the importance of identification with 
social movement through actual practice. They, in A.A.’s words, believe that practising 
‘virtual political activism’ stems from the political immaturity of ordinary Egyptians and, 
for this role to be real, people need to play the role properly on the streets, which may 
gradually develop from taking part in less-costly activities. As McAdam wrote, “each 
succeeding foray into safe forms of activism increases the recruit's network integration, 
ideological affinity with the movement, and commitment to an activist identity, as well 
as his receptivity to more costly forms of participation” (McAdam, 1986, p. 70).  
7.1.2. Instrumental uses of social media, young activists’ political dispositions and 
mediating a bridge to off-line collective action 
To this point, the qualitative findings have been supported by quantitative data from the 
questionnaire, which were discussed in Chapter Six: 
 Fear of repression: Reported feelings of fear of repression significantly and 
positively related to certain forms of SM use. These correlations, however, do not 
suggest that fear of repression can hinder young activists’ political activism. As 
delineated in Section 7.1.1 by the regression analysis, certain uses of SM (surveillance 
and networking), but not others (guidance, social utility, entertainment and 
convenience), are positively associated with online political participation. These uses 
that feed into young activists’ online activism did not correlate with fear of repression. 
Young activists’ reported feelings of fear did not influence the uses of SM that 
significantly correlated to their online activism. Instead, fear of repression positively 
correlated with SM uses that were found to be irrelevant to participants’ online activism. 
As may be recalled from Chapter Six, only using SM for social utility, entertainment and 
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convenience reasons significantly correlated with reported feelings of fear of repression 
(see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1). This finding, on one hand, stresses the importance           
of looking at the influence of certain media uses, rather than of measuring the impact    
of time spent with media (Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001; Norris & Jones, 1998). On the 
other hand, it supports participants’ views about the importance of off-line activism and 
confrontation with authorities for combating fear of repression. In other words, young 
activists who fear confrontation with authorities tend to use SM for habitual, rather than 
instrumental uses, that do not entail exerting effort and are not necessarily directed at 
achieving certain goals (Ruggiero, 2000), and thus they do not feed into their online 
activism. 
In his study of the features of collective action in the Middle East, Diani (2008) found 
that high levels of repression increase the cost of going public and, hence, discourage 
political activism in general, and specifically pose challenges on forms of action based  
on associations, coalitions, and movements. Diani argues that such actions recquire 
public discourse and public communication, which nominates SM as an efficient 
alternative means through which individuals can circumvent authority repression and 
the composing of communities and coalitions for political action becomes more possible.  
Additionally, as participants gain experience and feel more capable of becoming 
involved through low-cost practices, they may be more courageous in going off-line. 
This is corroborated by the significant correlation (discussed in Chapter Six) between 
political efficacy and the most frequently reported uses of SM (guidance, r = 0.119, p > 
0.05 and surveillance, r = 0.111, p > 0.05). It can be said, then, that using SM may be         
a benificial tool for mobilising off-line political practices through allowing individuals     
a platform for practising low-cost activism, gaining experience and developing an 
activist identity. This preparation process might eventually raise the level                          
of commitment among these loose communities and encourage individuals to become 
involved in off-line activism. A.Y. highlighted the importance of the online preparatory 
stage of training and practice for mobilising activism that is more demanding and, 
indeed, more effective than actions practised in the virtual sphere: 
  
 265 
 
Success or failure depends on the capability to create practical programes that may urge 
people to move from behind their computer screens to practical reality. In the 
preliminary stages of the campaign [to support El-Baradei], great success was 
accomplished in this regard. 
 Political efficacy: Interestingly, feelings of political efficacy related positively             
to surveillance, but not to networking, as delineated in Chapter Six (see Table 6.4 and 
Figure 6.1). This does not necessarily suggest that political efficacy may consequently 
negatively influence online activism. Rather, it may be that, for the surveillance 
correlate, on the one hand, gathering and disseminating certain information in precise 
timing, with a specific structure, in order to convey a certain message to potential 
supporters, entails possessing certain competences. The process of the social 
construction of a movement and the building of frames with which individuals can 
identify and interact, requires a degree of political efficacy, as well as Internet efficacy 
(Rucht, 2004) that is not necessarily needed for networking. Conversely, practising such 
a duo role, as media users/producers, will also fertilise young activists’ feelings               
of empowerment and agency. 
On the other hand, it could be that  forming online political groups and contacting 
people and inviting them to take part in political events, do not necessarily require 
certain political and/or communicative competences. Networking may also not be 
perceived as having a direct influence on the political process, but rather as a necessary 
operational step towards aggregating supporters that may not relate to people’s 
attitudes. This may explain the absence of a significant correlation between SM 
networking and young activists’ perceived political efficacy. In fact, as may be recalled 
from Chapter Five, young activists believe that SM have made networking so easy, to the 
extent that could, in M.S.’s words, “eventually mar the credibility of the source and the 
medium.” Similarly, van Laer and van Aelst (2010) argue that the Internet has made 
political action too easy in some cases, which limits the final impact of certain actions. 
Earlier, Lupia and Sin warned that “optimistic appraisals [of new communication 
technologies’ potential for collective action] overlook the possibility that evolving 
technologies can make some collective endeavours harder to maintain or easier to 
destroy” (Lupia & Sin, 2003, p. 316). Moreover, networking is a non-informational form 
of SM use. Informational uses of the Internet were found to encourage discussions about 
political issues and hence to strengthen people’s tendency to engage in political 
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activities (Nah, Veenstra, & Shah, 2006; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). Most 
importantly, communicating anonymously may interrupt the connection between 
networking and political efficacy. Although anonymity benefits activists, especially in 
authoritarian contexts, it may pose difficulties for the networking function of SM, as it 
may hamper trust building amongst online communities and hinder communicative 
exchanges, which, in turn, may not lead to the development of a sense of political 
efficacy. I.B. typically articulates this view: 
[People’s preference to communicate with a real person, not with a nickname] compels 
me to put my real name, because I need to communicate off-line with people who join 
the group and not to limit the interaction to the Internet. If I meet these people in real 
life, I will tell them that my name is I.Z.; the same name and person on Facebook. This 
grants me more credibility.  
Moreover, it has been argued that the “Internet is a better medium for disseminating 
information and opinions than for building trust, developing coherence and resolving 
controversies” (Clark & Themudo, 2003, p. 114). Last, but not least, the absence              
of a positive correlation between political efficacy and the networking uses of SM may 
be due to low levels of (inter)activity that such uses involve when compared                     
to informational uses of SM, which entail receiving, creating, sending and/or 
commenting on messages. Such high levels of activity in media use were argued to have 
the potential to develop a sense of political efficacy, due to the effort, time, and 
resources that active use of media necessitates (Bandura, 1986). 
To explore these conclusions further, I begin the following section by examining 
whether on- and off-line activism correlate significantly, and how introducing young 
activists’ political dispositions (reported feelings of fear of repression and political 
efficacy) might influence this correlation (if they do). 
7.1.3. Social media’s perceived contribution to moblising off-line collective action 
As revealed in Section 6.1, in the last chapter, and discussed hitherto, feelings of fear 
were not found to influence goal-directed (or instrumental) media uses, which mainly 
correlate to activists’ online activism. Rather, it correlated to media functions that are 
mainly habitual. Additionally, feelings of political efficacy were associated positively 
with informational uses of SM, which suggests that such positive self-perceptions may 
bolster young activists’ tendency to practise politics on- and off-line. 
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To test these assumptions, correlation between reported political practices on- and off-
line was first tested through answering the following question: 
Does using social media for instrumental purposes relate to young activists’ tendency to 
practise politics off-line? And if so, in what ways? 
Data from the questionnaire show that practising politics on SM was constantly related 
to engaging in political activities off-line (r = .601, p < 0.01). Young activists who 
practise political activities on social networking sites (SNSs) are more inclined                
to practise politics off-line. The same correlation was then examined after introducing 
political dispositions (fear and efficacy) as mediating variables. Results from partial 
correlation show that the association between on- and off-line activism was persistent, 
even when mediated by fear of repression (r = .576, p < 0.01), which was expected         
to detach SM users from bridging their online activism to the off-line arena, where they 
may face several forms of repression and harassment. The correlation also held true 
when mediated by political efficacy (r = .561, p < 0.01). Young activists who practise 
politics online tend to utilise their competences in off-line activism, even if they have 
security concerns. Similarly, it has been argued that opinion expression in one scenario 
is positively related to expression in other scenarios, and expressing opinion online will 
increase the possibilities of expressing it in reality (Liu & Fahmy, 2009). Figure 7.1 
delineates how introducing fear and efficacy dispositions does not break the connection 
between on- and off-line activism. 
7.1.3.1. Social media and the shaping of repertoires of collective action 
The young activists also used SM to shape repertoires of contention. Through utilising 
SM apparatuses, they manage to identify “a limited set of routines that are learned, 
shared and acted out through a relatively delebrate process of choice” (Tilly, 1995, p. 
26). Although Tilly’s definition of repertoires was criticised for constraining behaviour 
and choice (Crossley, 2002), defining what people should do while taking part                 
in a protest gains special importance in repressive regimes, where authorities are 
expected to crack down vigorously on any form of contentious political practice. Taking 
context into careful account when defining repertoires of protest finds support in one   
of Tilly’s hypotheses for repertoires, as he suggests that “the prior history of contention 
[in a given geographical/social arena] constrains the choices of action currently 
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available, in partial independence of the identities and interests that participants bring 
to the action” (Tilly, 1995, p. 29).  
Participants discussed how they had used SM to convey practical repertoires of protest 
and to share technical information about the know-how to become involved in specific 
events that they instigate. Mostly, the events that the young activists had been 
mobilising for were of a less threatening and low-risk nature. This, as mentioned above, 
is crucial in making such events more appealing to non-politicised individuals, who have 
not yet developed an activist identity, and who might not have the skills needed to 
practise more costly repertoires of activism. A.Y. explained how political activism 
transfers from Facebook pages to reality through online tools of mobilisation: 
We realised that the Internet presence is virtual and that we should identify and approach 
those who are willing to participate on the ground. So we provided an e-mail address to 
interact with those who wanted to volunteer for the campaign and participate in 
organising the welcoming of El-Baradei upon his arrival at the airport on February19, 
2010. We aggregated the first 300 volunteers in the national campaign (emphasis 
added). 
Young activists use the mailing lists’ repertoire to network for the political event 
mentioned. However, it should be stressed that, first, the aforementioned correlation 
mainly tests activists’ perceptions of their attitudes and practices, rather than the non-
politicised individuals’. Second, the event A.Y. mentioned is a low-risk event that might 
have appealed to non-politicised citizens due to the low levels of sacrifice that 
participation involved, which explains the high levels of participation.  
It has been argued that Web technologies are opening up new spaces of participation 
where rich, compelling, and sustainable social settings are nourished (Skoric, Ying, & Ng, 
2009; Scott & Johnson, 2005). However, there is also an agreement that “the Internet 
lags far behind” when it comes to reaching publics en masse domestically (Hofheins, 
2005). It could be said, then, that in order to make feasible changes and claim rights, as 
A.A. typically remarked, people need to be active in reality. They need to put real 
pressure on the regime to make their voices heard and to achieve their aspirations. An 
explanation of what A.A. meant by proper practice, as compared to SM activism, could be 
found in the status Hossam El-hamalawy, a prominent Egyptian journalist, blogger, 
photographer and social activist, posted on his page on Facebbok on 10th August 2013, 
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outlining the affordances of SM and comparing and contrasting online and off-line 
activism. As El-Hamalawy says: 
The Internet opens new, unprecedented horizons for political propaganda for any party 
or movement. You can express your position in a statement on Facebook and connect to 
millions of people. The media can also pick that statement up and broadcast it to the 
broader audience beyond your actual circle. This is very good, and we should benefit 
from every possible chance to make our voices heard. But the problem is that some have 
completely abandoned the self-evident: that printed leaflets should also be hand-
distributed in the streets. This gives you a real opportunity to test your ideas and 
attitudes in direct discussions … .. Posting comments on Facebook is not sufficient for 
reflecting the real mood of the public … .. I mean, how would youth get used to debating 
politics, building attitudes and working in the streets? Is it through interacting with 
Facebook comments, or via engaging in political debate with real people on the ground? 
… .. Relying solely on the Internet as a means of information dissemination and ignoring 
distribution on the ground leads inevitably to falling into the trap of using the language 
of the "abstract", rather than the "concrete", in political discourse, and this is the most 
dangerous thing in my view (El-Hamalawy, 2013). 
This suggests that the SM environment could be beneficial in the initial steps                    
of constructing communities of potential participants, where individuals can meet 
activists through their friends. SM spheres, however, might not be sufficient to develop  
a psychological bond between members of these communities, which are crucial for 
incentivising and sustaining higher-risk forms of activism that are basically practised 
off-line. However, before moving to explore young activists’ perceptions of SM’s 
potential for mobilising off-line collective action, it is useful to look at how participants’ 
political dispositions influence (if they do) their tendency to engage in online activism, 
and, hence, how young activists’ dispositions might mediate between their on- and off-
line activism. 
Participants seem not to be satisfied with the role that SM have been playing in making 
off-line collective action feasible in terms of the size of mobilisation that these media can 
instigate (see Table 5.3 for young activists’ distribution by SM satisfaction). Although 
people join political groups on SM platforms and meet like-minded individuals, the 
numbers that actually take to the street are proportionately lower than the numbers     
of the members of online political groups. Additionally, the fluid structure of the 
Internet makes it harder for activists to estimate the numbers of movement supporters 
and, accordingly, to predict the degree of success (or failure) that their movement may 
achieve. As Dahlgren writes, “given the fluid character of many … .. net-based 
movements, and the ease of joining and withdrawing, it is really difficult to estimate 
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what proportion of the citizenry is actually involved” (Dahlgren, 2004, p. xiii). SO., for 
example, expressed a typical concern about losing supporters when individuals have    
to cross the virtual arena to reality, where action becomes more demanding: 
A very limited percentage moves from online to off-line. If a thousand individuals 
indicate that they will attend an event, and if we subtracted political activists, then only 2 
or 3 ordinary people would actually attend. I might also be exaggerating if I say 2 or 3. I 
think there is no connection.  
SO. ascribes what could be termed situational dissonance between the virtual and the 
real spheres to what he calls the ‘negative hostility’ of the Egyptian people: 
The Egyptian people are negative hostile personalities; they resent the regime but they 
are passive … .. Facebook makes this passiveness easier. It is easier to say: I am against 
the regime, but I am still passive in reality. It is just a means for catharsis not for action 
(emphasis added).  
Although people have grievances and may aspire to change, they still do not act to claim 
their rights and change their situation. Walsh and Warland (1983) asked a sample          
of activists about the reasons for the reported high percentage of free riders amongst 
those who were essentially in agreement with their local social movement 
organisation’s goals (98 percent). They ascribed situational dissonance mainly                 
to ‘political powerlessness.’ Similarly, negativity, in SO.’s perception, is what makes 
ordinary Egyptian people refrain from taking active action to confront the regime, 
although they resent it and disagree with its policies. SO. thus believes that the realm    
of confrontation is limited to activists who are ready to express their grievances and 
vocalise their anger off-line. It was found that Internet users in authoritarian contexts 
were more inclined to practise politics online compared to non-Internet users, but their 
activities in the private sphere did not have a significant impact on their off-line 
participation. This has been ascribed, among other reasons, to limitations related to the 
repressive context and limited opportunities allowed for real world participation           
in oppressive and less developed societies (Skoric, Ying, & Ng, 2009). SO. stressed the 
same point in the previous extract. He believes that Facebook allows individuals               
a platform from which to vent their anger. It may thus result in deluding them and 
making them think that they are actively involved in politics, while all they are actually 
doing is merely an act of catharsis. Taking into account the argument that “the virtual 
space is not a sphere of its own [rather], it is to some extent a social representation        
of the real world,” (Neumayer & Raffl, 2008) it was not expected that such online 
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negativity would result positively in effective political participation off-line in terms      
of the size and scale of activism. 
Events that Egypt witnessed in the last decade also support the findings discussed 
hitherto. During the last few years, manifestations of political engagement have been 
evident in Egypt. They were crowned by the revolt of January 25th that led to the ousting 
of former President Mubarak. It may be recalled from Chapter Three that during the 
period 1998 to 2004, Egypt witnessed 1,000 social protests, with a 200 percent increase 
in the protest rate from 2003 alone (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). The eagerness             
to show discontent and claim political and socio-economic reforms was reflected in an 
unprecedented number of oppositional demonstrations, rallies and the formation          
of non-violent dissident groups which Egypt witnessed in 2004-2005 (El-Mahdi, 2009, 
p. 1011). Most of these political activities were pursued in the locus of the private 
sphere and have been enabled, buttressed, or at least attached, to new media apparatus 
use. However, those demonstrations have failed to bring about the change for which 
they aspired, although they have rung some bells and drawn attention to the public’s 
grievances. An explanation might be that these “tendencies are characterised by               
a variety of atomised action, taking place in a plurality of spaces that are both public and 
private. These tendencies are the property of a citizen leading a largely reflexive 
existence in order to actualise an identity that is fluid. The civic base of this identity is 
exercised via activity emanating from mostly a monitorial, rather than deliberative or 
proactive, standpoint” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 131), or, in SO.’s words, ‘negative hostility.’ 
However, this ideological fluidity is argued to be solidified with practice, as McAdam 
(1986, p. 70) suggests (discussed in Section 7.1.1.2.1).   
Practising politics and exercising mobilisation efforts on new media platforms 
comprises “privately contained activities with a public scope” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 
20). These activities, pursued in the private realm, serve as the “private preparation”    
of the independent individual for the public sphere (Dahlgren, 2009). Papcharissi 
(2010) explains that “it is from the mobile and connected enclosure of this networked 
cocoon of the private sphere that the individual directs atomised gestures of civic, social, 
cultural, economic, and multi-contextual natures to the rest of the world” (p. 21). These 
atomised gestures, however, might be sufficient for practising politics in Western 
democracies, but they are indisputably inadequate for practising collective activism and 
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bringing about democratic transformation in authoritarian regimes. In Egypt, sending 
online mobilising signals from young activists to popular civil society would be limited 
in scale due to cultural, social and technical hurdles, which suggests that activism in the 
online private cocoon cannot be sufficient on its own to enforce political change and 
bring about the desired political outcomes. Mobilisation should therefore take                   
a convergent pathway to surmount these hurdles. Merging face-to-face communication 
with online activism is crucial for mobilising political participation in Egypt. In what he 
calls “augmented revolution,” Jurgenson (2012) has stressed the importance of bringing 
the advantages of digitality and physical space together. Fast-spread information and 
enhanced organisational capabilities would not alone make a revolution. Bringing the 
on- and off-line together is what gathers people en masse to press for change. M.Da. 
explained: 
Social media are not sufficient in and of themselves. People should not use Facebook as 
an alternative to off-line participation. It should rather be used as a means to mobilise as 
many people as possible to go off-line. I think that collective actions that have succeeded 
recently, like the April 6th strike, started on Facebook, but the problem is to limit 
participation to the Internet arena. 
As discussed earlier, opening an information gateway does not necessarily entitle the 
Internet to serve as a source of mobilisation that incentivises the performance                 
of collective action. Active participation in a private sphere ‘shelter’ alone will not bring 
about political and social change. On the one hand, Gladwell (2010) argues that using SM 
for political participation will result in a ‘floppy’ form of engagement that has been 
termed “slacktivism”, whereby social change is pursued through low-cost practices, 
such as the mere activity of joining Facebook groups and ‘liking’ other people’s status, 
which, although it might be effective in showing and sharing feelings and dispositions, 
does not entitle any significant action. This monitorial tendency of media use may tune 
individuals to what I call the ‘safe mode’ of political practice, as they feel threatened       
in a stagnant political environment that has been ruled for decades by emergency laws, 
tightly controlled media platforms, and high rates of corruption and inflation, and they 
are burdened by cultural hurdles that render them alienated in their own societies 
(Sayed, 2011). Although they might thus have “the potential for activity, they spend 
most of the time in the suspended inactivity of monitoring, typically practised from         
a private sphere” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 103). 
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On the other hand, Shirky, while he agrees with this critique, states that SM’s 
effectiveness relates to actors’ level of commitment and their readiness to take their 
activism outside the ‘safe zone’ (Shirky, 2011). A.A. explains: 
The street is the real arena for taking action and making change feasible. We can utilise 
technological sources to acquire political news, but we should not turn that information 
into controversy and limit political activism to Facebook pages. What we should do is to 
aggregate people and take to the streets. 
Additionally, the potential of SM as mobilising tools is defined by their ability                   
to empower, which could be marred by notions related to the digital gap  (Papacharissi, 
2010). Low access levels, high illiteracy, and male domination may render audience 
members unequally privileged in benefitting from the opportunities allowed by new 
media. H.B. and SO. discussed two different viewpoints on how SM could help reaching 
out to such unprivileged publics through practising what could be termed a ‘multi-step 
flow of mobilisation:’ 
H.B.: I think the role [of SM] is limited when compared to the aspired change. I believe 
that the critical mass we need resides in labour blocks and trade unions and those are 
unreachable through Facebook, which is limited to youth. For example, I do not expect a 
labour leader to have a Facebook account. Hence, the role that Facebook can play is 
secondary in relation to the ‘size’ of the aspired change. To ‘change’ means to reach 
ordinary people not only young citizens through their Facebook accounts (emphasis 
added). 
SO.: I slightly disagree with that point of view. The categories that Hassan mentioned are 
not all above 40. Labours and peasants also include youth and they use Facebook. They 
can spread the word to their fellow colleagues, who might not have access to the 
Internet. Even if Facebook and other networks are limited or more heavily used by 
youth, this means that we need more users than the number we currently have in order 
to reach all peasants and labourers in syndicates. Facebook and the like could be the first 
ring in the mobilisation chain (emphasis added). 
H.B. commented: but the rate of Internet access is low in Egypt, which adds to the 
problem and limits the potential of social media for mass mobilisation. 
Bennett (2003b) has come to a similar explanation of the suggested ‘multi-step flow      
of mobilisation.’ He argues that “the co-ordination of activities over networks with many 
nodes and numerous connecting points, or hubs, enables network organisation to be 
maintained even if particular nodes and hubs die, change their mission, or move out      
of the network” (Bennett, 2003b, p. 20). In their discussion of the logic of connective 
action, Bennett and Segerberg imply that the technology-enabled networks                       
of personalised communication may play an important role in originating large-scale 
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action. It could be inferred from the following extract that social networking media 
constitute a first stage in a multi-step process of communication flow that will 
eventually lead to the off-line sphere if people wish to achieve feasible change on the 
ground. As Bennett and Segerberg (2012) continue: 
 
In place of the initial collective action problem of getting the individual to contribute, the 
starting point of connective action is the self-motivated (though not necessarily self-
centered) sharing of already internalized or personalized ideas, plans, images, and 
resources with networks of others. This ‘sharing’ may take place in networking sites 
such as Facebook, or via more public media such as Twitter and YouTube through, for 
example, comments and re-tweets. Action networks characterized by this logic may scale 
up rapidly through the combination of easily spreadable personal action frames and 
digital technology enabling such communication (p. 753) (emphasis added). 
Along the same lines, Jensen (2009) suggests an extended form of Lazarsfeld et al.’s 
(1944) two-step flow of communication that adds the ‘many-to-many’ to the traditional 
one-to-one and one-to-many patterns of information flow. Jensen argues that, through 
the ‘networked media,’ news and opinion flow from news organisations to opinion 
leaders, and then to the public, in a three-step flow model. The public, according to 
Papacharissi (2010), fit in the second and the third places of this flow equation; as they 
“possess opinion-leading privileges which allow them to function as consumers and 
modifiers of news content” (p. 153).  
7.1.3.2. Social media mobilisation against a backdrop of the 25th January 2011 
revolt 
During the events that commenced on 25th January 2011 in Egypt, manifestations           
of a convergent modular model of communicative mobilisation were evident. For 
example, Zhuo, Wellman, and Yu (2011) discussed the important role that SM played    
in enlarging the spiral of activism by ‘expanding the traditional word of mouth to inform 
a range of people broader than kinship and friendship networks’ (p. 7). This modality   
of multi-step/space of communication could have helped the young activists circumvent 
the hindrances of high illiteracy rates and low levels of access to technology, as well as 
the technology self-efficacy that could limit SM’s ability to afford the people the power 
needed for change. They discuss how mixing new and traditional communication forms 
(online to off-line interactions) could further expand their mobilising efforts and invite 
new cohorts of citizens to real world participation. These convergent mechanisms might 
suggest that practising mobilising efforts online, has become fruitful in aggregating         
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a critical mass only when supported by a hybrid of communication modalities and 
mobilising tactics that correspond to the cultural and social milieu in Egypt, or as M.M. 
put it: 
Facebook and these tools can be the first episode in a cyclical process to reach out to [a 
large] number [of participants]. 
Firstly, the time: Activists chose to take to streets on 25th January 2011 (The Police Day) 
to link their protests with the well-known cause of Kaled Said, and the frame they had 
been constructing for several years. They used police brutality as a rallying point. Mass 
demonstrations also reached the peak of accumulated grievances that were marked by 
the critical date of the fraudulent parliamentary elections of November 2010; as young 
Egyptian activists hoped that the rigged ballot would incentivise a mass movement 
around Iran's post-election protests (Ishani, 2011). Secondly, the significance of the 
place: Tahrir Square, which activists chose as a public sphere, inspired “a re-
interpretation of how people socially relate to space, time, and each other” 
(Papacharissi, 2010, p. 4). Mohamed Dawoud (2011) explains how space can be 
significant to practice. He argues that the incidents that the Delta city of Mahalla 
witnessed on the 6th of April 2008 could have turned into a 25th January had they 
happened in Cairo, 
I believe that if it was meant for the 2008 incidents to spread outside Mahalla all over 
Egypt, we would have witnessed the revolution in April 2008, rather than in January 
2011. Nevertheless, these demonstrations were a precursor to the January revolution. I 
believe that this ground swelling level of demonstrations did not happen in Mahalla 
because it stood alone and, hence, it was much easier for security forces in Mahalla and 
other neighbouring governorates to circumvent the demonstrations and arrest the 
demonstrators, who were put in jail on several charges, like rioting and destruction of 
public property. I think what made the difference on 25th January relates to the 
significance of the place. Cairo is a compelling center. The centralisation of everything in 
Cairo reflects the authoritarian spirit of successive former regimes in Egypt. The head of 
the regime controls all the authorities, which was mirrored demographically and 
economically in Cairo city. Gamal Hemdan has acutely portrayed this relationship by 
calling Cairo ‘a sweeping head on a crippled body’ (Dawoud, 2011). 
Thirdly, bonding the private with the public sphere: In the off-line public realm, and 
more evident in Tahrir Square, activists expanded their political action outside the 
electronic private sphere and connected to their fellow citizens. They gained what 
Arendt (1973) called the ‘in-between’ bond (cited in Dahlgren, 2009). Modes of culture-
based social connectivity were enacted in the Square, which, on the one hand, 
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accumulated a sense of unity, and sent, on the other, a strong message to the authorities 
by frustrating their malicious attempts to implant ideology-based discrimination among 
the public (i.e., attempts to instigate sectarian cleavages between Muslim and Christian 
Egyptians). Interestingly, they cut off the Internet only three days after the mass took   
to the streets (DailyRecord.co.uk, 2011) and this may have allowed room for trust-based 
networking mechanisms to flourish through face-to-face communication, which the 
Internet was blamed for undermining, since it joined the mainstream more than               
a decade ago (Kraut et al., 1998; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 2010).  This bond 
has also expanded across borders, but thanks to SM and ICTs this time. SM and ICTs 
were a panacea for connectivity problems caused by the Internet shut down. The 
regime’s attempt to curb the mass turnout of anti-government demonstrators was 
counteracted by launching the “speak-to-tweet” initiative for protesters, to enable them 
to send ‘tweets’ using a voice connection. Anyone could tweet by leaving a voicemail on 
certain phone numbers and no Internet connection was required. Users could also dial 
the same numbers to listen to the recorded tweets. This hybrid technological solution 
enabled what Castells called “flash mobilisation” (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, 
Linchuan, & Sey, 2007, p. 200) to give voice to Egyptians’ discontent with the regime. 
Protesters have also managed to create what might be termed the ‘Friday theme.’ They 
staged a series of massive protests, the largest of which were held on Fridays. Each 
Friday was flagged by a certain demand to clarify people’s reaction to the regime, 
and/or to announce the next step in the uprisings (i.e., Friday of rage, Friday                     
of departure, and Friday of cleanliness, etc.). Building on Ottaway and Hamzawy’s 
(2011) protest movement assessment in the Arab region, it can be said that this theme 
helped protesters to conduct a number of connected episodes, which built on each other 
to provide a form of organisation for a cohesive movement. Moreover, performing the 
Jom’aa prayer together in Tahrir Square on Fridays constructively helped to bridge the 
stratifying gaps of class and ideology and to convey a solidifying image of toleration and 
civilisation across the globe. This collective prayer is normally preceded by a public 
speech (khotba), which played a significant role in addressing the people and gave           
a regular momentum to the demonstrations. In the same light, Sreberny (2001) 
discussed how cassette tapes comprised a ‘suitable’ form of communication distribution 
among Iranians in the context of the Iranian revolution of 1979. She argues that              
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in a cultural environment that favors oral communication, and with an illiteracy rate     
of 65 percent of the population, this form of “small media” was an appropriate channel 
for public agitation.  Borrowing Putnam’s (2000) metaphor, it could be said that the 
young activists are bowling online and snowballing off-line (Sayed, 2011) as their 
movement gains momentum and enlarges in size and scale. 
In the light of the above, and given the specifications of the cultural milieu and political 
context in Egypt, it could be argued that SM have been enabling the young activists to 
urge citizens to take their first steps on the participatory ladder, but “it is probably 
unwise to say that the Internet and mobile phones have caused a single democratic 
revolution. Nevertheless, having an active online civil society [could be] a key ingredient 
of the causal recipe for democratisation” (Howard, 2010, p. 155).  
To summarise, when looking at the potential of SM for supporting collective action one 
needs to avoid technological determinism by integrating media into their context and 
dealing with them as a ‘capacity’ rather than as an ‘overhead tool’ (Hands, 2011). 
Commenting on the massive protests that erupted in Tunisia in late 2010, Hands 
stresses the importance of evaluating SM’s attributes and contributions with respect to 
the wider spectrum of the social specificities of a given society. These views also 
intersect with and corroborate suggestions made by U&G scholars about the significance 
of embedding the study of media characteristics into the broader communication 
contexts of their selection and use (Flanagin & Metzger, 2001). As Hands (2011) writes: 
A tool implies an object or technique used to directly leverage an outcome, and thought 
of in this way Twitter’s impact can be judged on some kind of scale to be argued over– 
and from here scepticism can easily spring. Yet the ‘virtual’ and the ‘real’ are no more 
separable than ‘mind’ and ‘body’. Twitter, social media or the Internet as a whole, can’t 
be isolated as the cause, or not, of anything, because they are part of the fabric of social 
life and the terrain of struggle. 
7.2. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to answer the third research question, which centres on the 
perceived role of SM in creating opportunities for mobilising collective political activism 
off-line. As revealed through the analysis, young Egyptian activists have been utilising 
SM to circumvent hurdles in their polity. They aimed to create opportunities that might 
help them to gain the public support needed to agitate collective action and to achieve 
the political outcomes for which they aspire. In this regard, SM have benefitted the 
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young activists in several ways. Firstly, they managed to use SM to build and 
disseminate a unique frame of their movement that would not have otherwise found its 
way to the national media. Through SM platforms they have managed to make certain 
issues visible to the public and put them face-to-face with their grievances. They believe 
that shocking the public with such grievances is crucial for mobilising them to face the 
imminent dangers in their polity. Secondly, the young Egyptian activists have been using 
SM to structure and propagate their movement. They have managed to build loose-knit 
networks of non-politicised supporters and potential activists. Through discussion        
of political issues on SM platforms and by mobilising low-cost and less risky activities, 
these supporters may eventually develop their competences and acquire an activist 
identity and hence become more inclined to take part in high-risk activities. Thirdly, is 
the potential of these networks to link to the off-line arena and aggregate a critical mass 
to achieve change on the ground. For this particular outcome to be achieved, as well as 
for the others, participants believe that SM are not sufficient in themselves to make 
feasible changes in the Egyptian polity. They demonstrated several forms of evidence 
about the deficits of SM in playing solo in mobilising sizable and diverse masses on the 
ground. On the one hand, the online space is not compatible with its off-line counterpart. 
SM are not media for the masses in Egypt. Access problems, illiteracy rates and 
technology efficiency are all hurdles to be jumped before reaching mass audiences 
solely through SM. On the other hand, being active on SM platforms could create an 
illusory feeling of being active. Such a feeling could limit actual participation on the 
ground, as online practitioners reckon themselves to be politically active in the online 
cocoon. The perceived political capacity of the medium could also contribute to holding 
such dispositions. For example, Shen et al. (2009) ascribed the limited political effects  
of the Internet in China to the perceived limited efficacy of the medium. They believe 
that state hegemony on the Internet might have shaken people’s beliefs in the medium’s 
capacity to bring about any feasible change (Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009, p. 467). 
Additionally, the young Egyptian activists believe that this limited, yet effective, role      
of SM can be ascribed to the way these media are used. For example, as mentioned         
in Chapter Five, M.S. ascribed the difference in size between ‘online interactors’ and ‘off-
line actors’ to “the irrational and mis-use of the medium, [which could lead to]                   
a disturbing glut of messages and notifications that might lead to abandoning most        
of these groups.”  
 279 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: SOCIAL MEDIA USES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
GRATIFICATIONS 
This thesis has focused upon perceptions of the mobilisation that preceded the eruption 
of the massive demonstrations which took place in Egypt in early 2011, one of a number 
in the region that became known as the Arab Spring. Many commentators (i.e., Aouragh 
& Alexander, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Wilson & Dunn, 2011; Wall & Zahed, 2011) 
have remarked upon the role played by social media (SM) in the Egyptian uprising and 
this has been the central concern of my research. More precisely, my research was 
designed to address the question: “How do young Egyptian activists perceive the 
potential of social media for mobilising collective action?” The research findings 
outlined in the preceding chapters make a unique contribution to contemporary debates 
about SM and the Egyptian mobilisations, since the data was gathered prior to the 
uprising of 25th January 2011. Consequently, it provides us with a clear understanding 
of what Egyptian activists actually thought and said about the potential value of SM, 
both for the organisation and the mobilisation of protests, rather than as retrospective 
judgments which may be subject to selective interpretations. The current research 
attempts to answer enquiries about SM and political dispositions during what turned 
out to be the preparatory phase of protests. Additionally, this research reports on the 
perceptions of a sample of young Egyptian activists to whom the credit for igniting the 
two waves of uprisings (25th January 2011 and 30th June 2013) has been widely 
attributed.  
This chapter is organised into three sections: 
8.1. A moderate case for the potential of social media for mobilising collective action. 
8.2. Social media cycles of mobilisation. 
8.2.1. Cycle (1) young Egyptian activists and the instrumentality of social media 
(corresponds to RQ1). 
8.2.2. Cycle (2) same media, different opportunities for different actors 
(corresponds to RQ2). 
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8.2.3. Cycle (3) social media uses and gratifying off-line collective outcomes 
(Corresponds to RQ3). 
8.3. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice. 
8.3.1. Recommendations for future research. 
8.3.2. Implications for practice. 
8.1. A moderate case for the potential of social media for mobilising collective 
action 
This thesis has tackled three main areas of inquiry. First: the uses of SM as reported by 
the participant activists. Second: the contribution of these uses to creating favourable 
dispositions for political participation in the Egyptian polity, given its specificities as an 
authoritarian form of governance, and third: the expected outcomes of SM uses with 
regard to mobilising the Egyptian constituency to engage in off-line political practices 
aimed at achieving political reforms in Egypt.  
Throughout the analysis of my data, I built a moderate case in favour of the potential of 
SM to give young Egyptian activists novel and honed affordances to practise 
‘preparatory mobilisation’ at the grassroots level, bridging their efforts in a bottom-up 
direction in order to put pressure on elites and to achieve political change. Several 
limitations were highlighted; some of which relate to the constituency, while others are 
mainly related to the media. The analysis led to a general recommendation to study SM 
as capacity and the unpacking of its utility through a contextual lens takes onboard the 
specificities of Egyptian society that might have, along with media, led to the unfolding 
of recent events. My findings situate this research almost on a middle point in the 
spectrum of the heated debate between technological determinists (e.g., Clay Shirky), 
who raise questions such as "would there have been a revolution in Egypt without 
Facebook?" and media scepticists (i.e., Malcolm Gladwell and Evgeny Morozov), who 
ascribe a frail role to technological innovations. In general, this research thus 
corroborates the view that “social media or the Internet as a whole, can’t be isolated as 
the cause, or not, of anything, because they are part of the fabric of social life and the 
terrain of struggle” (Hands, 2011). 
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In general, I argue that young Egyptian activists were using SM during the period that 
led to the 25th January 2011 uprising as instruments of dissemination, rather than to 
gain information motivated mainly by lowering the cost/risk of organisation and 
participation. SM also helped young activists to create opportunities for practising 
collective action by promoting favourable participatory dispositions among less-
interested and non-politicised citizens. However, these media portals were not 
perceived as being significant contributors to the mobilisation of sizable numbers           
of people to become involved in off-line activism, due to their instrumental utilisation, 
which does not necessarily feed into developing activists’ identies which is responsible 
for building trust, strengthening commitment, and hence, for sustaining social 
movement. della Porta (2012) has similarly attached some normative, rather than 
instrumental, constraints to different social movements’ uses of new media. This finding 
is also supported by previous research that stresses the importance of developing ‘non-
virtual identities’ (della Porta & Mosca, 2005) through affiliation to social movement 
organisations (SMOs) and by practising collective action as parameters of activist 
identity development and social movement dedication (i.e., van Laer & van Aelst, 2010; 
Bennett, 2005). Figure 8.1 builds on the suggested design of the study (Figure 4.2) and 
shows how the main themes of the research relate to, and interact with, each other. 
 
Figure 8.1: Research themes’ interrelations and interaction 
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More specifically, the young Egyptian activists have been engaged in what could be 
termed ‘networking preparatory mobilisation.’ In this bottom-up form of mobilisation, 
young activists mix their off-line experiences with their purposive online media uses     
in a three-step flow of mobilisation at the base level of the population. The mobilisation 
starts from activists on the ground and moves to their online (and off-line) circles, and 
then it feeds into reality again, where the active and the activated act together 
collectively. Taking a clue from Tilly’s (1978) classification of collective action into 
competitive, reactive and proactive actions, it is suggested that certain changes in the 
circumstances of the Egyptian polity and population,15 coupled with the power of SM 
resources have enabled young activists to mobilise the proactive collective action          
or “collective proaction” (p. 147), that have not previously been exercised. As far as the 
media impact is concerned, the size and scale of such off-line collective action relies —
among other things— on the degree to which online users can act as what has been 
termed ‘nodes’ (Castells, 1996). These key influencers, as seen by the young activists, 
are essential to lowering the costs of the social transaction of collective action to the 
broader disconnected population. 
This argument is represented, with regard to the aforementioned areas of enquiry,        
in three interrelated themes, or ‘cycles of mobilisation,’ that have emerged from the 
analysis: (1) the young Egyptian activists’ instrumental use of SM, (2) SM and the 
creation of different opportunities and dispositions for different actors, and (3) the uses 
of SM and the promotion of off-line outcomes. Each episode of this media-supported 
mobilisation continuum was discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, respectively. 
Figure 8.2 summarises the main findings of the research and shows how the emergent 
themes interconnect with each other. Thereafter, the diagramme is unpacked and            
a summary of results for each cycle is presented. 
8.2. Social media cycles of mobilisation 
A moderate case was built through a horizontal analysis of young Egyptian activists’ 
perceptions of SM to mobilisation. The analysis expanded over Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven. Each chapter addressed and answered one of the research questions and built up 
                                                        
15
 For example, the constitutional amendments of 2005 that led to the consequent success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections of that year. This was followed by a crackdown on the MBs in 
the parliamentary election 2010-2011. 
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a cycle in the suggested chain of mobilisation (see Figures 5.1, 6.1 & 7.1). Participant 
activists have been using SM to mobilise collective political practice that is mediated by 
certain dispositions. Figure 8.2 represents a holistic vision of the themes that emerged 
and shows how these processes interrelate and overlap. In the first cycle (media uses), 
the young Egyptian activists used SM as instruments to disseminate information             
in order to draw users’ attention to certain issues. SM were found to be efficient              
in achieving certain goals related to youth activism, such as the organisation of events 
and mobilising action at low cost, but it was not symbolically used for identity building 
purposes. In the second cycle (dispositions), the young activists aimed to create 
opportunities for the non-politicised to take part in the collective actions for which they 
mobilised. At this stage, the young Egyptian activists believed that SM could introduce 
the non-politicised to the political arena and lower the cost of participation by serving 
as a safer environment for competence acquirement and political practice, yet they 
believe that it is not until the non-politicised engage in political activities off-line that 
they add value to the political process. This entails their involvement in the third cycle 
(off-line action), and acquiring the identity of an activist that is crucial for sustained 
participation, especially with their perceived low levels of both political awareness and 
an inclination to participate in politics, as seen from Chapter Two. At this stage, SM have 
benefitted the young Egyptian activists in achieving three outcomes related                      
to mobilising off-line collective action, i.e., they helped them frame their movement, 
recruit potential participants, and organise off-line collective actions.  
Activists believe that using SM as instruments of mobilisation places several hurdles     
in front of each of the aforementioned off-line-related outcomes. These hurdles affect 
the width of the third cycle (the digitally-enabled networks of participants) unless 
supplementary modes of communication are enacted (e.g., face-to-face networking). 
These perceived difficulties are discussed in Section 8.2.3. 
At the time when this research was conducted, November-December 2010, the 
participant activists believed that mobilising massive collective action was a very 
challenging goal to achieve. The massive uprising of 25th January 2011 falls outside the 
realm of the current analysis, yet taking insight from the current research and the 
consequent happenings in Tahrir Square, it might be concluded that it was not until 
these digitally-enabled networks met ordinary people in the off-line domain to shape 
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wider networks of supporters with the power of face-to-face interactions and word       
of mouth, that a critical mass was formed, a social movement materialised and                  
a revolutionary threshold was reached. This was an outcome that had not been 
anticipated earlier by the young activists when they discussed SM as means                      
of mobilisation. 
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In the following pages, these cycles are unpacked and the main findings are summarised 
against a backdrop of pertinent literature. 
8.2.1. Cycle (1) young Egyptian activists and the instrumentality of SM 
The answer to the research question: ‘Why do young Egyptian activists use SM?’ was 
discussed in Chapter Five. It was found that participant activists were using SM prior    
to the January 2011 uprising, mainly for the purposes of guiding and mobilising others. 
They were engaged in their online tier of activism, in activities that aimed to aggregate 
popular support for their cause. They predominantly sought to reach wider circles of the 
publics, to affect their political decisions and to urge them to participate in events that 
support their cause. The main path to such an outcome, as seen by the participants, was 
to disseminate information and to spread the word to as many supporters as possible. 
One of the main reasons for this information-oriented use of SM was to lower the 
threshold of the social transaction costs of collective action.  
For young Egyptian activists, as they operate under an authoritarian regime with scarce 
resources, it is crucial to externalise the costs of mobilisation. Networking was the 
instrument with which they fulfilled this need. Using SM for instrumental functions 
corroborates the findings of previous research on computer mediated communication 
(CMC) and protest mobilisation (see, e.g., della Porta & Mosca, 2005; Diani, 2000). This 
perceived necessity for information dissemination function may also enhance the 
prospects of participation for the non-politicised users of SM. This finding is supported 
by previous research on media functions. It was found that “individuals who use the 
Internet for information exchange probably encounter more mobilising information and 
experience more opportunities for recruitment in civic life with the panoply                     
of mobilising content available on-line, citizens who are armed with such information 
may be able to exert greater control over their environments, encouraging participation 
and enhancing trust” (Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001, p. 154). 
Using the Internet instrumentally was expected to hamper the significance and 
sustainability of SM-supported collective action, although instrumental uses of the 
Internet do not necessarily rule out its symbolic capacity, as previous research has 
underlined the Internet’s aptitude for generating new, flexible identities (della Porta & 
Mosca, 2005), yet, it was also found that the instrumental contribution of (CMC)              
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to social movements outweighed its symbolic one, and that it is more likely that CMC 
reinforces ties that have originally developed through direct networks, rather than 
creating new ones (Diani, 2000). Notions of engaging those who are traditionally active, 
and of engaging the already engaged, have also been corroborated by other scholars 
(e.g., Chen & Lee., 2008). Viewed together, these results led to the question on whether 
instrumental use of SM might contribute to achieving the desired outcomes                       
of mobilisation, or even to the creation of participatory dispositions, especially among 
the non-politicised individuals. To put it differently, social movement identification        
is crucial for collective participation, especially when it comes to involvement                  
in unconventional and more demanding forms of practice (Crossley, 2002). Yet, 
reinforcing identity implies the prior existence of a collective identity in which SM play 
the secondary role of a supporter rather than the key role as a constructor.  
Furthermore, studies that have highlighted the Internet’s contribution to building new 
identities have mainly been focused on protest events and movement activists’ use        
of media. This implies that participants in these studies are already committed                
to a certain ideology and are more likely to share common identities with on-the-ground 
others. However, SM’s contribution to developing a sense of collective identity in the 
non-politicised is not necessarily ruled out. McAdam (1986) argues that “high-risk/cost 
activism is often expected to grow out of a history of prior involvement in less intense 
forms of movement participation” (p. 81). It was thus suggested that if SM could serve as 
a low-risk environment for participation, they might help to recruit potential 
participants for collective action. This thread was picked up in the discussion on SM’s 
perceived potential for creating participatory dispositions, in Chapter Six. 
8.2.2. Cycle (2) same media, different opportunities for different actors  
Media functionality cannot be assessed in a vacuum. Certain circumstances and 
attributes of polity also affect both the constituency and active actors. Such conditions 
were taken into consideration in order to shed light on the role that SM might have 
played in creating opportunities for mobilisation and participation in the pre-uprising 
context. The main focus of Chapter Six was to answer the research question: ‘How do 
young Egyptian activists use SM to create participatory dispositions?’ This discussion 
mainly centred on the perceived role that SM might have played in creating 
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opportunities by the young activists and for ordinary Egyptian people to make them feel 
more politically enabled by looking mainly at the fear of oppression and at political 
efficacy. In an authoritarian regime, it was expected that both factors might be 
significant parameters of capacity building that may encourage, or impede, individuals’ 
decisions to go off-line.  
The young Egyptian activists perceive remarkable differences between themselves. as 
core activists, and non-politicised citizens in regard to the contribution of SM to creating 
opportunities for both organisers of, and participators in, collective action. Figure 8.2 
provides an exemplary summary of the perceived dichotomous potential of SM for 
mobilisation of both the active and non-politicised citizens. As might be expected, 
activists differ from those who are newly introduced to the political arena, yet this 
difference, as perceived by the participant activists, is basically driven by differences     
in their active media use at the individual level and the consequent opportunities this 
purposive use helps to seize or create. Normally, yet most importantly, this difference 
stems from prior experience with political practice, which the activists mainly acquire 
and develop in the real world. 
This conceptual pairing (organisers versus participators) consists of analytical 
categories used by social movement scholars (Walsh & Warland, 1983; Earl & Kimport, 
2011). It also supports research findings from the same participatory context. It has 
been argued that access to information and communication technologies (ICTs), along 
with the rise of a new generation of well-educated Egyptian youth, has helped Egyptian 
youth dissidents to instigate circles of non-violent protests and to shape what has been 
called a “Youth Movement” (El-Mahdi, 2009). Such non-violent protests were clearly 
linked to creating opportunities in authoritarian systems (Beissinger, 1993). This 
distinction between activists and non-activists also finds support in Dahlgren’s work   
on civic culture. He argues that elements of civic culture have an impact on bottom-up 
mobilisation. This means that the individual uses and appropriations of available media 
may vary according to variations in cultural contexts (Dahlgren, 2009). Accordingly, the 
role that SM can play is expected to vary between the well-educated, more privileged 
social classes and the more politically-involved citizens, and their non-politicised and 
less socially privileged counterparts.  
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As revealed by the quantitative data, SM did not actually contribute much to the creation 
of political opportunities for young activists in Egypt with regard to overcoming their 
reported fear of authority, nor were they relevant to realising incentives for undertaking 
collective action in the Egyptian polity. This clear distinction between the opportunities, 
and outcomes that SM deliver for the young activists and the non-politicised others, 
resonates with Tarrow’s argument that “movements create opportunities not only for 
themselves, but also for others [and that] they do this by diffusing collective action 
through social networks and by forming coalitions of social actors” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 
82).  
The young Egyptian activists have been actively using SM apparatuses to help the non-
politicised users in their online circles to break their fear of authorities, to feel that they 
are in a majority by creating a supportive participatory atmosphere, and to provide an 
interactive environment for sharing information and transforming participatory skills. 
SM have allowed the non-politicised an access to participation, which is argued to be the 
major important stimulus for collective action (Tarrow, 1998).  
It has been suggested that a rise in repression and an overall perception of closing 
opportunities for action usually discourage a civic activity in the Middle East and would 
thus limit the establishment of networks to the boundaries of environments that are 
safe. Such networks could represent a type of informal autonomous networks which 
have been argued to trouble repressive regimes less than networks linked to tradition, 
such as religion or the local-community (Diani, 2008). SM have made the formation       
of such networks easier and less costly for young activists, as may be recalled from 
Chapter Five. This suggests that networks formed on SNSs could provide an alternative 
milieu of inclusion for young citizens and hence encourage a sense of agency and 
political efficiency that will connect long endured grievances to action. Additionally, this 
also suggests that authorities will not bother to tightly circumvent such networks, 
rather, the Egyptian government might have, in fact, underestimated the potential of SM 
potential and have relied on a ‘tolerant model of governance’ (Tilly, 1978), hardly 
reacting to online political groups. For example, “let them have fun” was a customary 
reaction by the former presidency when issues of youth dissent arose. This toleration 
has allowed young activists a greater chance to mobilise and create/seize opportunities 
for collective action.  
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However, while using SM for political interactions was perceived by the participant 
activists as a means of lowering the cost (of participation) for the non-politicised, by 
framing a safer environment of practice and promoting a sense of collective support and 
solidarity, there was the risk of the increasing force of Olson’s (1971) statement of the 
free-riding problem, especially in relation to off-line participation. Participants raised 
concerns that online participation might delude newcomers into thinking that they were 
contributing their share to the group’s efforts and so were eligible for the outcome,       
or the collective good, due to their online activism, while they were actually free-riding 
on the efforts of those who transcended the online borders with reality. Previous 
research has supported the illusory participation argument. Putnam (2000), for 
example, argues that Internet users develop a sense of “depersonalisation” and “feel less 
solidarity with one another due to interacting anonymously in the virtual sphere (p. 
176). Similarly, Lerner (2010) argues that “the anonymity and isolation of Internet 
membership in various groups may replace real world interactions to the detriment      
of the solidarity and singular purpose associated with social movements” (p. 557). 
It has been argued that people opt to free ride especially when their actions stem from, 
or are mobilised by, material incentives, rather than a collective identity, even if they are 
interested in an issue (Pollettal & Jasper, 2001). In the worst cases, this is expected        
to nullify the provision of the public good (Brubaker, 1975), while a less dramatic 
scenario suggests that the provision of the public good will be sub-optimal because        
of the many free riders (Samuelson, 1954; Marwell and Ames, 1979, cited in Walsh & 
Warland, 1983). Different findings have been reported on the formation of an activist 
identity in regard to media use. While some recent empirical studies have found that the 
Internet allows an environment where individuals can develop a sense of the collective 
and obtain a civic identity (Dahlgren & Olsson, 2009), some scholars argue that                 
a collective identity entails active participation and face-to-face interactions with 
activists (McAdam, 1986). Bennett and Segerberg (2012) corroborate this view by 
arguing that transcending the barriers of political organisations, ideologies, interests, 
class, gender, race, or ethnicity, lies outside the capacity of SM. Loose networks with 
weak ties within online group members might jeopardise solidarity and lessen the level 
of commitment to the group, thus making ‘free riding’ an easier option, which might 
diminish the size and scale of collective action. 
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It was expected that people would be more inclined to ride-free on the efforts of the few 
in the case of increasing fear and cost of participation, or even due to waning interest. 
The difference between those who indicate their support to a certain issue or event      
on social networking sites (SNSs) and those who actually take on the burden and 
participate in reality was the focus of Chapter Six and represents the locus of cycle (3).  
8.2.3. Cycle (3) social media uses and gratifying off-line collective outcomes  
Media uses, discussed in Chapter Five, and youth’s related aspired for political 
outcomes, were linked to the actual outcomes (or obtained gratifications) that youth 
managed to achieve (or gratify) in relation to their reported media use. As discussed     
in Chapter Seven, the young Egyptian activists have perceived SM, in the context of the 
pre 25th January 2011 uprising, to be a valuable tool for achieving feasible outcomes and 
for mobilising collective action in the off-line space. Nevertheless, they were aware        
of the hurdles they were facing. In answering the research question: How do social 
media contribute to practising collective action off-line?, it was found that the participant 
activists were utilising SM to mobilise political participation through: the promotion     
of common beliefs about their movement (framing), the recruitment of large numbers  
of supporters and potential participants, and their incentivisation to act collectively off-
line (outcomes).  
The young Egyptian activists reported that they were using SM to inform the public 
about the regime’s misconduct, which does not normally find its way onto the tightly 
controlled national media. This finding corroborates Lim’s assertion that “social media 
are not simply neutral tools to be used or adopted by social movements, but rather 
influence how activists form and shape the social movements” (Lim, 2012, p. 234). 
However, it is worth noting that such instrumentality did not exclude the emotional 
element from the mobilisation equation. In fact, the young activists were uploading 
photos, sharing videos and disseminating information through which they made the 
invisible visible and widened the circles of diffusion by providing a spectacle that 
interested traditional media. Although some participant activists argued that brutal 
images might demobilise the public, since they raise the ceiling of the cost                         
of participation, many others agreed that it was necessary to shock the public and create 
a sentimental link with the issue. It could be said that such images have helped the 
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young Egyptian activists shape the emotionality of the collective action for which they 
have been mobilising by stimulating certain sentiments and beliefs. They introduced the 
publics to sentiments that resonated with their frame of reference and urged them to 
take active actions to face the imminent dangers in their polity. The case of Khaled Said 
well-exemplifies this notion. Although it is emotional, it does not lack rationality or 
contradict instrumentality. It provided a reason for taking action. Such images 
resonated with the rationality of the collective action as it is “perfectly understandable 
that a person who is mistreated will become angry” (Crossley, 2002, p. 49). Additionally, 
it created an emotional link with the public who felt that every one of them might be 
another Khaled Said, should the regime resume trampling over their rights. The young 
Egyptian activists’ utilisation of SM has assisted both the instrumental element and the 
emotional component of framing the collective actions for which they have been calling. 
While digital personal protest networks, or “dissentworks”, have managed to spread 
horizontally (Coopman, 2003) in established democracies, due to several hurdles and 
some contextual specificities, such networks have remained vertically distributed 
among a certain cohort of politically active, well-educated youth in Egypt. Organisations 
operating under authoritarian regimes tend to rely on decentralised structures that are 
more difficult to monitor and repress, prompted mainly by the open information-
sharing system supported by the growing Internet services (Whine, 1999, p. 125). The 
Internet also allows dissidents an affordable opportunity to reach their targeted 
populations. In his attempt to model the Internet-based dissidence in the Middle East, 
McLaughlin (2003) found that lowering the cost through Internet use outweighed the 
desire of non-state dissident groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and 
Egypt, and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) in Saudi Arabia, for 
gaining support from groups or countries within the international community 
(internationalisation), as well as in seeking to erode support for their rivals (support 
erosion).   
The young Egyptian activists perceive ordinary Egyptians as ‘passive angry people’ (SO., 
2010); although they suffered many grievances, they yet lacked the motive (or the 
opportunity) to take action to change or improve their status quo. As might be 
remembered from Chapter Two, the Egyptian regime has been investing for decades     
in ignorance and a dependent state-citizen relationship, grooming generations                
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of illiterate people, or poorly qualified ‘educated’ people (Zaky, 2013), and playing the 
role of breadwinner. Such practices prompt ordinary Egyptians to prefer stability and 
order over change and democracy.  
Other hurdles have to do with the communication medium itself. Participants believe 
that political discussions over SM platforms are polarised. They do not follow a certain 
theme that one can easily track and comprehend, which mars their educative 
effectiveness and makes shaping identity through SM more difficult. Furthermore, 
practising politics on SM, especially for the non-politicised, might capture users into       
a ‘safe mode’ of action and delude them into the feeling of being politically active, while 
they are actually limited to the online bubble. An additional hurdle related to the 
economy of the medium and the way some users utilise it for political purposes. Lacking 
what participants called the ‘efficient culture of utilising SM’ (SO., 2010), coupled with 
the non-centralised organisation of the medium, as well as access problems in Egypt, 
causes audience stratification and makes massive aggregation of supporters solely 
through SM activism even more difficult.  
Contrary to what Shah et al. suggest (2005, 2006), the young activists did not see digital 
media as capable of transforming the scope and scale of interpersonal political 
relationships, at least off-line if not online (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Nah, 
Veenstra, & Shah, 2006; Hwang, Schmierbach, Paek, Zuniga, & Shah, 2006). Indeed, the 
participant activists raised issues about the need for a ‘better culture of using social 
media’ and for a ‘central organisation of the medium’, in order to be able to deploy 
meaningful connectivity capable of inducing social and political change with the help of 
SM. Conventional organisation, in terms of hierarchy and centralisation in such a fluid 
collective action space could thus enable more entrepreneurial and less centralised 
communication networks to form among members (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005), 
giving way to stronger ties, much needed in a threatening environment of participation, 
to form. Taking a clue from a resource mobilisation perspective (RM), which suggests 
that proponents are maintained in their involvement by a variety of selective individual 
incentives (Tilly, 1978; Oberschall, 1973), such organisations may also resource political 
activities by providing such incentives. It could be said, then, that the off-line created, 
digitally enabled networks of young activists have fuelled, but not necessarily amplified 
 294 
 
the power of the uprising on a grassroots basis, due to hurdles relevant to constituency, 
communication medium and the participatory context within which both operate.  
However, given the illusory feeling of safety that the online environment instigates, SM 
were not perceived by participant activists as efficient tools in themselves for 
aggregating people en masse to participate in off-line collective action. Although they 
have proven successful in creating loose networks of online supporters, yet these 
networks shrank as they moved to the off-line arena. The young activists raised the 
problem of the “point at which [forms of contention] enter the part of the range 
conventionally understood as social movement” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 745). 
Returning to the online ‘cocoon’ (Papacharissi, 2010), this was found to lend less power 
to technology-based networks of dissent and leave the young activists sceptical about 
the efficiency of what has been termed the ‘connective action’ (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012), that is, the form of collective action which is basically supported by online 
technology and conducted by networks of individuals who are primarily motivated by 
personal needs for political connotations. This represents a case of limitation of the 
political action in the communication network (Earl & Kimport, 2011). 
Building on what has been said hitherto, it is suggested that SM have created an inward 
spiral of mobilisation, or an inverted pyramid (Figure 8.3), where the number of online 
supporters of a certain issue outweigh the number of off-line actors in support of the 
same issue. SM have significantly allowed the young activists an opportunity to mobilise 
political action at lower levels of cost. They have also allowed the non-politicised 
citizens the opportunities for lower-cost political practices-in the online sphere. 
Nevertheless, as the cost (of participation) increases, as media participants move to the 
off-line arena, opportunities for political practice become more limited. Accordingly, the 
numbers of online actors and (inter)actors are perceived to be sizably greater than the 
numbers of those who actually take to the streets and participate in collective actions 
(see Figure 8.3). 
However, the base of the pyramid (Figure 8.3) started to widen on the 28th January, as   
a wide base of ordinary people massed with the critical group of young activists.              
A critical mass was shaped in the off-line domain of Tahrir-Square when the two poles 
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met, giving momentum to the eighteen days of protest that toppled the former regime 
while the Internet was completely shut down for consecutive five days (see Figure 8.2). 
                                   
Mobilising a critical mass that might significantly influence the Egyptian polity could not 
be achieved solely through SM. In fact, the young Egyptian activists could not actually 
anticipate a mass uprising that would topple the regime after almost thirty years            
of a dual problem of authoritarian rule and public silence. Rather, they believed that       
a drastic and sudden political change would drag the country into a dilemma for which it 
was not ready, or as MH., one of the participant activists, put it:  
  People have rightful demands. These demands should be fulfilled, but gradually. There 
must be some objectivity and a balanced discourse. Otherwise, we would find our 
country divided into a 100 pieces overnight. 
To conclude, SM are apparatuses for mobilisation that are instrumentally used with 
respect to given factors (or opportunities) at each stage of the life span of the youth 
social movement and the context within which it emerged. A similar conclusion was 
reached by Rinke and Roder (2011) in their analysis of the components                              
of communication during the Egyptian (first) uprising. They suggested that what is 
needed for anti-authoritarian movements in the Arab world is a comprehensive 
consideration of the communication role. Available media apparatuses, different actors, 
diverse cultural contexts, and different stages in the lifetimes of such movements, need 
all to be taken into account. However, this is not to propose that the suggested cycles of 
Online  users and issue-supporters 
Online participants 
Offline  
participants 
Figure 8.3: The perceived inward spiral of mobilisation via social media 
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mobilisation through SM occur consequentially. Rather, the young activists have been 
using SM interchangeably as they mobilise the non-politicised to engage in politics 
online and themselves take part in collective actions off-line.  
It could be said that SM have allowed the young activists an opportunity to practise         
a form of ‘preparatory mobilisation’ that is presented as the most top-down form           
of mobilisation, which is only likely in the smallest groups without active leadership and 
deliberate organisational effort (Tilly, 1978). As the number of free-riders is argued      
to be the highest in this form of mobilisation, ‘selective incentives’ are needed                  
uto motivate people to take part in collective action and so to enjoy the collective 
outcome. This supports the argument that a form of organisation-centred solution might 
be needed to assure the commitment of resources to collective ends. As discussed in the 
last chapter, SM have been enabling the young activists to mobilise citizens to take the 
first step in this preparatory mobilisation process. However, this is not to suggest that 
groups of activists could organise and mobilise for collective action using solely SM 
apparatuses. SM could not compensate for formal organisation, especially in a society 
where citizens are perceived to be “passive angry” (SO., 2010). In such a recipient 
culture, people need incentives to move and to participate and hence, formal 
organisation may still be crucial for social movements to grow. Although this might be 
hard to assess, yet recent incidents that took place in Egypt may illuminate this 
argument. For example, the 25 January 2011 protests have significantly escalated on 28 
January after members of the Muslim Brothers, the biggest organised opposition group 
in Egypt, started pouring into Tahrir Square adding momentum to the protests.  
Although collective action frames might be beneficial in lowering resource costs (and 
the costs of participation) by retaining the mobilised population’s emotional 
commitment to action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), the logic of rational choice is still in 
action in relation to contentious issues at hand, as people need selective incentives to 
overcome their long endured passivity.  
We should avoid becoming obsessed with just the communication technology itself. 
Instead we need to include in our analytic horizons the complex ways in which ICTs 
interplay with the dynamics of the social movements, as well as with mainstream 
political structures and contemporary cultural trends that frame these movements 
(Dahlgren, 2004, p. xv).  
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8.3. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice 
While using digital media is an activity that is widely embedded in the everyday life       
of the younger generations in developed, post-industrial democracies, this is still far 
from the case in authoritarian and less developed societies. Personalised ideas                
of a political nature that are digitally transformed were argued to engage youth               
in politics “as an expression of personal hopes, lifestyles and grievances” (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012, p. 743). Such an individualised approach seems to resonate with            
a cohort of young Egyptians, who have deployed the Western model of knowledge-
resourced, digitally-enabled activism. A new generation of well-educated Egyptian 
youth have shaped their pathway to political inclusion and have been successful             
in instigating circles of non-violent youth protesters and in shaping what has become 
known as the “Youth Movement” (El-Mahdi, 2009). Such non-violent protests were 
clearly linked to creating opportunities in authoritarian systems (Beissinger, 1993). It is 
widely reported that these youth were the spark of the 2011 uprising. However, these 
youth, according to the participants in the current research, did not see the uprising 
coming, due to the aforementioned hurdles that they met while working to widen their 
reach in the Egyptian polity. It is suggested, then, that such an individualistic model       
of mobilisation through digital media might not resonate with the specificities of the less 
developed societies that live under authoritarian forms of governance. This model could 
not be applied at a grass root level to include ordinary people in the political process 
and encourage a collective action powered by digital media. Accordingly, this research 
study cannot lead to generalisable suggestions for action. As discussed in the 
methodology chapter (Chapter Four), the research sample was not chosen to be 
representative of the whole population of Egyptian young activists, and the researched 
issues and related ongoing developments on the ground are too complex                          
for a straightforward statement to be made. However, on the basis of the research 
undertaken, I will make some suggestions for both future research and practice. 
8.3.1. Recommendations for future research 
 In authoritarian contexts, regimes are more expected to promote a “legitimating 
frame that provides the citizenry with reasons to be quiescent” (Gamson, 1992). 
While the relationship between new media and political participation and 
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mobilisation have been the focus of a plethora of scholarly work, and have produced 
dichotomous views between technological determinists and more sceptical scholars, 
such issues are often still less articulated in discussions about youth under 
authoritarian regimes. Under such forms of governance, youth are more likely to be 
excluded from political life and may have different opportunities for political practice 
than those allowed in established democracies, where most of the debates take place. 
Issues of imposed political deprivation and opportunities for empowerment and 
democratisation in authoritarian regimes need to be further scrutinised with a 
mediascopic scholarly lens. 
 Most recent scholarly works have researched event-centred contentions, such as 
protests and sequences of protests, while the current research was applied to more 
stable issue-advocacy networks. Compared to the former group, where the role that 
SM might play in organising and orchestrating collective action is more evident since 
they spontaneously create a different set of mechanisms that do not necessarily rely 
on recourse mobilisation and identity building (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), the 
connection was moderate in the present case. In fact, the young activists did not 
foresee the January 2011 uprising. This suggests that more non event-centred 
investigations need to be undertaken to unravel the prospective role of SM, 
separately from the enthusiasm and spontaneousity of event-centered contentions.  
 Moreover, due to the perceived hurdles in utilising SM for mobilising collective 
action, it is expected that incentivising greater populations of the Egyptian 
constituency to overcome free-riding might still rely on shaping identities in common 
and, to some extent, on resource mobilisation. Such assumptions need to be 
investigated in further research.  
 As should be obvious, differences that have been sketched in this work between the 
young activists and the non-politicised citizens in terms of SM’s potential for 
mobilisation, are based on the perceptions of a sample of young activists and how 
they see SM’s potential for mobilising collective actions that involve the participation 
of a broader base of non-politicised and less-interested citizens. This suggests that     
a study of the non-politicised is needed to shed light on the perceptions of this 
quantitatively and qualitatively significant cohort of the Egyptian constituency, how 
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they might use new media to create, realise and seize opportunities for political 
practice, and what outcomes could be attached to such opportunities and practices.  
 The current study also pointed out a socio-psychological aspect of collective 
participation in authoritarian regimes with regard to SM use. While SM are perceived 
by young activists as a less costly tool of mobilisation and as a safer environment for 
skills sharing and participation for the non-politicised, participation at a low cost,     
or in a shelter, might appeal to the less-experienced citizens more than taking to the 
street and participating in collective action. Eventually, a free riding problem could 
arise. The participant activists have raised concerns about a significant margin of SM 
users who might resort to the online arena and refrain from taking part in collective 
actions that are normally practised off-line. Such an angle falls outside the immediate 
scope of interest of the current research. Contrary to utilitarian models, such as 
Olson’s (1971), which assume the absence of collective identity, and suggest that 
people make strategic judgements based on their expectations about costs and 
benefits, it was argued that “solidarity and collective identity operate to blur the 
distinction between individual and group interest, undermining the premises on 
which such utilitarian models operate” (Gamson, 1992, p. 57). Concepts of online 
commitment and solidarity in authoritarian contexts need to be unpacked and 
further inspected.  
 Embracing the ‘civic culture’ paradigm to study political practice might be better 
situated in established democratic contexts. However, recent accelerating 
developments in the Egyptian polity, and the massive aggregation of almost 33 
million people in Tahrir-Square and various other public spaces in Egypt (the lowest 
number reported was 17 million protesters) suggests that a new form of civic culture 
might be evolving in Egyptian society, especially among youth. In fact, many of the 
problems Egyptian society has been enduring in recent decades have been ascribed-
along with other factors, to the demolition of the Egyptian middle class, while the 
recent societal awakenings have been widely ascribed to the emergence of a new, 
well-educated cohort of Egyptian youth. This suggests that embracing a ‘civic culture’ 
model in studying youth utilisation of SM might shed new light on the novel 
modalities of political and civic traditions in post-revolt(s) Egypt.  
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 The qualitative data from the FGDs corroborate the validity of the suggested 
alteration to the scale used to measure the uses of SM. Participant activists discussed 
how they used SM to address other users, who are mainly non-politicised and may be 
potential supporters to their movement. However, it is recommended that future 
research statistically tests the validity of such qualitative evidence for the suggested 
‘towards others’ dimension of purposive use of SM. Building such a SM use scale, 
starting with an open ended question about media uses. Categorising participants’ 
responses then follows to define SM use constructs. Running exploratory factor 
analysis is finally needed to test the dimensionality of the yielded use constructs and 
to test the validity of the suggested alteration 
8.3.2. Implications for practice 
 More inclusive collective action frames need to be promoted and diffused among the 
less-interested and the non-politicised people to raise the possibility of mobilising 
political actions on a collective scale. 
 As such collective frames were found to hit the barriers of political organisations, 
ideologies, interests, class, gender, race, or ethnicity, the overcoming of which seems 
to be beyond the capacity of SM (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), it is suggested that 
more emphasis should be placed on the role of conventional institutional 
organisations alongside the role of digital networking technology, to promote and 
widely diffuse collective memes of political action.  
 Both loose and strong organisations (and by extension loose and strong ties) might 
benefit political practice in Egypt. Loose organisations can allow for more centrally 
organised use of SM while allowing room for “considerable discretion to activate 
personal networks that may extend well outside a particular organisation’s reach” 
(Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008, p. 284) and hence extend the scale of digitally-
enabled political action. Strong organisations, on the other hand, could be beneficial 
in promoting collective action frames that are more linked to common identities,       
to raising political awareness and to making political involvement more appealing    
to powerless citizens. Such organisations could also create personal incentives for 
participation that SM may not offer to prospective participants. For example, a well- 
organised group, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (and elsewhere), played          
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a significant role in mobilising its members and supporters to take to the streets en 
masse during the events of 25th January 2011 uprising, and it was not until they 
joined on the 28th January that the demonstrations significantly escalated and 
reached a more pressing level. Such organisations may use SM as a means                    
of mobilising participation, but they do not, however, seem to welcome personalised 
interpretations of problems and self-organisation of actions (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012). 
 Creating more opportunities for physical exchanges and personal interactions 
between activists and non-politicised citizens would benefit the latter so that they 
can acquire the participatory skills and activist identity needed for involvement in 
collective action.  
At the time of writing, Egyptian people are pouring into the streets in tens of millions 
breaching the epic ‘million protest’ of January 25th 2011. In less than three years, 
specifically on 30th January 2013, ordinary Egyptians have become capable of voicing 
their grievances more vigorously, despite the enduring corruption, poverty and 
illiteracy. They took to the streets to restore their ‘revolution’ and to claim their 
unfulfilled demands for eish, horreya, adala egtema’eya, karama ensaneya (bread, 
freedom, social justice and human dignity) in what some regarded as a second wave      
of the 25th January revolt, while others viewed it as a military coup. However, the fact 
remains that the spiral of silence into which Egyptians have been dragged for decades 
seems to be broken.They have come to realise that ballot boxes do not necessarily enact 
democracy. However, while some world leaders, political scientists, media scholars and 
commentators have praised young Egyptians for making the whole world watch on 
January 25th 2011, others have regarded the Rebellion Movement, ‘Tamarod’, that broke 
out on 30th June 2013 as a breach of legitimacy and a setback for democracy. The main 
party to blame was SM.  
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APPENDIX (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I am a research student at The University of York, UK. My research explores how and why young 
activists use social media to engage in politics. Your cooperation in response to this 
questionnaire will contribute to the understanding of how and why young activists choose 
social media platforms (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and weblogs) and how this may reflect 
on their political engagement offline.  
 
 Confidentiality of information you provide is completely guaranteed. 
 Information you provide will be exclusively used for research purposes. 
 If you have any queries regarding this research project and how data will be dealt 
with, please contact the researcher on nsh503@york.ac.uk. 
 
Please answer all the questions below. 
 
Social media (SM) use: 
 
Q1: There are different social media platforms that provide users with several opportunities to 
interact with others, please indicate the types of media you use from the following list (choose 
all that apply). 
1.  Facebook. 
2. YouTube. 
3. Twitter. 
4. MySpace. 
5. Blogs. 
6. Other (please specify) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Q2: On average, approximately how much time on a typical day do you generally spend on SM? 
 
Less than an hour One-two hours Two-three hours More than three hours 
1 2 3 4 
 
Q3: On average, approximately how much time on a typical day do you spend discussing or 
practising politics on SM? 
 
Less than an hour One-two hours Two-three hours More than three hours 
1 2 3 4 
 
  
Young Egyptian Activists’ Perceptions of the Potential of Social Media for 
Mobilisation 
Nermeen Sayed Kassem 
November 2010 
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Q4: Since when do you use those social media? 
 
less than 6 
months 
6–less than 12 
months 
12–less than 24 
months 
2–3 years 
more than3 
years 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q5: Do you disclose your real identity on SM (your name and contact information)? 
 
all the time most of the time some of the time only now and then never 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Online political activism: 
 
Q6: Websites like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, etc.  have variety of features that provide users 
with various opportunities to engage in political activities, please indicate the degree to which 
you have been engaged in any of the following activities on SM in the last 12 months. 
 all the 
time 
most of 
the time 
some of 
the time 
only now 
and then 
never 
Joined or left a political group  5 4 3 2 1 
Started a social or political topic for 
discussion 
5 4 3 2 1 
Posted links to news stories relating to 
a political cause 
5 4 3 2 1 
Posted links to videos relating to a 
political cause 
5 4 3 2 1 
Created or invited others to participate 
in an event related to a political cause 
5 4 3 2 1 
Posted a photo that something to do 
with politics 
5 4 3 2 1 
Signed an e-mail or web petition. 5 4 3 2 1 
Forwarded a political e-mail or link to 
another person 
5 4 3 2 1 
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Reasons for using SM: 
Q7: Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following factors as 
reasons for using SM for political activism: 
I use social media platforms . . . 
strongly 
agree 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
To help me decide how to vote in the future 5 4 3 2 1 
To help me decide about important issues 5 4 3 2 1 
For unbiased viewpoints 5 4 3 2 1 
To help me convince others to vote in the 
next election 
5 4 3 2 1 
To help other users decide on important 
issues 
5 4 3 2 1 
To find specific political information I am 
looking for 
5 4 3 2 1 
To keep up with main issues of the day 5 4 3 2 1 
Because it is an easy way to disseminate 
information 
5 4 3 2 1 
To help me draw other users’ attention to 
certain political information 
5 4 3 2 1 
To form/join political groups 5 4 3 2 1 
Because it helps me express my opinion 
among a large group of people 
5 4 3 2 1 
Because it helps me organize political 
events on a large scale 
5 4 3 2 1 
To give me something to talk about with 
others 
5 4 3 2 1 
To use as ammunition in arguments with 
others 
5 4 3 2 1 
Because it is entertaining 5 4 3 2 1 
Because it helps me relax 5 4 3 2 1 
Because engaging in an online activity is 
less time consuming 
5 4 3 2 1 
Because engaging in an online activity is 
less money consuming 
5 4 3 2 1 
Because I can get what I want for less effort 5 4 3 2 1 
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Political efficacy: 
 
Q8: Some people believe that their participation in politics would make difference, while others 
do not. On the following scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
 
strongly 
agree 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
Politics is too complicated for someone like 
me to follow 
1 2 3 4 5 
There’s not much point in participating in 
political campaigns: one person’s 
participation will not make any difference 
1 2 3 4 5 
People like me do not have a say in 
government 
1 2 3 4 5 
Politicians do not care about what people 
like me think 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Fear of repression: 
 
Q9: On the following scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
 
strongly 
agree 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
I worry about being emotionally or 
physically harrased if I go on thestreet to 
participate in a political activity 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel worried about expressing my political 
opinion in public 
1 2 3 4 5 
Egyptian citizens could face violations 
which make him/her worry about his/her 
safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Off-line poltical activism: 
 
Q10: Please indicate the degree to which you have been engaged in any of the following political 
activities in the last 12 months. 
 
 all the 
time 
most of 
the time 
some of 
the time 
only now 
and then 
never 
Expressed political opinion through 
main stream media (Written a letter 
to the editor of a newspaper or 
magazine or called a live radio or 
TV show to express a political 
opinion) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Volunteered for a campaign or 
other political cause 
5 4 3 2 1 
Organized or participated in 
organizing a political event 
5 4 3 2 1 
Attended political meetings or 
speeches 
5 4 3 2 1 
Participated in demonstrations or 
protests 
5 4 3 2 1 
Displayed a political button, a sign 
or sticker 
5 4 3 2 1 
Voted in election 5 4 3 2 1 
Tried to influence how others 
would vote 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
SM satisfaction: 
 
Q11: Over all, how satisfied are you with the job SM do in providing you with the things you are 
seeking?  
 
very much 
satisfied 
satisfied 
neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
dissatisfied 
very much 
dissatisfied 
5 4 3 2 1 
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Demographics: 
 
Q12: Gender: Q13: Education: 
1. Male 1. University student (undergraduate). 
2. Female 2. University BA or its equivalent. 
 3. Higher degree as well as MA. 
  
Q14: Age: Q15: The average monthly income of your 
household: 
1. 18 – 21 years. 1. Less than 1000 EGP. 
2. More than 21 – 24 years. 2. 1000 – less than 3000 EGP. 
3. More than 24 – 27 years. 3. 3000 – less than 5000 EGP. 
4. More than 27 – 29 years. 4. 5000 – 7000 EGP. 
5. More than 29 years. 5. More than 7000 EGP. 
 
Optional: 
 
Would it be possible for me to contact you for a follow-up interview? If so, please provide 
information about your preferred method of contact 
 
Your name Your e-mail address Your mobile number 
    
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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وبركاته...أنا باحثة دكتوراه في جامعة يورك بالمملكة المتحدة، وأجري دراسة حول دوافع استخدام الشباب السلام عليكم ورحمة الله 
، وأود في البداية أن أشكرك )sgolB ,rettiwT ,ebuTuoY ,koobecaFالمصري لساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي عبر الإنترنت (مثل: 
ن لديك أي استفسار فيما يتعلق بهذا البحث بإمكانك التواصل معي عبر بريدي على تعاونك في ملء بيانات هذه الاستمارة، وإذا كا
 .ku.ca.kroy@305hsnالإلكتروني  
 
 .أرجو الإجابة على جميع الأسئلة بوضع دائرة حول الإجابة التي تعبر عن رأيك
 
 استخدام ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي:
 
عبر الإنترنت، حدد أي من الوسائل التالية تستخدمها في التواصل مع الآخرين عبر  ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعيتوجد العديد من : 1س 
 ).(يمكنك تحديد أكثر من وسيلةشبكة الإنترنت 
 .ebuTuoY .1
 .sgolB .2
 خدمة إضافة التعليقات التي تتيحها مواقع الصحف الإلكترونية عبر الإنترنت. .3
 .rettiwT .4
 .koobecaF .5
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------مواقع أخرى  .6
 
في  للتواصل الاجتماعي مع الأصدقاء والزملاء والأقارب بشكل عامما متوسط المدة التي تقضيها تقريبا ًفي استخدام هذه الوسائل : 2س 
 ؟يوم العاديال
 
 ساعات 3أكثر من  ساعات 3من ساعتين إلى  من ساعة  إلى ساعتين أقل من ساعة
 4 3 2 1
 
في المجتمع  لمناقشة القضايا والموضوعات السياسية المثارة (تحديدا)الوسائل  ما متوسط المدة التي تقضيها تقريبا ًفي استخدام هذه: 3س 
 ؟في اليوم العاديالمصري 
 
 ساعات 3أكثر من  ساعات 3من ساعتين إلى  من ساعة  إلى ساعتين ساعةأقل من 
 4 3 2 1
 
 في المجتمع المصري؟  لمناقشة القضايا والموضوعات السياسية المثارة (تحديدا)منذ متى تستخدم هذه الوسائل : 4س 
 
 سنوات 3من أكثر  سنوات 3من سنتين ألى  من سنة ألى سنتين أشهر ألى سنة 6من  أشهر 6أقل من 
 5 4 3 2 1
 استمـــــــارة استقصــــــاء
 
 رؤية الشباب المصري الناشط سياسيا لدور ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي عبر الإنترنت في تفعيل الحراك الاجتماعي
 
 إعداد: نرمين سيد قاسم
 
 بيانات هذه الاستمارة سرية ولا تستخدم إلا ّلأغراض البحث العلمي
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 عبر هذه الوسائل؟ منافشة القضايا السياسية تحديداهل تستخدم اسمك ومعلوماتك الحقيقية أثناء : 5س 
 
 دائما   غالبا   أحيانا   نادرا   أبدا  
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 النشاط السياسي عبر ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي:
 خلال السنة الماضية. ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي عبر الإنترنتحدد معدل ممارستك لكل من الأنشطة السياسية التالية من خلال : 6س 
 
 أبدا   نادرا   أحيانا   غالبا   دائما   العبـــــــــارات
 1 2 3 4 5 انضممت إلى، أو غادرت مجموعة ذات اهتمامات سياسية
 1 2 3 4 5 تعليقات حول موضوع يتعلق بقضية سياسيةشاركت في مناقشات أو كتبت 
 1 2 3 4 5 أضفت روابط لقصص إخبارية لها علاقة بقضية سياسية مثارة
 1 2 3 4 5 رفعت أو شاركت لقطات فيديوأو صور لها علاقة بقضية سياسية
 1 2 3 4 5 دعوت آخرين للمشاركة في حدث له علاقة بقضية سياسية
 1 2 3 4 5 سياسي أو مررت عريضة سياسية عبر الإنترنتوقعت على بيان 
 1 2 3 4 5 أو رابطا ذا طابع سياسي لشخص آخر liam-eمررت رسالة إلكترونية 
 
 أسباب استخدام ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي:
 :الإنترنت كساحات للتفاعل السياسيأسباب استخدامك لوسائل التفاعل الاجتماعي عبر أرجو إبداء رأيك في العبارات التالية حول : 7س 
 
معارض 
 بشدة
 موافق محايد معارض
موافق 
 بشدة
 . . . أشارك في ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي عبر الإنترنت
 لتساعدني في اتخاذ قرار التصويت في الانتخابات 5 4 3 2 1
 لتساعدني في تشكيل آرائي نحو القضايا الهامة 5 4 3 2 1
 في الحصول على آراء غير متحيزةلتساعدني  5 4 3 2 1
 لأنها تمكنني من دعوة آخرين للإدلاء بأصواتهم في الانتخابات 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1
لأنها وسيلة أستطيع من خلالها إقناع آخرين بتبني وجهات نظر معينة نحو 
 القضايا الهامة
 لتساعدني في الحصول على معلومات سياسية محددة أبحث عنها 5 4 3 2 1
 لأبقى على اطلاع ودراية بأهم الأحداث والقضايا التي تحدث على الساحة 5 4 3 2 1
 نها وسيلة سهلة لنشر المعلوماتلأ 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1
لتساعدني في جذب انتباه آخرين نحو موضوعات ومعلومات سياسية 
 محددة
 5 4 3 2 1
نفس اهتماماتي لأنها تتيح لي الانضمام إلى مجموعة أو مجموعات لها 
 السياسية
 لأنها تعد أداة فعالة لتنظيم المشاركة الجماعية في القضايا السياسية 5 4 3 2 1
 لأن لها القدرة على الوصول إلى عدد كبير ومؤثر من الناس 5 4 3 2 1
 لأنها تمدني بقضايا وموضوعات يمكنني التحدث فيها مع الآخرين 5 4 3 2 1
 يدعم وجهة نظري عند الدخول في نقاش مع الآخرينلأجد ما  5 4 3 2 1
 لأنها مسلية 5 4 3 2 1
 لأنها تساعدني على الاسترخاء 5 4 3 2 1
 لأن التواصل من خلالها لا يتطلب الكثير من الوقت 5 4 3 2 1
 لأن التواصل من خلالها غير مكلف 5 4 3 2 1
 مجهود لأنني أحصل من خلالها على ما أريده بأقل 5 4 3 2 1
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 الكفاءة السياسية:
 حدد على المقياس التالي درجة اتفاقك أو اختلافك مع كل من العبارات التالية:: 8س 
 
معارض 
 بشدة
 موافق محايد معارض
موافق 
 بشدة
 العبـــــــــارات
 يصعب علّي متابعة القضايا السياسية لأنني أجدها معقدة جدا 1 2 3 4 5
 1 2 3 4 5
مشاركتي في الأحداث والفاعليات السياسية لا تُحدث فارقا ًأشعر أن 
 كبيراً 
 أشعر كمواطن عادي بأّن كلمتي ليس لها قيمة لدى الحكومة 1 2 3 4 5
 1 2 3 4 5
أرى أن المسئولين في الحكومة لا يهتمون بمعرفة رأي المواطن 
 العادي في القضايا والأحداث المثارة
 
 الخوف من القمع:
 أي درجة تتفق أو تختلف مع العبارات التالية؟إلى : 9س 
 
 العبـــــــــارات
موافق 
 بشدة
 معارض محايد موافق
معارض 
 بشدة
أخشى أن أتعرض للإيذاء النفسي أو البدني إذا نزلت إلى الشارع للمشاركة في 
 1 2 3 4 5 نشاط سياسي
 1 2 3 4 5 أشعر بالقلق إذا أبديت رأيي السياسي بشكل معلن
يتعرض المواطن المصري لمضايقات أمنية تجعله أحيانا ًغير آمن على نفسه قد 
 1 2 3 4 5 أو أفراد أسرته أو ممتلكاته
 1 2 3 4 5 يمكنني الثقة في معظم المسئولين في الحكومة الحالية
 1 2 3 4 5 أنا على قناعة بأن المسئولين في الحكومة يتخذون القرار الصائب دائما
 1 2 3 4 5 المسئولون في الحكومة بتنفيذ الوعود التي يعدون الجماهير بها عادة ما يلتزم
 
 
 المشاركة السياسية في الواقع:
، في هذا الإطار حدد أرض الواقعتتعدّد الأنشطة السياسية التي يمكن للفرد أن يعبر من خلالها عن رأيه أو موقفه السياسي في : 01س 
 التالية خلال السنة الماضية.معدل ممارستك لكل من الأنشطة 
 
 أبدا   نادرا   أحيانا   غالبا   دائما   العبـــــــــارات
عبرت عن رأيي السياسي من خلال وسائل الإعلام التقليدية (راسلت محررا ًفي 
 1 2 3 4 5 صحيفة أو مجلة، أو تواصلت مع أحد برامج الراديو أو التليقزيون)
 1 2 3 4 5 بقضية أومرشح سياسيتطوعت في حملات سياسية تتعلق 
 1 2 3 4 5 شاركت في الإعداد لتنظيم حدث سياسي
 1 2 3 4 5 شاركت في ندوات أو محاضرات خاصة بقضية أو شخصية سياسية
 1 2 3 4 5 شاركت في تظاهرات / إضرابات / اعتصامات
 1 2 3 4 5 ارتديت أو لصقت أو وزعت ملصقات أو شعارات سياسية
 1 2 3 4 5 بصوتي في انتخاباتأدليت 
 1 2 3 4 5 أقنعت أو حاولت إقناع شخص أوأكثر بالمشاركة في انتخابات أو أحداث سياسية
 
 
 ساحات التفاعل الاجتماعي:من خلال  لاحتياجات السياسيةا معدل الرضا عن إشباع
 قد تحققت؟ السياسي (تحديدا)ً بهدف التفاعلتعتقد أن توقعاتك المسبقة من استخدامك لتلك الوسائل  هل: 11س 
 
 إلى حد كبير جدا   إلى حد كبير إلى حد ما بشكل ضعيف بشكل ضعيف جدا  
 5 4 3 2 1
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 المتغيرات الديموجرافية:
 
 : الجنس:21س 
 ذكر .1
 أنثى .2
 
 : التعليـــــم:31س 
 طالب جامعي .1
 حاصل على مؤهل جامعي .2
 حاصل على مؤهل أعلى من الجامعي .3
 
 العمــــر: 41س 
 سنة 22 – 81من  .1
 سنة 62 – 22من  .2
 سنة 03 – 62من  .3
 سنة 53 – 03من  .4
 سنة 53أكثر من  .5
 
 : متوسط الدخل الشهري للأسرة:51س 
 جنيها 0003أقل من  – 0001 .1
 جنيها 0005أقل من  – 0003 .2
 جنيها 0007 – 0005 .3
 جنيها 0007أكثر من  .4
 
 اختيــــــــــــاري
 
للحصول على المزيد من المعلومات أو لاستيضاح بعض النقاط، لك مطلق الحرية في ترك  قد يتطلب البحث التواصل معك في المستقبل
 بياناتك الشخصية.
 بريدك الإلكترونــــي رقم الهاتف المحمول اسمــك
   
 
  را لحســــن تعاونــــكشكــــــ
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